The topic I will analyse in this contribution is the presence of other political parties in the People’s Republic of China and the role they played in the struggle for liberation from Japan and against the Kuomintang (KMT) dictatorship.
The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) is a body of the United Front Central Department. It is still a key organisation in the development of multi-party cooperation through the leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and an important public discussion forum to promote democracy according to Chinese characteristics.
On the eve of May 1, 1948, the CPC’s Central Committee issued a call to convene another Conference after the failure of the previous one. In fact, on October 10, 1945 – in the aftermath of Japan’s defeat – Mao Zedong (1893-1976) and Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek, 1887-1975) had agreed on the reconstruction of the country and the convening of a consultative political Conference. It opened on January 10, 1946 with the participation of seven delegates from the CPC, nine from the Kuomintang, nine from the Democratic League, five from the China Youth Party and nine independents. After reaching agreement of February 25, 1946, the Conference stalled in July when Jiang Jieshi launched a large-scale offensive against the Communist territories with 218 brigades: the real start of the civil war. In December 1947, however, Mao announced that 640,000 nationalist soldiers had been killed or wounded and over a million had laid down their arms.
The call of April 30, 1948 was appreciated and immediately echoed by democratic parties, people’s organisations, non-movement personalities and overseas Chinese. On May 5, the leaders of the various democratic parties (including Li Jishen (1885-1959) and He Xiangning (1879-1972) of the KMT’s Revolutionary Committee (the former was its Chairman); Shen Junru (1875-1963) and Zhang Bojun (1895-1969) of the Democratic League’s leadership; Ma Xulun (1885-1970) and Wang Shao’ao (1888-1970) of the China Association for Promoting Democracy; Chen Qiyou (1892-1970) of the China Justice Party; Peng Zemin (1877-1956) of China Peasants’ and Workers’ Democratic Party; Li Zhangda (1890-1953) of the National Salvation Association; Cai Tingkai (1892-1968) of the KMT’s Committee for Promoting Democracy; and Tan Pingshan (1886-1956) of the Sanminzhuyi (the Three Principles of the People) Comrades’ Federation; as well as Guo Moruo (1892-1978), a person with no party affiliation) sent a joint telegram from Hong Kong to the CPCCC, to Mao Zedong and to the entire nation supporting the Communists’ call. Meanwhile, the Association for Promoting Democracy and the Jiu San (September 3) Society, which had established their headquarters in areas under the Kuomintang’s rule, held secret meetings of their Central Committees to welcome the CPC’s document. Mao Dun (1896-1981), Hu Yuzhi (1896-1986), Liu Yazi (1887-1958), Zhu Yunshan (1887-1981) and 120 Democrats issued a joint communiqué expressing their understanding of the CPC’s position.
Furthermore, 55 leaders of democratic parties and personages with no party affiliations issued joint comments on the political situation in China, declaring: “During the People’s Liberation War, we are willing to contribute to, and cooperate in, the planning of programmes under the CPC’s leadership, expecting to promote the quick success of the Chinese People’s Democratic Revolution for the forthcoming establishment of an independent, free, peaceful and happy New China”.
The Conference held its first plenary session in Beijing from 21 to 30 September 1949, with a total of 622 representatives sent by the CPC; democratic parties; independent personalities; mass and regional organisations; the People’s Liberation Army; ethnic minorities; overseas Chinese; patriotic democrats; and religious groups. The first session exercised the functions of a full-fledged parliamentary, legislative and constitutional Assembly of the nascent State until 1954, when the first National People’s Congress was elected.
The CPCCC adopted the Provisional Constitution (CPCCC’s Common Programme), the Organic Law of the CPCCC and the Organic Law of the Central People’s Government. It chose Beijing as the country’s capital; adopted the five-star red flag (Wu Xing Hong Qi) as the national flag and the March of the Volunteers (Yiyongjun Jinxingqu) as the national anthem; and opted for the Gregorian calendar. The session elected the CPCCC’s National Committee (NC) and the Central People’s Government Council. On October 1 – through the mouth of Mao, Chairman of the NC – it proclaimed the People’s Republic.
It is worth noting that the three NC vice-Presidents were not from the CPC: Song Qingling (1893-1981), widow of the Father of the Republic, Sun Zhongshan (Sun Yat-sen, 1866-1925), and honorary chairwoman of the KMT’s Revolutionary Committee; Li Jishen and Zhang Lan (1872-1955), President of the Democratic League. The CPC deputies were Zhu De (1886-1976), Liu Shaoqi (1898-1969) and Gao Gang (1905-54).
Besides the said personalities, many Ministries and offices were entrusted to members of other parties and independents. Those were not merely formal or symbolic acts, as the New China’s government needed experts, men and women who had also fought against Japan and the Kuomintang’s dictatorship. They included a large number of China’s leading scholars and technical experts. Shen Junru, an internationally renowned jurist, was elected to the Presidency of the Supreme People’s Court, the highest legal institution in the People’s Republic of China. Many scientists who had obtained their degrees in Europe and the United States of America, and were living abroad, were invited to return to rebuild the country.
Shortly after their founding, the democratic parties developed cooperative relations with the CPC at different levels, and such relations continuously made headway in their joint struggle against imperialist aggression. After the incident on September 18, 1931, the Japanese troops occupied the entire northeast China, bringing about an unprecedented national crisis. The CPC promptly put forward the proposal to create the National Anti-Japanese United Front, which was matched by enthusiastic responses from the existing democratic parties and various social groups. The CPC and the independent parties worked closely together in the resistance against Japanese aggression and for the unity and progress of the country. On July 7, 1937, the Japanese troops attacked the Lugou Bridge (Marco Polo’s Bridge) on the outskirts of Beijing, and the Chinese defenders fought back promptly. The Lugou incident marked the beginning of Japan’s all-out aggression against China, and of the Chinese War of Resistance against that country.
During the war, democratic parties and people from all walks of society supported the CPC’s position of “Yes to resistance, No to surrender; Yes to unity, No to separation; Yes to democracy, No to autocratic rule, urging the Kuomintang to implement political reforms, to establish a coalition government, to guarantee citizens’ rights, and to improve people’s living conditions.
After the victory over Japan in 1945, the CPC put forward peace, democracy and unity as the three general principles for national reconstruction. Those principles reflected the common desires of democratic parties and independents from various walks of society in the country. During the second civil war, the democratic parties publicly sided with the CPC and broke up with the Kuomintang.
After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the CPC continued to adhere to the policy of “long-term coexistence, mutual supervision, sincere treatment with each other and sharing of weal and woe” with the democratic parties. They enjoyed and still enjoy full rights and freedom of activity as recognised by the Constitution. Since 1950 the democratic parties have conscientiously participated in consultations on important issues concerning the country and the management of State affairs. They have encouraged their members and associated people to take part in all fields of work; and have provided significant contributions to socialism with Chinese characteristics. Many leading representatives of the democratic parties have been elected as deputies to the National People’s Congress (NPC) and are members of the CPCCC at all levels. Furthermore, many of them serve in leadership positions in NPC standing committees, CPCCC commissions, regional governments, and economic, cultural, education, science and technology Ministries at all levels. The democratic parties have grown in membership, through mainstream and local organisations established in most provinces of the country, in municipalities directly under the central government, in autonomous regions, and in different large and medium-sized urban areas.
The democratic parties cooperate with the CPC in the political and administrative management of the State, just as the former four/five-party coalition aligned under Christian Democrats’ “right leadership” did in Italy. At the time when the one-party governments of the Christian Democratic Party appointed all Ministers of the same party, the national governments in the People’s Republic of China entrusted responsibilities to some Ministers of political groups other than the CPC. After all, the class component of the Chinese democratic parties mirrored and still mirrors that of the Italian Social-Democratic, Socialist, Republican and Liberal Parties: national upper middle class, petty bourgeoisie in large and medium-sized cities, intellectuals and other types of citizens (patriots in China and opportunity-seekers in Italy).
The eight democratic parties recognised in China are the following:
Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang (Zhongguo Guomindang Gemingweiyuanhui)
After the start of the War of Resistance against Japan in 1937, the democratic members of the Kuomintang supported the National Anti-Japanese United Front promoted by the CPC and participated in patriotic activities. As of 1943, two Kuomintang factions planned to create the Sanminzhuyi (the Three Principles of the People) Comrades’ Federation and the KMT Association for Promoting Democracy (APD), respectively, to better carry out actions against the Japanese. The Sanminzhuyi held its first National Congress in Chongqing in the autumn of 1945, and the Kuomintang APD in Guangzhou in the spring of 1946. Each of them drew up its own political programmes, statutes and constitutions, and formally declared its own establishment. At the end of 1947 the two organisations joined together with further democratic elements of the Kuomintag and held the first Conference in Xianggang, which formally declared the establishment of the Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang (RCCK) on January 1, 1948. At the second Conference in November 1949, which was attended by independent personalities, the movement operated as a single political party. The RCCK is mainly made up of former KMT members and of those who had historical ties with the KMT itself, including a group of employees working in government organisations, as well as intellectuals in the fields of science, technology, culture, education and medicine (it has 101,865 members).
China Democratic League (Zhongguo Minzhu Tongmeng)
The predecessor of China Democratic League (CDL) was the China League of Democratic Political Organisations (CLDPO), founded on March 19, 1941 and consisting of the China Youth Party, the National Socialist Party, the Chinese Action Committee for National Liberation (later renamed the Chinese Peasants’ and Workers’ Democratic Party), the Chinese Professional Educational Community, the Countryside Construction Association, and some independents. The CLDPO held a national Congress in Chongqing in September 1944 and decided to become a party, by replacing group membership with personal membership and changing its name to China Democratic League (CDL). After the War of Resistance against Japan, the CDL insisted on opposing the Kuomintang’s autocratic rule and demanding democracy. In October 1947, the Kuomintang administration declared that the CDL was an “illegal organisation” and forced it to disband. In January 1948, the CDL held the third plenary session of the first CC in Hong Kong, and set up provisional national headquarters. The meeting declared that the CDL would cooperate with the CPC to strive for the full achievement of a democratic, peaceful and independent society and a united New China (it has approximately 230,000 members).
China Democratic National Construction Association (Zhongguo Minzhu Jianguo Hui)
The Association was founded on December 16, 1945 by a number of industrialists and businessmen belonging to the national bourgeoisie, as well as by some intellectuals who were closely involved in manufacturing and trade during the war of resistance against Japan. At that time, they met and held informal talks on topical issues. In December 1945, the Association was founded in Chongqing. It is mainly composed of national industrialists and businessmen, as well as experts in the field (approximately 100,000 members).
China Association for Promoting Democracy (Zhongguo Minzhu Cujinhui)
Founded in Shanghai on December 12, 1945, its original members were mainly intellectuals in the fields of culture, education, publishing and science (as they still are today). They lived in the aforementioned city during the period of the War of Resistance. The aim of the Association is to “carry out the democratic spirit and push forward the realization of democratic politics in China” (it has approximately 100,000 members).
Chinese Peasants’ and Workers’ Democratic Party (Zhongguo Nonggong Minzhudang)
The predecessor of the Chinese Peasants’ and Workers’ Democratic Party was the Provisional Action Committee of the Kuomintang or “Third Party”, founded in November 1927 in Shanghai by Deng Yanda (1895-1931), a well-known Kuomintang left-wing leader, and by other comrades (Deng was shot by Jiang Jieshi in 1931). In 1933 the Provisional Action Committee of the Kuomintang was one of the protagonists of the Fujian rebellion. In November 1935, the Committee changed its name to the Chinese Action Committee for National Liberation. As seen above, it participated in the establishment of the China League of Democratic Political Organizations in 1941. In February 1947, it was renamed Chinese Peasants’ and Workers’ Democratic Party. Most of its members are intellectuals in the fields of medicine, science, technology, culture and education (approximately 90,000 members).
China Justice Party (Zhongguo Zhigongdang)
The China Justice Party (CJP) derives from the Hung Society Zhigong Hall fraternity, based in San Francisco and composed of overseas Chinese. The said organisation was one of the decisive supporters of Sun Zhongshan’s revolutionary efforts to overthrow the Manchurian Qing [Ch’ing] dynasty.
The party was founded in October 1925 in the above stated US city and led by Chen Jiongming (1878-1933) and Tang Jiyao (1833-1927), two former Kuomintang warlords who had gone over to the opposition. Their first programme was federalism and pluralist democracy. The CJP moved its headquarters to Hong Kong in 1931 during the works of the Second Congress. After Japan’s coeval invasion of Manchuria, it began to engage in anti-Japanese propaganda and boycotts and devoted itself to mobilising the large crowds of Chinese expatriates to actively support the Chinese cause. The CJP was almost wiped out during Japan’s occupation of Hong Kong. The CJP shifted to the left at its third Congress in May 1947: it condemned the Kuomintang for fostering civil war and perpetuating autocratic rule. The headquarters were moved from Hong Kong to Guangzhou in 1950, and then to Beijing in 1953.
Its members are mainly returned overseas Chinese and their relatives, as well as experts, scholars and prominent figures with links and relations abroad (approximately 20,000 members).
“3 September” Society (Jiusan Xueshe)
Carrying on the spirit of the May 4th Movement of “democracy and science” and adhering to the aims of uniting to resist Japanese aggression and strive for democracy, a group of progressive intellectuals organised the “Forum on Democracy and Science” in Chongqing at the end of 1944. Later, in commemoration of the victory of the War of Resistance against Japan and the Axis powers on September 3, 1945, it adopted the name Jiu San Society (Jiusan means exactly “September 3”). On May 4, 1946, the “September 3” Society was officially established.
Its members are mainly intellectuals in the fields of science, technology, education, culture and medicine (approximately 100,000 members).
Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League (Taiwan Minzhu Zizhi Tongmeng)
The Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League was established in Hong Kong in November 1947 by Xie Xuehong. She had been one of the organisers of the uprising in February 1947 against the presence of the Kuomintang’s army on the island, which was suppressed with a massacre of the native population that resulted in 30,000 deaths. In fact, most of its founders are patriotic democrats originating from Taiwan. Its aim is to fight against imperialist aggression, and all regimes that support the separation of Taiwan from the mainland; to oppose the Kuomintang’s reactionary rule and promote the establishment of a people’s democratic dictatorship.
Its members are people who are either from, or have family roots, in Taiwan but currently live in China’s mainland (approximately 2,100 members).
What China Does Not Know about India
Indian authorities said on April 30 that they discovered Chinese smartphone maker Xiaomi Group had made illegal remittances to foreign entities by passing them off as royalty payments. As a result, they seized USD 725 million from Xiaomi’s local bank account in India. I deemed that the Chinese smartphone company has a misunderstanding of India and how the Indians do business.
China still does not comprehend India. While the Chinese often consider their own country as an ancient and great civilization, Indians consider India as an even more ancient and greater civilization.
India established diplomatic relations with China in the second year of the establishment of the People’s Republic of China. Following this, New Delhi issued a statement supporting China’s entry as a permanent member of the United Nations’ Security Council. Many Chinese, therefore, often perceive that China-India relations were rather good at that time. If not completely incorrect, this is at least a subjective misunderstanding of India on China’s part.
In reality, India prided itself as a great country in the world, vis-à-vis with Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War. By recognizing China, India showed the two great powers that it has the authority to self-determination.
For a long time, China has created an impression within the country that it is the founder of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Back in 1955, Indian leader Jawaharlal Nehru had already issued a call for the creation of the movement to the world, which gained support from many developing countries, including China. The rest of the world, including India, sees China as merely a responder to NAM. The world, not least India, perceive China to be a mere member of the NAM, not a founder. As the initiator of NAM, Prime Minister Nehru naturally became its spokesperson and leader of the organization. He was especially responsible for delivering speeches in many developing countries on international affairs.
From the points of India’s view, the well-known Bandung Conference held in Indonesia in 1955 has its origin as India’s idea as early as 1947. It was only because of India’s help that China was allowed to attend the NAM conference, which introduced the People’s Republic to the world. These perceptions of India are indeed, largely true. The relationship between India and China at that time was far closer than that between Pakistan and China today.
On the international front, India would even be chosen as a mediator in the disputes between the United States and the Soviet Union. President Dwight Eisenhower also complimented India at the Indian Parliament, saying, “India speaks to the other nations of the world with the greatness of conviction and is heard with greatness of respect”. It is rare for any U.S. President to heap this kind of praise on a country. Much later, President Donald Trump also inherited this momentum and arranged for Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to jointly hold a session in the United States, where they were well-received by both Indians and Americans alike. This certainly added to India’s national pride.
The Soviet Union at that time also recognized India’s status in the world, and it actively wooed India. Being able to make friends with India was synonymous with having several NAM countries as partners, which was anything but trivial. Indeed, from the past to the present, from India-Soviet friendship to today’s India-Russia relations, the two countries’ friendly relationship has a history of more than 70 years, and it has not changed despite numerous trials. The Chinese would make a blunder if they believe that such relationships could be challenged solely through the use of money.
“India was, I guess, the most positive example of USSR’s connections with non-socialist states,” states Sergei Lounev, professor of Oriental Studies at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations. The professor was certainly not exaggerating. As early as 1971, the Soviet Union and India signed a Friendship Treaty, pledging to act against any military alliance or aggression directed against either of the two nations. For the Soviet Union, it was the first such treaty signed with a country that did not formally embrace socialism.
All of this is history. However, the Chinese appear to understand India poorly, and the same is true in India’s understanding of China, resulting in frequent misperceptions. With its strong nationalist sentiment, India believes it is stronger, wiser, and better than China, and its actions would naturally reflect this belief.
Holding on to Uncle Sam: US-Taiwan Relations
The bilateral ties between the United States of America and Taiwan or the Republic of China (ROC) have developed through a peculiar and complex course. The relationship, however ambiguous, continues to form a crucial aspect of security relations in East Asia.
When the Communist forces led by Mao Zedong expelled Chiang Kai shek’s Nationalist regime, who fled to the isle of Taiwan in 1949, US President Harry Truman decided to accept the inevitability of the Communist victory in China and even planned to work out a bilateral relationship with the newly established People’s Republic of China without heeding much to the plight of his former ally Chiang. It was the eruption of the Korean War (1950-1953), which displayed the strength and danger of a Communist alliance between the Soviet Union, China and North Korea, that made President Truman realise the importance of supporting the staunchly anti-Communist regime of Chiang’s Kuomintang (KMT) as a bulwark against what became apparently the rising tide of Communism in the third world nations of Asia. The raison d’être of Chiang’s regime was to overthrow the Communist Party rule in Beijing and “reunify” Taiwan and Mainland China, an act that both the KMT and CCP believed would restore China’s historical rights over the island snatched away by the Japanese and would redeem the historical injustices it faced at the hands of the colonial powers. Chiang constantly insisted for the United States to help him in waging a war against Mao to achieve this objective. However, Washington was not ready to support another war in the region.
Chiang finally succeeded in framing Mao’s maritime offensive acts during the early 1950s as a growing threat and pursued the Eisenhower administration to sign with him the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty which promised military protection for his regime. The United States abdided by Chiang’s One China policy under which it recognised that Chiang’s Republic of China was the sole legitimate representative government of the one China that exists on the face of the earth.
It was by utilising Washington’s vast diplomatic clout that Chiang did not just earn non-socialist allies but also found place in the United Nations Security Council as a Permanent Member.
However, the golden days couldn’t last long. The growing differences between China and the Soviet Union became more apparent by the 1970s and gave way to clear enmity as border clashes and ideological tensions ensued. The United States saw this development as an opportunity to crack the socialist international alliance and decided to turn the dynamics of the security triangle between itself, Moscow and Beijing in its favour by recognising the People’s Republic of China. US President Richard Nixon’s visit to Beijing in 1972 and the Shanghai Communiqué that followed stated that ‘Chinese on both sides of the border believe that there is but one China’ and that ‘Taiwan is a part of China’. Washington left it to the CCP and KMT to decide which one represented the “One China” and promised not to intervene. In 1979, came a decisive shift as the United States established official ties with the PRC. Following Beijing’s non-negotiable One China Policy, Washington broke away all official ties with the ROC and officially recognised the PRC as the sole legitimate representative of the one China.
This came as a major setback for Chiang not just as a great betrayal but also as following Washington, several non-socialist allies like Canada shifted to recognise Beijing. Chiang refused to budge on his One China policy and broke away all ties with any country who recognised Beijing which costed him much of his diplomatic standing.
A major shock came when the issue of the permanent seat at the UNSC was raised. Washington asked Chiang to accept simultaneous representation of both ROC and PRC but the latter refused it and as UNSC Resolution 2758 was raised at the 26th United Nations General Assembly to oust ROC, Chiang staged a walkout thus leaving the space for the PRC to gain. What followed was a period of diplomatic isolation as by 1980s, the ROC was ousted from most major international organisations like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank as space was created for the PRC to be accomodated.
The only positive development for the Republic of China was the enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 by the US Congress as a response to the government’s decision to establish official ties with Beijing. Thanks to an active Taiwan lobby, many Senators opposed the government’s decision and claimed that Washington must retain unofficial ties with Taiwan. Under the TRA, Washington not only maintains robust socioeconomic and cultural relations with Taiwan which function through the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the US which function in more or less the same way as the embassy but also maintains that any resolution to the Taiwan issue in a way other than a peaceful measure would be considered by Washington as a threat on the Western Pacific, implying its security perceptions of an expanse covering the concerns of the United States of America.
Democracy hues: Reunification to Independence
While the TRA brought some respite, Chiang Kai shek’s son Chiang Ching kuo, who took over the reins of governance after his father, realised the importance of democratisation in order to not just enhance Taiwan’s soft power among the liberal West but to also make it appeal to the Mainland Chinese who had presented the demand for civil freedom and democratic rights in the Tiananmen Square Movement of 1984. Hence, in 1987, the martial law was removed. Chiang’s successor, Lee Teng hui declared a unilateral end to the Chinese Civil war in 1991 thus, establishing socioeconomic and cultural ties with the Mainland and breaking away from the old KMT tradition of No Contact, No Negotiation and No Compromise with Communist China.
While the rhetoric of abiding by the “One China Policy” was maintained, Taiwan inched closer to an independent status, thanks to the democratisation process which made it important for the regime to reflect on the popular opinion which turned heavily anti-unification. With a proliferation of governmental and indigenous non-governmental organisations such as civil societies and political parties; deregulation of media and educational reforms among other changes led to the emergence of a new islander Taiwanese identity as distinct from Chinese ethnicity. For instance, in the 1994 White Paper Relations Across the Taiwan Strait, Taiwan dissociated Republic of China from One China for the first time while maintaining the rhetoric of abiding by the policy. Such sentiments further developed as the leader of the Democratic People’s Party (DPP) (which calls for Taiwan’s independence from the Mainland), Chen Shui bian, became the first non-KMT President in Taiwanese history. The growing strength of such sentiments is reflected in the eruption of the Sunflower Movement in Taiwan against President Ma Ying-jeou’s “viable diplomacy” with Mainland China which the protestors saw as making Taiwan increasingly economically dependent on Beijing which hampered the prospects for its independence as well as in the election victory of DPP’s Presidential candidate Tsai Ing wen who remains a major pro-Independence figure.
Thus, during the Cold War itself, Taiwan’s Foreign policy has changed from pressing the United States to recognise it as the One China to the one of being recognised as an independent sovereign nation which historically developed distinctly from that of China. Ever since the fall of the USSR in 1991 and the end of the Cold War which made Washington the undisputed hegemon in the international order, the United States has shifted its focus away from Taiwan to other regions such as Afghanistan where it finds its national interests served best. Taiwanese foreign policy in such a scenario has been to hold onto the United States as much as it can so as to ensure regime survival.
Is Taiwan still important to the United States?
While the dilution of ideological politics and increased communication with China since its Reform and Opening up (改革开放) in 1978 and the fall of the USSR has decreased Taiwan’s relevance for the United States, it still remains important.
First and foremost is the strategic reason as access to Taiwan presents a wide maritime defense depth for launching both offensive and counteroffensive measures.
Second, Taiwan is a region rich in natural resources particularly coal, oil and gas.
Third, as a democracy which has remained favourable to it since the very beginning, the United States does not just feel obligated to protect Taiwan for ideological reasons but also Taiwan’s presence as a flourishing democracy poses a major domestic political challenge to the CCP led PRC where the regime has taught its people that Western style democracy is unfit to Chinese culture and civilisational history.
Fourth and most importantly, the United States’ hegemony rests on its control of the Asia-Pacific region and though it might seem to be reducing its expanse, leaving China to take over Taiwan and the vast strategic importance it holds would be the last nail in the coffin of the era of US hegemony. The US hence, would fight till the last to maintain its relevance in the region by keeping Taiwan independent.
Is it important enough to go to war?
Though Taiwan is important to Washington, it puzzles many analysts if it would go to war with China in case Beijing tries to take over the island.
While the nuclear nature of both the nations is a huge deterrent which would, if at all, lead to a pyrrhic victory; the vastly enmeshed Sino-American economic relations is also a major reason where any hard blow on the Chinese economy would also hit Washington’s. If the United States loses the war, it would not just be immensely destroyed but would exit the world stage with a bang rather than a whimper making it harder to stand back as a world leader. Moreover, even if the United States wins, there would be no guarantee that China would not recuperate its forces and try another time to occupy the territory leading to more hostility and instability.
At the turn of the century, the United States realised China’s rise as an indisputable fact which meant that whether Washington liked it or not, it would constantly find Beijing on its way at every juncture. While such a development does not always mean confrontation or ensure cooperation, it shows the importance of dialogue and compromise in order to maintain stability which is mutually beneficial. Hence, while the United States would not sit back and watch Beijing take over Taiwan, it is also true that it would not rush to wage a war. Even though Beijing has stepped up its rhetoric of absorbing Taiwan with force if necessary, it realises that such a move would not be a cakewalk and hence is likely to consider other options before using force. The hard part of such developments is that it has reduced the central focus of Taiwan’s Foreign policy to holding onto the United States and by putting all its eggs in the American basket, Taiwan can hardly do anything substantial rather than wait for the two superpowers to decide on its future.
U.S. Violates Its Promises to China; Asserts Authority Over Taiwan
As Werner Rügemer headlined on 28 November 2021 and truthfully summarized the relevant history, “Taiwan: US deployment area against mainland China — since 1945”. However, despite that fact, America did officially issue a “Joint Communique” with China recognizing and acknowledging not only that Taiwan is a province of China but that for America or its allies or any other nation to challenge that historical fact would be unethical.
The U.S. regime hides this crucial historical fact, in order to hoodwink its masses of suckers into assuming to the exact contrary — that Taiwan isn’t a Chinese province. Here is how they do this:
The CIA-edited and written Wikipedia, which blacklists (blocks from linking to) sites that aren’t CIA-approved, is the first source for most people who become interested in what is officially known as the Shanghai Communique of 1972, or the 27 February 1972 “JOINT COMMUNIQUE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA”. That article, avoids presenting the Communique’s 1,921-word text, but instead provides, in its “Document” section, a mere 428-word very selective, and sometimes misleading, summary of some of the document’s less-important statements, and also fails to provide any link to the document itself, which they are hiding from readers.
The U.S. regime’s Wilson Center does have an article “JOINT COMMUNIQUE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA”, at which only the document’s opening 286 words are shown, while the rest is veiled and the reader must then do additional clicks in order to get to it.
The U.S. State Department’s history site, does provide the entire 1,921-word document, but under a different title, one that plays down the document’s actual importance, “Joint Statement Following Discussions With Leaders of the People’s Republic of China”. (If it’s a “Joint Statement,” then whom are the “Leaders of the People’s Republic of China” “jointly” issuing it with — that title for it is not only false, it is plain stupid, not even referring to the U.S, at all.) Consequently, anyone who seeks to find the document under its official and correct title won’t get to see it at the U.S. State Department’s site.
Here are some of the important statements in this document (as shown below that stupid title for it at the State Department’s site):
With these principles of international relations in mind the two sides stated that:
—progress toward the normalization of relations between China and the United States is in the interests of all countries;
—both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict;
—neither should seek hegemony in the Asia–Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony; and
—neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states.
Both sides are of the view that it would be against the interests of the peoples of the world for any major country to collude with another against other countries, or for major countries to divide up the world into spheres of interest. …
The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.
The Wikipedia article’s 428-word summary of the “Document” did include parts of the paragraph which started “The U.S. side declared,” but the summary closed by alleging that the document “did not explicitly endorse the People’s Republic of China as the whole of China. Kissinger described the move as ‘constructive ambiguity,’ which would continue to hinder efforts for complete normalization.” How that passage — or especially the entire document — could have been stated with less “ambiguity” regarding “the People’s Republic of China as the whole of China” wasn’t addressed. In fact, the statement that “all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China” includes asserting that the Taiwanese people “maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China.” So: the U.S. did agree with that, even signed to it in 1972. If the U.S. refuses to agree with it now, then what was the U.S. agreeing to in that Communique, and under what circumstances does the Communique become null and void for either of the two agreeing Parties to it? When does it stop being binding? Perhaps the document should have added something like “The U.S. Government will never try to break off pieces of China.” But maybe if that were to have been added to it, then the U.S. regime wouldn’t have signed to anything with China. Is the U.S. regime really that Hitlerian? Is this what is ‘ambiguous’ about the document?
In fact, the affirmation that, “The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan.” is now routinely being violated by the U.S. regime. Here’s an example:
One of the leading U.S. billionaires-funded think tanks, the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), was co-founded by Kurt Campbell, who is Joe Biden’s “Asia co-ordinator” or “Asia Tsar” with the official title of “National Security Council Coordinator for the Indo-Pacific.” The other co-founder is Michèle Flournoy, who also co-founded with the current Secretary of State Antony Blinken, WestExec Advisors, which firm’s client-list is secret but generally assumed to be top investors in firms such as Lockheed Martin. That advisory firm’s activities are also secret.
Perhaps nothing is more profitable than trading on inside information regarding corporations whose main, if not only, sales are to the U.S. Government and its allied governments. Trading on inside information needs to be secret in order to be non-prosecutable. The clients of WestExec Advisors might be extraordinarily successful investors, because they’ve hired people who have ‘the right’ contacts in the federal bureaucracy and so know where your ‘national security’ tax-dollars are likeliest to be spent next.
CNAS issued, in October 2021, “The Poison Frog Strategy: Preventing a Chinese Fait Accompli Against Taiwanese Islands”. It was written as-if the Shanghai Communique hadn’t prohibited this. The presumption there was instead that America and Taiwan would have so much raised the heat against China’s not being picked apart, so as for China to have militarily responded in order to hold itself together; and, then, a stage, “MOVE 2,” would be reached, in which:
The Taiwan and U.S. teams engaged in more direct communication, which aided the U.S. team in framing the crisis. By Move 2, the U.S. team had accepted that using military force to retake Dongsha would be too escalatory and might disrupt the formation of any counter-China coalition. Accordingly, the team reframed the takeover of Dongsha as an opportunity to expose Chinese belligerence and to encourage states to join together to balance against China’s aggressive behavior. The U.S. team’s decision to place U.S. military forces on Taiwan during Move 1 became a key driver for the rest of the game.
By Move 3, both the U.S. and Taiwan teams were in difficult positions. The U.S. team did not want to let Chinese aggression go unpunished, both for the sake of Taiwan and within the context of the broader regional competition. At the same time, the U.S. team wanted to show its partners and allies that it was a responsible power capable of negotiating and avoiding all-out war. The Taiwan team was caught in an escalating great-power crisis that threatened to pull Taiwan into a war that it was trying to avoid. The Taiwan team had to balance its relationships and policies with the United States and China while simultaneously spearheading de-escalation. And in the early part of the game, before communication between the United States and Taiwan teams improved, the Taiwan team had, unbeknownst to the U.S. team, set up a back channel with the China team. At the same time the back-channel negotiations were ongoing, the U.S. team was still, in fact, considering additional escalatory action against the China team. …
Toward the end of the game, the U.S. and Taiwan teams’ main strategy was to isolate China diplomatically and economically and garner enough international backing among allies and partners to make that isolation painful. To this end, the Taiwan team focused on pulling in some of its regional partners, such as Japan, while the U.S. team reached out to its NATO allies.9 To avoid unwanted escalation or permanent effects, the U.S. and Taiwan teams limited their offensive military operations to non-kinetic and reversible actions such as cyberattacks and electronic warfare.
Under “Key Takeaways and Policy Recommendations” is:
Given the inherent difficulty of defending small, distant offshore islands like Dongsha, Taiwan and the United States should strive to turn them into what the players called “poison frogs.” This approach would make Chinese attempts to seize these islands so militarily, economically, and politically painful from the outset that the costs of coercion or aggression would be greater than the benefits.
The U.S. regime’s having in 1972 committed itself to there being only “a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves” has somehow now become a license for the U.S. regime to provoke “Chinese attempts to seize these islands” and yet to cause — by America’s constant further provocations and lying — this to be “so militarily, economically, and politically painful from the outset that the costs of coercion or aggression would be greater than the benefits.”
In other words: the U.S. regime expects to portray China as being the aggressor, and the U.S. regime as being the defender — but, actually, of what? It would be the defender of breaking off a piece of China to add it to the U.S. regime’s allies, against an ‘aggressive’ China that opposes America’s violating its own, and China’s, 1972 Joint Shanghai Communique — which prohibits that.
On May 19th, The Hill, one of the U.S. regime’s many propaganda-mouthpieces, headlined “China warns of dangerous situation developing ahead of Biden Asia trip”, and opened:
China warned the U.S. that President Biden’s visit to East Asia this week could put their relations in “serious jeopardy” if officials play the “Taiwan card” during the trip.
In a phone call with national security adviser Jake Sullivan, China’s top diplomat Yang Jiechi warned the U.S. against speaking out on the independent sovereignty of Taiwan, a self-ruling democratic island in the Indo-Pacific that China claims is historically part of the mainland and should be under Beijing’s control.
China doesn’t claim that Taiwan “is historically part of the mainland and should be under Beijing’s control,” but that, just like Hawaii is NOT a part of “the mainland” but IS “under U.S. control,” and NOT “a self-ruling” nation, Taiwan is NOT a part of “the mainland” but IS (not ‘should be’, but IS) under China’s control, and NOT “a self-ruling” nation. Just as there is no “independent sovereignty of Hawaii,” there also is no “independent sovereignty of Taiwan.” How many lies were in that opening? (And this doesn’t even bring in the fact that whereas Hawaii is way offshore of America’s mainland, Taiwan is very close to China’s mainland.)
And how long will the U.S. regime’s constant lying continue to be treated as if that’s acceptable to anything other than yet another dangerously tyrannical regime — a U.S. ally, perhaps?
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