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The Other Political Parties in China: History and Presence

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The topic I will analyse in this contribution is the presence of other political parties in the People’s Republic of China and the role they played in the struggle for liberation from Japan and against the Kuomintang (KMT) dictatorship.

The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) is a body of the United Front Central Department. It is still a key organisation in the development of multi-party cooperation through the leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and an important public discussion forum to promote democracy according to Chinese characteristics.

On the eve of May 1, 1948, the CPC’s Central Committee issued a call to convene another Conference after the failure of the previous one. In fact, on October 10, 1945 – in the aftermath of Japan’s defeat – Mao Zedong (1893-1976) and Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek, 1887-1975) had agreed on the reconstruction of the country and the convening of a consultative political Conference. It opened on January 10, 1946 with the participation of seven delegates from the CPC, nine from the Kuomintang, nine from the Democratic League, five from the China Youth Party and nine independents. After reaching agreement of February 25, 1946, the Conference stalled in July when Jiang Jieshi launched a large-scale offensive against the Communist territories with 218 brigades: the real start of the civil war. In December 1947, however, Mao announced that 640,000 nationalist soldiers had been killed or wounded and over a million had laid down their arms.

The call of April 30, 1948 was appreciated and immediately echoed by democratic parties, people’s organisations, non-movement personalities and overseas Chinese. On May 5, the leaders of the various democratic parties (including Li Jishen (1885-1959) and He Xiangning (1879-1972) of the KMT’s Revolutionary Committee (the former was its Chairman); Shen Junru (1875-1963) and Zhang Bojun (1895-1969) of the Democratic League’s leadership; Ma Xulun (1885-1970) and Wang Shao’ao (1888-1970) of the China Association for Promoting Democracy; Chen Qiyou (1892-1970) of the China Justice Party; Peng Zemin (1877-1956) of China Peasants’ and Workers’ Democratic Party; Li Zhangda (1890-1953) of the National Salvation Association; Cai Tingkai (1892-1968) of the KMT’s Committee for Promoting Democracy; and Tan Pingshan (1886-1956) of the Sanminzhuyi (the Three Principles of the People) Comrades’ Federation; as well as Guo Moruo (1892-1978), a person with no party affiliation) sent a joint telegram from Hong Kong to the CPCCC, to Mao Zedong and to the entire nation supporting the Communists’ call. Meanwhile, the Association for Promoting Democracy and the Jiu San (September 3) Society, which had established their headquarters in areas under the Kuomintang’s rule, held secret meetings of their Central Committees to welcome the CPC’s document. Mao Dun (1896-1981), Hu Yuzhi (1896-1986), Liu Yazi (1887-1958), Zhu Yunshan (1887-1981) and 120 Democrats issued a joint communiqué expressing their understanding of the CPC’s position.

Furthermore, 55 leaders of democratic parties and personages with no party affiliations issued joint comments on the political situation in China, declaring: “During the People’s Liberation War, we are willing to contribute to, and cooperate in, the planning of programmes under the CPC’s leadership, expecting to promote the quick success of the Chinese People’s Democratic Revolution for the forthcoming establishment of an independent, free, peaceful and happy New China”.  

The Conference held its first plenary session in Beijing from 21 to 30 September 1949, with a total of 622 representatives sent by the CPC; democratic parties; independent personalities; mass and regional organisations; the People’s Liberation Army; ethnic minorities; overseas Chinese; patriotic democrats; and religious groups. The first session exercised the functions of a full-fledged parliamentary, legislative and constitutional Assembly of the nascent State until 1954, when the first National People’s Congress was elected.

The CPCCC adopted the Provisional Constitution (CPCCC’s Common Programme), the Organic Law of the CPCCC and the Organic Law of the Central People’s Government. It chose Beijing as the country’s capital; adopted the five-star red flag (Wu Xing Hong Qi) as the national flag and the March of the Volunteers (Yiyongjun Jinxingqu) as the national anthem; and opted for the Gregorian calendar. The session elected the CPCCC’s National Committee (NC) and the Central People’s Government Council. On October 1 – through the mouth of Mao, Chairman of the NC – it proclaimed the People’s Republic.

It is worth noting that the three NC vice-Presidents were not from the CPC: Song Qingling (1893-1981), widow of the Father of the Republic, Sun Zhongshan (Sun Yat-sen, 1866-1925), and honorary chairwoman of the KMT’s Revolutionary Committee; Li Jishen and Zhang Lan (1872-1955), President of the Democratic League. The CPC deputies were Zhu De (1886-1976), Liu Shaoqi (1898-1969) and Gao Gang (1905-54).

Besides the said personalities, many Ministries and offices were entrusted to members of other parties and independents. Those were not merely formal or symbolic acts, as the New China’s government needed experts, men and women who had also fought against Japan and the Kuomintang’s dictatorship. They included a large number of China’s leading scholars and technical experts. Shen Junru, an internationally renowned jurist, was elected to the Presidency of the Supreme People’s Court, the highest legal institution in the People’s Republic of China. Many scientists who had obtained their degrees in Europe and the United States of America, and were living abroad, were invited to return to rebuild the country.

Shortly after their founding, the democratic parties developed cooperative relations with the CPC at different levels, and such relations continuously made headway in their joint struggle against imperialist aggression. After the incident on September 18, 1931, the Japanese troops occupied the entire northeast China, bringing about an unprecedented national crisis. The CPC promptly put forward the proposal to create the National Anti-Japanese United Front, which was matched by enthusiastic responses from the existing democratic parties and various social groups. The CPC and the independent parties worked closely together in the resistance against Japanese aggression and for the unity and progress of the country. On July 7, 1937, the Japanese troops attacked the Lugou Bridge (Marco Polo’s Bridge) on the outskirts of Beijing, and the Chinese defenders fought back promptly. The Lugou incident marked the beginning of Japan’s all-out aggression against China, and of the Chinese War of Resistance against that country.

During the war, democratic parties and people from all walks of society supported the CPC’s position of “Yes to resistance, No to surrender; Yes to unity, No to separation; Yes to democracy, No to autocratic rule, urging the Kuomintang to implement political reforms, to establish a coalition government, to guarantee citizens’ rights, and to improve people’s living conditions.

After the victory over Japan in 1945, the CPC put forward peace, democracy and unity as the three general principles for national reconstruction. Those principles reflected the common desires of democratic parties and independents from various walks of society in the country. During the second civil war, the democratic parties publicly sided with the CPC and broke up with the Kuomintang.

After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the CPC continued to adhere to the policy of “long-term coexistence, mutual supervision, sincere treatment with each other and sharing of weal and woe” with the democratic parties. They enjoyed and still enjoy full rights and freedom of activity as recognised by the Constitution. Since 1950 the democratic parties have conscientiously participated in consultations on important issues concerning the country and the management of State affairs. They have encouraged their members and associated people to take part in all fields of work; and have provided significant contributions to socialism with Chinese characteristics. Many leading representatives of the democratic parties have been elected as deputies to the National People’s Congress (NPC) and are members of the CPCCC at all levels. Furthermore, many of them serve in leadership positions in NPC standing committees, CPCCC commissions, regional governments, and economic, cultural, education, science and technology Ministries at all levels. The democratic parties have grown in membership, through mainstream and local organisations established in most provinces of the country, in municipalities directly under the central government, in autonomous regions, and in different large and medium-sized urban areas.

The democratic parties cooperate with the CPC in the political and administrative management of the State, just as the former four/five-party coalition aligned under Christian Democrats’ “right leadership” did in Italy. At the time when the one-party governments of the Christian Democratic Party appointed all Ministers of the same party, the national governments in the People’s Republic of China entrusted responsibilities to some Ministers of political groups other than the CPC. After all, the class component of the Chinese democratic parties mirrored and still mirrors that of the Italian Social-Democratic, Socialist, Republican and Liberal Parties: national upper middle class, petty bourgeoisie in large and medium-sized cities, intellectuals and other types of citizens (patriots in China and opportunity-seekers in Italy).

The eight democratic parties recognised in China are the following:

Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang (Zhongguo Guomindang Gemingweiyuanhui)

After the start of the War of Resistance against Japan in 1937, the democratic members of the Kuomintang supported the National Anti-Japanese United Front promoted by the CPC and participated in patriotic activities. As of 1943, two Kuomintang factions planned to create the Sanminzhuyi (the Three Principles of the People) Comrades’ Federation and the KMT Association for Promoting Democracy (APD), respectively, to better carry out actions against the Japanese. The Sanminzhuyi held its first National Congress in Chongqing in the autumn of 1945, and the Kuomintang APD in Guangzhou in the spring of 1946. Each of them drew up its own political programmes, statutes and constitutions, and formally declared its own establishment. At the end of 1947 the two organisations joined together with further democratic elements of the Kuomintag and held the first Conference in Xianggang, which formally declared the establishment of the Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang (RCCK) on January 1, 1948. At the second Conference in November 1949, which was attended by independent personalities, the movement operated as a single political party. The RCCK is mainly made up of former KMT members and of those who had historical ties with the KMT itself, including a group of employees working in government organisations, as well as intellectuals in the fields of science, technology, culture, education and medicine (it has 101,865 members).

China Democratic League (Zhongguo Minzhu Tongmeng)

The predecessor of China Democratic League (CDL) was the China League of Democratic Political Organisations (CLDPO), founded on March 19, 1941 and consisting of the China Youth Party, the National Socialist Party, the Chinese Action Committee for National Liberation (later renamed the Chinese Peasants’ and Workers’ Democratic Party), the Chinese Professional Educational Community, the Countryside Construction Association, and some independents. The CLDPO held a national Congress in Chongqing in September 1944 and decided to become a party, by replacing group membership with personal membership and changing its name to China Democratic League (CDL). After the War of Resistance against Japan, the CDL insisted on opposing the Kuomintang’s autocratic rule and demanding democracy. In October 1947, the Kuomintang administration declared that the CDL was an “illegal organisation” and forced it to disband. In January 1948, the CDL held the third plenary session of the first CC in Hong Kong, and set up provisional national headquarters. The meeting declared that the CDL would cooperate with the CPC to strive for the full achievement of a democratic, peaceful and independent society and a united New China (it has approximately 230,000 members).

China Democratic National Construction Association (Zhongguo Minzhu Jianguo Hui)

The Association was founded on December 16, 1945 by a number of industrialists and businessmen belonging to the national bourgeoisie, as well as by some intellectuals who were closely involved in manufacturing and trade during the war of resistance against Japan. At that time, they met and held informal talks on topical issues. In December 1945, the Association was founded in Chongqing. It is mainly composed of national industrialists and businessmen, as well as experts in the field (approximately 100,000 members).

China Association for Promoting Democracy (Zhongguo Minzhu Cujinhui)

Founded in Shanghai on December 12, 1945, its original members were mainly intellectuals in the fields of culture, education, publishing and science (as they still are today). They lived in the aforementioned city during the period of the War of Resistance. The aim of the Association is to “carry out the democratic spirit and push forward the realization of democratic politics in China” (it has approximately 100,000 members).

Chinese Peasants’ and Workers’ Democratic Party (Zhongguo Nonggong Minzhudang)

The predecessor of the Chinese Peasants’ and Workers’ Democratic Party was the Provisional Action Committee of the Kuomintang or “Third Party”, founded in November 1927 in Shanghai by Deng Yanda (1895-1931), a well-known Kuomintang left-wing leader, and by other comrades (Deng was shot by Jiang Jieshi in 1931). In 1933 the Provisional Action Committee of the Kuomintang was one of the protagonists of the Fujian rebellion. In November 1935, the Committee changed its name to the Chinese Action Committee for National Liberation. As seen above, it participated in the establishment of the China League of Democratic Political Organizations in 1941. In February 1947, it was renamed Chinese Peasants’ and Workers’ Democratic Party. Most of its members are intellectuals in the fields of medicine, science, technology, culture and education (approximately 90,000 members).

China Justice Party (Zhongguo Zhigongdang)

The China Justice Party (CJP) derives from the Hung Society Zhigong Hall fraternity, based in San Francisco and composed of overseas Chinese. The said organisation was one of the decisive supporters of Sun Zhongshan’s revolutionary efforts to overthrow the Manchurian Qing [Ch’ing] dynasty.

The party was founded in October 1925 in the above stated US city and led by Chen Jiongming (1878-1933) and Tang Jiyao (1833-1927), two former Kuomintang warlords who had gone over to the opposition. Their first programme was federalism and pluralist democracy. The CJP moved its headquarters to Hong Kong in 1931 during the works of the Second Congress. After Japan’s coeval invasion of Manchuria, it began to engage in anti-Japanese propaganda and boycotts and devoted itself to mobilising the large crowds of Chinese expatriates to actively support the Chinese cause. The CJP was almost wiped out during Japan’s occupation of Hong Kong. The CJP shifted to the left at its third Congress in May 1947: it condemned the Kuomintang for fostering civil war and perpetuating autocratic rule. The headquarters were moved from Hong Kong to Guangzhou in 1950, and then to Beijing in 1953.

Its members are mainly returned overseas Chinese and their relatives, as well as experts, scholars and prominent figures with links and relations abroad (approximately 20,000 members).

“3 September” Society (Jiusan Xueshe)

Carrying on the spirit of the May 4th Movement of “democracy and science” and adhering to the aims of uniting to resist Japanese aggression and strive for democracy, a group of progressive intellectuals organised the “Forum on Democracy and Science” in Chongqing at the end of 1944. Later, in commemoration of the victory of the War of Resistance against Japan and the Axis powers on September 3, 1945, it adopted the name Jiu San Society (Jiusan means exactly “September 3”). On May 4, 1946, the “September 3” Society was officially established.

Its members are mainly intellectuals in the fields of science, technology, education, culture and medicine (approximately 100,000 members).

Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League (Taiwan Minzhu Zizhi Tongmeng)

The Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League was established in Hong Kong in November 1947 by Xie Xuehong. She had been one of the organisers of the uprising in February 1947 against the presence of the Kuomintang’s army on the island, which was suppressed with a massacre of the native population that resulted in 30,000 deaths. In fact, most of its founders are patriotic democrats originating from Taiwan. Its aim is to fight against imperialist aggression, and all regimes that support the separation of Taiwan from the mainland; to oppose the Kuomintang’s reactionary rule and promote the establishment of a people’s democratic dictatorship.

Its members are people who are either from, or have family roots, in Taiwan but currently live in China’s mainland (approximately 2,100 members).

Advisory Board Co-chair Honoris Causa Professor Giancarlo Elia Valori is an eminent Italian economist and businessman. He holds prestigious academic distinctions and national orders. Mr. Valori has lectured on international affairs and economics at the world’s leading universities such as Peking University, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Yeshiva University in New York. He currently chairs “International World Group”, he is also the honorary president of Huawei Italy, economic adviser to the Chinese giant HNA Group. In 1992 he was appointed Officier de la Légion d’Honneur de la République Francaise, with this motivation: “A man who can see across borders to understand the world” and in 2002 he received the title “Honorable” of the Académie des Sciences de l’Institut de France. “

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Mongolia To Strengthen Transparency Through Constitutional Reforms

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The Government of Mongolia has this week made efforts to strengthen the governance of its legislature and increase transparency by passing into law a number of changes to the country’s constitution. The country hopes to create more opportunities for civil society representation by moving to a mixed electoral system.

Representatives in the country’s parliament, the State Great Khural, debated and approved reforms that will increase the number of members in the parliament from 76 to 126, with nearly 40% of the MPs now being elected through proportional representation. The Government is also shortly due to introduce separate proposals that will increase the representation of women in the parliament. All these changes are set to be in place in time for the next set of general elections in 2024.

Mongolia’s political system is centred on the sharing of executive power between the Prime Minister as the head of government, and an elected President. The country’s Constitution was adopted in 1992, with amendments made in 1999, 2000, 2019, and 2022. Recent changes have focused on securing political stability in the country, through for example limiting the maximum term of the presidency from two four-year terms to one six-year term, and amending the number of parliamentarians who can hold ministerial positions. 

The increase in the size of the State Great Khural will address the rise in the number of voters represented by each parliamentarian, which has increased from 27,000 in 1992 to 44,000 today. Alongside the move towards a more proportional electoral system, the reforms are designed to bring parliamentarians closer to the people they are elected to serve by enhancing the scrutiny given to new laws.

A separate amendment to the country’s constitution creates a role for Mongolia’s Constitutional Court in reaching a final decision on citizen petitions alleging breaches of civil rights and freedoms, including equal rights between men and women, freedom of thought, speech, and peaceful assembly.

Commenting on the proposed changes to the constitution, Mongolia’s Prime Minister, L. Oyun-Erdene, said:

“I strongly support these proposed changes to Mongolia’s Constitution. They represent a further step for our country in the direction of a more inclusive and democratic future. Through increasing the representation in our parliament and broadening input into the law-making process, we will be better placed to meet current challenges and ensure that we continue to make progress towards our Vision 2050 goals, improving the livelihoods of people across Mongolia.”

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East Asia

Taiwan’s International Status: “A Country Within a Country”

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Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen met with US House Speaker Kevin McCarthy in California. (Photo: Taiwan's Presidential Office)

In California, a recent meeting was held between the President of Taiwan, Tsai Ing-wen, and the U.S. House Speaker, Mr. Kevin McCarthy, which holds political significance. This aforementioned meeting facilitated a negative shift in the bilateral relations between China and Taiwan.  The latent hostilities between China and Taiwan possess the potential to escalate into full-scale armed conflict at any given juncture.

The proposal

The incongruent dynamic existing between China and Taiwan has persisted since 1949, when Taiwan made the conscious decision to separate from mainland China.

From 1949 onwards, China and Taiwan have been embroiled in a geopolitical imbroglio pertaining to their respective territorial integrity and claims of sovereignty. The Chinese government asserts that Taiwan is an integral component of its sovereign geography. On the contrary, Taiwan is assertive of its autonomy as a distinct, self-governing entity that operates independently and is no longer subject to Chinese jurisdiction.

The discordant relationship between the two sides which has escalated over the preceding biennium, potentially heightening the likelihood of military confrontation.

Over the course of the past two years, there have been several instances in which China has deployed the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to conduct military maneuvers in close proximity to Taiwan. The aforementioned initiative was aimed at preventing any activities fueled by Taiwan that could have been construed as provocative and potentially encroach on China’s claims of rightful control over Taiwan’s sovereignty and territorial boundaries

The persistent geopolitical tensions between China and Taiwan since 1949 can be attributed to diverging opinions regarding the formal recognition of Taiwan, in particular, the contentious matter of Taiwan’s sovereignty. Tensions will continue Between China and Taiwan until Taiwan becomes independent or recognizes its self-identification as a constituent part of China.

Since 1949, the China has exerted persistent pressure upon Taiwan to acquiesce to the notion of reunification or the incorporation of Taiwan into the mainland territory of China. Nevertheless, it appears that Taiwan’s internal political circumstance and dynamics persist in maintaining its political choices and ideology as a democratic and self-governing entity.

The prolonged inability of both parties to develop a more extensive and adaptable resolution or methodology to address the matter implies that the aspiration to “normalize” relations between China and Taiwan continues to exist solely within the realm of rhetoric.

In order to achieve the objective of unification under the the idea of the “One China Principle” or One China Policy and to surmount the political divergence concerning Taiwan’s official position, has engendered several propositions by China aimed at resolving this issue. A proposed approach adopt the implementation of a “one country, two systems” protocol akin to that employed in Hong Kong and Macau.

The Chinese government has expressed that the policy is exceedingly permissive and capable of surmounting the distinct system variances that exist between the mainland region of China and Taiwan.

The proposal of “special administrative region” attributed to Taiwan enables the continued preservation of its economic, social, and security system that they have built so far, while attenuating or obviating any undue influence or interference by China. Nonetheless, the aforementioned proposal appears to be insufficient in instigating political transformation in Taiwan, given the persistent refusal of Taiwanese individuals and governmental officials to endorse unification and uphold their desire for independence.

In view of China, safeguarding Taiwan and accomplishing the complete unification of the country is not solely a matter of fulfilling its constitutional obligations, but also serves the purpose of preserving its stature as a dominant and revered nation on the global stage.

In contrast, Taiwan persistently endeavors to establish diplomatic and cross-strait relations through a range of diverse strategies and approaches with multiple nations across the globe. The clear objective is to secure the hearts and compassion of the global populace. Taiwan undertook this action with the aim of restoring its position in the global arena and paving the way for its eventual recognition as a self-governing entity with full political autonomy.

“Country within a country”

Again, the China-Taiwan issue is rooted in a territorial and sovereignty perspectives. In the global arena, China maintains a comparatively advantageous position. China, is a prominent participant in the United Nations, the most extensive intergovernmental organization encompassing numerous states worldwide, Positioning itself as a powerful participant in the direction and reflection of global politics. Furthermore, China belongs to “the distinguished” member of UN Security Council’s five permanent members, which has so far strong and great influence on world politics.

On the other hand, the international position held by Taiwan is considerably intricate. The question regarding the statehood of Taiwan remains a matter of unsettled dispute, given the absence of any universally recognized body empowered to render definitive judgments regarding the status of a nation-state.

Since the adoption of Resolution A/RES/2758 by the UN General Assembly on October 25, 1971, Taiwan has lost its international “stage”. This is because the resolution affirms China as the sole legitimate representative of China to the United Nations and consequentially nullifies Taiwan’s membership from the organization.

It is a well-documented reality that numerous nations have forged informal diplomatic ties with Taiwan, particularly in the realm of trade and investment. The United States, for instance, has solidified such relations through the Taiwan Relations Act. To the present day, a limited number of 22 nations have formally acknowledged and established official diplomatic intercourse with Taiwan. A notable aspect is that the majority of these nations lack any substantial sway or significant leverage on the international political sphere. Specifically, countries of comparatively small size in the African and Latin American regions, namely Haiti, Belize, and Tuvalu.

Taiwan has indeed met the three constitutive elements or absolute requisites deemed necessary for a country as exemplified by the 1933 Montevideo Convention. These components include the presence of a defined territorial boundary, a functioning populace, and a duly constituted government. However, Taiwan lacks a crucial element in its diplomatic status, namely the recognition from the international community through a declarative act.

The restricted global acknowledgement of Taiwan undoubtedly carries considerable political and legal ramifications. Recognition is widely regarded as the key component in modern international politics that has the potential to enhance the legitimacy and sovereignty of a given state.

Taiwan faces formidable challenges in achieving recognition. In order to attain successful governance, Taiwan must display adeptness in efficiently managing both internal and external political dynamics. Otherwise, the current state of affairs will persist, leading to Taiwan’s classification as a “subnational entity” Or “A country within a country”.

Ultimately, the resolution of the China and Taiwan conflict proves to be a formidable challenge. In order to mitigate potential future crises and uphold regional and international stability, it is necessary for China and Taiwan to refrain from engaging in provocative actions. It is imperative to adopt a cooperative approach through negotiations and concessions that are all-encompassing and pertinent, in order to attain a sustainable resolution that caters to the interests of both China and Taiwan’s populace of 23 million, while acknowledging and adapting to their respective challenges and circumstances.

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The Sino-Russian-led World Order: A Better Choice for the Globe?

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Photo: Grigoriy Sisoev, RIA Novosti

International forums, which were once established to promote cooperation and dialogue among the world’s states, are now increasingly being used as platforms for confrontation and accusation. The recent example of G20 and G7 summits, where China and Russia faced criticism and isolation from Western countries over the Indo-pacific and their actions in Ukraine, plus India’s accusation of Pakistan as a terrorist sponsor state in the SCO summit, illustrate these trends. Instead of working towards finding a solution to pressing global problems, these meetings have devolved into platforms for airing grievances and pointing fingers – this shift in focus has undermined the effectiveness of these forums in addressing the very issues they were created to solve.

At their recent summit in Hiroshima, Japan, the G7 leaders issued their strongest-ever condemnation of Russia and China. They accused them of using economic coercion and militarizing the South China Sea and urged them to push Russia to withdraw its troops from Ukraine. Furthermore, at the G7 summit, leaders of the significant democracies pledged additional measures targeting Russia and spoke with a united voice on their growing concern over China.

Similarly, in Feb 2023, at the G20 finance minister’s summit held in Bengaluru, Russia and China declined to sign a joint statement condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and of course, as a sovereign state, Russia has the right to defend its territory and combat threats that pose a danger to its survival. These are just a few instances that illustrate how the Western world reacts to the actions and policies of China and Russia on the global stage.

Consequently, this recent condemnation and blaming at the Hiroshima summit demonstrate that international forums can no longer address serious global issues; instead, they have become arenas for blaming and accusing one another. This shift in the nature of international forums has significant implications for global governance and cooperation – It highlights the need for the failure of the current global system dominated by the Western bloc.

Besides, accusing states such as China and Russia at international forums is not a solution to global problems; instead, it can exacerbate regional tension and promote anti-sentiment against influential states. Furthermore, instead of promoting cooperation and dialogue, such accusations can foster an environment of mistrust and hostility, making it more challenging to find common ground and work towards resolving global issues.

In one of my previous papers, I argued that “the contemporary geopolitical landscape is characterized by escalating tension between the United States and its allies and China and Russia. This can be attributed to the absence of transparent and inclusive unipolar world order that effectively addresses the interests and concerns of all nations.

I further elaborated that the US and its allies are not inclined to recognize the emergence of a Sino-Russian-led world order, as evidenced by the recent summit development. The West has frequently chastised China and Russia for their autocratic governments, breaches of human rights, and expansionist ambitions. Such claims, however, are based on a skewed and obsolete understanding of the global system that ignores the two countries’ legitimate interests and aspirations. Instead of making allegations, the Western world should be grateful for the Sino-Russian-led international system, which provides a more democratic, multipolar, and peaceful alternative to the US-dominated regional hegemony.

To begin with, the Sino-Russian-led international order is more democratic than the Western one since it recognizes the globe’s diversity of political systems and cultures. China and Russia do not push their ideals or ideologies on other countries but instead encourage them to exercise their sovereignty and self-determination. They also reject any influence or intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries, particularly by the United States and its allies. In contrast, the Western world has frequently employed economic and military force to compel or remove governments that do not share its interests or tastes. Iraq, Libya, Syria, Venezuela, and Iran are a few examples. Such operations have breached international law and generated insecurity and misery in several places.

Second, the Sino-Russian-led international order is more multipolar than the Western one because it balances the strength and influence of many global players. With expanding economic, military, and diplomatic capacities, China and Russia have emerged as crucial powers in the twenty-first century. They have also formed strategic alliances with other growing nations, including India, Brazil, South Africa, Turkey, and Iran. They have joined forces to oppose the US-led unipolar system and call for more egalitarian and inclusive global governance. On the other hand, the Western world has attempted to preserve its domination and hegemony over other countries, particularly in regions such as Europe, Asia-Pacific, the Middle East, and Africa. Many countries seeking greater autonomy have expressed displeasure and hostility to such a system.

Third, the Sino-Russian world order is more peaceful than the Western one because it values discussion and collaboration above confrontation and war. China and Russia have settled their historical differences and formed a comprehensive strategic alliance based on mutual trust and respect. They have also collaborated on several regional and global concerns, including counter-terrorism, non-proliferation, climate change, energy security, and pandemic response. They have also backed international institutions and procedures such as the United Nations (UN), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), BRICS (Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa), Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and others. In contrast, the Western world has frequently instigated or intensified tensions and disagreements with other countries, particularly China and Russia. A few examples are NATO expansion, missile defense deployment, sanctions system, and commerce.

Finally, international forums have the potential to promote cooperation and dialogue among nations; however, their effectiveness is hindered when they become platforms for confrontation and accusation. In contrast, the Sino-Russian-led world order is a superior choice for the globe to the Western one. It is more democratic because it values diversity; multipolar because it balances power; and more peaceful because it promotes dialogue – thus, rather than criticizing, the Western world should commend the international order led by Sino-Russian cooperation.

In conclusion, while international forums have the potential to promote cooperation among nations, they are increasingly being used for confrontation. In this context, the Sino-Russian-led world order offers a more democratic and peaceful alternative to the US-dominated hegemony and may be a better choice for promoting global cooperation.

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