Recently, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Center released its annual State of Southeast Asia Report that, among other things, found Vietnamese distrust of China remains very high. Given Chinese actions in the South China Sea and the long history between the two countries, why the negative view of China is so prevalent is well understood. What is less understood is how the intersection of Chinese action and Vietnamese history and nationalism constrain Vietnamese foreign policy choices today regarding China.
Following its conquest of Saigon after the Vietnamese and American war in 1975, the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) took over control of the entire Vietnamese country for the first time. As the party began rebuilding its nation, it also needed to develop ruling legitimacy. An element of the legitimacy of the CPV has always been it as defenders of Vietnamese independence. A sturdy defense against the French, Americans, and the Chinese cemented the CPV’s defender status. As Martin Grobheim argues, “Since the [CPV] embarked on its reform policy (đổi mới) in 1986, the party and its ‘memory machine’ have continued to disseminate an orthodox master narrative that presents the VCP as the inheritor of Vietnam’s tradition of resistance against foreign invaders.” Along with performance-based legitimacy that is supported by continued economic growth, this perception is at the core of its legitimacy, and reinforced by the “dissemination of an orthodox master narrative.”
The CPV’s embracing of the mantle of defenders of Vietnamese independence from foreign incursions is important because this narrative holds special relevance in Vietnamese history. Since BC 111, Vietnam has dealt with constant attacks by foreign invaders. In BC 111, China’s first domination of Vietnam began when the Han dynasty marched south and conquered the country. Besides moments where Vietnam briefly regained independence (40 AD- 43 AD and 544 AD- 602 AD), China would rule Vietnam for over a thousand years. It wasn’t until 939 AD when Ngo Quyen defeated the Chinese force and regained Vietnamese independence. This independence would last until 1400 AD when the Chinese re-established control of the country for only twenty-seven years. Following this brief period, Vietnam would again experience freedom until the French came in 1845. In the next 140 years, France and Japan would each control it for a period while it fought off foreign incursions from the French, Japanese, Americans, and Chinese. National identity—and nationalism—forged by the defense of its independence and especially against China has driven its history.
With this history of struggle against Chinese imperialism, when the Chinese invasion of 200,000 troops killed between 20,000 and 50,000 Vietnamese, China was the nation that modern-day Vietnamese nationalism defined itself in opposition. This is clear in its modern-day culture. For example, as Bill Hayton discusses in his book Vietnam: Rising Dragon, a children’s folk song used in the 1970s to promote harmony between Vietnamese and Chinese, was changed in the late 1980s from focusing on affinities with its northern neighbor to China’s imperialist nature towards Vietnam. The CPV has further embedded this view of China in the cultural ethos by focusing the national history curriculum on Vietnamese figures who resisted Chinese invasions. Similarly, streets and buildings have been named after them, like the Trung Sisters, who repelled a Chinese invasion in 40AD, or Ly Thuong Kiet, who fought the Sung Empire in 1076. A anti-Chinese sentiment is now palpable across Vietnamese culture.
Chinese actions have only solidified this nationalist view of them as an imperial power ambitious for Vietnamese territory since 1979. China’s dubious claim to nearly the entire South China Sea, the islands, and the resources within—including the Paracel and Spratly islands which China and Vietnam both claim —plays an essential role in reinforcing this perception of China. Chinese actions in the South China Sea have included an array of threatening tactics such as island building, maritime patrols in other countries’ exclusive economic zones while harassing foreign fishermen, and building military installations equipped with missile systems and other equipment.
China has not been shy in enforcing its territorial claims with Vietnam. For example, in 1988, Chinese vessels rammed three Vietnamese ships, sinking them and killing seventy-four Vietnamese soldiers. Since then, China has maintained its assertive tactics in the South China Sea, notably, Vietnamese-specific incidents including a 2014 oil rig collision near the Paracel Islands and a six-month standoff between Vietnam, China, and Malaysia in 2020.
With this historical backdrop as context, the modern-day distrust of China is as high as it is with the Vietnamese is better understood. The previously mentioned ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Center annual State of Southeast Asia Report illustrates this reality. The survey found that an overwhelming 73 percent of Vietnamese would align with the United States over China if forced to choose. Similarly, it found that 80 percent of Vietnamese are worried about China’s growing influence in the region.
History may not play a determinate role, but it certainly amplifies the reactions to Chinese action—particularly when it threatens Vietnamese territory or autonomy. Consider the May 2014 incident in which China stationed an oil rig in Vietnamese claimed territory in the South China Sea, igniting a severe reaction within the Vietnamese populous. Shortly after China’s bold move and a couple of escalatory actions by both sides, rioters began targeting foreign factories and foreign workers. Specifically, they targeted ethnically Chinese workers and factories. For example, a 1,000 person mob overran a Taiwanese steel plant attacking Chinese workers and setting the place ablaze. Violent groups burned down fifteen foreign national factories, and mobs attacked hundreds more in southern Vietnam. Signs carried by protestors were full of references to China and the South China Sea disputes (or the East China Sea as Vietnam refers to it), while some protested directly in front of the Chinese embassy. Reportedly, over 600 Chinese nationals fled the country.
As the Guardian reported, these groups were not just directing protests at China but the CPV for not doing enough to safeguard Vietnamese territory. The CPV is aware that China and independence animate Vietnamese nationalism and are conscious to ensure that its ire isn’t directed at them.
As a result, the distinct form of nationalism that is hyper-sensitive to maintaining territorial security and strategic autonomy has had a constraining effect on Vietnam’s policy choices—particularly with Chinese investment. For example, in 2018, the Vietnamese government considered a policy that would grant foreign investors a ninety-nine-year lease in three economic zones to incentivize investment. Again, this fear sparked widespread fears of losing autonomy to a more extensive Chinese influence and presence in Vietnam. After pressure from massive and passionate protests across the country, the National Assembly shelved the bill indefinitely.
Similarly, the North-South Expressway project is a key infrastructure initiative that seeks to connect the whole of Vietnam in a radically new way. Starting in 2005, the government developed a plan to build 5,870 km of expressway by 2020, but the government had only developed 1,163 km by then. As Doan Loan explains, “Explaining the slow progress, the ministry has cited the country’s limited financial resources, saying the state budget can only meet investment for renovating and upgrading the national highway system.”
This inability to fund the project became problematic as the government opened bids for the eastern portion of the expressway in 2019. Given Vietnam’s inability to fund the projects themselves, outside investors would invest in eight of the eleven sub-projects. During the bidding process, China was the primary bidder. Of the sixty bids that came in, thirty were from Chinese companies—an unpalatable proposition given the length of these projects and heavy Chinese presence that would result from granting them the bids. As a result, citizens voiced a palatable opposition online, and shortly after, the government rejected all foreign proposals in a move that experts argue was a direct response to China’s bids. Since then, the government has failed to find domestic companies prepared for the undertaking and changed the remaining eight projects (while adding a sub-project) into publicly funded ventures.
As Leon Trotsky is assumed to have once opined, “You may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you.” Tolstoy explained to the reader that war is a force too powerful for one person to ignore. This same phenomenon applies to history, which plays a determinate role in our lives, countries, and cultures. At times, as in the case of Vietnam, it can play a critical role in a state’s foreign policy. Its defense against foreign invaders and its history of struggle against China characterize its nationalism, which Chinese actions and territorial ambitions in the South China Sea activate. Through the influence of this nationalism, the history between these two nations plays a significant role in constraining Vietnamese engagement with China.
