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Blurring The Lines of War and Peace: Gray Zone Conflicts in New Era of Great Power Competition



Abstract: The nature of warfare has evolved continuously and in contemporary era the role of irregular wars along the spectrum of warfare has enhanced rapidly amid great power competition. This research paper tries to highlight the new concept of gray zone tactics, its application tools and implications on international system. How this dimension would  manipulate the relations between state actors and impact the strategic lexicon. The research paper highlights that why is it necessary for statesmen to differentiate between the thin line of war and peace and assesses how is it impacting the relations among the competing powers. 


In the contemporary era the spectrum of conflict has evolved over the years. Lines  between war and peace have become the new arena of battlefield for various major actors in at the international level. This new irregular form of warfare has engaged states and non-states actors into a low intensity  conflict which  comprises using a mixture of elements including political, diplomatic, economic, military and non-conventional along with information and cyber warfare to pursue their objectives. The increasing turmoil caused by increasing ingression, physical intervention, economic and diplomatic coercion by major powers such as US, Russia with use of regular forces and proxies in Eastern Europe, Middle East, and Northern Africa along with the support of regional actors respectively .

In South East Asia the South China Sea region is becoming the focal point of power competition and friction between status quo and revisionist powers and has seen increase in political, economic and military tensions . The staging of coup attempts with support of rogue elements and use of economic sanctions and military in Latin American region for establishing spheres of influence . Thus, these emerging low intensity conflicts and hostilities using elements of national power ranging from political, economic, military and non-military elements is increasingly shifting the principles of warfare and diplomacy at international level among the major stakeholders contesting for power . This has brought the international system into a dilemma  as it struggles to counter the emerging threats due to lack of norms and doctrines  effecting their strategic calculations.

The change in modes of warfare is not new but as the methods  for conducting war has evolved over the time. Thus, these changes call upon formulation of new doctrines and strategies to be adopted for better understanding and countering the emerging challenges. The changing nature of warfare strategies are based on engaging the enemy with an indirect approach which is above the line of normal diplomatic practices and below the threshold of an all-out war . This scenario has been described by various scholars as a Gray Zone Conflict in the strategic studies lexicon which is  in broad manner means the activities which are conducted beyond the steady state deterrence in an attempt to obtain security objectives without resorting to direct use of sizeable force in conventional manner. Clausewitz has described this notion of change in warfare as a chameleon which in connotative manner reflects the constant flux and change in the warfare spectrum at strategic, doctrinal, operational and tactical levels.  Although this approach is not new and existing strategic terms such as indirect, low intensity, irregular guerrilla warfare, and hybrid warfare already exists.

The emergence of new terms call upon need for comprehending, understanding and formulating strategies and doctrines within the strategic community to counter the emerging threats ranging from change in spectrum of conflict. The blending of regular and irregular warfare during Napoleonic wars during from 1812’s when Russian militias embedded with regular Russian army to fight against French. In 1813 Prussian militia filled out Prussian regular units positions which were raised by Carl Von Clausewitz. In 1776 during US Civil War, George Washington raised and commanded regular troops and irregular militias from 13 British colonies and formed Continental Army to fight against the Great Britain.   

War is considered to be a political activity in international relations.  The legitimacy for any act of aggression and war is actually carried out according to the national interests of a state which are dictated by a political objectives. As level of analysis states that nations pursue their national interest (either offensive or defensive in nature) under the political objectives by using its elements of national power including diplomatic, economic, military and information devised under the grand strategy . The grand strategy is the outcome of the coherent strategic culture of a nation state which impacts the thought process of decision making bodies. Strategy which is often defined in terms of warfare but is not confided to spectrum of war alone and is equally valid and viable in peace time also.

Strategy in international relations is defined as the implementation of political objectives with the use of military power by state actors which may include forms of deterrence, coercion to use of physical force, military alliances and reassurance, protraction and attrition, cyber and information warfare campaign.  The use of military power in order to wage war calls upon carrying out campaigns which is the operational part for implementing strategy. Operational campaigns calls upon conducting various tactical actions in time and space inflicting damage to enemy’s decisions, will and material capabilities in order to wage war. Tactics at the tactical level impacts on how the military forces engage and directly fights with the enemy .

Another major factor which regulates and accounts the interaction between two or more actors in international relations during war and peace is the spectrum of conflict or warfare. The spectrum of conflict/warfare measures the scale and means which are adopted and used by various rational actors and concludes whether they are proportional or not in use of force during their interactions. The spectrum of conflict at higher end would undertake the aspects of conventional and regular use of military force, including the use of nuclear deterrence or the use of chemical or biological warfare in theater conventional level or all-out war . The non-conventional or irregular war in low intensity conflicts irregular warfare, hybrid and gray  zone conflicts using of proxies and terrorism, attacks carried out via in cyber and space domain, along with the manipulation through psychological operations and information warfare in the lower half of the spectrum. 

Gray Zone Conflicts

The evolving nature of warfare makes it difficult for the strategists to understand and differentiate the challenges at hand and formulate policies accordingly. For this purpose defining the emerging concepts is necessary and crucial. Defining the Gray Zone Conflict as the state which lies in between the murky borderline of war and peace is not sufficient and would call for further explanation. The Gray Zone Conflict is defined as an alternative approaches adopted by states to obtain their interest by using and exploiting tactics which lie in between the state craft and open warfare with potential to substantially escalate hostilities and violence. Various statesmen, national security practitioners, military leaders and diplomats including academicians have used a variety of terms to define the threats that have emerged from military conflicts which are below the threshold of conventional warfare. The Gray Zone Conflicts partially are defined as, “Use of irregular warfare techniques with a mix of soft and sharp power tactics, hybrid warfare, political warfare, strategic competition and active measures including intelligence assessments and geospatial awareness.”

The concept also includes unique combinations of intimidation, coercion, influence and aggression to create effective resistance and manipulating risk perceptions in one’s own favor for obtaining regional advantages. The definition furthers highlights the major aspect that an actor indulging in Gray Zone Conflict is to avoid crossing the threshold of outright conflict while moving gradually towards acquiring objectives described under national interest instead of seeking conclusive outcome as in limited time. Another definition for the Gray Zone approach includes the tools used for information warfare, manipulation of the integrity of the institutions and distortion of political environments of the targeted states. Thus, the concept of evolving new warfare dynamics includes the subversive activities in the realm of politics, economics, diplomacy and sub-conventional warfare gradually without crossing the threshold of total war.

The Gray Zone Conflicts could also be defined by identifying following elements.

Bounded Thresholds

The Gray Zone Conflict consists of set of observable activities that are threatening the state craft but is short of direct military engagement between major actors. While, it is difficult to define accurate, precise and universal parameters we can say none the less that the gray zone techniques primarily seek to avoid direct conflict, any war engagement and escalatory tripwires. The actors that engage in using Gray Zone tactics seek to acquire the stated objectives gradually and slowly. The actors try to potentially accrue those objectives which were previously acquired through regular military expeditions. In this Gray Zone Conflicts the actors might also engage in violence by adopting the use of non-state actors, proxies and other means of distortion and obfuscation while remaining below the threshold of rivals escalatory limits.

Intentionally Veiled Security Interests

The actors in international affairs use the Gray Zone Tactics in pursuit of their security objectives which might be obscured and vague. The link between he tactics employed and the security aims and objectives may be veiled by the actors. These security objectives may include the economic, diplomatic military and information objectives. Information and economic tactics could be used to manipulate the will and economic standing of the enemy.

Multi-Dimensional Toolkit for Gray Zone Tactics

The means adopted by the actors engaged in Gray Zone Tactics to curtail enemy’s capabilities while engaging below the threshold of the regular war not by traditional legal and functional categories. The use of concealed security intentions without implementing full spectrum state power. The role of non-state and quasi-state entities use is crucial in Gray Zone conflicts while exhibiting hybrid capabilities including coercive force and economic strategies with ambiguous legal connections of the state.

Disinformation Operations

The use and inclusion of disinformation and information operations for bolstering the narratives of state using them simultaneously and in synch for fomenting social and political instability in the adversary states.

Public and Private Sector Domains

The boundaries between public and private sector domains are blurred in the Gray Zone conflicts as the actors actively use state and private enterprises as cover up activities. The private entities are used for the reason that they can evade the legal, bureaucratic and governmental checks and balances and state authorities. Private companies could also be used to undermine political processes and hold citizens at direct risks.

The Gray Zone Techniques could also be defined as the series of efforts that are used to advance an actors security objectives at the expense of the rivals using means that are associated beyond those within the arsenal of routine statecraft and below the means of direct military conflict. Thus, by engaging in the gray zone conflict the actors avoid crossing a threshold that results in direct engagement of war.

The use of these tactics could also be accessed by the analyzing the following toolkits:

Information and Disinformation Information Operations

Use of print, electronic and cyber media domains to manipulate and distort the information or spread disinformation to create confusion and perish the enemy’s will to resist by spreading propaganda and sowing doubt.

Political Coercion

The use of coercive instruments which can illicit or licit tools to affect and manipulate the decision making and political composition process within a state to reach for a desired outcome.

Economic Coercion

The use of coercive economic and financial tools, use of sanctions, illicit financing, effect the exchange rate, balance of trade of an adversary to achieve desired objective.

Cyber Operations

Use of cyber domain to wage attacks in cyber domain by hacking, using viruses, trojan attacks, attack critical infrastructure, carry out disruption in communication, distortion of information and manipulation of political processes using malicious malware in cyber domain.

Space Operation

Outer Space has become a competing zone for major power actors and they are in constant friction to maintain their dominance and hegemony by disrupting the competitors position of advantage  by interfering in space-enabled services, equipment, communication and satellites data uplink procedures.

Proxy Support

Use of non-state, quasi state elements to wage or obtain military objective or control a certain territory to influence or achieve specific political outcomes.  

Provocation by State Controlled Proxies

The use of paramilitary elements in conjunction with private entities while aiding and financing them to achieve certain interests through informal use of force. This also includes sabotage activities, clandestine intelligence operations and use of private military contractors which operate outside the realm of normal state control and authority.

Hybrid Warfare

Before we move forward with realizing the ground realities and implementation of gray zone tactics by discussing the geospatial events we have to define and differentiate another over-rated terminology used in contemporary era to define the emerging nature of irregular warfare, i.e. Hybrid Warfare. The Hybrid warfare is the neologism which was described by Frank Hoffman as a, “Nature of warfare that infuses and incorporates a range of various different modes of warfare including a mix of conventional warfare tactics with irregular warfare and indiscriminate use of violence and coercion, terrorist acts and criminal disorder.” Hoffman basically defined his findings in his article Conflict in 21st Century after studying and analyzing the ongoing US War on Terror in Afghanistan and Iraq post 9/11and also the Israel-Hezbollah conflict in 2006, in which he compared the battlefield challenges faced by western forces while fighting against non-state actors.

Another reference for defining the terminology of Hybrid Warfare is credited to Russian Chief of General Staff of  Russian Army Valery Gerasimov who in his article wrote that the rules of warfare have changed highlighting the role of non-military means as essential for achieving political and strategic goals and non-military means have surpassed and exceeded in effectiveness over the power of force of weapons. He propagated the use of political, economic, diplomatic and.  Valery summarized his findings from analyzing the civil wars ensued after the Arab Spring and highlighted following major factors essential for waging a hybrid warfare.

Nature of Military Operations

The nature of military operations is based upon groupings of line-units.


The nature of warfare is highly maneuverable and non-contact combat operations are carried out by line-units based upon inter-branch groupings.

Engaging Critical Infrastructure of the Enemy

Weaken the military-economic base of a state by engaging its critical infrastructure in a short period of time rendering the enemy in a compromised position.

Use of Precision Munitions

The use of high-precision weaponry  at large scale with the use of special operations forces aided with autonomous weapon systems and inclusion of civil and military component in combat operations.

Simultaneous use of all spheres of warfare

The simultaneous use of all kinetic and non-kinetic assets including line units autonomous weapon systems, in physical environment and information spheres in asymmetric and indirect operations.

Command and Control

The command and control of all the assets must be in a unified manner controlled by information domain.

Contours of Grey Zone Conflicts and Great Power Competition

The new modes of unconventional warfare using irregular tactics to obtain strategic goals while remaining below the threshold of war is also evident from the 2015 US National Military Strategy which highlighted that due to emerging great power competition implies that the security and defence strategies of US are heavily relying upon unconventional and irregular warfare strategies based upon counter insurgency and terror operations, foreign internal defence and stability operations with consideration of containing the influence of major states in the American area of interest which indicate shift from the global war on terror strategy post 9/11. US indicated emerging rival powers Russian and China, while rogue state elements such as Iran and North Korea as major threats apart from other groups of non-state actors. This point was further highlighted in the 2017 National Security Strategy which indicated that US considered political, economic and military competition from major threat powers as a major to its security.

The US had over the years tried to engage and contain the potential adversaries without directly engaging them into direct conflict. Thus, these new areas of conflicts are identified as Gray Zone Conflicts which require use of unconventional and irregular warfare strategies, information space and cyber domain for accomplishing the strategic goals. These strategic priorities amid the great power competition are recognized by the changing character of war. The change is driven by the change in technological advancements in computing, artificial intelligence, robotics, big data analysis, autonomous systems, biotechnology and directed energy weapon systems. Thus, these tectonic shifts in technology has impacted the ways and means of conduct of warfare and by declaring certain issues as Gray Zone Conflict has enhanced the role of US to intervene, manipulate and exploit a certain conflict according to its own interests without directly engaging into any conflict.  


Gray Zone Conflicts although a new term in the strategic lexicon has now been gaining ground in the international relations domain with pace. State actors in the international system have realized the role and importance of manipulating the thin line between war and peace and how to tread on this line while maintaining diplomatic courtesy and remaining under the threshold of a conventional war. As Clausewitz has rightly mentioned that the nature of war is like a chameleon, following the new trends in the warfare spectrum in light of gray zone tactics toolkit help us observe these shifts in the nature of warfare and new emerging trends much more vividly. The major powers have been exercising these policy options using various tools for gray zone tactics especially using cyber and space domain along with state controlled proxies and conducting such acts with impunity and relaxation. The major reason for this is that there are no international norms and frameworks that control the actions of state actors and private entities in this domain of irregular warfare spectrum as states tend to exploit the bounded thresholds between state craft and total war.

Moreover, as the trends for direct conflict engagements and conventional wars have decreased the major powers have increasingly adopted the irregular warfare norms and gray zone conflicts in particular to further their veiled interests while, tip toeing over the escalatory tripwires and treading the thin line between war and peace. As major powers are adopting to this new architecture of threat spectrum the role of international institutions and platforms have increased than ever before to maintain a viable lifeline providing communication channels and help erode mistrust and uncertainty among major competing powers. Unfortunately, there is a likelihood of an event when a state actor accidently might not be able to maintain the brinkmanship by misreading the actions of the opponent and result into a devastating and utter chaos.

I am a keen reader of international relations and political studies with specific interest in low intensity conflicts.

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India’s Maritime Security Strategy in the ‘Century of Seas’



21st century has been very aptly called the “Century of the Seas”. The core argument of the “Father of Sea Power,” Alfred Thayer Mahan’s- “The Influence of Sea Power” was that the secret to Empire building was the Sea Power or the Naval Strength of a nation. This has been proved repeatedly and still holds a lot of relevance today, specifically for a country like India which possesses a very strong maritime asset having a coastal length of 7516.6 km with world’s second largest peninsular area of 2.07 million sq. km. Regrettably, India has suffered from an intellectual vacuum historically with regards to policy making in the maritime domain in spite of being one of the oldest seafarers in the world, its maritime history dating back to 3000 BC (Indus Valley Civilization). But with the shift in power dynamics from Euro Atlantic to Indo Pacific, it has realized that its geopolitical aspirations cannot be fulfilled without giving the due importance to Maritime domain. The Government certainly thinks that India is ready to explore and expand its maritime domain by not just observing from the shore but by obtaining a larger stake in it.

India’s approach to Maritime security is quite holistic, it is not just about deploying battleships or policing the seas like Britain did in 19th century and China is doing now. Our intentions were made noticeably clear on the international forum when Prime Minister Narendra Modi chaired a high- level debate on maritime security in the United Nations Security Council in the month of August last year. This unanimous adoption of the “Presidential statement” was the UNSC’s first ever outcome document on this theme in which issues like piracy, economic development, marine environment, and illegal fishing were discussed. SAGAR (Security and Growth for all in the Region) initiative taken in 2015, focused on Sustainable use of oceans with cooperative measures. As a part of this policy, our Navy assisted many countries in the Indian Ocean Region in tackling piracies, disaster relief, search and rescue. A framework for security, safety, and stability in the region was the key objective of this mission. India aims to create a holistic and congenial maritime environment for not just its neighbors but for all the international players.

India’s soft power was always ahead of its hard power but for the last decade it has been trying to strike a balance by cautiously and carefully expanding its Maritime Power so that it does not threaten its neighbors while protecting its interests. Indian Navy has stepped up its overseas deployment by securing agreements with other strategically located nations for military access to their bases which include Indonesia’s Sabang Port, Oman’s Duqam port, America’s base at Diego Garcia and French base on reunion island. India has also invested in commercial ports like Chabahar which is under controversy at present but to build a large information radar network and boost cooperation with partners across the region, investment in commercial ports present in countries like Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Seychelles, and Mauritius etc. must be given priority.

To demonstrate its pursuit through interoperability, India has become a part of various bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral partnerships and has drastically improved its Naval Diplomacy. It conducts and participates in a plethora of complex Naval Exercises with countries which share common interests and strategic convergence like UAE, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, Vietnam, Britain, Philippines, Sri Lanka, South Africa, Indonesia, Singapore, Brazil, and Quad members. These exercises serve the objective of demonstrating a shared vision of free and open Indo-Pacific. India also hosted the IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa) meet where the respective NSAs

discussed and agreed to setup their cooperation around Marine Security in 2021, it also invited these members were also invited to be a part of MILAN 2022 exercise in which more than 40 countries participated. Walter Ladwig argued that Indian Naval Expansion, thus shaping the maritime strategy existing today, involves three things: prevent intrusion from hostile powers, project power based off India’s interests, protection of the SLOCs[1].

The Naval Strategy forms a major part of Maritime Security Strategy, and the latest Doctrine by the Indian Navy released in 2015 -” Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy” is the revised and updated version of the previously outlined strategy released in 2007- “Freedom to Use the Seas: India’s Maritime Military Strategy”. A bold change in tone and sharpening of India’s   Maritime aspirations can be observed. Primary areas of interest as understood from the doctrine involve India’s immediate coastal neighborhood, the Bay of Bengal, the Arabian Sea, the Andaman Sea, the gulfs of Aden and Oman, Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. A significant amount of emphasis is given to the commanding of the sea and controlling of the chokepoints thereby securing the sea lines for open trade and communication. Indian Ocean has a roof over its head, which is not a good thing for a water body because the only entry and exit points in it are through 9 choke points or the navigational constrictions. These can easily give rise to transnational crimes which are dangerous from geostrategic aspect. From developmental aspects in the Indo-Pacific and the Asia-Pacific regions, the major chokepoints to be protected are Strait of Malacca which hosts 50% of world’s merchant fleet capacity, the Bab-el-Mandeb, which has principal oil shipping lanes, and the Strait of Hormuz, 40% seaborne crude oil passes through it.

Secondary area of India’s Strategic Maritime interest includes the South and East China Sea, Southeast Indian Ocean, Mediterranean Sea, the Western Pacific Ocean, Antarctica, and the West coast of Africa. To increase its Naval presence in these areas, India has started pushing towards marine expansion, power projection and naval modernization. India’s maritime force is transitioning into a “building navy” which was previously considered as a “buying navy”, that confirms its alignment with India’s “Make in India” for attaining self-sufficiency and self-reliance. The strategy of modernization and indigenization of the aircraft carriers, frigates, destroyers, submarines, corvettes, combat aircrafts and patrol crafts may sound promising but will only be effective if the delay gaps between the dates of delivery and actual commissioning are reduced. Ensuring Secure Seas states that “in order to ensure sustained presence, the Indian Navy will comprehensively address the twin issues of ‘reach’ and ‘sustainability’ of naval forces.”[2] This will include the concepts of longer operational cycles, mixing the force ratio between strike groups, enhancing logistical support and extending reach through naval air power.

There are many driving actors that influence the changing paradigm of India’s Maritime Security Strategy. The nuclear-powered countries, Pakistan, China, United States, and other non-state actors play a vital role. Pakistan Navy’s face value does not seem to be capable of posing a threat to India, but it does possess sea-based nuclear armament and under-sea warfare elements which present a significant challenge. Just like any other nation in the region, Pakistan also has economic stakes in the Indian Ocean. Typically, it does not have any “Blue-water” aspirations but when combined with the strength of PLAN, it can indeed become formidable to be countered. China, is clearly marching towards becoming the global superpower by directing its energy towards the sea

1 Walter Ladwig, “Drivers of Indian Naval Expansion,” in The Rise of the Indian Navy: Internal Vulnerabilities, External Challenges, ed. Harsh V. Pant (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2012), 25.

2 Directorate of Strategy, Concepts and Transformation, Ensuring Secure Seas.

or in theoretical terms following the Mahanian principle. It has exponentially increased its footprint in the Indian Ocean region in recent years which is directly posing a threat to the stability of this area. But the document ‘Ensuring Secure Seas’ see China as a partner in maritime cooperation and not as a threat. According to John Garver, the PLAN has sufficient capability “to seize the Andaman Islands in the Bay of Bengal as an effort to control the Strait of Malacca chokepoint.” In terms of technology, Indian and Chinese navies are equally equipped but India has an advantage in aircraft carriers whereas China in undersea warfare.

US Navy is one of the most powerful navies in the world, and being an economic superpower, Indian Ocean Region is of great strategic concern for US. PRC’s growing relations with Pakistan has strengthened US’s relations with India, it has emerged as a strategic maritime partner. Deals signed between Ministry of Defence, India and American contractors have further built up the cooperative security in the region so even after being capable, US navy certainly does not have the intent to dominate India in the maritime domain. India’s Naval Doctrine has mandated that the “Indian Navy will project combat force in and from the maritime domain, and undertake offensive action for national defence.” This projection of combat force will involve a consolidated effort across the spectrum of maritime warfare to include anti-surface, anti-submarine and anti-air warfare demonstrated from all platforms in the navy’s inventory. The Indian Navy’s aspirations for power projection and sea control are similar in maritime doctrine to the United States, whose proven combat operations at sea can attest to success of said doctrine.[3] This conceptual mirroring will allow for better cooperation among the two maritime nations.

The maritime strategy of a country must be in alignment with the economic and political realities of it. Indian Navy’s new doctrine “Securing the seas” elevates it above its previously assigned ‘Cinderella Service’ role. India has high diplomatic, economic, and military stakes in the Indian Ocean Region. Interestingly, last decade has witnessed the shifting contours of India’s attitude, it has become more aggressive, upfront, and competitive in this domain. India is already a key player and the main security provider in the region, if it sustains the momentum that it has set, China’s assertiveness cannot stop it from becoming the leader in the evolving Maritime architecture.

[1] Walter Ladwig, “Drivers of Indian Naval Expansion,” in The Rise of the Indian Navy: Internal Vulnerabilities, External Challenges, ed. Harsh V. Pant (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2012), 25.

[2] Directorate of Strategy, Concepts and Transformation, Ensuring Secure Seas.

[3] Century of the seas- unlocking Indian maritime strategy in 21st century

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The Profits Side of the War in Ukraine



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The war business is extremely profitable, because governments are willing to spend anything in order to win. In a country such as Russia, where all of the weapons-manufacturing firms are 50%+ owned by (controlled by, and serve) the Government itself, profits are not the main objective, national-defense is; but, in a fully (or nearly fully) capitalist country, such as the U.S. and its allies, the people who control the decisions are actually private investors, and profits are their main (or only) objective; and, so, the controlling investors in ‘defense’ firms hire agents (including politicians) in order to control each of their main markets, which are their own country and the countries that those investors are allied with. Also, in order for their weapons to be able to be used, target-nations are needed, whom those armaments-investors (and their news-media) declare to be their nations’ “enemies” and consequently to be lands that their weapons should be targeted against (if “enemy”) or to defend (if “ally”). Both “allies” and “enemies” are needed, in order for these investors to have a thriving armaments industry; and both “allies” and “enemies” are needed in order for those companies to have markets (their own nation, and its “allies”) and to have targets (the “enemies”). The key here is that in order to maximize the profits of armaments-firms’ investors, they need to control their own Government, because that Government will determine which other nations are also markets (“us”), and which other nations are instead targets (“them,” or “enemies”). These investors therefore need to control, above all, their own Government, in order for them to succeed, to be, themselves, “winners” at the investing-game. These investors also tend to control their nation’s ‘news’media, because those businesses validate the Government’s “allies” and “enemies”; and thereby validate its invasions (so as to pump their weapons-sales). And this is the way that capitalism functions; and it is the way that imperialism (which is a natural adjunct to capitalism, because capitalism serves investors above all — not workers, nor consumers, but specifically investors) has always functioned, in order to produce wars (which serve only the wealthiest).

Perhaps the world’s largest and most effective marketing organization for U.S.-and-allied armaments manufacturers is NATO, but many others (perhaps not so well known) also exist, and sometimes provide more candid information to the public. 

Here are relevant highlights from an interview with Ukraine’s Government, at a major recent international trade-show by U.S.-and-allied weapons manufacturers, as published by the trade magazine for America’s armaments-industry, National Defense, whose publisher is the National Defense Industrial Association:


“BREAKING: Ukraine to U.S. Defense Industry: We Need Long-Range, Precision Weapons (UPDATED)”

by Stew Magnuson, 15 June 2022

The war-torn nation desperately needs artillery and artillery rounds, but what can truly give it the upper hand over its Russian invaders are long-range precision weapons such as armed Predator drones, loitering munitions and the multiple launch rocket system.

Denys Sharapov, Ukraine’s deputy minister of the defense in charge of procurement, support for weapons and equipment, and Brig. Gen. Volodymyr Karpenko, land forces command logistics commander, spoke with National Defense Editor in Chief Stew Magnuson and other reporters through an interpreter in the Ukraine Ministry of Defense’s booth at the Eurosatory conference in Paris on June 15. …

At Eurosatory this week, you’re meeting a lot of defense companies. What are your expectations since they normally sell through their own countries? What’s the purpose of talking with companies and not countries?

Sharapov: So those are parallel processes. There are constant government negotiations on all levels, diplomatic levels, military levels, ministry-to-ministry — both ministers of foreign affairs, ministers of defense — I believe this is not only an ongoing dialogue, but this is unprecedented dialogue.

It doesn’t matter whether we work with private enterprises or government enterprises, any weapon transfer is made upon the decision of the government. So that’s why we are really hoping for the support of those governments. …

Our readers are about 1,800 corporate members of the defense industrial base in the United States. What message do you have for them? And what do you need from them urgently?

Sharapov: The [Ministry of Defense] is concentrating currently on fulfilling all the needs of the armed forces. You asked a question about needs. First, you have to understand that the frontline is 2,500 kilometers long. The frontline where there is active combat in more than 1,000 kilometers long. That’s like from Kyiv to Berlin. … As of today, all the people in all of our armed forces and within the defense and security sector is up to one million people. And we have to support them all. We have to supply them with small arms, with personal protection gear and with the means of communication. …

We have received a large number of weapon systems, but unfortunately with such a massively expendable resource, it only covers 10 to 15 percent of our needs. We need artillery, we need artillery rounds, infantry fighting vehicles, combat vehicles, tanks. We really need air-defense systems and the multiple launch rocket system.

Also, high-precision weapon systems, because we believe that high-precision weapon systems will give us an edge over the enemy, the upper hand in this war.

There is a debate in the United States about whether to send Ukraine armed Predator drones. How important are they to your fight?

Sharapov: The party that will win in this war will be the party that will first start using contemporary high precision equipment and weapon systems. And those drones that you mentioned, they are a part of the modernized, highly accurate, highly precise, modern equipment. …

As of today, we have approximately 30 to 40, sometimes up to 50 percent of losses of equipment as a result of active combat. So, we have lost approximately 50 percent. Approximately 1,300 infantry fighting vehicles have been lost, 400 tanks, 700 artillery systems. …

Equipment that has gone to the rear of the frontline is maintained solely by Ukrainian specialists that have been trained by different foreign companies for that specific purpose. …

Quite unfortunately for us, we have become the biggest consumer of weapons and ammunition in the world. And we’re hoping to receive support from the entire Europe and the entire world. …

At Eurosatory this week, you’re meeting a lot of defense companies. What are your expectations since they normally sell through their own countries? What’s the purpose of talking with companies and not countries?

We really expect that the governments we’re cooperating with will fully support their weapons factories in support of Ukraine.

My first Eurosatory was 20 years ago. And all those years Ukraine was a seller of weapons. And this is the first exhibition when instead of being a seller of the weapons, we have become the largest consumer. This is the first year of Eurosatory where we are represented not by our industry, but instead by our ministry of defense, who is the consumer, who is the client, the purchaser of all these weapon systems. …

You can trust us with your weapons, your technologies, to use them to best of our abilities. We know how to use them. We know how to fight a war with them.

And it is largely due to the efforts of the Ukrainian armed forces that many foreign brands are currently on the front pages of newspapers. People are naming their children Javelin.


A good example of how this works is that Jeff Bezos owns the Washington Post, which is one of America’s leading marketers of U.S. invasions and wars; and his Amazon Web Services subsidiary supplies the cloud-computing services to the Pentagon, CIA, NSA, and entire Intelligence Community; so, he, himself (as Amazon’s top stockholder), is a major U.S. Government contractor. Subscribers to news-media in America are paying subscription fees in order to be inundated constantly with propaganda to increase the sales by contractors to the U.S. Government. The controlling investors derive part of their wealth (in Bezos’s case, a major part of it) from their Government, and another part of their wealth from selling to the subscribers to (and advertisers in) their publications and news-networks the propaganda that will cause the U.S. public to vote for their preferred political candidates and against the ones that those investors don’t prefer. This makes the entire operation “democratic,” even if the winning candidates of each of the two political Parties — both candidates — back even larger ‘defense’ expenditures by the one government in the world, the U.S. Government, that already spends approximately half of the entire world’s costs for ‘defense’.

The United States Government, and the Governments in Europe, don’t have enough money to protect the health of their people, and to provide the educational systems that they need, and to reduce crime, and to maintain and improve the infrastructure for them, but instead are prioritizing weapons-production, in order to defeat Russia on the battlefield of Ukraine, which borders Russia. That is their top priority. Ukraine has threatened Russia ever since Obama’s coup there in 2014. That was the opening round of World War III. Ukraine is an authentic national-security interest of Russia, because it’s on Russia’s doostep. That’s why Obama grabbed it. But Ukraine isn’t an authentic national-security interest of the United States, nor even of other nations in Europe. None of them were not only on Russia’s border but couped by the U.S. Government in 2014 and thereby transformed from being neutral to being rabidly anti-Russian. Russia struck back on 24 February 2022, which precipitated the current explosive boom for U.S.-and-allied armaments firms and their investors. Those investors are being well served by their Governments. But those nations’ publics are not. Is this democracy? Or is it instead fascism? Will one find reliable, trustworthy, evidence on that matter, in the newsmedia to which one has subscribed? In a time of war, should one seek-out to access, on a regular basis, especially newsmedia from countries that one’s own Government labels as being “enemies”? In a capitalist country, how can a person intelligently seek-out truth regarding international relations? It’s a real problem. Therefore, it is a problem that’s ridiculed (as ‘conspiracy theory’ or such) by all of the mainstream media in those countries. Sometimes, some things are too true to be publishable within the mainstream. That’s especially common in a dictatorship. Anyway, it is the case in U.S.-and-allied countries today.

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The New Nuclear Arms Race



Nuclear weapons are currently an international security issue. Lessons learned from past events have contributed to a global fear of such weapons. Simultaneously current events are indicating a global trend in nuclear proliferation, especially among powerful actors. States in possession of nuclear weapons are focusing on developing their nuclear capabilities and expanding their programs. Why is that so? Why are states still building nuclear weapons? Are these states conscious of the dangerous consequences involved? Are we experiencing the threat of a nuclear war?

In this paper, we will first define the term nuclear proliferation since it is key to understanding the different aspects of international security. Next, we will look at the different existing models explaining the current trend of nuclear proliferation and link these models to past events. Eventually, we will try to understand the recent developments in the field of international insecurity and analyze whether there is currently an international source of a nuclear threat.

Nuclear proliferation

It is important to understand the term nuclear proliferation. To do so, we need to define “proliferation”. The Cambridge Dictionary offers the following definition: “the fact of something increasing a lot and suddenly in number or amount“ (Cambridge Dictionary 2022). To simplify this definition, proliferation can be understood as “growth and propagation” (Rizky 2022).

So, what is nuclear proliferation? Nuclear proliferation is “a spectrum of possible activities related to the exploration, pursuit, or acquisition of nuclear weapons by states” (Rizky 2022). Therefore, it refers to the sudden rise in the number of weapons in circulation. Indeed, powerful states are focusing on developing their nuclear capabilities by building new weapons, perfecting their capability to build such weapons as well as investing financially in nuclear technology and its sophistication.

The main actors currently owning nuclear weapons are Russia, the United States, China, North Korea, Pakistan, India, Israel, France, and the United Kingdom (SIPRI 2021). However, not all of them are taking part in this pursuit of nuclear proliferation.

Reasons for the proliferation of nuclear weapons

Now that the meaning of nuclear proliferation is clear, another question emerges. Why do states still build nuclear weapons? International relations studies often offer an “obvious answer” to this question. Namely the idea of national security. States justify the building of nuclear weapons to ensure their national security in case of an external military threat. It is assumed that no alternative can guarantee their national security like nuclear weapons do (Sagan 1996).

However, this is an important question regarding the current global events and needs a more precise explanation. It is necessary to have a wide range of possible answers to envision the future of international security and its potential nuclear threat.

The answers can be divided into four different categories, respectively models. Namely the Security Model, which refers to the simple and basic answer found in most studies. The second one is the Norms Model, followed by the Domestic Politics Model and finally the Model we will be referring to as the Technological Race Model (Sagan 1996).

In Sagan’s article “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?” (Sagan 1996), he explains the three first models mentioned above. The first model refers to a state’s response to an external threat. States that have the financial resources, build nuclear weapons because it seems to be the safest option to ensure their national security. Weak states, however, states that could not invest in such expensive weapons, have the option to join alliances, such as an alliance with a nuclear power that would become an ally in case of a nuclear threat (Sagan 1996).

 Under this category, I believe there is also the idea of international anarchy. A powerful state hearing about another one building a nuclear weapon might consider this as a sign of potential threat. George Shultz explains this phenomenon as “Proliferation begets proliferation” (Shultz 1984).

Indeed, the proliferation started by one state will encourage another one to do the same and therefore take part in this nuclear proliferation as well (Sagan 1996). This phenomenon can be perceived as a post-war strategic reaction. In World War II the United States launched nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. These events provoked the current trend of nuclear proliferation. The USSR, the United Kingdom, France, China, India, and Pakistan all reacted in a similar way. They invested in the development of nuclear weapons, widened their nuclear capabilities, and intensified their national research in nuclear technology (Rizky 2022).

This leads us to the next model, namely the Norms Model. Sagan explains this category as followed: “Nuclear weapons decisions are made because weapons acquisition, or restraint in weapons development, provides an important normative symbol of a state’s modernity and identity“ (Sagan 1996).

Indeed, nuclear weapons nowadays are a symbol of prestige and power. Therefore, powerful states follow this unwritten, international norm to ensure their global recognition. They take part in this nuclear proliferation race to show what they are financially and technologically capable of.

Sagan argues that the symbol of possessing nuclear weapons is similar to the symbol of a state’s Olympic team or national airline. In some states, national airlines are established more to demonstrate their technological capabilities and valuable human capital of scientists than to offer an additional domestic mode of transportation (Sagan 1996).

I believe this is also the motivation behind the third model of Technological Race. Globally, the United States (US) has been recognized as the leader in advanced technology and artificial intelligence. Especially when looking at Silicon Valley and its potential. Nonetheless, in the past few years, the US has been caught up by China, which has now become its biggest competitor. This indeed provoked the US to invest even more in its research and that is exactly what it did in its nuclear technology sector (Rizky 2022).

As we can see, this model refers to one country’s whole image as a leader in technology. But, this is only the case from a technological perspective. There exists another model from a political perspective, namely the Domestic Politics Model.

This category demonstrates nuclear proliferation as a tool to ensure domestic political interest. Not necessarily national interest, but the personal interest of at least one politician respectively, one political actor. Indeed, it could be the military influencing a political decision to get a larger national defense budget and acquire nuclear weapons. In such a case, the perception of an external threat could be worsened to promote the necessity of nuclear weapons (Sagan 1996).

Recent developments

For decades, the world has been focusing on disarmament and reducing the number of nuclear weapons in circulation. Especially the main actors mentioned above were dedicated to promoting different treaties to avoid the spread. However, these public announcements, coming from wealthy, powerful nations in possession of such arms are contradictory to the current trend in nuclear proliferation (Al Jazeera 2022).

Even more surprising is the fact that the idea of disarmament has suddenly disappeared after the Russian attack on Ukraine. In fact, in a matter of months, actors in possession of nuclear weapons have announced to invest in nuclear arms in order to increase, modernize and optimize their arsenal. Countries that wanted to get rid of nuclear arms are now putting strong importance on the capability of their weapons. Russia’s threat of using nuclear weapons against Ukraine has provoked a common global reaction to get ready for potential danger (Al Jazeera 2022).

Therefore, it seems like Russia’s war has already activated a nuclear proliferation trend, stronger and faster than in the past decades. A new nuclear arms race has started, altough this time it is not about technological capability and artificial intelligence. This time it is about being prepared and ready for a potential attack from a country possessing the world’s largest nuclear arsenal (Hille 2022).


To conclude, the Russian attack on Ukraine has provoked large, powerful nations to rush toward the development and modernization of their nuclear arms. This reaction has not only accelerated the proliferation of nuclear weapons but also created a threatening environment.

Nevertheless, I believe there will not be a World War III, even if Russia threatens to use its arsenal against Europe, because too much is at stake. The world is aware of the catastrophic consequences a nuclear attack can cause and has learned from the past lessons. Putin’s behavior is his way of showing the world how powerful he is, what resources he owns, and what he is capable of. There is no need for fear since his announcements are pure arrogance and bluff.

The large nations who joined the nuclear arms race are reacting to his threats as the world expects them to. Namely, appearing to act, preparing, and making sure their arsenal could be operated at any time, even if they are not sincerely planning on doing so. Governments expect to reassure their population by taking action and guaranteeing national security.

Therefore, the reason this nuclear arms race is happening is due to Russia’s threat of nuclear attack and led to international governments taking actions such as discussed in the Domestic Politics Model.

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