Connect with us

Middle East

Double standards haunt US and Europe in dealings with Turkey and the Middle East

Published

on

Image source: NATO

US and European acquiescence in Turkey’s long-standing refusal to honour Kurdish ethnic, cultural, and political rights came home to roost when Turkey initially objected to Finnish and Swedish membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Ultimately, Turkey postponed potential conflict in NATO by dropping its initial objection to Finland and Sweden’s application.

Nevertheless, Turkey maintains a sword of Damocles over the process. NATO’s 30 member parliaments have to ratify the two countries’ membership. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan warned that ratification by the Turkish parliament would depend on the Nordic states putting their money where their mouth is and in effect adhering to Turkey’s anti-Kurdish policies.

Even though Turkish ratification will be the ultimate litmus test, NATO appears to have moved on since Turkey allowed Finnish and Swedish membership to move forward. NATO does so at its peril.

What Mr. Erdogan was actually saying was that the issue of Nordic membership had been temporarily resolved, not permanently. The president warned that parliamentary ratification would depend on Sweden and Finland implementing the provisions of a memorandum signed by the two Nordic countries with Turkey on the eve of last month’s NATO summit in Spain. The memorandum persuaded Turkey to lift its initial objections to their membership.

The Turkish sword of Damocles resembles Saudi and Emirati efforts to pressure US President Joe Biden to take greater account of their concerns about Iran and fortify the United States’ commitment to Gulf security during his visit this week to the kingdom. Saudi Arabia and the UAE will likely take heart from Turkey’s initial success in getting its way, particularly considering a US failure in recent years to respond to attacks by Iran and/or their Yemeni Houthi allies on critical oil and other infrastructure in the kingdom and the Emirates.

The Nordic memorandum with Turkey suggests that Finland and Sweden went a long way in meeting Turkish demands. Pressured by NATO, Finland and Sweden promised that they would not support Syrian Kurdish groups that Turkey considers a threat to its national security. These include the People’s Protection Units (YPG), a US-backed Syrian Kurdish group that played a crucial role in defeating the Islamic State,

Turkey’s initial threat to block Nordic membership sparked debates about the country’s controversial place in the North Atlantic defense alliance. The debates died down once Turkey lifted its objection.

However, Turkey’s involvement in the Kurdish issue, whether at home, where Kurds, an ethnic group spread across south-eastern Turkey, northern Iraq, northern Syria, and western Iran, account for up to 20 per cent of the population, or in Iraq or Syria, where Turkey intervenes militarily, will inevitably revive questioning of the country’s place in the alliance.

Turkey’s initial NATO objection already increased the spotlight on Turkey’s long-standing suppression of Kurdish rights and identity under the mum of a fight against terrorism and separatism.

Turkey’s critics assert that Turkish military interventions in Syria aims to prevent the emergence of a Kurdish autonomous region similar to the self-governing Kurdish entity in northern Iraq.

Turkey regularly attacks bases of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) in the Qandil Mountains in northern Iraq. Alongside the United States and the European Union, Turkey has designated the PKK as a terrorist organisation. The group has waged a decades-long insurgency against Turkey in which tens of thousands have been killed.

Turkey has also cracked down on the country’s pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic party (HDP) after the party won enough seats in the 2015 general election to threaten Mr. Erdogan’s parliamentary majority.

HDP leader Selahattin Demirtas, one of the most high-profile of thousands of politicians, journalists, academics, judges, and civil servants jailed in Turkey in recent years, faces more than 100 mostly terrorism-related charges. The European Court of Human Rights ruled that Demirtas’ detention violates “the very core of the concept of a democratic society.”

The Turkish effort to impose its policies on its fellow NATO members spotlighted the Middle East’s ability to act as a disruptive force if its interests are neglected against the backdrop of uncertainty about how committed the United States remains to the region’s security. The US commitment is likely to be clarified during Mr. Biden’s visit this week to the Middle East. Closer Arab Israeli security cooperation could facilitate clarification of the degree of US engagement.

On the positive side, clarification and Turkish ratification of Finnish and Swedish NATO membership would allow the United States and Europe to benefit from Turkish efforts to capitalise on endeavours by Central Asian governments to limit their reliance on Russia and soften the fallout from economic sanctions against the Kremlin because of its invasion of Ukraine.

Turkey has recently expanded its footprint by signing trade and defense agreements, stepping up arms sales, and Mr. Erdogan conducting high-profile meetings with his counterparts in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Mr. Erdogan recently wrapped up a two-day trip to Uzbekistan and left with 10 agreements and a pledge to increase their annual bilateral trade volume to US$10 billion.

Similar trade agreements were concluded during a visit to Turkey by Uzbek President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev in May. With China too seeking to benefit from the consequences of the Ukraine war, the United States and Europe would be able to partially compensate for their neglect of a region at the heart of Eurasia that some describe as part of a greater Middle East.

That is particularly true if Turkey succeeds in positioning itself as a viable alternative to Russia on China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which ferries goods from western China through Central Asia and Russia to European markets. The sanctions undermine Russia’s role as a key transit node on the BRI.

“The Central Asian states, and Kazakhstan in particular, are seeking greater Turkish engagement because of changes in connectivity patterns across Eurasia,” said Emil Avdaliani a scholar at the European University in Tbilisi and director of Middle East studies at the Georgian think tank Geocase.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has heightened European interest in Central Asia. In a first response, European Union officials said that the EU would become the top investor in the world’s tallest dam in Tajikistan. The move was aimed at helping Central Asia cut its reliance on Russian energy and constitutes part of the EU’s answer to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

To be sure, playing the Kurdish card benefits Mr. Erdogan domestically, particularly at a time that the Turkish economy is in the doldrums with a 70+ per cent inflation rate.

Mr. “Erdogan always benefits politically when he takes on the Kurdistan Workers Party (the PKK) and groups linked to it, like the YPG in Syria… In fact, attacking the PKK and the YPG is a two-for-one. Erdogan is seen to take on genuine terrorists and separatists, and at the same time, he gets to take a swipe at the United States, which taps into the vast reservoir of anti-Americanism in Turkey,” said Middle East scholar Steven A. Cook.

Kurdish rights figure only tangentially in debates about Turkey’s place in NATO even though the country’s policy towards the Kurds has long violated criteria for alliance membership that include “fair treatment of minority populations.”

When Kurdish rights are mentioned, it is primarily as a prop for taking Turkey to task for its slide into authoritarianism. Even so, past US and European failure to stand up for Kurdish rights has complicated the fight against the Islamic State, stymied Kurdish aspirations beyond Turkey’s borders and enabled repression of Kurdish rights in Turkey.

However, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu was not completely wrong when he accused the United States of making  ”a selective and discriminatory move” when it decided in May to exempt from sanctions against Syria regions controlled by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) but not areas controlled by Turkey and its Syrian proxies.

The problem with the US decision was that it was driven by support for its allies in the fight against the Islamic State rather than also a quest to achieve Kurdish rights. The decision complicated the US position during a recent United Nations Security Council debate on maintaining humanitarian aid to rebel-held areas in northern Syria. Mr. Erdogan is expected to discuss Syria at a summit in Tehran next week with his Iranian and Russian counterparts,  Ebrahim Raisi and Russian leader Vladimir Putin.

The failure to hold Turkey accountable for its repression of Kurdish ethnic and political rights within the framework of the Turkish state has enabled Ankara to establish adoption of Turkish policies as a condition for NATO membership even if they violate NATO membership criteria.

Those policies include defining the peaceful expression of Kurdish identity as terrorism and the rolling back of Kurdish language and cultural rights since the collapse in 2015 of peace talks with the PKK. Turkey lifted the ban on Kurdish languages and the word Kurd in 1991. Until then, Kurds were referred to as ‘mountain Turks.’

The governor of the south-eastern Turkish province of Diyarbakir, widely seen as a hub of Kurdish cultural and political activity, forced this writer under treat of death to leave the region for using the word Kurd rather than mountain Turk in interviews in the 1980s.

Kurdish language programs in universities have dwindled in recent years amid administrative hurdles, while Kurdish parents complain of pressure not to enrol their children in elective Kurdish courses. Most Kurdish-language services and activities created by local administrations were terminated by government-appointed trustees who replaced dozens of Kurdish mayors ousted by Ankara for alleged links to the PKK. Many of the ousted mayors and other leading Kurdish politicians remain behind bars.

The caving into Turkish demands and the failure to take Turkey to task early on for its policy towards the Kurds takes on added significance at a time when NATO casts the war in Ukraine as a battle of values and of democracy versus autocracy that will shape the contours of a 21st-century world order. For his part, Mr. Biden has sought to regain the moral high ground in the wake of the Trump presidency that broke with American liberalism by declaring “America is back” in the struggle for democratic and human rights.

However, Mr. Biden and Europe’s problem is that their credibility rides on cleaning up at home and ensuring that they are seen as sincere rather than hypocritical. That’s a tall order amid assertions of structural racism on both sides of the Atlantic; controversy over gun ownership in the United States; preferential arrangements for Ukrainian refugees as opposed to non-Europeans and non-whites fleeing war, persecution, and destruction; and foreign policies that treat violations of human and political rights differently depending on who commits them.

In the case of the Kurds, meeting Turkish demands regarding perpetrators of political violence is one thing; acquiescing in the criminalization of legitimate Kurdish political and cultural expression is another. That is a tough bargain to drive home in Ankara. However, it would offer a compromise formula that could serve everyone’s interest and help Turkey solve a problem that promises to be one of the Middle East’s multiple exploding powder kegs.

As a result, the Kurdish issue is likely to influence where Turkey will rank as the world moves towards a bi-polar or multi-polar power structure. From that perspective, the battle over perceived Scandinavian, and mainly, Swedish support for Kurdish aspirations involves the degree to which the United States and Europe will continue to kick the can down a road.

The Kurds are not the only issue to cause friction in the relationship between Turkey or Turkiye as the country wants to be known going forward. Turkey, like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, is attempting to carve out a place of its own as a middle power in a reconfigured 21st century world order by trying to walk a tightrope in their relations with Russia as well as China.

A refusal by the Turkish parliament to ratify Finnish and Swedish NATO membership risks reenergizing a debate about Turkey’s membership in NATO, much like Prime Minister Victor Orban’s opposition to a European embargo of Russian energy has raised questions about Hungary’s place in the EU.

“Does Erdogan’s Turkey Belong in NATO?” asked former US vice-presidential nominee Joe Lieberman and Mark D. Wallace, a former senator, in an oped in The Wall Street Journal. Unlike Finland and Sweden, the two men noted that Turkey would not meet NATO’s democracy requirements if it were applying for membership today.

“Turkey is a member of NATO, but under Mr. Erdogan, it no longer subscribes to the values that underpin this great alliance. Article 13 of the NATO charter provides a mechanism for members to withdraw. Perhaps it is time to amend Article 13 to establish a procedure for the expulsion of a member nation,” Messrs. Lieberman and Wallace wrote.

The two men implicitly argued that turning the tables on Turkey would force the obstinate NATO member back into line. It was an argument supported by Turkish intellectuals, academics, and journalists, who fled Mr. Erdogan’s increasingly autocratic and arbitrary rule. “Giving into Ankara’s demands amounts to letting an autocrat design the security architecture of Europe and shape the future of the Western system,” said journalist, analyst and scholar Cengiz Candar.

A Turkish exit from NATO, which no one really wants or expects, would deal a body blow to the North Atlantic alliance. Nevertheless, while Turkey’s circumstances differ from those of other Middle Eastern players, the country’s NATO dispute suggests that the Ukraine crisis may no longer be a far-from-my-bed show for the region. To be fair, the question never was if but when Ukraine would arrive on the Middle East’s doorstep.

Two centrifugal forces threatened to push Middle Eastern nations off their tightrope: an increasingly bifurcated world populated by a multitude of civilisational leaders in which “you are with us or against us,” and a mounting need for consistency in the US and Europe’s application of international law and upholding of human and political rights standards.

Increasingly, it’s evident that it doesn’t take much to throw straddlers off balance.

In fact, if one fades out the ambient noise, it becomes evident that neither Turkey nor other Middle Eastern states have any intention of fundamentally altering their security relationships with the United States, even if the dynamics in the cases of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE are very different. That is likely to be reaffirmed during Mr. Biden’s Middle East tour.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE recognize that there is no alternative to the US security umbrella, whatever doubts they may have about the United States’ commitment to its security. With Mr. Biden’s visit to Saudi Arabia, the question was not how US-Saudi differences would be papered over but at what price and who will pay the bill. That may be a question that will only answered over time in deeds rather than words.

A potential failure of the Vienna talks that aim to revive the 2015 international agreement that curbed Iran’s nuclear programme could fast track the narrowing of the Gulf’s options. The talks stalled as a covert war between Israel and Iran appeared to escalate while Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia that has no formal relations with Israel, were seeking to tighten security cooperation with the Jewish state.

Saudi Arabia has signaled for some time that it would like to formalize its expanding informal relations with Israel but needs a cover to do so. Moreover, Saudi Arabia has not rejected a US proposal for a regional Middle Eastern air defence system that would include the kingdom and Israel.

In the final analysis, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern states recognise that the United States is the only real game in town. “The US can still easily build global coalitions when necessary. While Russia will be radioactive, more a predatory pariah than partner,” said former White House director for the Gulf Kirsten Fontenrose.

She warned that “it would be foolish for nations that previously enjoyed beneficial relations with Russia to invite that radioactivity onto themselves now, in the emerging world order where Russia is not the unipolar power it hoped to become, but instead a failed bet.”

Dr. James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, co-director of the University of Würzburg’s Institute for Fan Culture, and the author of The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer blog, a book with the same title, Comparative Political Transitions between Southeast Asia and the Middle East and North Africa, co-authored with Dr. Teresita Cruz-Del Rosario and three forthcoming books, Shifting Sands, Essays on Sports and Politics in the Middle East and North Africaas well as Creating Frankenstein: The Saudi Export of Ultra-conservatism and China and the Middle East: Venturing into the Maelstrom.

Continue Reading
Comments

Middle East

An updated Chinese strategy towards the Arab region: Evidence from Saudi Arabia

Published

on

The economic ties between Saudi Arabia and China are a reflection of both countries’ current development. From 1949 until the mid-1970s, interactions between China and the Muslim world were almost non-existent. During the late 1970s, China began its economic reform initiative, which reshaped China’s economy from 1978 to 2000, opening the way for developing the bilateral relations. The relationship between Saudi Arabia and China was improved with the beginning of the twenty-first century. In 2008, the global financial and economic crisis ravaged the United States; this paved the way for further progress in the Saudi-Chinese relationship.

After Saudi Arabia put out its 2030 vision for multilateralism, the movement in Saudi-Chinese relations coincided with the transformation in the global system, which is one of the most essential parts of multipolarity. As a result, China now has more possibilities for being involved in this process.

After China’s openness to the West, the country devoted itself primarily to the acquisition of advanced financial and technological infrastructure. At the time, China was not interested in strengthening its ties to Saudi Arabia and raising the level of the relationship to a strategic partnership. According to Saudi officials, the Chinese economy had nothing to tempt them to create links with it, regardless of China’s significant economic progress made. In terms of the world’s greatest economies, China has yet to make it into the top ten.

There was little trade between the two countries. A mere 1.171 billion riyals, or around 1.5 percent, of Saudi Arabia’s total imports were made in China in 1987. After more than 20 years of economic changes in China, this statistic remained unchanged. Even though China’s volume tripled, China’s share of Saudi imports remained at 3.5%, thus it takes time to create economic ties.

China’s imports to Saudi Arabia doubled in value between 1987 and 1999, rising from 1.2 billion to 3.7 billion riyals. The Saudi’s overall worldwide imports still dwarf this amount, notwithstanding the rise. However, by the end of the nineties, there was an improvement in this relationship. The year 2000 marked the beginning of a major shift in the economic ties between the two countries. There was an increase in bilateral trade that year of more than 1.7 times what it was last year. This is due to an increase in previously unreported Saudi shipments to China. Between 1990 and 2000, exports nearly quadrupled. Saudi’s on-going trade surplus with China can be attributed to this increase in exports.

Economic ties between the United States and Saudi Arabia will be altered significantly. High-level visits, discussions, and exchanges of views between Saudi Arabia and China have created new horizons in bilateral relations, in addition to strengthening economic ties. Globalization has also contributed to the building of trade linkages between all countries, including China and Saudi Arabia. This is also relevant to the World Trade Organization’s principles and the development of a free market economy. The economic ties between the two countries developed dramatically between 2000 and 2007. This is mainly due to the rapid growth of the Chinese economy. Growth in China’s economy has begun to pick up steam, shifting the world’s top economies into a new position. China, which ranked sixth in 2000, surpassed the United Kingdom to take fourth place in 2006. In 2007, it overtook Germany to take third position.

During the period between 2001 and 2007, Saudi Arabia’s exports to China nearly doubled, while imports nearly quadrupled. In the time since 2008, major developments have led to stronger ties between the two countries’ economies, paving the way for future strategic collaboration. After the housing crisis, the financial and economic crisis of 2008 had a significant impact on the development of Saudi Arabia’s ties with China. Because of this tragedy, there was a global economic downturn. Except for China, the rest of the industrialized world’s growth rates were either negative or extremely low throughout this period. China rose from third to second place in the world’s economy between 2007 and 2010, ahead of Japan, which fell from third to fourth.

As of 2010, China’s GDP had overtaken Japan’s, ranking it second in the world’s major economies matrix. By 2028, China is expected to overtake the United States as the world’s most powerful economy.

In terms of bilateral trade exchanges, minerals accounted for nearly eighty per cent of the overall value of Saudi’s top exports to China in 2019. Electrical goods and equipment are among the many items that China exports to Saudi Arabia.

It’s no surprise that Saudi Arabia ranked first and second in terms of oil exports to China in 2019 and 2020, respectively. Last year, China bought more than twice as much oil from Saudi Arabia as Russia did, at 1.69 million barrels per day.

The Chinese grand strategy, based mainly on the Belt and Road Initiative, will not make progress without a solid partnership with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. China is a huge powerhouse that depends mainly on trade and industry; therefore, in order for China to survive, it is likely that in the next few years we will witness a qualitative leap in the bilateral relationship between China and Saudi Arabia.

Continue Reading

Middle East

Iraq Must Recognize Assyrians as its Indigenous People

Published

on

Assyrians are the descendants of the ancient Assyrians.[1] They are historically, culturally, and spiritually tied to northern Mesopotamia, a region that is located from north Baghdad to south of Lake Van, as well as from Persian borders in the east to the Euphrates in the west. However, today, and after centuries of persecution, numerous massacres and genocide they now concentrate in northern Iraq. According to Kelly, while the Assyrians are not legally recognized, many scholars and more importantly the Assyrian community, acknowledge Assyrians as one of the indigenous populations of Iraq. Many studies, research papers and books about the topic have been published. These scholarly studies provide ample evidence that the Assyrians survived the fall of the empire.

The Indigenous Assyrians

US Senator John Nimrod asked, “how do we know that the Assyrians, who are also known as Chaldeans and Syriac, are the indigenous people of Iraq?” He answers by stating: “One only has to take a shovel and dig it into the ground and the only history found will be that of the Assyrians.”

So what do we mean by indigenous people? The modern understanding of the term indigenous is based on specific aspects, including the followings:

• Self- identification as indigenous peoples at the individual and community level,

• Historical continuity with pre-settler societies,

• Strong link to territories and natural resources,

• Distinct social, economic or political systems,

• Distinct language, culture and beliefs,

• Form non-dominant groups of society, and

• Resolve to maintain and reproduce their ancestral environments and systems as distinctive peoples and communities.

Assyrians meet all the above factors.

The Assyrian community needs to highlight and communicate their unique culture, rooted history, and to stress rights to their historic and ancestral lands on a global level. The doors were opened to effectively do so after the 2007 United Nations Declaration for the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). The United Nations Permanent Forum for Indigenous Issues (UNPFII) provides a platform for indigenous perspectives to be heard worldwide. Assyrians attended all UNPFII sessions from 2012 through 2019[2] represented by delegations from the Assyrian Aid Society (AAS); they met with representatives of other indigenous peoples, civil society organizations, as well as representatives of some participating countries.

The AAS representatives clarified who Assyrians are; neither Arabs nor Kurds, but rather the indigenous people of Iraq. They explained that it was vital for Assyrians to be recognized by both the governments in Baghdad and Arbil and to be allowed to govern themselves as the first step to preserve their culture and history.

Assyrians Settled in Mesopotamia since the Dawn of Time

When it comes to documentation, we read from cuneiform texts that after 2750 BC the Akkadian dynasty came into power in northern Babylonia. Sargon, or Sharrum-kin (meaning “just king”), emerged and the power of the Dynasty of Akkad flourished. Sargon expanded his power in northern Mesopotamia, the area later known as Assyria.[3] From these Akkadians sprung the Assyrians (and Babylonians).

The Assyrian civilization existed over at least five millennia ago in Assyria. According to Saggs, Assur (Ashur) was the first capital of Assyria. The name Assur comes from a temple name that was dedicated to the goddess Ishtar, attested from soon after 2800 BC. Religion occupied a major place in the social and economic structure of the lives of the Assyrians. Saggs explained that the religious power and civil functions have always been interlocked.[4] And according to Bottero, Assyria was established in northern Mesopotamia from the middle of the second millennium. She states, “[ancient Mesopotamia] was an original civilization, rich and complex, that survived for three millennia through innumerable vicissitudes, across generations of people, of whom I personally know a few thousand…”[5]

Also excavations in Kala-tepe, near Kara-Eyuk, a mound lying eighteen (18) kilometers north-east of Caesarea in Cappadocia in modern Turkey (still in northern Mesopotamia), shows some tablets written in Semitic containing theophorous names, compounds of Ashur, Itti-Ashur, Taba-Ashur, Ashur-Malik, Ashur-muttabil. That in this region northwest of Assyria there were Votaries of Assur in the twenty-fourth century before the Christian era.[6]

Historical evidence is plentiful to prove beyond any reasonable doubt that the Assyrians (Suraye) are the descendants of the ancient Assyrians concentrated in what is today northern Iraq. The Assyrians (Suraye) lived in the modern region of Iraq before Arabs, Turkomans and more recently Kurds arrived to the region and before Islam swept the Middle East. In the Chronicle of 640 or the Chronicle of Toma, we read, “In Mesopotamia, many of the Assyrians that were within the Persian Empire were sold by the Tayaye (Arabs)”.[7] Here the Christian Assyrians are shown to be living in northern Iraq and a good reference to the Assyrians presence in the early Islamic conquest of Mesopotamia.

The Language Continuity

The Assyrians spoke the Assyrian Akkadian language. However, the cuneiform script was not convenient for running a vast empire. Communication between Nineveh, the capital, and the vassal regions were difficult as the Cuneiform was a complex script that few were capable to understand. Thus, in around 750 BC, the Assyrians and the other people within the empire began officially to use the Aramaic alphabet because it was easier to learn and be communicated between the various people under the empire. It is not strange then that the Assyrian language and Aramaic script became the lingua franca of the vast empire. After the fall of the Assyrian Empire, the Medes, Romans, Greeks and Parthians controlled northern Mesopotamia, but the Assyrian language and the Aramaic alphabet remained in use specially by the Assyrians. Scholars have shown that the Akkadian language survived until the 3rd Century of the Christian era. M. J. Geller states, “I have argued elsewhere that Akkadian was likely to have survived throughout the Parthian period, at least until the mid-third Century A.D.”[8]

Even 2,600 years after the fall of Assyria, linguists have shown that many words being used today  were, in fact, in use in ancient Assyria. These linguists have argued that the Assyrian language (known widely by the Assyrians as Sureth), is a mix between the Assyrian Akkadian and Aramaic. Furthermore, the Aramaic script continues to be used by the Assyrians.

Religion Continuity: The Assyrians have been Christians for the last 2000 years.

The Assyrian people converted to Christianity during the time of the Apostles and remained Christians ever since. The Christological controversies that followed the Council of Ephesus (431) and the Council of Chalcedon (451) isolated the Assyrians as denominational units and communities. As the Church established further structure and hierarchy, the Churches of the Assyrians kept the various Assyrian communities together under the leadership of their respected patriarchs. The Assyrian denominational terms Nestorian and Jacobite were born. Later, in 1681 in Diyar Bekir (Turkey) and in 1830 in northern Iraq (Alqosh) the conversion of Assyrians to Catholicism isolated Assyrians as the term Chaldean was given to these converts. However, and according to Nisan, these communities created strong ties between themselves. He states, “… in the far north of Iraq bordering Turkey, The patriarchal ideal was the social norm in the family unit. Further north in the Hakkari Mountains, tribal formations remained the grid of the communal life. These units did not prevent joint action and the cultivation of national unity …”[9]

The birth of Islam was a double-edged sword for the Assyrian Christians and the region’s history. Before Islam, Mesopotamia belonged in part to the Byzantine and Sassanian empires, each people keeping in its possessions a body of troops and administrators. Ras al-’Ayn (Rish ‘ayno) and the territory beyond it as far as the Euphrates belonged to the Romans; Nisibis (Nisibin) and the territory beyond it as far as the Tigris belonged to the Persians.[10] Islam reunited Mesopotamia. On the other side, many peoples (including Assyrians) converted to Islam to escape death or avoid taxes. With time they were Arabized because of the influence of the Koran and the Arabic language. But many remained faithful to their religion and continued to live close to their ancestors historic capitals: Ashur, Kalah (Nimrud), Dur-Sharukin (Khorsabad), and Nineveh (Nebi Yunis) or close to their churches and the diocese of Mosul, Arbil, and Kirkuk in modern Iraq, Qudchanis (modern Turkey) or Antioch and Tur ‘Abdin (modern Turkey).

According to Murre-Van Den Berg “The Church of the East, as present in the region of Urmia, Mosul and the Hakkari mountains at the beginning of the nineteenth century, has its origin in the Christian communities that developed in the first centuries AD in the Parthian and Sassanian (from 224) empire.[11]

The church of the Assyrian people was not spread in northern Mesopotamia alone. History tells us that prior to Emperor Zeno’s closing of the Edessa “Nestorian” work in 488, a very significant event in the history of the Church of the East took place in Beth Lapat, near the ancient Ur. Zeno has addressed his famous instrument of union to the patriarchs of Constantinople, Alexandria and Antioch; all three had adopted his formulation of the heretical monophysite christology. In 484 the Church of the East called a synod in Beth Lapat where they did not oppose the Chalcedonian formula of 451, but resented that Council’s confirmation of the repudiation of Nestorius. The path of the Church of the East was now different from the Church of Rome.[12]  This led soon to the separation of the Church in the Persian Empire from the rest of the Christendom – the Church of the East became an independent church.[13] [14] The Church of the East missionevlved into a marvelous church that was born in Edessa (Urhai), then in Adiabene (Arbil) and soon with its headquarters at Ctesiphon-Seleucia (al-Mada’in, near Baghdad).[15] That church is still standing today as the Assyrian Church of the East. It remains an eastern church native to modern Iraq.

One of the most celebrated days in the liturgical calendar year of the Church of the East is the Rogation of the Ninevites. This is a three day fast observed by the churches that follow East and West Syriac (Assyrian) liturgical traditions. This fast is based on the Book of Jonah in the Old Testament where God sends Jonah (c. 786-746 BC) to Nineveh to warn its inhabitants of destruction unless they repent for their sins. The Assyrian King repented and covered himself with sackcloth, sat in ashes and called upon all the people to fast.[16] The Assyrians have observed this fast for the last 2750 years.  

Genetic Studies

There have been genetic studies about the Assyrians. One of such studies was conducted under the leadership of Professor L. Luca Cavalli-Sforza who is one of the most preeminent human population geneticists in the world. He, along with Professors Paolo Menozzi, and Alberto Piazza spent eight years collecting data for their study on the genetics of almost two thousand different populations and gathered some eighty-six thousand entries. Their analysis shows that the Assyrians, as a population, represent a unique genetic profile that is distinguished from other peoples. They write: “The Assyrians are a fairly homogeneous group of people, believed to originate from the land of old Assyria in northern Iraq” (Cavalli-Sforza et al. 1996, 243)[17]. The authors additionally write that the Assyrians spoke a Semitic language and they used the cuneiform that were replaced later by the Aramaic, which used the Phoenician alphabet. The Assyrians to this very day, the authors write, speak this language. They add that the Assyrians living between Mosul and Arbil “are Christians and are possibly bona fide descendants of their namesakes” (Cavalli-Sforza et al. 1996, 218)[18]

Historically, the Assyrian people rarely intermarried with surrounding populations. This fact was supported by the 2000 and 2008 genetic studies that proved Assyrians as genetically distinct from other groups in the Middle East.

Broken Promises

The Iraqi people were looking forward to freedom and peace within a secular and democratic Iraq as President George W. Bush promised to end the oppressive regime of Saddam Hussein and secure freedom for all Iraqi people regardless of their ethnicity or religious belief. Speaking from Cincinnati on October 7, 2002, President Bush carefully distinguished between the various people of Iraq when he declared, “the oppression of Kurds, Assyrians, Turkomans, Shi’a, Sunnis, and others will be lifted. The long captivity of Iraq will end, and an era of new hope will begin.[19] However, the new Iraqi Constitution, ratified in 2005, continues to define Assyrians as an ethno-religious minority. Article 125 guarantees fundamental rights to “various nationalities, such as Turkmen, Chaldeans, Assyrians, and all other constituents”. The Iraqi Constitution came short from recognizing Assyrians as the indigenous people of Iraq and it divided the Assyrian people into Assyrians and Chaldeans.

Proposed Regions Under The Iraq Protected Indigenous Status

The Indigenous status must be applied on the Assyrians in Iraq: the Iraqi and Kurdish regional constitutions must assert to it and a protected region administered by the Assyrians within historic Assyria must be secured in order to allow the Assyrians to live and thrive in peace in accordance to the 1994 United Nations General Assembly resolutions A/RES/48/163. These steps are achievable, considering that the Iraqi Council of Ministers has approved the creation of the Assyrian Christian Administrative Area. That came first in 2014 a short time before ISIS invaded Mosul and the Nineveh Plain. The approval was reiterated again on June 2, 2019 after the defeat of ISIS.

We suggest the following regions to be categorized as protected federal regions for the Assyrians:

A) Sapna region:

Sapna is a large valley in northern Iraq, contained by two small mountain ranges to the north. The valley is watered by the Upper Zab River, which flows along the eastern portion of the valley, and features hilly terrain in the central portion of it around Amadiya District.

The villages are:

Bibedeh, Komaneh, Deiri, Bilejan, Hamziyya, Inishkeh, Araden, Dawodiya, Dehe, Sersank, Badarish.

B) The Barwari Bala Region:

This is the Assyrian region along the Turkish Iraqi borders that has been forcefully occupied by the Kurds.

The villages are: Aina d’ Nuneh (Kani Masse), Maya, Derishke, Bi-Qolke, Doureh, Aqri, Helwa, Bet Shmiyaye, Hayyat, Hayyis, Malakhta, Jdide, Musakan, Dargeli, Tuta Shamaya, Tarshish, Be-Baloka, Maghribiya, Chim Dostina, Saradashti, Bet Tanoreh, Biqoole, Mani Nsara, Beshmayaye, Dereshkeh, Khwara, BuTarra, Merka Chiya, Hesseh, Kani Blafeh, Moska, Baz, Chaqla, Chalek Nsara, Ayit Horkeh, Dar Keleh, Chameekeh, Torwanish, Bazeveh, BiKozinkeh.

C) Nahla Region:

Nahla is a region in the provinces of Nineveh and Dohuk to the north of Nineveh Plains in northern Iraq.

The villages are:

Kashkawa, Belmit, Hezaneh, Merokeh, Khalilaneh, Jouleh, Rabetkeh, Chameh Chaleh, Kasreh. 

D) Nineveh Plain Region

The Nineveh Plain is a region in the Nineveh Governorate that comprised of three districts: Telkepe, Hamdaniya, Shekhan.

The towns and villages includes:

District of Telkepe (Telkepe, Batnaya, Tesqopeh, Alqosh)

District of Hamdaniya (Khidir Ilyas, Baghdeda, Ba’sheeqa, Bartella, Karamlesh)

District of Shekhan (Ain Sifni, Ba’thra, Qasrok)

Read also the attached details for the Assyrian villages in northern Iraq.

The Issue is Political

Many Assyrians in the national and human rights circles argue, rightfully so, that the recognition of Assyrians as the indigenous people of Iraq lacks neither historical arguments nor evidence. The evidence is there. The Jews and Kurds were assisted to have lands reserved for themselves, so do the Assyrians. Even during his trial, the brutal dictator Saddam Hussein responded to the Kurdish lawyer who claimed that the Christians and Yezidis living in the Kurdish region were Kurds. Saddam said, “as for the Christians, there are Chaldean Christians [Catholic Assyrians] and they are the origin for establishing the Iraq’s ancient Assyrian State”. He added, these Christians are not Kurds. The reason that Saddam opted to mention exclusively the Chaldeans is of course because of Tariq Aziz, his most trusted Christian Ba’ath Party friend and comrade, who was a Catholic Assyrian (Chaldean). Saddam mentions that the identity of a group is based on history and belonging. He was trying to say that the [Chaldean and Assyrian] Christians and Kurds Muslims neither share the same history nor belonging, thus the [Chaldean and Assyrian] Christians are not Kurds.

The Above map is from a book titled, “The Ecclesiastical Organisation of the Church of the East: 1318-1913”. By David Wilmshurt. Published in Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium, Vol. 582, Tomus 104. Lovani. In Aedibus Peeters. 2000. 

Religion is an issue since Assyrians are Christians while 98% of Iraq’s population is Muslim. The US applies double standards when dealing with the various oppressed people around the world. The policy depends on the US economic interests. The US helps the Kurds in Iraq and Syria, but does not do the same with the Assyrians. In fact, the US opened all avenues possible to see the Assyrians out. The author’s entire family side that settled in Tell Hafian, Khabor, Syria since 1933 have been resettled in the US, Sweden, Germany and Australia after the attacks of ISIS on the Assyrian Khabor villages.  Most of the Khabor Assyrian villages are empty of Assyrians. Who will occupy those villages? The Kurds, of course.

The Return of Assyrians to their Ancestral Lands

The Iraqi government must establish a road map that clearly defines the process for returning Assyrians to their ancestral homeland and the returning all illegally confiscated Assyrian towns and villages, specially in the Kurdish controlled areas to their rightful Assyrian owners. The two governments must secure the necessary funding for the reconstruction of the destroyed villages and worship places during the Kurdish revolt years. The reconstruction of the 14,000 homes and building in the Nineveh Plains must begin as soon as possible. Many misconceptions exist contrary to the realities on the ground about the condition and situation of the Assyrians. As one Assyrian observer explains, “In the decade leading up to the Islamic State invasion, the Kurdish regional government created the appearance of security in the plains through the harasment of locals and a system of political and financial patronage”. The continuous disputes between Arbil and Baghdad and the so-called disputed territories continue to delay any efforts of return.

The long claimed Assyrian triangle autonomous region that was presented to the 1919 Paris Peace Conference (League of Nations) that was modified later as shown in the map above could be declared as a protected indigenous region protected by an Assyrian Force that could emerge from the already existing NPU (Nineveh Plain Protection Unit).

Assyrian Towns and Villages Names to be Restored

We are told that the names of places are more than a geographical indicator. Indigenous place names carry knowledge that has been passed from generation to generation – they have connected Indigenous people to their homes. While this Assyrians and their cities, towns, rivers, mountains, etc connection has at times remained strong despite several eras of assimilation; however, it has also disassociated them of that link. Thus, the consequences could be annihilative. This historic people-place link is powerful and it has threatened subsequent nations ruled northern Iraq. Hence, subsequent authorities have replaced the Assyrian town names by Arabic, Turkish or Kurdish names. Consider changing (or Kurdifying the name) Arbil (Arbela) to Hawler, Aina d’ Nuneh to Kani Masse, Diyana to Soran, Mar Yaqu to Kasha Fir, Shiyas to Sayjay, Harrania to Rania, Aridu to Rawanduz, Anisu to Qal’aat Diza, Ieri to Sardasht, Arzuhina to Gok Tape, Assur-Iqisha / Bidaro to Zakho, Gannanati to Qasr-e Shirin, Azari to Sulaimaniya, Girmua to Jerwan, Musru to Jabal Maqlub, Milqia to ‘Ain Kawa, Amantu to Sultan ‘Abdallah, etc. [20] It is argued that indigenous people can reclaim the spaces in which their cultures and languages have been subjected to attempted assimilation or outright eradication, but the authorities need to understand and tolerate the indigenous people’s dilemma and endangered situaion.

Final Thoughts

On May 13, 2012, at the Indigenous People’s form in New York, President of AAS in Iraq, the late Ashur Sargon Eskrya, stated, “We call upon you for the inclusion of the Assyrians as one of the indigenous peoples of Iraq and be eligible for support from programs funded by the Permanent Forum for Indigenous Peoples, as well as support from other United Nations organizations in accordance with the UN Declaration on the indigenous peoples and their legitimate rights.” AAS has called for the support of and empowerment the Assyrian people to rebuild their historical areas, protecting their cultural heritage and language. AAS also called on all indigeous people to cooperate with each other in order to learn and benefit from any successful experiences to ensure the revival and preservation of the languages of the original peoples.

If Iraq does not recognize the Assyrians as its indigenous people, the Assyrians will continue to face genocide and massacres[21] and in time will disappear from Iraq, (and Syria and Turkey). This recognition will not add any burden on Iraq since that status will make the Assyrians eligible for support from various programs provided by the Permanent Forum for Indigenous Peoples, as well as support from other United Nations organizations in accordance with the UN Declaration on the indigenous peoples. Recognizing the indigenous status of the Assyrians is very important not only for the Assyrians, but also for Iraq, Syria and Turkey themselves. Iraq, Syria and Turkey have their issues of human rights violations and the treatment of non-Arabs and non-Turks in their respective countries. Many argue that recognizing the Assyrians as the indigenous people of these three host countries and recognizing and improving the treatment of all the other components in those societies will open a new page in the history of the three states. We can envision the relationships between those three countries and the rest of the advanced and civil world. In addition, a new page of peace will spring between the Assyrians and those states. The recognition of the three said countries, Iraq most importantly, is very important, because, as Donabed and Joseph argue, “As long as Middle Eastern states do not recognize Assyrians and other peoples as indigenous, the process cannot commence; first peoples will be unable to negotiate in the political forum as long as their host countries monopolize their rights”. And since most Assyrians in Iraq live in northern Iraq’s region under the Kurdish control, then we expect the KRG to do the same and recognize the Assyrians as the indigenous of the region.

The Assyrian people deserve and are entitled to live in peace, security and freedom and their endangered language embraced and protected. Consider that the UNESCO Atlas of the World’s Languages warns that the Assyrian (Syriac/Aramaic) language will disappear within a century. Many linguists argue that a language dies within three or four generations outside its original habitat. Some Assyrian schools have been opened in Iraq and in the KRG region; however, the financial support for these schools is meager and there is no genuine legislation to support the Assyrian language. During the time that you finish reading this article, another language somewhere around the world has died. With every language dying, a culture also dies. Imagine the impact of that on civilization. Most importantly, Iraq was among those countries that voted in favor of the 2007 UNDRIP. Only four countries voted against it and they were Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States. Lastly, but not least, the Assyrians’ population was around 1.5 million before 2003 US invasion of Iraq. Today, observers put their numbers at 250,000 at best. Only the designation of indigenous people of Iraq will save and keep them in this diverse region of the Middle East. 


[1]           a.. Warda, William M. Assyrians Beyond the Fall of Nineveh: A 2,624 Years Journey. USA. 2013. 

            b. Aprim, Frederick. Assyrians: The Continuous Saga. Xlibris, 2004.

[2]COVID caused the cancellation of meetings in 2020 and 2021.

[3]Saggs, H.W.F. Everyday Life in Babylonia and Assyria. B. T. Batsford Ltd. London. 1965. p. 30

[4]Saggs, H.W.F. The Might That Was Assyria. Sidgwick & Jackson, London. 1984. p. 21

[5]Bottero, Jean, Mesopotamia: Writing, Reasoning, and the Gods. Translated by Zainab Bahrani & Marc Van De Mieroop. The University of Chicago Press. 1995. p. 21

[6]Delaporte, L. Mesopotamia: The Babylonian and Assyrian Civilization. Translated by V. Gordon Childe, New York, Barnes and Noble, Inc. p. 240

[7]Toma was a Syriac Othrodox priest, a native of Mardin. The Chronicle is preserved at the British Library under reference number ADD.MS.14,643.

[8]Geller, M. J. Paper titled “The Survival of Babylonian Wissenschaft in Later Tradition.” In the Heirs of Assyria. The Neo-Assyrian Text Corpus Project. Sanna Aro and R. M. Whitting, ed. Helsinki, 2000, p.3.

[9]Nisan, Mordechai. Minorities in The Middle East: A History of Struggle and Self-Expression. McFarland & Company, Inc., Publisher, London. 1991. p.157

[10]Palmer, Andrew. Monk and Mason on the Tigris Frontier: The Early History of Tur ‘Abdin. Cambridge. 1990. p. 7

[11]Murre-Van Den Berg, H. L. From A Spoken to a Written Language. Leiden. 1999. p. 31

[12]Young, John M. L. By Foot to China. Radiopress, Tokyo. 1984. p. 7

[13]Vine, Aubrey R. The Nestorian Churches: A Concise History of Nestorian Christianity in Asia From the Persian Schism to the Modern Assyrians. Independent Press, Ltd. London. 1937. p. 22

[14]Holm, Frits. My Nestorian Adventure in China. Gorgias Press. 2001.

[15]Stewart, John Rev. Nestorian Missionary Enterprise: The Story of a Church on Fire. Trichur, India. 1961. p. xxxi

[16]Holy Bible: From the Ancient Eastern Text. George M. Lamsa Translation. 1984. Book of Jonah 3:6-7.

[17]   Elias, Joel J. “The Genetics of Modern Assyrians and Their Relationship to Other People of the Middle East.” Article in Nineveh Magazine, no. 1 & 2. Berkeley, 2000.

[18]Ibid

[19]Aprim Frederick, The Betrayal of the Powerless: Assyrians After the 2003 US Invasion of Iraq. Xlibris. 2021

[20]Most of these original and modern names are from Simo Parpola & Michael Porter. The Helsinki Atlas of the Near East in the Neo-Assyrian Period. Helsinki, 2001.

[21]Consider WWI genocide, 1933 Simele massacre, 1969 Soriya massacre and 2014 ISIS genocide and the destruction of Assyrian archaeological sites, villages, churches and monasteries in both Iraq and Syria. 

Continue Reading

Middle East

The Changing Political Dynamics of the Middle East

Published

on

It is often said that the politics of the Middle East is as clear as mud. The fresh events that unfolded in the region indicate the significance of this assumption. The strict and hyper-strategic alliances that characterized the region during the Cold War are now vanishing as a new order seems to emerge that is much more hybrid, unpredictable, and pragmatic. With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Middle Eastern states are keen on keeping their distance as they refuse to take sides. The dynamics were quite opposite in the Cold War era and during the unstable period that dominated the region afterward. The shift evident in the region today is thoroughly complex and complicated but it is different from the Cold War period.

The Middle East was a playground for the two dominant sides during the Cold War. It was subjected to major foreign invasions and large-scale conflicts. The Iranian Revolution in 1979 added further spices to the bitter Saudi-Iran rivalry and the race continued throughout the war. Unlike other parts of the world, the post-Cold War era was even further devastating for the Middle East as Arab Spring ignited some of the world’s deadliest conflicts. The wars in Yemen, Syria, and other countries portray the arch rivalry of global and regional players to dominate the region. However, today it seems that the major actors in all these conflicts are tired and fatigued. As the regional crisis meets dead ends, a new geo-political environment is emerging in the Middle East.

In the last few months, the two major powers, the United States and Russia have focused comprehensively on the Middle East as it is a major economic and strategic zone. The trilateral summit between Iran, Russia, and Turkey and the American-Arab summit held in Jeddah demonstrate the efforts. The summit in Jeddah signaled a divergence and lack of trust between the United States and its partners in the region. Unlike the previous talks, the environment lacked confidence and the actors could not agree on most of the views. It was more of a stage to blame each other as the Saudi Prince defended himself against the opprobrium of Biden by mentioning the war crimes committed by the United States in Iraq. Riyadh and Cairo also questioned the strategic competency and power of the United States given its humiliating withdrawal from Afghanistan and Iraq. President Biden also tried to convince and pressurize Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt to cut off all ties with Russia and cease all cooperation. Although increasing oil production was agreed upon but no party indicated to stop dealing with Russia on trade and energy. More surprisingly, Israel, Washington’s closest ally in the region has also shown a diversion from following the orders of the United States. It is a tipping point in history where it seems that the United States has lost its hegemony in the Middle East, and it has become a client state of the Saudis. The events delivered a clear message that countries in the Middle East only want America’s aid and arms, not its advice.

In the same way, another important ally of the United States in the region, Turkey has been following a hybrid model for quite a time. The trilateral summit held in Tehran was a milestone in strengthening Turkey’s ties with Russia and Iran. Turkey has even proposed arms sales to Iran which shows a clear diversion from a major NATO member. Turkey has also turned towards Russia to attain the S-400 system after NATO refused to sell the air defense system. More importantly, Saudi Arabia has also shown the intention to get the system from Moscow. As is the case with other states, Iran is also keen on building good ties with China and Russia. The country is collaborating with the European nations to reestablish the Nuclear Deal on acceptable terms. Despite having disagreements over most of the issues, Iran and Saudi Arabia are involved in diplomatic talks to de-escalate the tensions in the region. MBS is looking for diplomatic accommodations with Iran to help the region in development through trade. While speaking with CNN, Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud said that they are hoping for a kind response from Iran in order to build a diplomatic solution. He favored giving incentives to Iran on the negotiations table to have a peaceful future in the region. UAE’s normalization of ties with the Assad regime in Syria and exit from the war in Yemen also indicate the concerns of the major powers in the region about the instability. It is indeed the beginning of a changing regional order in the Middle East where the Cold War model is evaporating.

In short, the changes undergoing in the Middle East do not look similar to the hyper and rigid order during the Cold War. More governments in the region are opting for hyper, hybrid, and pragmatic policies that favor their national interests and regional stability over the benefits of foreign powers. The Middle East is a powerhouse of the world and the shifting plates in the region would surely influence world politics. It is still unsure so make predictions about the future since the ongoing situation is very complicated and complex. The political dynamic of the Middle East is unpredictable and it will further complicate global affairs. What might come next is a mystery and where the next explosion would occur is a sheer guess.

To conclude, the world seems to be changing now as China is threatening the position of the United States and the resurgence of Russia is a clear challenge to the dominance of the United States. In such an uncertain environment, the Middle East is a center of gravity for the “haves” of the world. President Biden’s visit to the region and the trilateral talks between Russia, Iran, and Turkey mark the significance of dominating the region today. An evaluation of the recent events portrays that the rigid and hypersensitive environment of the Middle East is converting into a hybrid, pragmatic, and unpredictable domain. The divergence of the allies of the United States in the region from the dictated course and tilt towards Russia signals a tectonic shift. Iran’s involvement in the affairs is another point of importance to decide the future of the region. It is impossible to correctly predict the rapid changes in the Middle East, however, the years ahead are surely of vital significance.

Continue Reading

Publications

Latest

South Asia4 hours ago

Politics of Pakistan: A Riot or an Opportunity

On 14th August, 1947 Pakistan appeared on the world map as the largest independent Muslim state of that time. Sixty-five...

New Social Compact13 hours ago

COVID- a way forward with Sustainability & Biodiversity

Since the onset of the COVID- 19 pandemic, a new unprecedented situation has arisen many new challenges including social, health,...

South Asia16 hours ago

Seventy-Five Years of India’s Independence

If anyone had asked Jawaharlal Nehru as he made his midnight speech on August 15 and freedom dawned, how he...

World News18 hours ago

‘Immensely bleak’ future for Afghanistan unless massive human rights reversal

The international community must dramatically increase efforts to urge the de facto authorities in Afghanistan to adhere to basic human...

Economy21 hours ago

The Policy of Sanctions and the Golden Horde Legacy

The modern policy of sanctions resembles, to some extent, the management practices of the Mongol Golden Horde. One of its elements was a system of labels...

International Law23 hours ago

What Is a Sovereign State?

Against the backdrop of the rapid collapse of the US-led world order, the question of which states will survive in...

World News1 day ago

IAEA: ‘Very alarming’ conditions at Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant

The situation at Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant has deteriorated rapidly to the point of becoming “very alarming,” Director General...

Trending