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Terrorism, Radicalisation and Legitimacy

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Terrorism

In discussions about fighting terrorism, the word “radicalisation” is often used, yet its meaning remains unclear. Focusing only on intellectual radicalisation risks assuming that radical ideas are a proxy for terrorism or a crucial precursor when we know this is not the case. Different paths and processes of engagement in terrorism act differently for different individuals at different times and circumstances. 

This article examines the difficulties in defining radicalisation and radicalism and concludes that radicalisation, especially participation in terrorism, is best understood as a collection of distinct processes. It then discusses several potentially exciting theories, such as social movement theory, social psychology, and conversion theory, that could encourage future research into these processes. Further, the article describes potential frameworks for comprehending how the processes may assist terroristic activity. 

Radicalisation has been arguably the most common foundation for understanding micro-level shifts toward violence during the past decade. Nonetheless, the concept has evolved into more than just a dominant police paradigm; it has also become a holistic government strategy that includes vigilance, security, vulnerability, and civic engagement. With the introduction of this approach came a slew of analysts, consultants, and professors claiming “expert” knowledge of individual conversions to political violence. Relevant researchers on terrorism and extremism have yet to agree on a clearly articulated understanding of this notion. However, the term’s meaning and bounds are hotly debated around the globe.

The definition of radicalisationby McCauley and Moskalenko (2017) is “greater preparation for and commitment to intergroup conflict and violence.” Hafez and Mullins (2015) defined radicalisation as a “gradual ‘process’ including indoctrination into an extreme belief system that lays the groundwork for violence but does not guarantee it.”

However, Alex Schmid (2013) reassessed radicalisation to improve the consistency and objectivity of discussions around this concept. According to him, 

“an individual or collective (group) process whereby, usually in a situation of political polarisation, normal practices of dialogue, compromise and tolerance between political actors and groups with diverging interests are abandoned by one or both sides in a conflict dyad in favour of a growing commitment to engage in confrontational tactics of conflict-waging. These can include either (i) the use of (non-violent) pressure and coercion, (ii) various forms of political violence other than terrorism or (iii) acts of violent extremism in the form of terrorism and war crimes. The process is, on the side of rebel factions, generally accompanied by ideological socialisation away from mainstream or status quo-oriented positions towards more radical or extremist positions involving a dichotomous world view and the acceptance of an alternative focal point of political mobilisation outside the dominant political order as the existing system is no longer recognised as appropriate or legitimate.”

Although the term “radicalism” and its subsequent derivative “radicalisation” historically has had a much broader meaning, in the context of contemporary studies and policymaking, the term “radicalisation” typically refers to a path that leads to terrorism, a gradual slide into extremism or fundamentalism, or, more generally, a movement toward justifying violence and eventually engaging in it. The great majority of definitions agree that radicalisation is a process; nevertheless, they disagree on where this process will go after it is complete. 

For instance, the European Commission’s expert group on radicalisation describes radicalisation as “socialisation to extremism that emerges as terrorism” (European Commission Expert Group 7). In contrast, the United States Department of Homeland Security describes radicalisation as “the process of acquiring an extreme belief system, including the readiness to advocate or use violence as a means” (US Department of Homeland Security). Institute for Homeland Security Studies According to some official definitions, it is a path that leads to terrorism. For instance, in the United Kingdom, it is defined as “the process through which an individual comes to support terrorism and forms of extremism that lead to terrorism” (House of Commons Home Affairs Committee).

People in representative democracies have the freedom to voice views that go to the core of issues (precisely what the word “radical” denotes) and the right to advocate for significant changes to political, economic, or social systems. Many of the concepts European “radical groupings” proposed in the late 19th and early 20th centuries were ultimately incorporated into the conventional conception of political liberalism (widening the franchise, redistributing property, freedom of the press, etc.). 

This is likely why liberal constitutions protect the rights of individuals to defend radical or unusual opinions and limit free speech only when it incites violence, is offensive or is vulgar. The rules that govern the realm of thoughts are opposed to the laws that govern the world of actions. Individual conduct is rigorously watched, especially when it involves the illegal use of violence against non-combatants that is not state-sanctioned. 

Individuals and organisations who use violence without discrimination confront justifiable objections in open societies. For instance, the experts commonly use “radicalisation” while discussing Salafists and the ultraconservative Islamists. These groups are notorious for their relentless proselytising and support for ISIS and Al-Qaeda. Since Salafists are affiliated with both of these terrorist organisations, this is the case. Radicalisation, however, is not contained in one aspect or region of the globe. It is seen in all types of terrorism, including leftist, rightist, anarchist, ethno-nationalist, and religious terrorism. 

Prior research and analysis support the assumption that there is no one causal pathway or explanatory theory that applies to all types of individuals. According to Walter Laqueur (2003), the search for a “universal theory” of terrorism is erroneous since “many terrorists exist, and their traits change over time and between nations.” The same seems to be true of the radicalization process.

Despite this, a variety of efforts have been made to articulate a fundamental sequence of stages, events, or obstacles that may apply to both cross-group and within-group kinds. How do individuals come to accept violent extremist beliefs (radicalise), translate them — or not — into reasons or imperatives for using terrorist action, and choose (or not) to participate in violent and subversive behaviour in the service of these ideologies? This seems to be the driving question for these initiatives.

To be clear, the great bulk of what has been written so far on “radicalization” into violent extremist ideas (particularly those supporting terrorism) is conceptual rather than factual. While the exact processes and sequencing of these changes are controversial, it is certain that various pathways and mechanisms function differently for different people. We may be able to design better-informed policies and procedures to curb and prevent the spread of violent extremism if we have a more sophisticated understanding of how this process unfolds inside and among organisations.

For decades now, the international community has worked to adopt impartial standards in times of conflict that prohibit the use of particular types of violence and weaponry by setting limits aimed to safeguard certain people and objectives. However, the neutrality of these regulations has traditionally benefitted the more powerful, leaving those with less power with few options for circumventing them. This explains why, after WWII, the greatest amount of victimisation has happened during non-international wars.

Consider also that the lack of international law to offer adequate procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes has all too often left protagonists with no choice but to resort to violence and, as a result of power imbalance, to violate the rules on the limits to violence. At a summit of chiefs of state in the Americas in 1961, President John F. Kennedy clearly said that “those who make peaceful revolution impossible make violent revolution inevitable.”

Thus, in the absence of effective mechanisms for peaceful conflict resolution and the rule of law that applies equally to all protagonists, the alternative is violence—and, more often than not, violence in violation of international humanitarian law and human rights law, which falls under the definition of terrorism.

Borum (2012) has sought to describe the driving elements that drive radicalisation, particularly militant Islamist radicalisation in Europe, by looking outside of the existing radicalisation paradigm.

Background factors or personal struggles with religious identity, experience with discrimination, etc. Trigger Factors or specific events that could provoke antipathy or activism; finally, Opportunity Factors include the individual’s degree of access and exposure to extremist ideas, such as physical and virtual spaces where she/he is likely to meet like-minded people. (ibid). Additionally, in developing a functional explanation for political radicalisation, McCauley and Moskalenko (2017) describe it as “a stronger readiness for and commitment to intergroup confrontation.” They outline the process using the Pyramid Model, with the base of the pyramid consisting of all persons who sympathise with the terrorists’ stated goals. All individuals who wanted the “Brits out” in Northern Ireland were part of the Irish Republican Army’s support base.

As with the staircase model, the pyramid’s higher levels are associated with decreasing numbers but increasing radicalisation among individuals regarding their views, attitudes, and behaviours as we go from the base to the apex. It was previously stated in this article that the process of radicalisation differs amongst persons.

McCauley and Moskalenko go even farther, describing how radicalisation occurs at several levels, including the individual, the group, and even the masses. Individuals may become radicalised for a number of reasons, including personal victimisation, political grievances, and joining a radical organisation, either via an existing membership with the group of a loved one or by a prolonged process of self-radicalisation. Even though self-radicalisation has been heavily debated, the presence of a group dynamic has been demonstrated to be critical for radicalisation, and an increasing number of psychological studies have shown the deadly potential of self-radicalisation.

Milgram’s 1963 experiment sought to ascertain the conditions that might persuade someone to do ”evil’. The experiment required volunteers to shock a person who answered a question incorrectly. As the number of incorrectly answered questions increased, so did the shock voltage until a lethal voltage was administered. Although no genuine shocks were administered, the individuals were unaware of this. The majority of participants gave what they thought were lethal quantities of electricity. While the experiment’s primary goal was to understand the concept of obedience in humans, it also helped explain how people could transform into radicals simply because an authoritative figure promised them significance within a group. This provided them with enough motivation to disengage from the evil they were committing morally.

Further talking about the legitimacy or non-legitimacy of radicalisation, for decades now, the international community has endeavoured to develop impartial rules in times of war that restrict the use of certain forms of violence and armament by establishing limitations designed to protect specific persons and purposes. However, the neutrality of these restrictions has historically favoured those with more power, leaving those with less power with few choices for evading them. This explains why, following World War II, the highest number of victims have occurred in non-international conflicts.

Moreover, the lack of international law to provide proper processes for the peaceful resolution of conflicts has often forced protagonists to resort to violence and, as a consequence of a power imbalance, to breach the norms about the boundaries of violence. It has always been easier for nations to proclaim self-defence and legitimacy, whereas aggrieved groups have found it more challenging to make the same claims. A significant example is an Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Regardless of the nature of the violent action, it is legal when carried out by Israel, with the rare exception of perhaps excessive use of force. Nevertheless, it is almost always terrorism when carried out by the Palestinians. Utilising violence to instil fear in a population has been a constant throughout history. Despite what contemporary politicians claim, terrorism, as we have come to call it, is not new, nor are its responses.

Nevertheless, regardless of whether terrorism is illegitimate or not, there are three critical qualities that, when combined, distinguish terrorism from other violent social engagements. First, a violent act is considered terrorist when its psychological effects on a specific population or social aggregate, in terms of widespread emotional reactions such as fear and anxiety, are disproportionate to its actual or potential material consequences, in terms of physical harm to both people and property (Aron, 1962). Second, for such violence to impact, it must be systematic and unexpected, often directed at targets selected for their symbolic value within a dominant cultural framework and within a particular institutional framework (Thornton, 1964; Walter, 1969). Third, the injury of such targets is utilised for communicating signals and threats, making terrorism a tool for communication and social control (Roucek, 1962; Crelinsten, 1987).

Even though there is reason to believe that various state and non-state actors initiate radicalisation in reactions to oppression, hatred, bigotry, and discrimination, classifying the workflow as legitimate or illegitimate would be reducing a comprehensive and multifaceted problem to strict binary functions. Leaders of violent extremist groups, for instance, may exploit Muslims’ perceived marginalisation across the globe. However, there is a heated intellectual and political debate on whether the perceived marginalisation of Muslims throughout the globe as a source of extremism is or just an interpretation of extremist goals. Human rights abuses and the perception of international hostility may radicalise diaspora groups for sure.

Several social scientists have identified legitimacy as a crucial issue in the study of terrorism. According to Martha Crenshaw, legitimacy is “a significant obstacle in conceptualising terrorism and, indeed, any kind of political violence.” Often, legitimacy is at stake in conflicts between governments and terrorist organisations; in these circumstances, one side disputes the legitimacy of the other. Crenshaw identifies far-left terrorists “Consider actions against the state to be morally permissible and question the state’s legitimacy. Frequently, right-wing terrorists “deny the validity of protest and believe that violence in the service of order is sanctioned by the significance of the status quo.” Lastly, impacted states claim legitimacy: a state under terrorist attack is often required to “maintain and defend its legitimacy while delegitimising the terrorist threat” (Crenshaw, 1983).

States and terrorist organisations must explain their use of force or violence to obtain legitimacy and show a genuine commitment to democratic values and objectives. Given these conditions, which are necessary but inadequate for establishing legitimacy, it should be clear that legitimacy claims are not just challenging to prove but also defensible once established. A state’s legitimacy crisis might be caused by a single act (denying its citizens the right to a fair and open trial) or a sequence of interconnected actions. Ultimately, this crisis may culminate in a challenge to the existence of a state or government; this challenge may take the form of substantial civil disobedience (as happened in France in May 1968), or it may be more violent.

According to the literature in the social sciences, terrorism has been utilised in response to analogous situations. In contrast, legitimacy is a challenging and complex term with legal, political, and moral ramifications. After establishing legitimacy as a crucial aspect in the struggle between governments and terrorist organisations, so, it is not unexpected that social scientists avoid discussing the issue.

I am a Postgraduate student of International Relations, pursuing MA in Diplomacy, Law and Business, specializing in Defense and National Security Studies, and South-East Asian Studies from the School of International Affairs, O.P. Jindal Global University, Sonipat, Delhi NCR. Previously, I have completed my BA in Philosophy (Hons.), and English Literature (Elective) from Hindu College, Delhi University.

Terrorism

Al-Assad -Xi Jinping: Confronting Turkestan Islamic Party and its relations with ISIS

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Perhaps after deep thought on my part about the other hidden reasons, in addition to the declared ones, about the reasons for Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad’s visit to China at this precise and sensitive time, I realized that the issue of the “Chinese terrorist Turkistan Islamic Party” and its extensions in Syria and its work with the terrorist organization ISIS  The Chinese authorities asked their Syrian counterpart to hand over Uyghur fighters to them and count their numbers.  Here it is necessary to draw attention to the fact that the transformation of Syria and Iraq in particular into a destination for jihadists from all corners of the earth was not a coincidental act, but rather an organized act by global and regional intelligence services, with the aim of flooding Syria and Iraq with foreign fighters. While European intelligence services were facilitating the passage of European jihadists to the Middle East and Syria, with the aim of getting rid of them, the finger of blame was directed at the role of Turkish intelligence in bringing in jihadists, led by Chinese Uyghur fighters from the Xinjiang region, and spreading them in Syria and Iraq.

  Perhaps this matter, despite its extreme sensitivity to China and its danger, related to the fighters of the Chinese terrorist Turkestan Islamic Party, or what is known as “Uyghur fighters”, may not have been extensively covered in analyzes of the reasons behind Bashar al-Assad’s visit to China, namely China’s attempt and the requests of its officials, at their forefront is the former Chinese Premier (Li Keqiang) in 2021. The Syrian side is requested to assist it in the issue of confronting the Turkestan Party and its expansion in Syria and its relations with the terrorist organization ISIS, which includes Chinese Uyghur fighters and is located in northwestern Syria. The separatist Turkestan Islamic Party, based in the Chinese province of Xinjiang, is considered a terrorist organization by the Chinese authorities, and its work in Syria is a branch of the Uyghur Turkestan Islamic Party, which works with the terrorist organization ISIS in Syria.

  The Chinese Ministry of State Security and its counter-terrorism agencies were keen to follow up on the official establishment of a branch of the terrorist Turkestan Islamic Party, which was established in Syria at the beginning of 2014, and which operates in Syria alongside the “Al-Nusra Front” (Al-Qaeda). The leader of the Turkestan Islamic Party in Syria was the terrorist known as “Abu Reda al-Turkestani”, who was killed by Syrian aircraft in a raid on Jisr Al-Shughur Hospital, which was his stronghold. He was followed by the liquidation of the terrorist “Ibrahim Mansour”.

  Due to the strong coordination between the Chinese authorities and their Syrian counterparts, the influx of Uyghur terrorists from China to Syria has decreased and may have stopped, specifically starting in 2018, and those who are still fighting with ISIS in Syria are the reason for maintaining the tense situation in the Latakia countryside and launching sporadic attacks on it.  With care to settle several thousand Uyghur terrorists and their families there.

  What was striking about the Chinese Turkestan Islamic Party in Syria was its participation in the demolition of Syrian churches by its fighters, members of the Uyghur Turkestan Islamic Party, who glorified the acts of destruction. The Turkestan Islamic Party also cooperated in the squares of Homs and Idlib with the Uzbek brigades and the Al-Nusra Front. Here, Jabhat Al-Nusra and ISIS are competing with each other to recruit Uyghur fighters. The flag of the Turkestan Islamic Party was placed in “Jisr Al-Shughur” above the cross of the church after the end of the battle, as evidence of their victory in it. Therefore, China fears that Uyghur fighters will return to it and cause unrest there, especially in  China’s Xinjiang region, and for this purpose it is trying to coordinate with the official Syrian authorities to count their numbers and try to arrest them and hand them over to the Chinese authorities.

 Western intelligence is trying to obstruct Russia and China by supporting separatist terrorist groups banned there. On the Russian side, Chechen terrorist movements are supported, and on the Chinese side, the East Turkestan Independence Movement is supported, which demands the independence of the Uyghur minority from the Chinese central government in Beijing.

  Here, the reports of the Syrian intelligence services loyal to the Bashar al-Assad regime indicate the presence of three thousand Chinese terrorist Uyghur fighters affiliated with the Turkestan Islamic Party, fighting in Syria alongside terrorist organizations, especially the Al-Nusra Front and ISIS.  Therefore, the meeting between Chinese President “Xi Jinping” and his counterpart Bashar al-Assad focuses on the issue of military and security cooperation between the Chinese security system and the Syrian security services, with a real intention made clear by China to increase its military support for the Syrian army, with the aim of combating and combating Takfiri groups. Specifically, Uyghur fighters of Chinese origin, whom Beijing considers a future threat to it, especially in the Xinjiang region in the west of the country.       

  Confirmations by the Syrian intelligence services indicate that Uyghur fighters have two main camps in the Syrian Idlib Governorate, the first in the village of Ehsim in the Jabal al-Zawiya area, and the number of those in this camp is estimated at about 2,500 Uyghur fighters from the Turkestan Party, while the second camp of the Chinese terrorist Turkestan Islamic Party is located in the town of  Two marshals in Jabal Al-Zawiya. This camp includes about three thousand Uyghur fighters. The Uighur fighters, who brought their families from the Chinese province of Xinjiang to Syria, are intending to settle some villages in Idlib Governorate, and take them as their main headquarters, especially in the villages of Jabal Al-Summaq, from which they expelled their people or confiscated their property in partnership with Jabhat Al-Nusra terrorists.

   Uyghur fighters affiliated with the Chinese terrorist Turkestan Islamic Party and its branch in Syria and its extensions with the terrorist organization ISIS are trying to find a foothold in Syria, specifically trying to create their own organization extending from the west of Idlib Governorate and the countryside of Latakia to the south and east of the Iskenderun district in Syria, with a plan in place to settle 200,000 Turkestan fighters in those areas inside Syria, including the families of Turkestan Uyghur fighters. The process of settling Turkestan families in towns such as Rabia, next to Turkmen and Jabal Al-Bair, up to the Salqin region, also took place on a large scale. The most dangerous is the construction of new homes and residential complexes for Chinese Uyghur fighters in Syria in the “Jabal al-Summaq” area in Harem.  Or even in Christian villages whose residents were completely abandoned by terrorists, such as the villages of (Al-Yaqubiyah, Al-Ghassaniyah, Hallouz, and Atira). There is also confirmed information that Turkey has granted its citizenship to more than 300,000 Chinese Uighurs since 2011.

  Therefore, the visit of Syrian President “Bashar Al-Assad” to China comes in a serious Chinese attempt to cooperate with the Syrian side and Bashar Al-Assad’s intelligence to hand over Uyghur fighters to it and limit their numbers, especially with the common Chinese-Syrian fear that the Chinese terrorist Turkestan Islamic Party in Syria will begin to establish (The Chinese Islamic Emirate of Turkestan) in northern Syria, provided that this emirate is led by the Turkestan fighter (Jund Allah al-Turkestani), in the Jisr Al-Shughur region in particular and other areas close to it, so that this would be the first recognition of its kind for the establishment of an emirate and settlements for the Turkestans in Syria, from those who are fighting since the beginnings of the Syrian crisis.

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Bad Strategies Boost Al-Shabab

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There is not much left to debate on the dangerous aspect of al-Shabab’s demonic doctrine that proclaims Islamic values and functions as mindless terrorists or bloodthirsty hoodlums, at best. At its core, al-Shabab is what it is. However, in recent years it has been transforming away from its original monolithic nature. Aside from becoming decentralized franchises with mercenary style function, it has infiltrated the Somali government, intelligence, and the traditional clan structure. That said, it would be naïve to assume that al-Shabab is the only source of violence and insecurity in Somalia. 

More than a year ago, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud declared an ‘all-out war against al-Shabab’ and vowed to take the fight to them in every remote village across Somalia. Therefore, he decided to partner with various clan-based vigilantes and armed them to fight al-Shabab. Some warned against that strategy due to its potential to further divide the country, fuel perpetual clan wars, and inadvertently strengthen al-Shabab. Almost a year and a half later, Somalia is barely surviving a worse scenario. Today, more and more clans are turning their guns on each other.

Worse, the Somali army and the highly trained counter-terrorism divisions Danab and Gorgor continue to get ambushed at night, massacred, their equipment taken, and others destroyed in remote villages and military camps in no man’s land in Galmudug and Hirshabelle federal states. These kinds of attacks that happened more than a dozen times—the worst and most under reported being Cowsweyne—are raising serious concerns. They are causing finger pointing, and profound distrust within the military apparatus.

Is al-Shabab strong enough to deliver these successive defeats against a much larger army that is backed by ATMIS and U.S.? Is al-Shabab logistically capable of executing deadly operations in various locations of a vast geographical area? How many fighters, combat technical and suicide trucks did they bring to execute such ambushes? How come on each occasion the massacred soldiers failed to hear the roaring engines coming at them? We are talking about rural areas where there are only dirt tracks that zigzag through a flat landscape. And at night one could hear the muffled sound of the coming truck from a far distance and could see its headlights from afar.  

Answers to these critical questions, and to get to the bottom of these mysterious attacks, would depend on whether you drank the Kool-Aid or not. In other words, if you are persuaded by the government’s version that al-Shabab is the only group behind all terrorist attacks—past, present, and future—you don’t need to read beyond this point. However, if you are pained by the scores of young commandoes being mysteriously terminated, or are simply in pursuit of truth, things are not the way they are officially presented.

Somalia, due to its abundant natural resources, lack of patriotic leadership, prevalence of high-level corruption, and relentless zero-sum political competition, is a lucrative, open-for-all illegal mining cottage industry. And Galgadud region, particularly around the town of El-Bur, remains the center of gravity regarding this latest, multi-actor, deadly competition for control.

War Is a Deception

In late August 2011, at that historic night when al-Shabab abruptly pulled out of Mogadishu, I received a good news call from a senior Somali official who told me something to the effect ‘Our mole was right. They are leaving.’ When I asked ‘Who?’ He enthusiastically replied: ‘Al-Shabab, of course.’ I was Somalia’s Special Envoy to the U.S. at the time. In the morning, local and international headlines were claiming that al-Shabab was defeated by a coalition of the Somali National Army and AMISOM. President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed declared al-Shabab “defeated,” and they declared it “a change of tactics.”

However, there were no face-to-face deadly battles between these entities that ultimately compelled al-Shabab to run for their lives. Al-Shabab was controlling almost all of Mogadishu and executing its terrorist attacks at-will. Likewise, it controlled the narrative as it owned more propaganda outlets than the government. But, behind the scenes, al-Shabab militants were being hunted down every night by killer ghosts- mercenary sharpshooters using military night vision and silencers. Al-Shabab militants were dropping like swatted flies when their leader, Ahmed Godane, realized the existential threat that his militants were facing and ordered immediate evacuation.

The ghost-lords of Halane, predatory capitalists, and their armed enforcers, have always been the x-factor. A few countries already have their own mercenaries to serve their interests. Sure, those interests may at times coincide or confluence with the national interest of their host nation. But let us not forget, mercenaries are neither disciplined and restrained by ethics or moral values nor are they accountable to any authority other than their next lucrative contract.  

Change of Scenery

On August 5, President Mohamud put on his military gear and set up a central command in Dhusamareeb of Galmudug region to lead the Somali military and clan militias’ all-out war against al-Shabab from there. He has been there more than 40 days. This raised many questions since the town of Mahas in the Hiiraan region was recognized as the ground-zero where that whole community declared war against al-Shabab.

Dhusamareeb is the headquarter or the bazaar of international illegal mining. A fierce competition is already underway between Ethiopia—the old field guardian—and mercenaries funded by U.S, UAE, and the late comer, uranium-desperate, European Union whose new Ambassador took a private plane to present her diplomatic credentials to President Mohamud in Dhusamareeb. An historic moment, indeed.

Meanwhile, President Mohamud cannot go to Garowe- the capital city of Puntland which is only 270 miles from where he is now stationed. Puntland has officially suspended its relationship with the federal government. It is now where Somaliland was three decades ago. 

Meanwhile, the people of Sool, Sanaag and Cayn (SSC-Khatumo) who have been living under brutal repression by Somaliland military have organized themselves in recent months and accomplishing what many thought impossible. They convincingly defeated Somaliland military and exhibited exceptional discipline for not chasing the fleeing army into their clan territory. Immediately after their victory, they officially declared their independence from Somaliland and appealed to the Federal Government to accept them as a federal state. With visionary leadership and the right strategy, this issue could have served as a catalyst to a Somali-owned, country-wide reconciliation process. But, President Mohamud pled deaf, dumb, and blind.

Danger still looms as this issue is likely to morph into a long military struggle. Neither Somaliland, nor UAE which heavily invested in Berbera seaport, nor UK which is Somalia’s penholder, and the trainer of Somaliland’s special forces are willing to accept this latest fateful development.

And as if all these are not enough, the federal government mandated citizens to apply for a digital national identification card. While this may be appreciated from the security perspective, for a nation whose constitution remains ‘provisional’ and what constitutes Somali citizenship is yet to be determined, this will only further divide the country. Because clan identity is strong in Somalia and these clans inhabit various parts of East Africa, the citizenship issue has been the most controversial issue since the trusteeship period (50-60).       

The emotionalization of the war on al-Shabab, and the muzzling of media reports has not only ensured President Mohamud jingoistic praises, it also emboldened him to declare victory over al-Shabab despite a large number of Somali soldiers getting killed and others being forced to evacuate almost every town or region they occupied for a short while. Things turned out so bad that President Mohamud had to sideline top military commanders, give the greenlight to reshuffle the government after the UN General Assembly, and request an emergency 90-day delay on ATMIS troops reduction.   

Any objective observer would question the logic driving the claim of victory against al-Shabab under the current circumstances. But thinking logically means questioning the government’s narrative, and that ironically is considered a treasonous act.

Sadly, the only thing that stood the test of time in Somalia in the past three decades is lustful greed and the attitude that integrity is not necessary in building trust and unity. The status quo preserves al-Shabab, sustains corruption, and makes failure a lucrative cottage industry. Neither the doner nations, nor the Somali government, nor the international non-governmental organizations want to see that industry under any form of scrutiny.

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Moscow remembers horrendous terrorist attack in Beslan

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On September 3, the Russian Federation is marking a memorable date, specifically, the Day of Solidarity in the Fight against Terrorism that became part of Russian legislation in 2005, a year after a horrendous terrorist attack in Beslan that killed over 300 Russian citizens, including children. This appalling terrorist atrocity was something unprecedented in terms of its meanness and brutality, and it highlighted the need to rally the entire international community against terrorism.

“We have to state that, in the current international realities, the issue of combatting terrorism has long since lost its unifying essence. The collective West that considers itself a beacon of democracy and human rights is openly waging a hybrid war against Russia. Not only is the West using Ukraine as a geopolitical battering ram against our country, but it is brazenly turning a blind eye on the terrorist essence of the Kiev regime and is sponsoring it,” official statement, released ahead of September event, said.

At the same time, the Western line to “isolate” Russia has not been crowned with success even in such a sensitive area as the fight against terrorism. The opinion of Russia remains significant and weighty during dialogue with friendly states. The Russian Federation prioritises cooperation with friendly states in the current complicated conditions of foreign policy turbulence. For example, we are collaborating rather fruitfully with our partners at various regional associations, including the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation. 

Close contacts between the security agencies of these associations’ member states are taking place under the auspices of the CIS Anti-Terrorism Centre and the SCO’s Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure. As for the CSTO, it can deploy its Collective Peacekeeping Forces in the shortest possible time, and this is an extremely important, effective and essential factor in facilitating counter-terrorism security in the zone of its responsibility.

Additionally, the BRICS Counter-Terrorism Working Group now ranks among the most advanced cross-regional formats. The BRICS Counter-Terrorism Strategy and the Action Plan for its implementation, drafted in 2020 and 2021 when Russia and India chaired BRICS, are the gold standard, reflecting an analytical and well-thought-out perception of real, rather than imaginary, terrorist threats.

The Russian Federation also supports constructive dialogue on counter-terrorism operations with the states of the African continent. The Declaration of the Second Russia-Africa Summit on Strengthening Cooperation in the Fight against Terrorism, signed following the Second Russia-Africa Summit in St Petersburg in July 2023, reflects the common approaches of our countries.

“We will continue to coordinate joint efforts in the above-mentioned multilateral formats, including those aimed at streamlining the existing mechanisms for coping with the security risks of the states involved,” the statement finally said.

The Beslan school siege and the Moscow theater siege were the toughest tests that Vladimir Putin went through during his 20 years in power. “Major terrorist attacks were the toughest to deal with. The Beslan school siege was one of them. I will never forget it. Another one was the Moscow theater siege,” Putin noted in the Kremlin.

Back in 2019, officers and rescuers who helped to release hostages from Beslan’s School No.1 in 2004 were awarded by Vyacheslav Bitarov in the Caucasus republic of North Ossetia.

More than 1,200 people were taken hostage during the terrorist attack at a school in the North Ossetian city of Beslan, which occurred on September 1, 2004, the first day of the academic year. The tragedy claimed 334 lives, including 186 children. Some 126 of these hostages became handicapped, of them 70 children.

The school, located next to the district police station, housed approximately 60 teachers and more than 800 students. Its gymnasium, where most of the hostages were held for 52 hours, was a recent addition, measuring 10 metres (33 ft) wide and 25 metres (82 ft) long. 

There were reports that men disguised as repairmen had secreted weapons and explosives into the school during July 2004, something that the authorities later denied. However, several witnesses have since testified they were forced to help their captors remove the weapons from caches hidden in the school. There were also claims that a “sniper’s nest” on the sports-hall roof had been set up in advance.

The attack at Beslan was met with international abhorrence and universal condemnation. Countries and charities around the world donated to funds set up to assist the families and children that were involved in the Beslan crisis. This School No. 1 was one of seven schools in Beslan, a town of about 35,000 people in the Republic of North Ossetia–Alania in Russia’s Caucasus. 

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