Russia

Why the Russian Invasion to Ukraine is a Miscalculation on the Feasibility of Conquest

Published

1 year ago

June 21, 2022

Marsha Phoebe

In the midst of a recovering world from the pandemic, a war in Europe is the last thing anybody would ever wish for. The conflict has been boiling down since the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea and Russia’s troop buildup outside of the Ukrainian borders has been happening since February 2021, when it announced a large troop deployment for a ‘large scale exercise’. By December in the same year, Russia made an 8-point wish list amidst rising tensions and on February 24^th 2022, Russia started its invasion of Ukraine under the guise of what Putin says is a ‘special military operation’. The following day, heavy Russian artillery marches towards Kyiv expecting an easy path, however they were met by heavy resistance from the Ukrainian military and civilians.[1] Within the following months, the struggle to take over Kyiv has proven Russia’s miscalculation on what Van Evera terms as the ‘feasibility of conquest’. But in order to fully understand where miscalculation lies, it is important to note the background and sources of insecurity between all parties involved.

In Putin’s worldview, the legitimacy of the Ukrainian identity and statehood is a precarious issue. He has long stated and emphasized on Eastern Slav unity between Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, suggesting that the political destiny of the three nations is inseparable with one another. This “unity paradigm” as coined by Zenon Kohut, or the commitment to the believe that Eastern Slavic states encompasses an “all-Russian” people and thus part of Russia’s sphere of influence (as suggested by the conception of the Ruskii miir)) is what lead to Russia’s primary source of insecurity in recent years. The denial of the Ukrainian identity and statehood by Russia is engrossed within the long historical narratives of Russia’s imperial tradition, and thereby perceiving Ukraine’s desire to separate from Moscow’s influence as a product of “external forces”. As a growing Ukrainian identity is eventually established due to the three-decade process of ‘Ukranization’, calls for integration with the European Union and NATO is a hard pill to swallow for the Kremlin. Should Ukraine adopt a ‘western European identity’ and join NATO, Russia is faced with a reality of a disintegrated Eastern Europe community. In haste, Russia attempts to bring Ukraine back into its arms through military force, under calculations that ethnic Russians living on the southern and eastern parts of Ukraine still holds post-imperial consciousness and pro-Russian sentiments.[2] Therefore, a pro-Western and anti-Russia Ukrainian statehood who potentially could be holding a NATO base is the greatest source of insecurity for Russia.

Another view is that Russia’s motivation in Ukraine is based on its identification as a great power state. But its slow growing economy, old population, and security problems within its vast territory makes it not resemble like one. Hence, Russia’s great power status undeniably rests on three things; membership in the UNSC, its nuclear weapons, and its position as the largest state in Eastern Europe. But all these have been challenged before by Western Europe and the US allies, noting the intervention in Iraq and the 2008 recognition of Kosovo which it perceives as efforts to undermine its position in the UNSC. Growing numbers of NATO bases in Eastern Europe, particularly in Poland and the Czech Republic, have also threatened Russia’s edge on its nuclear ability. The idea to admit Ukraine and Georgia into NATO as reiterated by Bush’s administration in 2008 also became a threat to its relevance in Eastern Europe. Furthermore, Russia saw Ukraine moving away from its reaches when it proposed the signing of the EU association agreements.[3] All of this have fueled to become Russia’s primary source of insecurity and motivations as to why it is so adamant in ‘reacquiring’ its neighbor back. [4] This further explains why Russia justifies the invasion under two narratives; one, as a reaction to the encroachment by NATO and the West and two, as a historically justified view that Ukraine belongs to Russia.[5]

On the contrary, Ukraine’s greatest source of insecurity is its unpredictably aggressive and large neighbor who views their sovereignty as illegitimate. As a smaller and developing state compared to Russia, Ukraine views Russia’s meddling in its political affairs as an unwanted intervention. The decoupling of the Russian and Ukrainian identity has started since long ago from laws regarding using the Ukrainian language as the national language and establishing a Ukrainian Orthodox Church. As Ukraine’s political outlooks diverge from Russia, its insecurity lies in its stubborn neighbor refusing to acknowledge their distinctiveness as a sovereign and legitimate state.[6] The 2014 annexation of Crimea has further spurred concerns over its territorial integrity and without being part of any official security alliances, Ukraine is faced with the reality that a war with Russia means fighting on the battlefield alone.

Despite this, the concern over Ukrainian security is not an exclusively Ukrainian agenda, but also a concern for the Western European states and the Atlantic alliance. Russia’s invasion has proved itself as a predatory state with blatant disregard to existing notions of sovereignty and its behavior risks tipping the international security collective, noting that some Eastern European states like Poland—who is a member of NATO and borders Russia and Ukraine—are in close range with the on-going war. Hence, for most of the international community, the primary source of insecurity is the anarchic state of the international system that allows the violation of sovereignty norms, kickstarting worries of their own sovereignties in the face of predatory states. Furthermore, the war has undermined the geopolitical stability of the European continent since the last World War II. As most of these countries identify themselves as ‘democratic adherers to freedom and liberty’, as well as being geographically situated within the region of the conflict, an unsettled Europe risks destabilizing the region’s development as a whole.

As the war has led to the further decoupling of Europe, Ukraine’s resilience (with the help of Western governments support) has taken Russia by surprise. According to Van Evera, the concept on ‘feasibility of conquest’—or in other words, why states would initiate invasions and wars—is shaped by four factors such as military technology, geographic factors, social and political factors, and the nature of diplomacy in relations to the conflict.[7] In hindsight, Russia’s military technology and power outnumbers Ukraine as the former spends 10 times as much on their defense spending than the latter. It has three times the artillery of Ukraine and 10 times as many aircrafts[8]. But the miscalculation lies on the emphasis on its military prowess, forgetting other factors like geographical feasibility, social-political leadership and solidarity, and the diplomatic context of the conflict. To be fair, Russia seems to have thought its military campaign against Ukraine would be a three-day march to takeover Kyiv without much resistance. Therefore, it was left unprepared towards fighting a war that has lasted up to almost 5 months. This is just as Van Evera has written; aggressive operations can penetrate enemy defenses but a reckless operation will expose one’s own defenses.[9]

Russia is not prepared to fight this war. Not only did it did not have a long-term plan on how its invasion was going to play out, Russian forces were underequipped; riding on old armored vehicles, facing gas, food, and water shortages leading to a generally disorganized war effort. This might also be caused by two factors; firstly, its political system and secondly, due to the lack of information among its troops. Russia is known to maintain elite loyalty by profiting off government provisions within procurement systems—including military procurement—which led to widespread corruption. The corruption with the military procurement has left Russian troops fighting in Ukraine with inadequate supplies causing them to loot civilian homes in an attempt to fulfill their water and food needs. Energy shortages has also left many Russian tanks and armored vehicles unable to move any further and are left disregarded on the sides of Ukrainian streets. Furthermore, despite its overwhelming numbers, the Russian air force has failed to dominate the skies due to the lack of tactical strategy.[10] Additionally, it seemed that the invasion was kept under wraps amongst military officials which led to a lot of the Russian troops losing morale quickly as they do not understand why they are fighting a war in a country where many of them have familial ties.[11]

Meanwhile, the Ukrainians have opted to capitalize on Russia’s strategic failure. Since the 2014 Crimean annexation, it has received weapons supply from western nations. In 2016, Ukraine and NATO did a training program for the Ukrainian special forces, but never truly expecting that the training would be put to test so soon.[12] Amidst the current war, the US and its allies in NATO and the EU have committed to sending weaponry such as Javelin antitank missiles, machine guns, sniper rifles, and stinger surface-to-air missiles.[13] The Ukrainians have adopted a strategy to wear down the Russian offense by sticking into the defense position. This is due to Ukrainian’s consciousness of its own military prowess; power-wise, Ukraine understands its limitations and optimizes what is has effectively. The weapons shipment from the West have also helped it strengthened its defense, as military technology that focuses on lethal firepower and mobility are best suited for defense.[14] The geographical factor definitely falls into the Ukrainian’s favor, as local knowledge on its geography has created an effective environment for its guerilla warfare. Many Ukrainian troops have opted to fortify cities instead of engaging with the Russians out in the open as seen in the struggle in Mykoliv city in order to save their military supplies and engage with Russians in the most efficient manner possible. Russia’s initial strategy to seize and encircle Kyiv through the Hostomel airfield had failed as the Ukrainian forces defense-dominant strategy have managed to holdout the Russian air and missile strikes and prevented them from further advancing towards Kyiv.

Barriers and fortifications are put up by destroying bridges and highways to prevent tanks from mobilizing. A strategy of the Ukrainians is to destroy the Russian convoy with artillery shells and antitank missiles whenever the vehicles were on the open highway. This relates to Van Evera’s point on strong fortification and human made obstacles like urban sprawls that are essential in the creation of a strong defense.[15] This can be seen in how Kyiv has been barricaded with large concrete blocks, sandbags, tires, and tanker trucks. Similarly, trenches have been dug out surrounding the city of Irpin as Russia’s lack of knowledge around Irpin has left their tanks stuck in small streets, making them easy targets for the Ukrainian military.[16] It should be noted that local knowledge is not simply limited in the geographical sense, but can also be sourced from civilian intel. Residents in several Ukrainian cities who were either unable to get out or refuse to leave have helped provide intel on Russian movements using their cellphones. [17] The war has further consolidated Ukrainian solidarity and Zelenskyy’s leadership when he opted to stay and fight in the capital alongside his countrymen. The charismatic leader’s popular government has garnered the ability to raise its citizens loyalty and organize them for effective guerilla resistance.[18] This can be seen in how voluntary Ukrainian citizens have joined in taking up arms in defending their cities via guerilla warfare. Many citizens have participated in building Molotov cocktails in the frontlines and even farmers are contributing by towing away Russian armored vehicles. [19] Furthermore, smaller arsenals are distributed amongst guerilla fighters noting the usefulness of assault rifles, machine guns, light mortars, and mines for defensive powers, which reaffirms the Ukrainian fighters’ commitment to defend instead of attack. [20]

This just goes in line with Van Evera’s writing on the usage of local knowledge which can hinder conquest. Similarly, Van Evera also states that when states do not have the adequate critical resources, conquest can also be hindered.[21] He also noted that the diplomatic factor that influences conquest feasibility are within these three arrangements; collective security systems, defensive alliance, and balancing behavior by neutral states.[22] The latter is most true in the context of Ukraine’s diplomatic efforts in garnering international support and sympathy towards its side of the war. Despite not being part of a collective security system or a formal defensive alliance, Ukraine has managed to gain the support of states like the US and EU members to play the role as ‘neutral balancers’, or those who join the weaker party in order to balance the more powerful party. Though they do not fight within the war directly, they are fighting in proxy by sending weaponry and supplies to Ukraine and imposing severe economic sanctions. Ukraine, for its part, is helping its ally states by stalling the war in order to make Russia suffer from the brunt of its sanctions. Furthermore, the involvement of balancing parties—who are also a part of a security collective like NATO—makes Russia’s aggression limited towards Ukraine, since expanding its aggression towards the balancing parties would enlarge the scale of the war. But this situation is also made feasible due to the political regimes within the balancing states involved which have strong willingness to intervene in preventing the expansion of regional hegemonies.[23] Should these states pursue isolationist policies; the war situation would be a completely different story.

The city of Lysychansk is likely to become Russia’s next target as it has been bombarding the city with airstrikes. In the other side of the river separating Lysychansk with the city of Severodonestsk, the street fighting and ground assaults has made humanitarian assistance to enter very difficult in the Luhansk region. Meanwhile, the struggle in Kharkiv continuous as Russia’s ground assaults to the northeast pushes’ Ukrainian troops away from Russian-occupied frontiers near the Russian border.[24] Amidst it all, there is no denying that the invasion to Ukraine for Russia’s part is a heavy miscalculation on the feasibility of conquest since it only focused on assumptions on its military powers. It neglects the other factors that should have been utilized to serve its own goals and is now being capitalized by the Ukrainian forces in holding out against the aggression. From differing perceptions of threat that have led to different security concerns for both parties—and to an extent, to balancing parties as well—there is one salient takeaway within this war. It is undeniable that the Russia-Ukraine War marks a rise in concerns regarding a state’s national security, noting the existence of predatory behavior within the international system. But security itself is an issue of specific context in which actors have different interpretations on what they deem as threatening and secure. In an international arena that is now buzzing with security concerns, a diverse spectrum of security concerns in relation to the Russia-Ukraine War has emerged. For some it might be concerns on how the war is impacting the slow-going post-pandemic recovery with rising food and oil prices that are predicted to cause instability in volatile regions like Africa and the Middle East, as well as straining developing and emerging economies in Asia and Latin America whilst Central and South Asian states risks getting their share of aid diverted to the Ukrainian cause.[25] For others, it might be the threat on the breach of sovereignty norms and the reminder of the constant precarity within the international life due to the existence of predatory behavior. Time can only tell how the Russia-Ukraine War will play out, but in the meantime, there is no denying that everyone is on the edge of their seats in following its development. Therefore, the Russian invasion in Ukraine has become one of the most pressing security issues in the 21^st century.

[1] Reuters, “A Timeline of War as Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Enters Third Month,” Hindustan Times, April 23, 2022, https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/a-timeline-of-war-as-russia-s-invasion-of-ukraine-enters-third-month-101650699536819.html.

[2] Jeffrey Mankoff, “Russia’s War in Ukraine: Identity, History, and Conflict,” www.csis.org, April 22, 2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-war-ukraine-identity-history-and-conflict.

[3] Ruth Deyermond, “What Are Russia’s Real Motivations in Ukraine? We Need to Understand Them | Ruth Deyermond,” The Guardian, April 27, 2014, sec. Opinion, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/apr/27/russia-motivations-ukraine-crisis.

[4] Kristen de Groot, “Putin’s Motivation behind the Attack on Ukraine,” Penn Today, February 24, 2022, https://penntoday.upenn.edu/news/putins-motivation-behind-attack-ukraine.

[5] Sebastian Shindler, “Opinion – Russian Motives in Ukraine and Western Response Options,” E-International Relations, February 28, 2022, https://www.e-ir.info/2022/02/28/opinion-russian-motives-in-ukraine-and-western-response-options/.

[6] Jeffrey Mankoff, “Russia’s War in Ukraine: Identity, History, and Conflict,” www.csis.org, April 22, 2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-war-ukraine-identity-history-and-conflict

[7] Van Evera, 1998, p.16

[8] Jeffrey Mankoff, “Russia’s War in Ukraine: Identity, History, and Conflict,” www.csis.org, April 22, 2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-war-ukraine-identity-history-and-conflict

[9] Van Evera, 1998, p.18

[10] France 24, “Five Reasons Why Ukraine Has Been Able to Stall Russian Advance,” France 24, March 8, 2022, https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220308-five-reasons-why-ukraine-has-been-able-to-stall-russian-advance.

[11] Zack Beauchamp, “9 Big Questions about Russia’s War in Ukraine, Answered,” Vox, March 30, 2022, https://www.vox.com/22989379/russia-ukraine-war-putin-zelenskyy-us-nato-explainer-questions.

[12] Sudarsan Raghavan, “How Kyiv’s Outgunned Defenders Have Kept Russian Forces from Capturing the Capital,” Washington Post, March 15, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/15/ukraine-kyiv-russia-war/.

[13]France 24, “Five Reasons Why Ukraine Has Been Able to Stall Russian Advance,” France 24, March 8, 2022, https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220308-five-reasons-why-ukraine-has-been-able-to-stall-russian-advance.

[14] Van Evera, 1998, pp.16-17

[15] Van Evera, 1998, pp.16-19

[16] Van Evera, 1998, p.20

[17] Sudarsan Raghavan, “How Kyiv’s Outgunned Defenders Have Kept Russian Forces from Capturing the Capital,” Washington Post, March 15, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/15/ukraine-kyiv-russia-war/.

[18] Van Evera, 1998, p.20

[19] Sudarsan Raghavan, “How Kyiv’s Outgunned Defenders Have Kept Russian Forces from Capturing the Capital,” Washington Post, March 15, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/15/ukraine-kyiv-russia-war/.

[20] Sudarsan Raghavan, “How Kyiv’s Outgunned Defenders Have Kept Russian Forces from Capturing the Capital,” Washington Post, March 15, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/15/ukraine-kyiv-russia-war/.

[21] Van Evera, 1998, p.20

[22] Van Evera, 1998, pp.21-22

[23] Van Evera, 1998, pp.21-22

[24] The Washington Post, “Latest Russia-Ukraine War News Updates,” The Washington Post, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/06/18/russia-ukraine-war-putin-news-live-updates/.

[25] IMF, “How War in Ukraine Is Reverberating across World’s Regions,” IMF Blog, March 15, 2022, https://blogs.imf.org/2022/03/15/how-war-in-ukraine-is-reverberating-across-worlds-regions/.

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Marsha Phoebe

Marsha Phoebe is on her fourth semester as an international relations major in Gadjah Mada University, Jogjyakarta, Indonesia. Her academic concentration is on global politics and security with a special interest for low security issues. Regions of interest include Southeast Asia, Japan, Latin America, and Africa.

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Russia

XV Congress of the International Association of Teachers of Russian Language

Published

6 days ago

September 18, 2023

Slavisha Batko Milacic

The XV Congress of the International Association of Teachers of Russian Language and Literature “Russian Language and Literature in a Changing World” began on September 13 in St. Petersburg. Outstanding Russian philologists from all over the world took part in the world congress. The objectives of the event and its significance for promoting the Russian language abroad were discussed at a press conference in TASS by the chairman of the congress program committee, adviser to the President of the Russian Federation, president of MAPRYAL and ROPRYAL, chairman of the supervisory board of the Russkiy Mir Foundation Vladimir Tolstoy, co-chairman of the congress program committee, rector St. Petersburg State University, member of the presidium of the Russian Language Council under the President of the Russian Federation, co-chairman of the Russian Language Council under the Government of the Russian Federation, corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences Nikolai Kropachev and president of the Leo Tolstoy Institute in Colombia Ruben Dario Flores Arcila.

The XV Congress of MAPRYAL is the largest event in the life of world Russian studies, in which about 600 delegates from 63 countries of the world take part: specialists in the field of scientific description and teaching of the Russian language, literature, theory and practice of translation, lexicography and other aspects. During the congress, 418 reports will be presented, which will present a whole range of international studies of Russian studies – from teaching methods to translations of literary texts and analysis of phraseological units.

As the President of MAPRYAL and the Association of Teachers of Russian Language and Literature, Chairman of the Supervisory Board of the Russkiy Mir Foundation Vladimir Tolstoy noted, today MAPRYAL has 130 collective and 65 individual participants, and interest in the study of the Russian language and Russian literature is only growing around the world.

“This year, new colleagues from Argentina, Venezuela, Qatar, Kenya, Nigeria, Lebanon, Peru, Senegal, Tanzania, Ecuador, as well as our old friends from the CIS countries, Asia, the Balkan region, countries of Eastern and Western Europe joined the work of the congress . We are grateful to St. Petersburg State University for its active participation in organizing the congress,” said Vladimir Tolstoy during a press conference.

The XV Congress is being held in Russia for the first time in 20 years, and St. Petersburg is becoming its capital for the second time in the history of the event. In 2003, it was held in St. Petersburg on the initiative of the outstanding Russian scholar, rector and president of St. Petersburg State University Lyudmila Alekseevna Verbitskaya, who is the author of more than 300 scientific and educational works in the field of Russian and general linguistics, phonetics, phonology and methods of teaching the Russian language , as well as the significant project “Let’s speak correctly!” As part of the “zero” day of the congress, a sculptural portrait of Lyudmila Alekseevna Verbitskaya was unveiled at St. Petersburg State University, which will greet philologists and linguists every day.

Today, St. Petersburg University pays great attention to the study of the Russian language and its promotion abroad. The University has 112 Russian language centers, represented in 50 countries. In 2023, St Petersburg University opened Russian language centers in Indonesia, Malaysia, South Africa, Kenya, Algeria and Paraguay.

“SPbU has traditionally become the most popular university in Russia among foreign applicants. Citizens from 105 countries come to study at the University; the competition among foreign students is 21 people per place. Young people come to St. Petersburg University to learn Russian and study in Russian. St Petersburg University also teaches more than 100 world languages, including rare ones spoken in two or three countries. We teach our students not just foreign languages, but culture, history, economics, and law in these languages, because language does not exist separately from other areas of human life. I believe that today the Russian language is so popular and strong, partly because our country is open to all languages of the world. And it will always be like this,” said Nikolai Kropachev.

As the participants of the press conference noted, the rules for using the Russian language as the state language of the Russian Federation require special attention today. Rector of St. Petersburg State University, Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences Nikolai Kropachev noted that the changes made on behalf of Russian President Vladimir Putin to the Law on the State Language established new requirements for consolidating the norms of the Russian language, which must be observed in areas of compulsory use of the state language. Such norms must now be enshrined in normative dictionaries, reference books and grammars, the list of which will be approved by the Government. The normative dictionary must also define those foreign words that have no analogues in the Russian language and therefore can be used in the areas of use of the state language.

Associate Professor at the National University of Bogota, President of the Leo Tolstoy Institute Ruben Dario Flores Arcila spoke about the motivation for foreign students to learn Russian. In Colombia, Russian has been taught since 1944, when the Institute of Friendship with the USSR was founded. According to him, the first foreign articles devoted to the study of the work of the Russian writer Leo Nikolaevich Tolstoy were written in Colombia, Cuba.

“I am confident that Russian literature and the Russian language are special cultural codes that help foreigners understand the identity of Russia and better recognize the culture of this unique country,” said Ruben Dario Flores Arcila.

As part of the events of the XV MAPRYAL Congress, experts will pay attention to the methods of teaching Russian as a foreign language, various aspects of translating the works of Russian writers and poets into different languages of the world, discuss issues of reflecting cultural changes in language, and much more.

According to the director of the MAPRYAL secretariat, Alexander Korotyshev, the list of participants and topics of reports indicate that in order to competently teach and study the Russian language, you need to know a lot about both the culture and history of the country. “Modern methods of teaching the Russian language strive for accuracy in conveying linguistic facts and are literally “tuned” to the cultural and linguistic characteristics of different national audiences. The number of congress delegates suggests that interest in the Russian language in almost all parts of the world continues to grow,” added Alexander Korotyshev.

It should be noted that from September 1, 2023, on the basis of St. Petersburg University, with the support of the Government of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation, the online school of St. Petersburg State University began its work. A unique educational project allows schoolchildren from different countries to undergo training in Russian according to an approved educational program for grades 5–11 and receive a standard certificate. As the rector of St. Petersburg State University Nikolay Kropachev noted, the project already in the first year of its existence showed that studying in Russian is important in different parts of the world: the University received applications from schoolchildren from 44 countries.

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The XV Congress of MAPRYAL was organized by the International Association of Teachers of Russian Language and Literature together with St. Petersburg State University with the support of the Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation and the Russkiy Mir Foundation.

The first MAPRYAL congress was held in 1969 in the USSR, and since then it has traditionally been held once every five years in different cities around the world. Since 1969, MAPRYAL congresses have been hosted by Moscow, Varna, Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Budapest, Regensburg, Bratislava, St. Petersburg, Shanghai, Granada, Astana.

Russia

Common wealth of independent states

Published

1 week ago

September 15, 2023

Asifa Fida

The geopolitical environment of Eurasia underwent a profound change with the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. A new regional structure known as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) arose to deal with the difficulties and uncertainties that came along with this momentous event as the largest communist state in the world began to fall apart. The former Soviet governments that make up the CIS sought to maintain regional stability in the post-Soviet era while fostering political, economic, and cultural cooperation among its member states.

This research explores the intricate topography of the Commonwealth of Independent States and offers a thorough examination of its establishment, structure, and governance. We can understand the motivations behind the formation of this regional organization better by looking at the historical context of the demise of the Soviet Union and the CIS’s ensuing establishment.

This research’s main goal is to explain the political and economic aspects of cooperation within the CIS. We focus on the decision-making processes that have an impact on how the CIS functions as we examine the organizational structure of the CIS as well as the obligations of its member nations. We can gain a better understanding of the role the CIS plays in promoting regional stability by looking at political cooperation initiatives including those that address shared security concerns and participate in political and legal coordination.

The economic cooperation of the CIS nations is also examined, with an emphasis on attempts for trade and economic union. We evaluate the same economic issues these countries confront and look into the coordinated actions done to address them. We intend to determine how well the CIS is fostering stability and economic progress in the region by studying its economic component.

We take into account the CIS’s accomplishments and future advantages while also acknowledging its flaws and detractors. Both the efficacy of institutional processes and the internal problems brought on by disputes and conflicts among the member states are explored. We also look at how the outside world perceives the CIS, focusing on how Russia is seen as the organization’s dominant force and how the CIS is perceived as important and having an impact on global concerns.

Then, we evaluate the CIS’s possibilities while taking into consideration the modifying dynamics among its member states and the transforming global scenario. We look at possible areas for growth and transformation while examining the CIS’s role in solving fresh concerns and promoting deeper regional integration.

This research study aims to increase understanding of the Commonwealth of Independent States and its importance in the post-Soviet era by closely evaluating the group’s conception, structure, functioning, and prospects for the future.

Historical perspective

The Soviet Union’s fall in December 1991 is where the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) got its start. Moscow’s centralized control over the vast lands and several republics that made up the union came to an end with the collapse of the Soviet Union. A number of causes, such as economic difficulties, political changes, and the growing yearning for independence among the Soviet republics, led to the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

Following the Russian Federation’s declaration of independence, other former Soviet republics started down a similar road in an effort to assert their sovereignty and create independent states. In the Belovezhskaya Pushcha, a woodland reserve on the border between Belarus and Poland, the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus met when the Soviet Union fell.

They approved the Belavezha Accords on December 8, 1991, thus dissolving the Soviet Union and founding the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Creating a framework for coordination and collaboration among the newly independent countries was the CIS’s main goal. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was founded in 1991 with Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan as its founding members. More former Soviet Union countries were added as the CIS grew over time to comprise the 12 member states it does now.

In its early years, the CIS faced numerous challenges. The difficulties that the member states faced included economic hardship, political upheaval, and territorial disputes from the Soviet era. The CIS provided a forum for dialogue and collaboration to address these problems and maintain regional stability.

The CIS had problems accomplishing its objectives while being technically created. Some member states prioritized their own national interests over group efforts while others offered varying degrees of support to the CIS. The Soviet Union, which had an intricate web of connections covering politics, economy, and security, was no longer as intertwined as the CIS.

The CIS has changed in terms of operations and organizational structure over time. While some programmes have improved member state cooperation, others have had very little success or have mostly been token efforts. The organization, despite various levels of efficacy and influence, provides a space for communication and collaboration. Following the fall of the Soviet Union, an effort was made to encourage regional cooperation among the newly independent republics by creating the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Structure

Following the fall of the Soviet Union, independent nations established the regional organization known as the Commonwealth of Independent Nations (CIS). The CIS promotes intergovernmental cooperation and aims to deepen the links that bind its member nations politically, economically, and culturally. The CIS’s organizational structure is made up of a number of important parts, including:

Council of Heads of State: The Council of Heads of State is the CIS’s highest legislative body. It meets at least once a year to talk about and decide on crucial topics affecting the CIS. The participating nations’ heads of state or government make up this group.

The Council of Prime Ministers, also known as the Council of Heads of Government, coordinates and implements the decisions taken by the Council of Heads of State. It meets frequently to discuss and organize many aspects of cooperation and is made up of the heads of state or prime ministers of the member states.

Council of Foreign Ministers: The foreign ministers of the member nations make up the Council of Foreign Ministers. It acts as a forum for coordination and diplomatic dialogue on issues related to politics, security, and foreign affairs. The majority of the CIS’s foreign policy priorities are established by the Council of Foreign Ministers.

Economic Council: The member states’ economic cooperation is the main emphasis of the Economic Council. It aspires to improve economic integration, trade, and investment inside the CIS. The implementation of joint economic projects, the creation of common economic policies, and the encouragement of intra-CIS commerce are all coordinated by the Economic Council.

Sectoral Cooperation Bodies: The CIS has a number of specialized organizations that focus on particular sectors of cooperation. These organizations represent a wide range of professions, such as those in the legal, judicial, cultural, educational, and medical fields. They promote collaboration, knowledge sharing, and team projects in their specialized domains.

Functioning

A structure of intergovernmental cooperation and consensus-based decision-making underlies the operation of the CIS. The following elements are essential to how the CIS functions:

In the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), decisions are frequently reached by consensus. Negotiations and discussions among the member nations frequently result in important decisions. All key decisions and initiatives shall be developed and approved by the Council of Heads of State and Government and the Council of Heads of State.
Cooperation Agreements and Protocols: The CIS is governed by a number of agreements and protocols that set the standards for member state cooperation. These accords cover a wide range of topics, including cultural exchange, economic integration, and security collaboration.
Working Groups and Committees: The CIS creates a range of working groups and committees to help with the execution of decisions and objectives. These organizations are in charge of planning events, keeping an eye on initiatives as they take shape, and resolving particular problems within their individual spheres of expertise.
Joint Programmes and Projects: The CIS supports collaborative initiatives that encourage member states to work together and integrate. These programmes cover topics like infrastructure construction, international interchange, scientific research, and humanitarian aid. Bilateral and multilateral agreements among member states are used to implement joint programmes and projects.
Interaction with International Organizations: The CIS is in touch with other international bodies as well as regional groups. In order to address shared difficulties and advance shared objectives, it cooperates and engages in discourse with organizations like the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).

The CIS aims to improve cooperation and collaboration among its member states in different political, economic, and cultural domains by operating within its organizational structure and functional framework. The operation of the CIS has, however, altered over time as a result of changing member state dynamics and a more general geopolitical environment.

Political and economic cooperation

A crucial component of the CIS’s operation is the political collaboration between its member states. It seeks to solve shared security issues, advance regional stability, and foster political and legal discussion. The following are some of the important CIS political cooperation areas:

Common Security Issues: The CIS focuses on resolving common security issues that member governments encounter. Combating terrorism, drug trafficking, organized crime, and illegal immigration are included in this. To improve regional security, the member states work together through collaborative initiatives like intelligence sharing, law enforcement coordination, and joint military exercises.
Regional Stability Initiatives: The CIS contributes to efforts to maintain peace and resolve disputes in the region. In order to resolve territorial disputes and disagreements between member states, it develops procedures for discussion and negotiation. The group promotes peaceful dispute resolution procedures, aids in negotiations, and offers a forum for communication between disputing parties.
Cooperation on Political and Legal Issues: The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) promotes cooperation on political and legal issues with the goal of harmonizing legal systems among member states. There are initiatives to harmonize legal frameworks, improve judicial collaboration, and advance the rule of law. Through discussion, the sharing of experience, and cooperative projects, the organization also addresses topics including human rights, democratic government, and electoral procedures.

Another important part of the CIS’s operation is economic cooperation, which aims to improve trade, investment, and economic integration among member states. Among the crucial components of economic cooperation within the CIS are the following:

Initiatives for Trade and Economic Integration: The CIS promotes intra-CIS trade and economic integration through a number of programmes. The establishment of a free trade zone, standardization of customs practices, the removal of trade restrictions, and the mutual recognition of standards and certifications are all included in this. Processes for trade are streamlined, cross-border travel is made easier, and investment flows are encouraged within the CIS.
Economic Reforms, Market Transitions, and Infrastructure Development are a few of the common problems that the CIS member nations must deal with. To meet these problems, the CIS promotes the sharing of knowledge, best practices, and technical support. Key economic sectors are developed, innovation is encouraged, and economic growth and stability are fostered through joint efforts and projects.
Joint Energy and Transportation Projects: The CIS places a high priority on energy and transportation cooperation. In order to develop and manage energy resources, such as oil, gas, and power, the member states work together. To improve regional connection and guarantee dependable energy supplies, projects including pipelines, power grids, and transportation networks are launched.
Financial Coordination: The CIS encourages member state coordination in the financial sphere, notably in the areas of capital markets, banking, and insurance. The region’s financial systems are being strengthened, monetary cooperation is being improved, and financial transactions are being made easier. Initiatives to stop corruption, money laundering, and illegal financial activity are also supported by the CIS.

It’s significant to note that over time and across member nations, the extent of political and economic cooperation within the CIS has changed. While some programmes have produced observable effects, others have run into difficulties because of conflicting national interests, economic inequalities, and geopolitical factors. As member states adjust to shifting conditions and work to further integrate the region, the efficacy of political and economic cooperation continues to change.

Challenges and Criticisms

The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) has encountered the following difficulties and criticisms:

Challenges:

The member states of the CIS have a variety of political, economic, and security interests. This could make it more challenging to conduct collaborative activities and achieve genuine cooperation. It could also make it harder to coordinate on important topics and develop consensus.
Institutional Weaknesses: The CIS’s institutional framework’s efficacy has been called into question. Some detractors contend that the organization’s capacity to respond quickly to new challenges is constrained by the bureaucratic and delayed decision-making processes. Concerns concerning the implementation of cooperative measures are also raised by the absence of enforcement procedures for agreements and protocols.
Conflicts and Disputes: Left over from the Soviet era, the CIS has had to deal with persistent conflicts and disputes among its member states. Territorial conflicts, separatist movements, and racial tensions are a few of these. Such disputes can erode confidence and make it harder for employees to work together.
Economic Disparities: The CIS faces difficulties integrating and cooperating economically due to the widening gap in wealth between its member states. Achieving equitable and sustainable economic cooperation may be hampered by differences in resource endowments, diverse economic systems, and varying levels of development.
Perception of Dominance: There has been criticism and worry over Russia’s perceived dominance inside the CIS. Some contend that the organization’s power dynamics are unbalanced as a result of Russia’s sway and ability to make decisions, which eclipse the interests of smaller member nations.

Case Studies

The case studies below demonstrate the difficulties and dynamics that the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) faces:

Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh: Within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Armenia-Azerbaijan war in Nagorno-Karabakh has continued for some time. Azerbaijan’s Nagorno-Karabakh territory, which is predominantly populated by ethnic Armenians, is the focus of a disagreement that has led to a protracted conflict and a precarious security situation. The CIS has attempted to aid in a peaceful resolution of the conflict through its processes and mediation efforts. Despite this, the crisis has brought to light issues like how difficult it is to come to a sustainable peace deal, how different national interests affect discussions, and how ineffective the CIS is at settling conflicts.

Conflict in Transnistria: The conflict in Transnistria, a province of Moldova that seceded, is still active. In 1990, Transnistria proclaimed its independence, sparking a bloody struggle between Moldova and the separatist territory. The Joint Control Commission, a CIS peacekeeping force, has been actively involved in maintaining tranquilly in Transnistria. The issue is a great example of how challenging it is to negotiate with separatist parties and how challenging it is to forge durable agreements inside the CIS.

Relations between Russia and Ukraine have had a significant impact on the dynamics of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine and Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 have strained relations between the two nations..

Future Prospect

Future prospects for the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) are uncertain and rely on a variety of factors. Within the organization, increased efforts by member nations to collaborate on security, political, and economic fronts may be seen. Increased collaboration in sectors like energy, transportation, culture, and education might lead to greater wealth and advancement for everybody. Along with forging ties with other regional organizations, the CIS may also need to adapt to altering geopolitical circumstances. However, problems such as divergent national interests, institutional shortcomings, and on-going conflicts between member states may continue to have an impact on how the CIS develops in the future.

The organization will need to deal with these concerns, encourage consensus-building, and effectively react to the changing requirements and aspirations of its member states if it is to preserve its relevance and effectiveness in the years to come.

Conclusion

The CIS’s future will ultimately depend on how committed its members are to overcoming obstacles, fostering cooperation, and advancing shared objectives. The CIS has the chance to promote regional stability, economic growth, and interstate peace among its numerous member nations as the geopolitical landscape changes.

Russia

Developing Far Eastern Region Russia’s Priority

Published

1 week ago

September 14, 2023

Kester Kenn Klomegah

The Eastern Economic Forum (EEF) is held annually in cooperation with the Far East regional administration, in the city of Vladivostok. Three years of COVOD-19, followed by Russia’s ‘special military operation’ and the current geopolitical situation have adversely affected this corporate business event, as Russia looks towards East and made its focus to develop the Far East.

Russian President Vladimir Putin said at the opening session that the government would not allow the pace of development to slacken in the Russian Far East as it is a strategic region for the country. “We will definitely not be scaling down the pace of development in the region, because the development of the Far East is an absolute priority for Russia, a direct priority for Russia as a whole for the entire 21st century, because it is a colossal region with a small population but huge potential. Of course, this is a strategic interest for the country,” the president said at the Eastern Economic Forum, which Vladivostok is hosting on September 10-13.

Putin further pointed out that it is necessary “not only to hold on to this region, but also to develop it and put its resources to work for the benefit of the state.” According to the president, “it is necessary to talk not only about the development of mineral resources in the Far East, it is necessary to build even more enterprises for the processing of industrial raw materials, so as to increase the added value.”

Putin later held discussion with Vice Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China Zhang Guoqing. Both noted that Russia-China relations in this area – the area of economic cooperation – have reached a very high level. This is a derivative of what has been achieved in the political sphere, but the results are excellent, as every year trade grows by almost one third. This year, over the first seven months, trade is up about the same amount, 24 percent – to as much as 120 billion. The goal President Xi Jinping and Putin have set – to reach the US$200 billion mark in trade – can be achieved by the end of 2023.

In addition to above, Putin held discussion with Deputy Prime Minister of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Pany Yathotou, also on the sidelines of the Eastern Economic Forum. Russia and Laos have made significant contributions to the development of bilateral parliamentary relations.

Russian Deputy Prime Minister, Yury Trutnev, earlier reiterated that the forum has been the world’s leading platform for discussing economic and political issues. The largest delegations are from such countries as China, Myanmar, India, Mongolia and Laos. He also expressed confident that a large number of new investment agreements with foreign participation would become the outcome of the forum. The Far East region expects new projects, technologies and jobs. And also to strengthen the Far East’s position in the system of economic relations in Asia Pacific.

For the past few years, Western and European businesses have largely been missing in this forum. And those from the Asian and Pacific are getting fewer and fewer as opportunities seem monotonous and speeches have the same message relating to world geopolitics. Business people are really for business opportunities, not geopolitics. Business people are simply looking for the unique products, services and profits.

Nevertheless, at the start of the forum the photo exhibition «Developing the Far East!», organized by the Corporation for the Development of the Far East and the Arctic with the support of the Office of the Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the Far Eastern Federal District and the Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East, opened in the departure area of the domestic terminal.

The exposition presents a chronology of images: a decade during which unique conditions for business development were created in the Far East, more than 2.8 thousand investment projects were launched, about 700 of which have already been put into operation.

According to analysts interviewed by Russian media Izvestia, the forum’s agenda will be comprehensive, covering both domestic Russian and external economic issues. “This year, due to the greater focus on the East that has emerged in the country’s economy, the agenda for discussions are extensive, on both internal domestic and external issues,” according to Vladimir Klimanov, Associate Professor and Director of the Center for Regional Policy at the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA) Institute of Applied Economic Research.

Anton Kobyakov, Adviser to the President of the Russian Federation and Executive Secretary of the EEF Organizing Committee, says participants have the chance to exchange experiences, discuss networking practices at EEF events including a plenary session, panel sessions, round tables, and business dialogues. The main theme of this year’s forum is “The Path to Partnership, Peace and Prosperity” fixed by Roscongress Foundation. The Eastern Economic Forum will be held on 10–13 September 2023 in Vladivostok on the campus of the Far Eastern Federal University.