Central Asia

Turkmenistan’s Presidential Elections: What to Expect from the New Head of State?

Published

11 months ago

April 29, 2022

Image source: Wikipedia

Not much is known about Turkmenistan – it is a rather closed-off country. While fairly credible information on the nation’s foreign policy can be found, there is no opportunity whatsoever to glean credible information on its economy, society and domestic policy. This article is an attempt to forecast the new president’s agenda by looking back to the presidential elections of the past.

Serdar Berdimuhamedow’s Rise to Office

Serdar’s father, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow, was in power since 2006. He won the latest election of 2017, securing 97% of the votes. The Constitution of Turkmenistan stipulated that the next election was to be held in 2024, but Berdimuhamedow announced an early vote in February 2022, marking the end of his 15 years in office. He specifically emphasized that he did not intend to run for president, instead remaining head of the Halk Maslahaty, the upper chamber of Turkmenistan’s parliament: “I support the idea that young leaders who have been brought up in a spiritual environment and in accordance with the high requirements of our time should be given an opportunity to lead our country,” he said on the occasion. “As the Chairman of the Halk Maslakhaty, I now intend to direct my vast life and political experience to this area.”

Political pundits and the media rushed to declare that Berdimuhamedow was preparing for a transfer of power. Special emphasis was laid on the fact that Serdar Berdimuhamedow, the president’s son, recently turned 40, which is the minimum age to become president under Turkmenistan’s Constitution. One of the possible reasons for the president’s retirement was his health, which can neither be confirmed nor disproved on the basis of the available information.

Two days into the statement by Berdimuhamedow Senior, on February 14, 2022, Serdar Berdimuhamedow’s candidacy was indeed proposed at the meeting of the ruling Democratic Party of Turkmenistan.

Two more days after, the Agrarian Party of Turkmenistan proposed the candidacy of Agajan Bekmyradov, deputy head of the Mary Region. On February 18, 2022, it was announced that at least six other candidates would compete for Turkmenistan’s presidency if they collected enough signatures. Then, two candidates emerged on February 19 – Berdymammet Gurmanov (a doctor from the Balkan Region) and Perhat Begenjov (a school principal from the Lebap Region). On February 22, more candidates were registered, most prominently Hydyr Nunnayev, Vice Rector for Research at the Turkmen State Institute of Physical Culture and Sports. The registration ended soon after, and the electoral campaign began on February 23.

As expected by observers, Serdar Berdimuhamedow took the election in a landslide. It should be noted, however, that the share of his supporters (72.97%) looked more realistic than the last result of his father.

Who is Serdar Berdimuhamedow: How He Prepared for His Presidency and What to Expect

On March 19, 2022, Serdar Berdimuhamedow officially became Turkmenistan’s third president.

Serdar Berdimuhamedow was born on September 22, 1981, in Ashgabat. He graduated from the Turkmen Agricultural University as an engineering technologist in 2001, at about the same time when his father, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow, started his political career. Berdimuhamedow Senior provided his son with plenty of opportunities to explore the many levels and dimensions of civil service.

The first step was to acquire some experience in foreign policy. In 2008–2011, Serdar Berdimuhamedow held the post of minister-counsellor in the Embassy of Turkmenistan to the Russian Federation. During that period, he graduated from the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia with a degree in International Relations. In 2011–2013, Serdar Berdimuhamedow worked as an adviser in the Permanent Mission of Turkmenistan to the United Nations in Geneva, where he studied European and International Security at the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF). On returning from Switzerland, he became Head of the European Department at Turkmenistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, overseeing the country’s relations with the entirety of Europe. In 2016–2017, he held the position of Head of International Information of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkmenistan. Finally, in 2018, he became Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkmenistan.

It should be noted that Turkmenistan’s permanent neutrality status—officially confirmed at a United Nations General Assembly meeting on December 12, 1995, during the rule of Saparmurat Niyazov (Turkmenbashy), but largely thanks to the efforts of Minister of Foreign Affairs and Vice Prime Minister Boris Shikhmuradov—is a key trait of the country’s identity in foreign policy. Serdar Berdimuhamedow has picked up the baton of this tradition. Since 1995, Turkmenistan has not been part of any bloc or integration, even opting to be an associated member rather than a full member of the Commonwealth of Independent States. This allows the country to pursue a pragmatic multi-vector foreign policy based on engaging with all interested countries in hydrocarbon trade. In his inauguration speech, Serdar Berdimuhamedow declared that he would be committed to the “principles of neutrality and good neighbourhood.”

Oil and gas remain the most important dimension of Turkmenistan’s economy: gas accounts for the majority of the country’s GDP. The new president has dabbled in this as well: in 2013, he was appointed Director of the State Agency for Management and Use of Hydrocarbon Resources.

Turkmenistan’s notable feature is that the president is often perceived as a “leader” in science and the arts. Saparmurat Niyazov actively contributed to history, religion and literature, and Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow published works on a wide range of topics, most of all medicine and healthy living. In Turkmenistan’s political culture, the subject taken up by the president becomes the key focus of the country’s ideology. Having obtained degrees of Candidate of Technical Sciences (roughly equivalent to a PhD) in 2014 and Doctor of Technical Sciences (a still more advanced degree) in 2015, it is quite possible that Serdar Berdimuhamedow will start publishing on technical and economic issues, technological innovation, etc.

In 2016, the future president started his career in domestic policy: in November, he was elected member of the Mejlis (lower chamber of parliament) of Turkmenistan. The following year, he became Chairman of the Legislative Committee.

In 2019, Serdar Berdimuhamedow was appointed head of the Ahal Region, a key province where the capital is located as well as where the politically dominant Teke tribe lives. In 2020, Serdar Berdimuhamedow was appointed Turkmenistan’s Minister of Industry. After a year in this capacity, he was appointed Vice Prime Minister, which equates to being the “second in command” in the country, since the president and the prime minister are one and the same person. It is from this office that Berdimuhamedow Senior had risen to the rank of president once Saparmurat Niyazov passed away. At the same time, Serdar Berdimuhamedow was appointed to the State Security Council of Turkmenistan.

What Should We Expect from Turkmenistan’s Third President?

Serdar Berdimuhamedow started his presidential term by dismissing the government, which was entirely in accordance with the Turkmenistan’s Constitution. With this, he’s set about forming new government and elaborating new policy. Experts are still out as to what his rule will be like. Some say that Berdimuhamedow Junior will maintain the system his father had erected. Others, including the author, expect that he may carry out some reforms, albeit at a limited scale.

The first reason why we could expect reforms from Serdar Berdimuhamedow is tradition. Serdar’s father likely advises his son to make the same political steps he made himself when he rose to power.

In this context, we may recall that Berdimuhamedow Senior’s presidential term started with moderate reforms. In large part, it was due to his background: unlike most heads of post-Soviet states, who came from business, military, security or intelligence agencies, or from the Soviet political establishment, Berdimuhamedow Senior was a representative of intelligentsia, just like Shavkat Mirziyoyev, the current President of Uzbekistan. Before his political career, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow was quite a successful dentist.

Berdimuhamedow Senior did away with some of Saparmurat Niyazov’s most notorious policies governing culture and everyday life, like the ban of opera and ballet as “contrary to national traditions.” In the social and economic domains, the second president made every effort to redress the utter breakdown of education and healthcare that occurred under Niyazov.

Certainly, when it comes to the political part, it is unlikely that Berdimuhamedow Senior will advise his son to repeat his history of reforms to the letter. The cult of Saparmurat Niyazov, who had declared himself a “prophet equal to Mohammed,” was quietly laid to rest. Berdimuhamedow Senior also replaced all the officials installed by Niyazov, with the most active “cleansing” taking place from mid-2007 to early 2008. Among those who lost their posts were key security and military officials, the Minister of Energy, Minister of Automobile Industry and Construction, Prosecutor General and Supreme Court leadership, as well as a number of other key figures. A significant number of political prisoners convicted under Niyazov were set free through the work of extrajudicial commissions. This time, however, the only political change we can expect is to see more younger faces, but even that would likely happen gradually.

Second, when speculating about possible reforms, we need to remember that Turkmenistan is undergoing a deep socio-economic crisis caused by an ineffective state bureaucracy and a less than advantageous gas contract with China.

Reports about the country’s progress in the fight against COVID-19 are also contradictory. According to the official sources, Turkmenistan’s healthcare system was well prepared for the pandemic: Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow said that healthcare facilities are receiving all the resources they need. It is important to note that Berdimuhamedow served as the minister of healthcare under Niyazov, so effective medicine is one of the pillars of his legitimacy in his post. At the same time, opposition sources paint a different picture: a dire need of beds, qualified doctors, testing facilities and personal protective equipment. Furthermore, opposition sources report that mass gatherings were held in Turkmenistan from March to April 2020 because political celebrations were not cancelled out of ideological considerations.

Crisis in the neighbouring Kazakhstan, another post-Soviet commodity exporter, is an important circumstance that reflects on risk assessment of the Turkmen leaders. During the civil unrest of January 2022, Turkmen security forces were put on high alert, and it was then that the decision to convene the upper chamber of parliament was made, which the president used to announce extraordinary elections.

Reforms may not only help to resolve difficult domestic situations, but also to successfully overcome challenges in foreign policy. If the civil war in Afghanistan escalates, hostilities might spill over the Turkmen-Afghan border. Other foreign policy risks include the consequences of mass migration into Turkey. Many of the Turkmen migrants have fought in Syria, and their return may create certain risks for the government.

Given the current reality of Turkmenistan, an important factor in maintaining the stability of the existing regime could be Berdimuhamedow Senior, who is apparently going to follow the Singapore/China model by gradually transferring power to his heir—much as Lee Kuan Yew and Deng Xiaoping did in their time. On the whole, a gradual transfer of supreme power from father to son is not new on the post-Soviet soil. This has been done by Heydar and Ilham Aliyev in Azerbaijan, and a similar process is currently unfolding in Tajikistan.

Speaking about reforms in Turkmenistan, we should understand that they will be rather limited, mostly aiming at economic aspects – specifically, expanding foreign investment opportunities and modernizing the country’s economy. Far-reaching political reforms, however, do not appear to be on the agenda. The Turkmen government’s main focus seems to be maintaining stability in a difficult international situation. It may find a possible model for economic reform in the experience of the neighboring Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan, both far ahead of Turkmenistan when it comes to modernization.

Russia may benefit from enhancing its economic ties with Turkmenistan, especially given the current foreign economic environment. Export items likely to be in demand on the Russian market include Turkmen vegetables, fruit and cotton textiles. The experience of quickly expanding trade with Uzbekistan after Mirziyoyev began his reforms may prove useful in this regard.

From our partner RIAC

Central Asia

The CSTO and the U.S. in Central Asia

Published

5 days ago

March 18, 2023

Yekaterina Strakhova

Image source: Aram Nersesyan / Sputnik / RIA Novosti

The Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) is becoming more active amid growing instability in the wider Eurasian region. Imangali Tasmagambetov, who became CSTO secretary general at the beginning of this year, has met with the secretaries of the Security Councils of Russia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, as well as with the heads of member states (except Russian President Vladimir Putin).

Tasmagambetov might have come to Yerevan as well, but they have recently tried to distance themselves from the CSTO. This year, Armenia refused to host the “Unbreakable Brotherhood” exercise and also decided not to take up the quota of deputy secretary general of the organisation.

Tasmagambetov is tasked with examining the difficult operational environment. On the western flank of the CSTO, there is a growing external threat from Ukraine and Poland, which could draw Belarus into a conflict between “the West” and Russia; in the southeast, there is the possibility of renewed conflict on the Kyrgyz-Tajik border and a growing Afghan factor. All this could have a negative impact on collective security.

On the European track, the urgent tasks of preventing and defending against aggression will first and foremost be handled by the regional grouping of troops from Belarus and Russia, which has been deployed since 2022.

As to the border problem between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the Russian expert Alexander Knyazev believes[1] that the CSTO should focus on demilitarization of the “conflict” areas and take them under the control of the Organization’s monitoring group and peacekeeping contingent. It is likely that Tasmagambetov visited both republics with these proposals.

The Afghan problem is multifaceted and requires a unified approach among the CSTO member states to curb it.

In addition to exploring challenges and threats in CSTO areas of responsibility, Tasmagambetov began promoting the topic of military-economic cooperation[2] among CSTO member states.

At a meeting with Russian Minister of Industry and Trade Denis Manturov, he suggested forming multilateral cooperation among military-industrial complex enterprises of CSTO countries to jointly develop and produce weapons and military equipment and establish service centres for their maintenance and repair.

Military and economic cooperation within the CSTO is an important component of integration, since it implies not only equipping the armed forces with the latest weapons, but also developing military engineering in all CSTO states and, importantly, maintaining common arms standards.

Tasmagambetov’s initiative will update the Concept for Standardisation of Armaments and Military Equipment within the CSTO, i.e. it will launch the work of defence enterprises under unified technical standards, ensuring compatibility of armaments on various parameters.

In addition, the CSTO itself is gradually being modernised. Ratification of the documents is underway, which will allow the military alliance to interact more effectively with the UN. Once ratification is complete, the CSTO will be able to form peacekeeping contingents and conduct operations under the auspices of the “coordinating state” with a UN mandate.

In February 2023, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov announced[3] that the CSTO was developing peacekeeping capabilities. He noted that “on Kazakhstan’s proposal we are making an addition” to the Agreement on CSTO Peacekeeping Activities, “because it says that CSTO peacekeeping forces are deployed by agreement and with the sanction of the UN Security Council. In Sergey Lavrov’s opinion, this norm is redundant and he believes that only an appeal by one of the member states to the Collective Security Council is sufficient.

Looking at the text of the Agreement on the Peacekeeping Activities, Article 3 notes that CSTO peacekeeping operations are authorised by the Collective Security Council (the CSTO body) if they take place on the territory of member states, as for example in Kazakhstan in January 2022, or by the UN Security Council if they take place on the territory of a non-member state of the CSTO.

The point of the forthcoming amendments to the CSTO documents, to which Lavrov referred, is that the CSTO could independently decide to conduct a peacekeeping operation on the territory of non-member states without consulting the UN.

It is not simply a question of stepping up CSTO activities. Increased instability in wider Eurasia points to the ineffectiveness of the universal global institutions for conflict prevention and resolution, which is the UN Security Council. At least in the form in which it currently exists. Therefore, the CSTO is now probably seen by the political elites of the member states as the basis for an autonomous regional security system.

It is not a question of a permanent break with international institutions such as the UN. The format of interaction with them will remain, and this is what the provision of a “coordinating state”, which will act under a UN mandate, is introduced for.

There is a risk that a peacekeeping operation will be vital, but the UN mandate will be blocked in the Security Council by some other countries. This is why the CSTO is planning to expand its mandate to carry out politico-military activities beyond the borders of its member states.

It is clear that it is not about distant “peacekeeping marches”. The CSTO is interested in the situation in neighbouring states where collective security may be threatened. If we talk about Central Asia, it is Afghanistan, from the territory of which militant groups can begin to carry out military and terrorist acts against CSTO member states.

The revival of the former Soviet-era cooperation between the defence establishments of the CSTO countries, which the Secretary General recently updated, may be aimed at creating a resource base for this autonomous security system in the region.

To prevent the development of military-economic and military-technical cooperation within the CSTO, the United States has initiated a discussion that Russia will at some point be unable to supply Central Asian countries with ammunition and weapons for border protection because of the ASW. In particular, US Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Donald Lu stated[4] this. The former U.S. ambassador to Kyrgyzstan noted that there is a debate on where the countries of the region could obtain defence equipment if needed, citing the United States, Japan and South Korea as possible arms suppliers.

Washington clearly understands that the revival of the military industry within the CSTO increases the level of independence of the member states. To prevent this, the U.S. is planning to get some CSTO member states put on the “arms needle”, possibly initially free of charge.

Armenia’s ‘special position’ in the CSTO is probably a phenomenon of the same order, which, according to some experts, is evidence of the desire of the country’s political elite to leave the Organisation. It is clear that this desire is motivated by the West, which seeks to prevent the emergence of an autonomous security system in our region. But according to [5]Yerevan expert Grigor Balasanyan, a country’s withdrawal from the CSTO would not be in the interests of the Armenian people.

So far, with the exception of Armenia, the other CSTO members have demonstrated their readiness for further evolution of the organization, which may be joined by other states. For example, Serbia and Afghanistan are currently observer countries at the CSTO Parliamentary Assembly. In addition, the SCO has a strong interest in developing cooperation with the CSTO, as these organisations have many overlapping lines and areas of responsibility.

[1] https://www.eurasiatoday.ru/expert-opinions/12769-одкб-разместит-миротворческий-контингент-на-территории-кыргызстана.html

[2] https://inbusiness.kz/ru/last/tasmagambetov-vyskazalsya-o-sovmestnoj-razrabotke-vooruzhenij-v-stranah-odkb

[3] https://ria.ru/20230202/odkb-1849206032.html

[4] https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/17221079?utm_source=yxnews&utm_medium=desktop&utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fdzen.ru%2Fnews%2Fsearch%3Ftext%3D

[5] https://verelq.am/ru/node/123321

Central Asia

Competition of U.S.-China in Central Asia & its Implications for Pakistan

Published

2 weeks ago

March 10, 2023

Muhammad Adan Nisar

US-China rivalry will affect various states, which have good relations with both (China and U.S). After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, China and the U.S. have been ambitious in strategically influencing the Central Asia region. Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a part of China’s grand strategy in Central Asia, which has intensified the importance of this region. Further, China’s influence in this region has increased through regional organizations such as Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Pakistan is an important pivot of China’s regional strategy. China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is the flagship project of China’s BRI. However, US’s grand strategies are phase 1.0 policy to 2.0 policy and C5+1 (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan with the United States of America) is also part of the US’s grand strategy in Central Asia.

China’s connection with Central Asia can be traced to an ancient times, but established during the Soviet. In 1992, the Ashkhabad summit intensified China’s role in this region.

China joins this region through Xinjiang, an autonomous region with a majority Muslim population. It also falls into the Central Asian region. Xinjiang shares its border with three Central Asian states (Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan).

The collapse of the Soviet Union curtailed security threats to China’s national security from Central Asia. However, in 1991, the victory of the US in the Gulf War and the emergence of the New World Order was an alarming situation for China. This situation pressed China to discover a role, particularly in regional affairs in newly born states of Central Asia.

In the New Great Game, China has comprehensively increased its national strength politically and economically and has influenced this region culturally. China has utilized classical geopolitical concepts, reviving the Old Silk Road, and divide and rule strategy. Silk Road is China’s identity, which connects Asia and the West by the terminus in Xinjiang.

In 2002, Former Secretary of the State Colin Powel once remarked in House Foreign Affairs Committee that we would enhance our presence and interest in Central Asia that we had not dreamed of before.

US grand strategy falls into two phases towards Central Asia. 1.0 Phase means to protect Soviet Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), protect the sovereignty of newly born states from Russian aggression, to break Russian monopoly over transit routes and gas pipelines. In this phase, the US should have paid more attention to its geopolitical approach towards Central Asia and had fewer priorities in this region.

11 September 2001 brought huge changes in US strategy towards Central Asia, and it introduced the 2.0 phase, which means that the agenda of the US towards Central Asia is political and economical. However, the military prevailed over this policy due to US’s military presence in Afghanistan, conducting an operation against terrorism. The US has utilized this policy for military cooperation in this region.

Strategic competition between U.S. and China will directly impact Pakistan’s national security at the broader level, such as economy, military and politics.

At the political level, it impacts Pakistan’s relations with China, Iran, Russia, and the Gulf States. At the military level, Pakistan’s geostrategic location enhances Pakistan’s importance. Pakistan has been an important ally of the US against the war on terror and played its role as a frontline state against this war. At the economic level, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a game changer for Pakistan’s economy. It will create opportunities for the economy of Pakistan.

The bigger challenge for Pakistan is how it can maintain its relations with China and the US. Pakistan needs help to maintain good relations with both (US and China). If we see a historical perspective, in the 1970s, Pakistan built a bridge between US and China. Strategic affairs experts strongly believe that Pakistan can defuse the tension between the US and China.

Pakistan has few policy options through which Pakistan can maintain its good relations with both countries.

China is Pakistan’s strategic partner, which addresses Pakistan’s regional strategic concerns in all fields, such as defense, economy, politics and security sectors. CPEC has formed strategic interdependence. Pakistan cannot afford to be the part of the US’s grand strategy to contain China.

Good Pak-US relations are required for regional security. These are guarantors to bring peace in Afghanistan and can counter terrorism and extremism in this region. It is difficult for Pakistan to uncouple from the US. However, the US has a great influence on IMF and World Bank. Pakistan is in negotiation with IMF to get a loan. The US can assist Pakistan with IMF. However, Pakistan has serious concerns over Indo-US growing strategic relations, creating an imbalance in the South Asian region. India is utilizing Indo-US strategic relations as a tool against Pakistan, which concerns Pakistan’s national security. However, good Pak-US relations depend on the US that how it wants to conduct its relations with India and China.

The last option for Pakistan is that it should only place some eggs in one’s basket. Pakistan needs diversifying approach towards all major powers. Although it would be difficult for Pakistan, Pakistan can maintain its relation through an issue-based relationship. It will not affect Pakistan’s relations with anyone rather than choosing one side. This option would protect Pakistan’s regional strategic interests and address Pakistan’s security concerns.

Central Asia

The Strategic Importance of Central Asia and India’s influence in the Region

Published

1 month ago

February 19, 2023

Subrat Sarma

Long-standing historical, cultural, political, and economic ties between India and Central Asia have evolved into a solid, experienced, and transformative connection over time. In light of the COVID-19 epidemic and the shifting global order, India’s proximity to and growing convergence on concerns with the five Central Asian nations of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan has led to increased collaboration on these issues. The two sides have simultaneously intensified their discussions and cooperation on issues like trade and connectivity, economic development, energy security, regional concerns of shared interest, and the shared geopolitical worries of both sides regarding new challenges in Afghanistan.

Trade significantly impacts India’s relationships and influence in the Central Asian Region. India’s trade with Central Asian countries helps to foster economic ties and strengthens political and cultural relations. India’s imports from the area, such as oil, gas, and minerals, provide the country with access to critical resources. In contrast, its exports, such as textiles and agricultural products, give the region market access.

Geostrategic Importance of the Central Asian Region

Central Asia is strategically important due to the location at the crossroads of Asia and Europe, making it a critical link between the two continents. The Region also has significant energy reserves, including oil, natural gas, and coal, making it a substantial energy supplier to Europe and Asia. Central Asia is also home to several major transportation and communication networks, including the historic Silk Road, connecting the Region to the rest of the world and making it a hub for trade and commerce. The Region’s proximity to several regional and global powers, such as Russia, China, and India, further highlights its strategic importance.

Central Asia is strategically located in the middle of both Asia and Eurasia. It connects Asia and Europe as a bridge between Eastern and Western nations. Central Asia’s importance is acknowledged due to its geopolitical, geoeconomic, and geostrategic position. The Central Asian states have historically been a centre of trade, rivalry, and warfare due to geography. It now serves as a bridge connecting North and South and East and West. In addition to its strategic location, the Central Asian Region is also seen by outsiders as the new global geopolitical and economic battleground. Over 2000 years of conflict have been etched into its history as the past great empires struggled to control the Silk Route, the vital trade route between Europe and Asia.

India’s Policy for growing its potential in the Central Asian Region

India’s trade with Central Asia also has the potential to help balance China’s growing economic influence in the Region. India has been actively pursuing a policy of economic engagement with Central Asian countries and working to increase investment, trade and energy ties with these countries. Several factors, including energy security, access to raw materials, and regional economic integration, have driven India’s engagement with the Region. India has made efforts to increase trade and investment flows with the Central Asian countries, which includes establishing trade agreements and participating in regional economic forums. Regional politics, competition with other major powers such as China, and regional security have also influenced the trade relationship. By engaging in trade with Central Asia, India can tap into the Region’s resources, enhance its economic footprint, and contribute to regional stability and prosperity. Drug trafficking, fundamentalism, and religious extremism threaten the strength of these communities and the wider area. Water, security, environmental, and immigration issues have all become urgent. The Region is threatened by more recent acts of narcoterrorism coming from Afghanistan. Russia, China, the U.S., Turkey, Iran, Europe, the E.U., Japan, Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan are all claimed to have significant economic and security interests in the Region, making the area a “theatre of the great game” where this and other conflicts are being played out. A significant obstacle to fostering and growing ties is that India still needs to have a shared land border with any of these states. Direct travel from Pakistan to either Afghanistan or Central Asia is prohibited. Thus, China is the transit country for time- and money-consuming land trade. India has made significant headway towards enhancing connectivity by signing a security cooperation agreement for the refurbishment of Chabahar port, the creation of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), and accession to the Ashgabat Agreement. This gap is expected to be closed by India’s involvement in both the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

The India-Central Asia Summit was presided over by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in January 2022 in the presence of all five Central Asian heads of state. The online meeting showed India’s dedication to its “Extended Neighborhood Policy”, which mandates that New Delhi diversify its geopolitical allies and diplomatic objectives, as well as its readiness to cooperate with its Central Asian partners on several fronts.

Overall, trade helps to position India as an essential player in the Central Asian Region and contributes to its regional and global significance. More interaction is anticipated to enhance regional economic growth and mutual security. Economically, Central Asia offers India’s industry a “near abroad” market, overland links to the Middle East’s and Russia’s rich resources, and considerable energy supplies at comparatively close ranges. Suez and the Mediterranean Sea are both shorter than the INSTC corridor route. This Region is projected to become more significant as competition with China for resources increases.

The increased trade can also help India to reduce its dependence on other areas for energy supplies and increase its bargaining power in the global market. It aimed at improving the flow of goods, services and investment between the two regions and also to tapping into the vast energy resources of Central Asia. Additionally, more significant business can lead to infrastructure development and job creation, thereby improving the economic conditions in both regions. However, it also faces challenges such as competition from other countries and the need for a well-developed transport and communication network in the area.