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Sino- Arab Relations: Velvet Hopes and Tragic Realities

Chinese President Xi Jinping, right, with Saudi King Salman during a signing ceremony at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China, March 16, 2017. (Lintao Zhang Pool Photo via AP)
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In the recent decade, China has become a crucial partner for many nations in West Asia. China-Arab relations have progressed steadily. China prioritizes this region because of its abundant natural resources, enormous commercial market, and strategic location. Since the Belt and Road Initiative was announced, West Asia has taken on new significance as a nexus between China and the world’s three ancient continents.

Trade Culture Trends

The volume of trade between the Arab world and China reflects two trends: for 2018, it was at $244.3 billion, up to 28 percent from 2017, compared to $25.4 billion in 2003. According to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, it will reach $266.4 billion in 2020, an annual rise of $15 billion. In 2019, China imported $146 billion worth of goods from Arab countries, a rise of 4.8 percent.

There was a 14.7% increase in Chinese exports to Arab countries, totalling $120.4 billion. As compared to 2018, Chinese FDI in Arab countries increased by 18.8% to $1.42 billion in 2019. Despite a decrease of 8.7% year-over-year, Chinese enterprises inked $32.5 billion worth of project contracts with Arab countries in 2018, bringing their total commercial value to $30.5 billion.

Electrified Railway

For the period between 2004 and 2018, China made a total investment of $224.3 billion in the Arab region. More than two-thirds of China’s aid to Arab countries in 2018 came in the form of loans, with $90.6 million going to the four countries of Syria, Yemen, Jordan and Lebanon. To build a 68-kilometer electrified railway to the new administrative capital, Egypt received $1.2 billion from the World Bank. Egypt received $3 billion in Chinese investment for the construction of eight buildings in the business district of the administrative capital.

The kingdom of Saudi Arabia aids China; An Oil and Petrochemical Complex in China and Leisure Area near Beijing Daxing International Airport.

In February 2019, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia signed 12 agreements worth $28 billion with China. Because of the company’s agreement to build an oil and petrochemical complex in China, Aramco contributed $10 billion of its own money. More than a dozen commercial, oil, and environmental agreements were struck between the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and China. An $11 billion grant was provided to Emirati developer Emaar for the construction of a residential and leisure area near Beijing Daxing International Airport.

One hundred and seventy-seven billion dollars was spent on Arab oil exports to China in 2018, and three Arab countries supplied the bulk of the country with all of the energy it required. Iraq came in at number four with $22.4 billion, followed by Saudi Arabia ($29.7 billion) and Oman ($17.3 billion).

There has been a 16.5 percent annual increase in the number of tourists between China and Arab countries, according to the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum.

Arabs made a total of 338.8 thousand trips to China, while Chinese made a total of 1.456 million trips to the Arab world, an increase of 0.7% and 8.9% from 2017–2018. China and the Arab world each have an average of 28 flights every day.

The Belt and Road Initiative

As for the Belt and Road Initiative, it will help strengthen Arab-Chinese relations. 18 Arab countries have signed agreements with China to participate in this initiative, while the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) includes 9 Arab members.

The China Atomic Energy Agency and the Arab Atomic Energy Agency signed agreements to create a training centre for the peaceful use of atomic energy in the Arab region with the Global Energy Interconnection Development and Cooperation Organization in China.


The Chinese Society for Arabic Literature Works was established in 1987 and numerous classic Chinese literary studies have been translated into Arabic. There has been an upsurge in the number of students from China and the Arab world in universities.

In 2019, there were 20,149 Arab students studying in Chinese universities, whereas just 1,129 Chinese were doing the same. Twelve Confucius Institutes and four Confucius classrooms have been set up in the Middle East by China.

Military Troops

Arab-Chinese ties are pacifist, as evidenced by the absence of Chinese military bases in the Arab region. In terms of regional arms sales, China does not hold the top spot.

There are 32–35 thousand American military soldiers in the Gulf states, including Syria and Jordan, according to Western sources.

While the United States, France, Italy, Russia, and the United Kingdom each have over a dozen military posts in Arab countries (13 in total), China only has a logistic station in Djibouti.

Chinese marine bases, according to Xinhua News Agency, might be located in Egypt’s Port Said or Lebanon’s Tripoli provinces. Building more aircraft carriers for international operations is underway.

China has indicated its willingness to engage in the fights against ISIS in Iraq if China’s security and interests are under risk, according to Wang Yi’s December 2014 statement. China’s intervention in Libya to save 36,000 people may be an indication of this trend, especially since China lost $20 billion in Libya, which made it realize that neglecting other locations may generate the same experience, so the basis of non-military activity abroad must be revised.

China’s policy of “adaptation” to the security situation in the Middle East is confirmed by the March 2021 strategic agreement between China and Iran, especially since the agreement does not refer to security dimensions or cooperation in the defence industries, while some reports indicate that there are possibilities for military cooperation, especially in countering terrorist movements and intelligence cooperation.

Data shows that the Arab region is one of the most unstable geopolitical areas in the world today. Since the Arab-Chinese commerce, investment, and the BRI in the Arab area could be affected by this climate, Chinese foreign policy is concerned. This means that China may need to rely on “soft” external influence, which can later turn “coercive,” in order to exert influence.

Silk Road

ISIS has previously published a map showing the Silk Road passing through Khorasan (which includes parts of China) and Islamic countries in West Asia, including Iran, Syria, and Iraq, before coming to an intersection with elements of the Caliphate state.

This is a threat to the New Silk Road Project, the Land Road, and the Maritime Road. Since its extension, the Suez Canal has become an important link between the Maritime Silk Route and Italy’s land road, which is also in direct contact with the caliphate project of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) (in Asia and the Sinai desert).

Thus, the Chinese project is threatened by ISIS or other radical Islamic groups. After the withdrawal of NATO and US forces, Chinese officials fear that Islamic movements will gain strength in Afghanistan and that the Wakhan Corridor between China’s and Afghanistan’s borders, which was used by the Taliban movement to train fighters, may reopen.


Oil sources estimate that China gets 20% of its oil from Iraq. It is also possible that a resurgence of Islamic movements in Iraq might pose a threat to China’s energy resources and interests. In Muslim regions of West Asia, Chinese energy ambitions are growing (60 percent of its oil comes from the Middle East).

In light of the fact that 60 percent of Syria’s oil is controlled by Islamic groups, this will urge China to protect its main sources of oil. Chinese defence and security expenditures have risen each year as a response to these changes and to protect China’s interests both domestically and internationally.

Security Expenditure

Both China’s defence and internal security expenditure increased significantly between 2010 and 2021, from $84.6 billion to $ 293.35 billion, respectively. Warplanes and battleships, which fall under the ministry of heavy industry, are not included in the Chinese accounting system for defence spending. In addition, tens of thousands of military retirees are not included in defence budget, but rather in social services and other programs.

China’s announced defence spending will be higher if China adopts the customary method of calculating it. China’s military spending increased linearly from 2010 to 2021, while estimates from other countries suggest that actual spending may be far higher.

In 2022, China is expected to spend $300 billion on defence, which will raise defence spending by 7.1%, faster than last year. In order for China and Russia’s “multipolarity” paradigm to operate, the international community, especially its central powers, must contribute to it. In the years following 1978, China’s political literature indicates a shift in the country’s perspective on international relations and the world order.

Political literature in China before to the 1990s was largely focused on the international system. Questions raised by Chinese scholar QIN in 1978 included whether the international system should be regarded from a perspective of war and struggle or peace and development, as well as whether China achieves its goals by integrating into the international system or competing for power.

According to Zheng Bijian’s idea, a multipolar international system should be established and the focus should shift from a country wanting to alter the current system to one seeking to integrate into it and take the lead in globalization. As the country’s worldwide prominence grows, it requires a specific role in the international system.

Immediately following Mao Zedong’s death, there was a dominant theory in Chinese thinking, “The Bird Cage Doctrine” of Deng Xiaoping, which incorporates socialism and capitalism. Chinese pragmatism is expressed in Lou Jiwei’s “cat colour theory”. Cats chase mice, not because they’re orange. Economic and political outcomes are more important than “ideological colour” in these times.

Curricula also changed to reflect major signs, such as a shift in interpretation of building the wall from resisting invaders to fostering national unity and the use of watchtowers to improve communication amongst Chinese tribes.

A return to Westphalian state conceptions in China can be seen in this instance. The qualitative shift in Chinese political and economic thought has direct repercussions on Sino-Arab relations, especially with regard to trade exchanges and the protection of economic interests, even if it leads to direct military intervention.

Mohamad Zreik is an independent researcher, doctor of international relations. His areas of research interests are related to the Foreign Policy of China, Belt and Road Initiative, Middle Eastern Studies, China-Arab relations, East Asian Affairs, Geopolitics of Eurasia, and Political Economy. Mohamad has many studies and articles published in high ranked journals and well-known international newspapers. His writings have been translated into many languages, including French, Arabic, Spanish, German, Albanian, Russian, Bosnian, Bulgarian, etc.

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Middle East

Saudi crown prince shifts into high gear on multiple fronts

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Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is simultaneously speed dating and playing on multiple diplomatic, religious, and economic chessboards.

The latest feather in his crown, his appointment as prime minister, aims to ensure that he can continue to do so with as little collateral damage as possible.

The appointment shields him from legal proceedings in the United States, France, and potentially elsewhere, including the International Criminal Court in the Hague, in which plaintiffs assert that Mr. Bin Salman was responsible for the 2018 killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul.

As a head of government, Mr. Bin Salman enjoys sovereign immunity, a status he could not claim as heir-apparent.

While the legal manoeuvre is certain to succeed, it is unlikely to significantly improve his image tarnished by the killing and his domestic crackdown on dissent that in recent weeks produced outlandish sentences to decades in prison for little more than a tweet.

Reputational issues have not stopped Mr. Bin Salman from shifting into high gear as he pushes ahead with efforts to diversify Saudi Arabia’s oil-dependent economy; replace regional competitors like the United Arab Emirates and Qatar as the center of gravity at the intersection of Asia, Africa, and Europe; demonstrate his diplomatic clout and relevance beyond oil to the international community; and position himself and the kingdom as the beacon of a moderate, albeit an autocratic, form of Islam.

Mr. Bin Salman’s multi-pronged dash has produced mixed results.

In his latest foray onto the international stage, Mr. Bin Salman sought to display his diplomatic skills and relevance to the international community by securing the release by Russia of ten foreign nationals captured while fighting for Ukraine. The foreigners’ release was part of a Ukrainian-Russian prisoner swap negotiated by Turkey.

Although Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan al Saud rejected as “very cynical” assertions that Mr. Bin Salman was seeking to shore up his image by associating himself with the swap, it seems likely that Russian President Vladimir Putin was happy to give him a helping hand.

In a similar vein, people close to Mr. Bin Salman see mileage in asserting that the crown prince’s lifting of a ban on women’s driving and enhancement of women’s rights and professional opportunities is what inspired women-led protests in Iran that have entered their third week as well as Iran’s recent relaxing of its prohibition on women attending men’s soccer matches.

Ali Shihabi, an analyst who often echoes official Saudi thinking, claimed in a tweet that “Saudi reforms for women have had a big impact on the world of Islam. As the previous upholder of ultra orthodoxy #MBS’s dramatic changes have sent a powerful signal that has undermined Uber conservatives across the region like the Mullahs in Iran.” Mr. Shihabi was referring to Mr. Bin Salman by his initials.

The nationwide protests were sparked by the death of a young woman while in the custody of Iran’s morality police. The police had arrested 22-year-old Mahsa Amini for what authorities described as sporting an “improper” hijab.

By contrast, Mr. Bin Salman’s economic diversification efforts appear to be producing more unambiguous results. For example, the Saudi industry and mineral resources ministry issued over 500 industrial licenses in the first six months of this year, primarily in the food, steel, and chemicals sectors.

The ministry reported that the number of factories that commenced operations doubled, from 303 to 721. Buoyed by massive oil export revenues, Mr. Bin Salman hopes to brand a ‘Made in Saudi’ label as part of his non-oil export drive.

Even so, foreign investment in manufacturing has been slow to take off, particularly in Mr. Bin Salman’s, at times, futuristic mega projects like his US$500 billion city of Neom on the Red Sea. New Jersey-based Lucid Group broke the mold when it announced in February that it would build its first overseas electrical vehicle production facility in the kingdom.

More controversial are plans for a beach in Neom scheduled to open next year that envision a wine bar, a separate cocktail bar, and a bar for “champagne and desserts” in a country that bans alcohol.

The plans seem out of sync with religious sentiment among a significant segment of Gulf youth if a recent opinion poll is to be believed,

Forty-one per cent of young Gulf Arabs, including Saudis, said religion was the most important element of their identity, with nationality, family and/or tribe, Arab heritage, and gender lagging far behind.

More than half of those surveyed, 56 per cent, said their country’s legal system should be based on the Shariah or Islamic law. Seventy per cent expressed concern about the loss of traditional values and culture.

In contrast to economics, the going in turning the kingdom into a sports and esports hub has been rougher.

In his latest move, Mr. Bin Salman launched a US$38 billion “National Gaming and Esports Strategy” to make Saudi Arabia an esports leader by 2030. The budget includes US$13 billion for the acquisition of “a leading game publisher.” The kingdom has already invested in Capcom, Nexon, Nintendo, ESL Gaming, SNK, and Embracer Group.

In addition, Saudi music entertainment company MDLBEAST saw a business opportunity in the 2022 Qatar World Cup that would also help project the once secretive kingdom as a forward-looking modern state. MDLBEAST has invited  56 top international and regional performers to entertain soccer fans on a custom-built stage in Doha during the 28 days of the tournament.

On an even grander scale, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, two of the world’s more notorious human rights violators, together with Greece, are considering bidding to host the 2030 World Cup –a move that sounds like an invitation to a perfect public relations fiasco, if Qatar’s experience is an indicator.

The potential bid did not stop soccer icon Cristiano Ronaldo from dashing initial Saudi hopes to attract a superstar to the kingdom’s top football league when he turned down a US$258 million offer to play for Al Hilal, one of Saudi Arabia’s top clubs.

Similarly, Saudi Arabia’s endeavour to bankroll Liv Golf, a challenger to PGA Tour, the organizer of North America’s main professional men’s golf tournaments, has turned into a public relations fiasco amid allegations that the kingdom was seeking to launder its reputation.

A refusal by major broadcasters to secure the rights to air the League’s tours exemplifies its problems.

Religion has proven to be the arena in which Saudi Arabia may have scored its most prominent public relations fete.

The Muslim World League, Mr. Bin Salman’s primary vehicle to garner religious soft power and propagate an autocratic version of Islam that is socially liberal but demands absolute obedience to the ruler, achieved a public relations coup when it forged an unlikely alliance with Nahdlatul Ulama. Nahdlatul Ulama.

Nahdlatul Ulama is arguably the world’s only mass movement propagating a genuinely moderate and pluralistic form of Islam.

Moreover, as the world’s largest Muslim civil society movement in the world’s most populous Muslim-majority country and democracy, Nahdlatul Ulama’s words and actions have an impact.

As a result, the League counted its blessings when Nahdlatul Ulama’ recognised it as a non-governmental organization rather than a de facto extension of Mr. Bin Salman’s rule.

The recognition opens doors for the League, which has so far traded on Saudi Arabia’s custodianship of Mecca and Medina, Islam’s two holiest cities; lofty statements and conferences that produced little, if any, real change; and funding of emergency and development aid in various parts of the world.

It allowed Nahdlatul Ulama to invite the League, a major promoter of Saudi ultra-conservatism before Mr. Bin Salman’s rise, to co-organize the newly established Religion 20 (R20), a summit of religious leaders under the auspices of the Group of 20 that brings together the world’s largest economies.

The first R20 summit, scheduled for early November in Bali, is part of the run-up to the meeting of G20 leaders later that month hosted by Indonesia, the group’s chairman for the year. The R20, the G20’s latest official engagement group, aims to “position religion as a source of solutions rather than problems across the globe.”

The limits of Saudi tolerance were evident last month when authorities arrested a pilgrim to Mecca for dedicating his pilgrimage to Britain’s Queen Elizabeth, a non-Muslim who had just died.

Nahdlatul’s outreach to the League is part of a bold and risky strategy. However, Nahdlatul Ulama believes that engagement creates an opportunity to persuade the League to embrace a more genuine and holistic vision of moderate Islam rather than one that is self-serving.

That may be a long shot, but it also may be a way of launching Saudi Arabia on a path that would help it repair its badly tarnished image. That is if Mr. Bin Salman pairs genuine religious moderation and pluralism with a rollback of domestic repression and greater political pluralism. So far, that appears to be one thing the crown prince is unwilling to consider.

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Middle East

Iraq and the ‘Blind Gordian Knot’

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After its occupation by the United States in 2003, Iraq fell into the double trap of the United States and Iran and became an insoluble problem. Similar to the legendary ‘Gordian’ knot, which Gordias, the king of Phrygia, tied so tightly that it was said that no one could untie it; Until ‘Alexander the Great’ came and cut it in half with one stroke of the sword and the knot was opened.

The trap that America set for Iraq was the constitution that it drafted for this country after the occupation. In this constitution, America removed Iraq’s Arab identity and imposed a two-thirds majority to elect the president, paving the way for the use of a ‘suspended one-third’.

At the same time, he set the conditions for amending this article and all the articles of the first chapter of the constitution so difficult that it was practically impossible to amend it. This constitution divided the power between Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds, as a result of which, the Iraqi society was subject to chaos and fragmentation, and the army that was created based on it collapsed in front of ISIS in Mosul. Now let’s skip the destructive role that Nouri al-Maliki had as the prime minister in this story.

But the trap that the Islamic Republic of Iran set for Iraq was that it formed armed groups affiliated with the Quds Force and gave them legitimacy under the umbrella of ‘The Popular Mobilization Forces, which resulted in the monopoly of power in the hands of the Shiites.

So far, all efforts to free Iraq from this double trap have failed. The popular revolution of 2019 in Baghdad, Karbala, and other southern cities did not reach anywhere with its anti-Iranian slogans, nor did the government of Mustafa al-Kazemi solve the problem with its patriotic government project, nor did the recent efforts of the Sadr movement under the leadership of prominent cleric Moqtada Sadr bear fruit.

The Sadr movement, which won the majority in the elections, tried to form a national majority government in an agreement with the coalition of the Sunni ruling party and the Kurdistan Democratic Party, but the coordination framework was dependent on Iran, using the one-third weapon, defeated the efforts of the Sadr movement.

In Iraq, there is no ‘Alexander the Great’ who will rise up and open the blind Gordian knot with one stroke of the sword and save Iraq from the crisis. No random event occurs. Now, the land between the two rivers is caught in deep-rooted and growing corruption and has lost its way among various Arab, Iranian, Eastern, and Western trends. Even Moqtada’s plan for the formation of a national government, which was put forward recently with the slogan ‘Neither East, nor West”, is also facing many difficulties and obstacles.

Of course, expecting the formation of a democratic system with the management of armed sectarian parties that advance politics based on religious fatwas and the force of destructive war missiles and drones is a futile thing, and talking about a national government in which power is in the hands of religious parties affiliated with the neighboring religious government is gossip and superstition.

Apart from that, according to the current laws of Iraq, the main power is in the hands of the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers, and the powers of the President are limited and few, as a result, Shiite parties and organizations, especially their larger organizations, get more privileges, and the main power is exclusive to the Shiite community.

In addition, the organization that will be called the largest and the majority based on the political Ijtihad of the Supreme Court of Iraq will actually be the same organization that the Islamic Republic of Iran creates within the Iraqi parliament, not the organization that will receive the most votes in the elections. As we saw in the last parliamentary elections, the Sadr movement won the majority of votes and tried to form a majority government in an agreement with the Sunni ruling coalition and the Kurdistan Democratic Party, but the groups affiliated with the Islamic Republic of Iran stood against it under the name of the coordination framework. And they made his efforts fruitless.

It is for this reason that it has been almost a year since the Iraqi parliamentary elections were held, but the parliament has so far been unable to form a government and elect a new president.

Of course, this is the nature of totalitarian systems. Although the Iraqi system is a democratic system according to the constitution, in reality, the ruling system in Iraq is a totalitarian system. Just like the ruling systems in the Soviet Union and China, where power rotates among the leaders of the Communist Party; Both the rulers were members of the Communist Party, and the political opponents were imprisoned or executed. Because in Iraq, all the pillars of political power are in the hands of the Shiites; Both the factions that are actually in power are the Shiites, and the factions that lead political struggles and protests as opponents are Shia parties. Even the revolution of 2019 was actually a revolution of the new generation of Shiites who had risen against the influence of Iran and America and their supporters.

The fact is that with this situation, Iraq will never be able to free itself from the American-Iranian double trap and untie the blind Gordian knot. Rather, it can only do so when all the Iraqi national and patriotic parties and groups come together under the umbrella of a democratic, national, independent, non-sectarian coalition that is not dependent on foreign countries, and form a strong national government that, while being independent, is in touch with the outside world and establish good relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran, Arab countries, and Eastern and Western countries.

The bottom line is, when the minds that have produced destructive thoughts cannot produce liberating thoughts, Iraq needs those thinkers and new political figures who will establish a correct, solid, and independent political system in Iraq. The current situation is rooted in the incorrect political structure, the foundation of which was laid in 2003. But it is a pity that only a clear understanding of the crisis is not enough to solve it.

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Middle East

The end of political Islam in Iran

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Nothing in Iran will be the same again. The uprising of the majority of big and small cities in Iran after the killing of Mahsa Amini by the “Morality Police” of the Islamic Republic of Iran has a new social structure. Because in the contemporary history of Iran, we have not witnessed such social forces that have been strongly influenced by the women’s movement.

The social structure of the uprising

During the era of Reza Shah Pahlavi, women were allowed to study in law and medical schools, or during the era of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, women were organized to implement the White Revolution ideology as soldiers. This means that at that time, women were “allowed” and “organized”, but all these freedoms were given to women based on men’s power, state power, and non-democratic methods, and the women’s movement did not play an active role in these actions. For this reason, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi said in one of his interviews: Women are schemes and evil, women have not even had first-class scientists throughout history, women may be equal to men before the law but they have not had the same abilities as men. They are not, women have not even produced a Michelangelo, Johann Sebastian Bach, or a good cook. It was not only Mohammad Reza Shah who had a misogynist view, but Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, was against giving women the right to vote and considered the entry of women into the National Assembly, municipality, and administrations as a cause of paralysis in the affairs of the country and government. In a letter to Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, he requested the abolition of women’s right to vote.

It can be said that the Iranian revolution (1979) was one of the biggest revolutionary movements that was completely “made“ by a mass social movement in the history of the 20th century, and women played a very active and prominent role in it. But the women in that revolutionary movement not only for themselves and the issues of women’s rights but under the framework of Islamic and communist parties and groups such as the Tudeh Party of Iran, Organization of Iranian People’s Fedai Guerrillas, People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran, and Muslim People’s Republic Party tried to solve the problems of Iranian women. That is, in that mass revolutionary movement, various communist, Islamic and guerilla ideologies were higher, more important, and more preferable than the women themselves, and women tried to find their answers with the help of these revolutionary ideologies to solve the general problems of the country and women’s issues.

But in recent developments, women have not been “allowed” through the reforms of the Pahlavi government, nor have they been “organized” through the ideologies of the revolutionary parties before and after the victory of the Iranian revolution. Rather, in the strict sense of the word, they have become the locomotive of the revolutionary upsurge of contemporary Iran and have given “allowed” and “organization” to other social and ethnic forces in the geography of Iran. From now on, women in Iran are the creators of social and revolutionary changes based on the women’s movement.

Discourse analysis of the uprising

After the June 2009 presidential election and the protest against election fraud, large protests started in other cities, especially in Tehran. In that rebellion, we witnessed the loss of the unity of the elites, the crisis of legitimacy, and the crisis of the efficiency of the Islamic Republic regime. After those protests, the Shiite Islamist ideology of the Islamic Republic faced illegitimacy and the unity of the elites of the ruling class was lost. On the other hand, the government faced a crisis of inefficiency after those incidents and could not meet the crisis economic, cultural, political, and civil liberties, and women’s demands. Therefore, in the demonstrations of 2018, tens of thousands of people rose up against economic policies, high prices, and unemployment, and with the spread of these protests, the ideological foundations and legitimacy of the regime were protested by the demonstrators. With a 50% increase in the price of gasoline in 2019 and a 35% inflation, unemployment and an increase in the price of basic goods and food, a new wave of protests in many cities of Iran faced the government of Hassan Rouhani with a major social and economic crisis. In those protests, women played an active role and chanted against the mandatory hijab.

Contrary to all these widespread protests and social riots in Iran’s contemporary history, in the recent revolutionary uprising, the cause of the uprising is the murder of Mahsa Amini, the defense of women’s rights, and opposition to the mandatory hijab. The overwhelming majority of Iranian women have declared their separation with the slogan of “women, life, freedom” from the movement of reformers, monarchists of the Pahlavi regime, the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran, fundamentalists of the Islamic Republic, utopias and communist, Islamist, totalitarian, anti-woman, and false ideologies.

It is very important in the recent revolutionary uprising, the cooperation of Turks men and women in the cities of Iran with the protests. Because the Turk social-political movement did not declare solidarity with the protesters of other cities of Iran due to the neglect of the right to education in the mother tongue, the right to self-determination, and the realization of economic, political, cultural, and environmental rights in the uprisings of 2009, 2018 and 2019. The slogan of “freedom, justice, and national government” of the Turks of different cities of Iran, also shows the existence of different and yet common demands of the majority of ethnic groups living in Iran.

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