Authors: Harsh Mahaseth and Samyuktha Banusekar*
Malaysia’s political reality is that the Executive is headed by a Cabinet of Ministers made up entirely of members of the ruling party, which can muster enough votes in Parliament to change the Constitution and enact any legislation. The logical conclusion is that the Legislature and the Executive assist each other in achieving similar goals and policies. The Judiciary is the weakest governing institution due to the sum total of their Constitutional powers. As a result, it is argued that all legislative and executive actions affecting the judiciary must be treated with caution.[1]
In 2002, there was a case in the High Court to entertain a writ of certiorari to quash the decision of the Sabah State Government which revoked the entry permit of the petition on the grounds of morality. The High Court observed that the ouster clause in Section 59a of the Immigration Act 1959/63 must be interpreted in a manner where the Courts did not have grounds for review of the Sabah Government’s decision. The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeal, where the writ was granted and ouster clauses were sought as unconstitutional. The Malaysian Federal Court however, on appeal by Sabah authorities, held that Constitutional Rights are not absolute and can be done away with in accordance with statutory law and the Section is conclusive on exclusion of judicial review.[2] This portrays a clear deviation from separation of power and abuse of power by the Executive. There exists a vagueness in the doctrine of separation of powers in itself in Malaysia and the doctrine is understood to have diminished as the role of the Executive has significantly grown.[3]
If Malaysian courts retain a judicial attitude of not interfering with the Executive’s power of detention under the ISA while laying down contradictory rules to obey in such cases, the courts would be vulnerable to criticism and public distrust. If this is the case, questions will be raised about whether the courts are doing their job in protecting fundamental liberties, especially when it comes to personal liberty, in preventive detention cases.
The Malaysian Parliament amended Article 121(1) of the Federal Constitution (“Constitution”) in 1988 to remove a clause that specifically vested “the judicial power of the Federation” in the country’s High Courts and lower courts. As a result, Article 121(1) now simply states that such courts “have such authority and powers as may be conferred by or under federal statute.” The amendment sparked a lot of controversy. There were some reservations about its precise effect. “So where does judicial power now lie?”—”Some critics feared that the courts will have full judicial power”—”So where does judicial power now lie? “No one is certain.” A report by the International Commission of Jurists, on the other hand, presumed that “judicial control” remained with the courts, but expressed concern that: Section 121 wording renders the High Court’s authority and powers reliant on federal statute, implying that the court lacks legally enshrined original jurisdiction. This compromises the separation of powers and creates a subtle form of control over judicial decision-making. This makes the High Court’s activity reliant on the legislature and jeopardizes the judiciary’s institutional independence.[4]
The Amendment to Article 121(1) has created the perception that the Executive wishes the silence the Judiciary in Malaysia and this has led to many judges accepting that they are not even an independent pillar of the Constitution.[5] Only the establishment of proper separation of powers in Malaysia would ensure clarity in the legal system of Malaysia, including Immigration law and rights of refugees in Malaysia.
*Samyuktha Banusekar is a fourth year law student pursuing B.Com. LL.B. (Hons.) at School of Law, SASTRA Deemed University, India.
[1] Yeong Sien SEU, “Clarity or Controversy- The Meaning of Judicial Independence in Singapore and Malaysia” (1992) 13 Singapore Law Review at 87.
[2] Case of reinstatement of entry permit to Sabah (Pihak Berkuasa Negeri Sabah v. Sugumar Balakrishnan), Decision of 2009, (2002) 3 MLJ 72; Mohideen Abdul KADER, “Access to Justice by Mohideen Abdul Kader” Bar Council of Malaysia (24 November 2005), online: Bar Council of Malaysia <https://www.malaysianbar.org.my/article/news/legal-and-general-news/legal-news/access-to-justice-by-mohideen-abdul-kader>.
[3] H.P. LEE, “The Malaysian Constitution after 50 years: Retrospective, Prospective and Comparative Perspectives” (2007) 9 (2) Monash University Faculty of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series at 307-320; Mahaletchumi BALAKRISHNAN, “The Judiciary and the Lost Doctrine of Separation of Powers” Bar Council of Malaysia (12 January 2010), online: Bar Council of Malaysia <https://www.malaysianbar.org.my/article/about-us/committees/constitutional-law-committee/the-judiciary-and-the-lost-doctrine-of-separation-of-powers>.
[4] Richard S.K. FOO, “Malaysia- Death of a Separate Constitutional Judicial Power” (2010) Singapore Journal of Legal Studies at 227-228.
[5] Dr. Shad Saleem FARUQI, “Restoring Judicial Power” The Star (16 April 2008), online: The Star <https://www.thestar.com.my/opinion/columnists/reflecting-on-the-law/2008/04/16/restoring-judicial-power>.
