Defense

A New Rashomon: How Tokyo’s Policy Will Shape Security in the Asia-Pacific

Published

12 months ago

March 30, 2022

Amid the incoming waves of restrictive measures imposed against Russia, Japan’s political establishment has come forward with a number of statements that may well push the country’s bilateral relations with Russia beyond the point of no return. The current economic, financial, technological, visa and other kinds of sanctions clearly demonstrate Tokyo’s commitment to the path charted by Washington and its allies. However, there have come to light some more dangerous trends—ones that could disrupt the fragile balance of power in the Asia-Pacific, causing a “wave” of instability with consequences that are difficult to predict.

Nuclear Communards

In late February 2022, former Prime Minister of Japan Shinzo Abe said on Fuji Television that—Japan’s participation as a non-nuclear state in the NPT Treaty and Tokyo’s own Three Non-Nuclear Principles notwithstanding—the country should think about enhancing its security, while refraining from seeing nuclear weapons as a no-go. Abe concluded that the Japanese government has repeatedly highlighted China’s growing military activity, as well as North Korea’s nuclear missile programme, to stress that the only feasible way to contain these threats could be through a joint nuclear mission (nuclear sharing) with the United States.

Within NATO, nuclear sharing provides for the deployment and storage of U.S. nuclear weapons in the territories of non-nuclear NATO member states. Today, U.S. tactical nuclear weapons (some 150 variable-yield B61 nuclear bombs) are deployed in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey, with all these nations (Turkey less so) being involved in training and planning exercises of nuclear strikes. However, the responsibility for the storage, control and command of these weapons lies with the U.S. Air Force, while it is solely Washington that decides when and to what extent they could be used.

Having enlisted support of such nations as Cuba, South Africa, Kazakhstan, Syria or the Philippines, the troika of Russia, China and Iran advocate a ban on the “horizontal proliferation” of nuclear weapons, which should include abandoning joint nuclear missions, as they go against the NPT. In a video address at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on March 1, 2022, Russia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov noted that NATO’s joint nuclear missions are essentially exercises on possible strike scenarios against Russia. With this in mind, he stressed that all U.S. nuclear weapons should be returned back home in a swift manner, with the associated infrastructure in Europe destroyed.

Abe believes that Japan, having suffered the atomic bombings in 1945, endorses the notion of global nuclear disarmament—still, in the face of the escalating need to protect the lives of the country’s nationals, he argues it is worth considering other options to bolster security. He referred to the case of Ukraine, which agreed to transfer to Russia the nuclear weapons that remained in its territory following the collapse of the Soviet Union and which failed to obtain security guarantees.

The incumbent Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, whose family comes from Hiroshima, was forced to dismiss his predecessor’s dangerous train of thought. He conceded that the idea of sharing nuclear missiles with the United States would be unacceptable for Japan—at least, in terms of Prime Minister Eisaku Sato’s Three Non-Nuclear Principles proclaimed back in 1968 and approved by the parliament three years later. According to these principles, Tokyo will not possess, produce or allow the introduction of nuclear weapons into the country. China has been quick to demand that Tokyo uphold its commitment to renouncing nuclear weapons in any form.

We should not forget about the secret agreement concluded between Tokyo and Washington in the late 1960s—the very agreement that allowed the United States to place nuclear weapons on the island of Okinawa in emergency situations. [1] The global community only learned of it in 2005, and it is still impossible to say with any certainty whether the non-nuclear principles—more of a political statement rather than a binding obligation—were observed in practice.

Don’t Wake Up Godzilla!

In 2017, Shigeru Ishiba, former Secretary-General of the Liberal Democratic Party, spoke out in favour of Japan acquiring the technology to build nuclear weapons, should the need ever arise. Some experts suggest this would not be a formal violation of Japan’s Constitution. Still, there are doubts within the country’s political elite as to the effectiveness of U.S. “nuclear umbrella,” although the White House reaffirmed in April 2021 its commitment to ensuring Japanese security, using a full range of capabilities at its disposal, including nuclear weapons.

Over the years, Japan has accumulated some 45 tonnes of plutonium through the operation of its nuclear power plants, although only 9 tonnes are stored in the country, as the rest is temporarily held in the United Kingdom and France. The so-called MOX (mixed oxide) fuel, which includes plutonium produced in reactors, has yet to win popularity in the energy sector, as there remain certain difficulties in processing it. This creates uncertainty about the fate of the massive nuclear material, even if it is under IAEA safeguards. While many believe that Tokyo has the capacity to construct up to 6000 nuclear warheads, serious reprocessing is required to accomplish this—whether Japan has the technological capability to do this is open to debate.

Japan has the technology to produce missile delivery vehicles, including ASM-3 (with a range of 400km), JASSM and LRASM (both with a range of 500km) cruise missiles, which are already in service, as well as missile weapons currently under development, including hypersonic weapons. Early in 2021, the Japanese government announced its intention to extend the range of its land-, sea- and air-based cruise missiles to 1500km, with characteristics that boost the chances of a successful strike (low visibility, complex directory, variable cruise speed etc.). In addition, Japan’s industry has as good as perfected the technologies for producing ballistic missiles, with the most advanced model being the three-stage Epsilon-5 launch vehicle with a payload of more than 1200kg. The Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency possesses remote sensing, telecom and reconnaissance satellites, while it could deploy interceptor spacecraft in the future. [2]

When assessing Japan’s nuclear potential, the only unknowns are the true scale and rate at which the country could be producing special warheads for missiles and bombs, as well as the likelihood of such a decision being taken.

Considering Japan chooses to maintain its non-nuclear status, Tokyo’s military build-up endeavors still make one doubt the pacifism of the country’s leadership. Of particular concern for Russia (and China) are the acquisition of ground-attack capabilities with precision-guided missiles, the advancements in anti-missile defence systems, and the far from hypothetical deployment of U.S. intermediate- and shorter-range missiles on the Japanese soil. For example, the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa already has tactical missile systems capable of launching hypersonic missiles.

Island of Bad Luck

In his interview for Fuji Television, Shinzo Abe also touched upon the Taiwan issue. He believes the U.S. should give up on the concept of “strategic uncertainty” regarding military guarantees of the island’s security, as the only way to contain Beijing would be to make it absolutely clear—through an official statement—that Washington would be ready to intervene in the event of attack against Taiwan. The former Prime Minister noted that the island of Yonaguni, now part of Okinawa Prefecture, is only 110km from the Taiwanese coast, and Japan would lose control over the air and sea space here if China were to launch a military campaign. Early in 2022, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida spoke of the need to bolster the defences of the Nansei island chain, which separates the East China and Philippine seas, while being close to the island of Taiwan.

In August 2021, Tokyo and Taipei discussed the possibility of fostering more cooperation in trade, economy, investment and technologies as well as developing defence and security ties. According to the ruling parties of the two sides, the policy of the Chinese leadership demonstrates a clear intention to isolate the island, forcing its administration to cede its independence to a great extent and make it reliant on the mainland. In this regard, representatives of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party did not rule out the possibility of Taiwan acceding to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership in the near future, as well as its membership in intergovernmental international organizations, such as the World Health Organization.

Throughout 2021, Japanese politicians, including Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso, openly spoke about the dangers for Japan of a possible Chinese military operation to return Taiwan and the need to help defend the island in the event of attack. For the first time ever, Japan’s annual defence report, delivered in July 2021, was unequivocal in stating the country’s stance on the Taiwan issue. A number of politicians have acknowledged that Japan’s Self-Defense Forces cannot repel Chinese aggression without the assistance of the U.S. Armed Forces. Naturally, such statements have not gone unnoticed in Beijing, where they have been described as absolutely unacceptable and dangerous. According to Zhao Lijian, spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, Japan is wholly responsible for the “Taiwan issue” and must therefore be careful in what it says and does. Any attempt to support the Taiwanese “secessionists,” he stressed, would be regarded as interference in the internal affairs of the People’s Republic of China.

It is worth noting that the Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development adopted in 2022 reflects Moscow’s unconditional support for the One-China principle. This should be understood as a recognition of Taiwan as an integral part of the People’s Republic of China, while some nations, at the behest of the United States, talk instead about a “united China,” avoiding any recognition of the sovereignty of the Communist authorities over the island. Incidentally, Taipei protested the joint statement and imposed sanctions against Russia in late February as the situation in Ukraine was developing.

Self-Defence has its limits

Finally, Tokyo’s reaction to the aggravated international situation amid Russia’s special operation is extremely concerning. Sanctions were to be expected, as Tokyo has consistently followed suit with U.S. policy in this respect. However, the nature and extent of restrictions turned out to be far more significant than in 2014. That said, the energy and fuel sector has so far remained untouched.

It is disappointing that Japan refuses to treat economic cooperation outside the context of resolving the “territorial issue” and discuss a peace treaty until these claims are satisfied. Effectively, all the agreements reached by Vladimir Putin and Shinzo Abe in Singapore in 2018 were disavowed. The Eight-Point Cooperation Plan presented in Sochi in 2016, which—until recently—significantly contributed to the bilateral cooperation, will likely remain dormant, too. The negotiations between Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan Yoshimasa Hayashi and Minister of Economic Development of the Russian Federation Maxim Reshetnikov held in February 2022 will probably also come to nothing. According to some unofficial reports, Japan does not consider it possible at the present juncture to continue trade, economic and investment cooperation.

For the first time, the Japanese government described Russia’s actions as “aggression.” In this regard, discussions on the need to amend Article 9 of Japan’s Constitution, which states that the country will never maintain armed forces or possess offensive weapons, have been stepped up. Other members of the parliament are gradually starting to support the initiative of the Japanese Communist Party to strengthen the country’s defence capabilities. The statement of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Russian “occupation” of the southern part of the Kuril Islands, which, as the Japanese leadership has it, is a violation of international law, just like Russia’s “invasion” of Ukraine, is particularly telling. The return to such rhetoric is unlikely to facilitate bilateral cooperation.

In this regard, it is becoming increasingly likely that the push to increase defence spending that has all but been adopted as policy will be legitimized at the official level—the defence budget for 2022 totalled $47.2 billion and it could be increased by a further $6.8 billion. The additional spending is to purchase weapons and equipment that were not delivered due to the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as to implement protective measures to respond to threats from North Korea and China. Judging by what Japanese diplomats have been saying recently, Russia may also be included in the official list of the country’s enemies. Increasing funding to 2% of GDP (from the current 1.3%), as U.S. analysts have proposed, will ensure the further improvement of the Japan Self-Defense Forces in terms of technology and strike capabilities, which will change the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific forever.

Yoshida F. (2018) From the Reality of a Nuclear Umbrella to a World without Nuclear Weapons: An Interview with Katsuya Okada // Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament. Vol. 1, issue 2. – pp. 474–485.
Skosyrev V. Japan to Launch Killer Satellites // Nezavisimaya gazeta, September 18, 2019.

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Defense

Indian Conventional and Strategic Arms Buildup: Implications for Pakistan

Published

1 week ago

March 18, 2023

Nadir Ali

South Asia’s regional dynamic is both flamboyant and intricate. Various empires have formed, prospered, and perished over the millennia, as innumerable conflicts and struggles for control of resources spread over the globe. However, 2021 was a year of fierce weapons competition between South Asia’s nuclear neighbors, India and Pakistan, who carried out 26 missile tests. India launched 16 ballistic and cruise missiles while Pakistan tested 10 missiles with nearly identical capabilities.

As a response to the perceived inability of the Indian Armed Forces (IAF) to adequately respond to the Pakistani insurgencies, and after the failure of the Indian forces to quickly react and mobilize their forces in 2001, the Indian Army and the defense policymakers realized the lack of modernized and consistent army doctrine. This resulted in the announcement by the Indian Army in 2004 of a new limited war doctrine known as the Cold Start Doctrine (CSD).

Importance of Air Base

The importance of air superiority can be witnessed by looking at the six days of the Arab-Israeli War, in which the Israeli forces pre-empted an attack from the bases of Jordan, Syria, Egypt, and Iraq, and struck the air force before the fight even began. The outcome of the war was determined during its first hours. By destroying the opposing air fleet, Israeli forces gained air superiority, and thus the Arab forces were helpless in their efforts, which eventually resulted in a humiliating defeat for the Arabs.

Indian Air-Bases: A Strategic Threat

In the contemporary era, military forces are going for weapon systems that require absolutely no time at all when it comes to striking a target. In that regard, the air force comes first for the obvious reason that its threshold is low as compared to a ballistic missile strike. Indian force deployment and employment are very close to Pakistan’s borders, from Siachen to the Rann of Kutch. In India’s most recent attack on Balakot, which took place in 2019, the air force was utilized. This clearly shows the Indian resolve to use the air force in any future blatant aggression like the one in February 2019.

The Indian air force deployment is tailor-made for Pakistan. If one analyzes the airbases/airstrips positioning and range from the Pakistani-Indo international border, the Line of Control (LOC), and the working boundary, it is quite obvious that the positioning shows the aggressive posture of the Indian Air Force. When deployed at those bases, the aircraft are the finest in the Indian military, both in terms of their quality and serviceability. When it comes to the up-gradation of the base’s facilities, this is the top priority list that is visible to everyone. In May 2021, the bases in Pakistan got priority.

The bases are positioned in such a strategy to cover every city in Pakistan, as it has no strategic depth. Pakistan’s major cities, like Karachi, Lahore, Multan, Faisalabad, Hyderabad, Bahawalpur, Rahim Yar Khan, Sialkot, and even the capital, Islamabad, are within the Indian Air Force’s reach. The same goes for the areas in Kashmir and Gilgit Baltistan.

Future Threat Scenario

Now the question arises what will happen in the future in light of past historical data? The answer to this is both simple and complex. It is simple in the context that the IAF will target Pakistan with its pre-defined strategy of naked aggression against peaceful neighbors, while the Indian Army is following a pro-active offense posture; the complex part is where, when, and how.

The IAF will utilize the war scenario created by the Indian government and Indian media after a staged terrorist attack on a civilian or military target, for which they will put full blame on the Pakistani state and security apparatus. They will try to raise the temperature to the point where the Indian civil establishment shows the world community that now enough is enough and our people are demanding a counter-strike. At that time, the Indian establishment will use its media to put blame on Pakistan and create a war-like scenario while raising tensions.

In light of that, the IAF, under the orders of the Indian government, along with the Indian army, will start attacking the Pakistani bases in the early moments of the war because if the IAF does not target PAF bases, then there will be grave consequences for the Indian army, and the Pakistani army also has additional fire support bases. The above-mentioned rationale will be the main cause of the IAF attacking the PAF infrastructure, thus undermining the national security of Pakistan. The Indian army, with the IAF, will aspire to rapid, shallow penetration of Pakistani territory, without crossing the nuclear threshold of Pakistan. The Indian military will go for a quick and short battle that will surprise Pakistan because that is the only possible strategy in their minds when talking about limited war scenarios or showing off war.

Conclusion

The IAF is a major threat to the national security of Pakistan in the wake of its alignment with the Indian military’s CSD. The operational exercises conducted in the past and the recent strikes at Balakot exhibit the growing role of the IAF in the Indian military offensive strategy against Pakistan. Vast parts of Pakistan are within the combat radius of the IAF’s operational fighters because of Pakistan’s lack of strategic depth.

The IAF will try to use this as an advantage to support the pro-active and offensive strategy of the Indian Armed Forces to harm Pakistan, as that would be their prime objective because of their hegemonic designs. In order to protect itself from India’s flagrant military aggression, Pakistan should take some protective measures.

Recommendations

In the wake of the growing IAF threat, the PAF and Pakistani government should take the following measures on an urgent basis:

Build some new airstrips along the border with India, to balance the threat by not allowing an IAF advantage in any sector. Moreover, the building of airstrips requires less money; thus this step will not put a strain on Pakistan’s economy;
Buy more advanced surveillance radars to detect early IAF movement.
Purchase advanced surface-to-air missiles to create a defensive barrier;
Go for indigenizing the modern, state-of-the-art 5^th generation fighter aircraft, as buying from foreign suppliers is very expensive.
Ask the international community to put pressure on both sides to sign confidence-building measures that will lead to peace and stability.

Defense

The audacious AUKUS submarine deal and Asia’s changing security landscape

Published

1 week ago

March 18, 2023

Bejoy Sebastian

image source: twitter @POTUS

In this exhaustive analysis, I try to spell out the impact and potential consequences of the recently-brokered submarine deal between the U.S., the U.K., and Australia on Asia’s changing security landscape.

***

All advanced navies of the world possess lethal submarines, powered by either diesel-electric or nuclear propulsion. These underwater warships are the most potent asset at the disposal of a naval force for maritime power projection, sea denial and sea control. Lying silently under water, they are capable of sinking surface ships, including large aircraft carriers, with torpedoes or ballistic missiles. Ever since WW-II, submarines have made its name as one of the most crucial components of maritime strategy and naval warfare. Australia and the U.K. are two key maritime nations of the world, which happen to be security allies of the United States, a country that owns and operates the largest fleet of nuclear-powered submarines in the world. Being nuclear-powered not necessarily mean being armed with nuclear warheads.

The 2021-formed AUKUS (Australia, U.S., U.K.) “enhanced trilateral security partnership” has taken cooperation between the three Anglophone countries to the next level. U.S. President Joe Biden hosted the prime ministers of the United Kingdom and Australia – PM Rishi Sunak and PM Anthony Albanese – in the Californian port city of San Diego on 13 March 2023, where they jointly announced a detailed four-phased plan to equip Australia (a non-nuclear-weapon state) with “conventionally armed, nuclear-powered” submarines (codenamed SSN) at least by the next decade along with strengthening cooperation in other areas such as critical and emerging technologies.

The plan would cost Canberra’s exchequer up to a whopping A$ 368 bn. (US$ 245 bn.) in total by 2055, according to reports. The detailed plan, spanning a time frame of three decades, was announced after an eighteen-month-long consultation period following the creation of AUKUS in mid-September 2021. Australian PM Anthony Albanese called the deal “the single biggest leap” in Australia’s defence capabilities in the nation’s history. If the plan goes ahead smoothly as planned, Australia will become the seventh country in the world to add nuclear-powered submarines to its navy. As the deal turns out to be a race against time, the biggest challenge is to ensure deterrence capabilities for Australia at the present, as the full benefits of the deal would take years to materialise.

AUKUS leaders believe that the deal would “strengthen deterrence and bolster stability in the Indo-Pacific and beyond for decades to come”, apparently keeping in mind the exponential growth of China’s naval power in the recent past. China has built 12 nuclear-powered submarines in the last two decades, including ballistic missile submarines (codenamed SSBNs) and is continuing its ambitious ship-building spree in all fronts. As per the AUKUS plan, the first phase of the deal is set to begin as early as this year, with U.S. and British SSNs increasing their port visits in Australia along with joint embedded training of naval personnel, which will be followed by a rotational deployment of U.S. and British SSNs in the island continent.

In the remaining two phases of the deal, Washington will deliver a flotilla of three to five advanced Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines to Australia by the early 2030s, upon Congressional approval, and eventually a new “SSN-AUKUS class” of nuclear-powered submarines (SSN) will be developed in the decade that follows, for future commissioning in both British and Australian navies. With the use of nuclear energy involved, the Indo-Pacific region is abuzz with fears and concerns of an escalating arms race, even though AUKUS promises “the highest nuclear non-proliferation standard”.

Current owners of nuclear-powered submarines

As of now, only the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (U.S., Russia, China, U.K., France) and India have active nuclear-powered attack-capable submarines in their naval fleet (see the image below). More than half of the 130 active nuclear-powered submarines in the world are operated by the U.S. Navy (67), followed by Russia (31), China (12), U.K. (10), France (9) and India (1). The rise of China’s offensive military capabilities and its naval power in particular, since the 1990s, is the single largest factor that has convinced Canberra to join hands with Washington and London to bolster its own capabilities, through AUKUS, by making use of “next-generation” British hull design and “cutting-edge” American technology.

Countries with active nuclear powered submarines (via Statista)

The AUKUS deal smartly gets away with a loophole in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968, which allows for the transfer of fissionable material and nuclear technology from a nuclear-weapon state (NWS) to a non-NWS if it is used for non-explosive military use like naval propulsion. Such a transfer is also exempted from inspections and monitoring by the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an organisation that stands for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the promotion of nuclear safety. The IAEA Director General said that he had received “separate communications” on the matter from the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Australia, as well as from the U.K. and the U.S.

Mixed reactions

Of all the countries that have reacted to the highly ambitious AUKUS project, the responses of China and Russia stands out, as they are in direct strategic competition with the de facto leader of AUKUS – the United States. While the Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson remarked that the U.S. and its AUKUS allies are “walking further and further down the path of error and danger for their own geopolitical self-interest”, Russian foreign minister commented, “the Anglo-Saxon world, with the creation of structures like AUKUS and with the advancement of NATO military infrastructures into Asia, is making a serious bet on many years of confrontation in Asia”.

While Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong cities Canberra’s bid for “strategic equilibrium” in the region as the underlying factor that led to the AUKUS pact, opinions on the submarine deal, which comes at a humongous cost, are not uniform across Australia’s political spectrum. Former Prime Minister Paul Keating thinks Canberra is compromising on a proper national defence strategy to help maintain U.S. “strategic hegemony” in Asia and has also stated that the submarine deal would be ineffective in the event of a war. Indonesia, Malaysia and New Zealand have also shared their concerns about the risk of nuclear proliferation in the region.

As per the Bangkok Treaty of 1995, Southeast Asia is a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ). Moreover, almost all of the ASEAN member-states have deep economic linkages with China, even though they rely on the U.S. for “security and stability” in Asia. Even though some of them have disputes with Beijing in the South China Sea, like the Philippines and Vietnam, they prefer to avoid unnecessary “provocations” and try to balance their ties with the U.S. and China, amid intensifying regional rivalry between the two big powers. Australian defence and foreign ministries are expected to embark on a diplomatic charm offensive to assuage all concerns of Southeast Asian countries lying in China’s periphery.

Eyeing for balance of power

AUKUS was announced just one year after a Pentagon report claimed that China has built the world’s largest naval fleet in sheer numerical terms, even though the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) relies mostly on smaller classes of ships, while the U.S. naval strength is further multiplied by its allied navies. One of the most-overlooked events of March 2023 was the annual session of China’s ceremonial national legislature, the National People’s Congress (NPC), which handed over China’s Presidency to the hyper-nationalistic and revanchist leader Xi Jinping for an unprecedented third time in a row.

The newly-appointed Chinese foreign minister Qin Gang, formerly China’s Ambassador to the United States, held a press conference on the sidelines of the NPC, during which he made a significant remark that throws light on the deteriorating state of U.S.-China relations. He accused the U.S. of harbouring a “Cold War mentality” and said, “… the United States claims that it seeks to out-compete China but does not seek conflict. Yet in reality, it’s so-called competition means to contain and suppress China in all respects and get the two countries locked in a zero-sum game … If the United States does not hit the brake but continues to speed down the wrong path, no amount of guardrails can prevent derailing, and there will surely be conflict and confrontation … Containment and suppression will not make America great, and it will not stop the rejuvenation of China …”

Washington’s shooting of a suspected Chinese “spy balloon” that flew over American airspace earlier this year is the latest example of this downward spiral in U.S.-China ties. The Indo-Pacific, as a geostrategic concept and a broader maritime region, came into being as China began to flex its military muscles throughout its immediate and extended neighbourhood, where U.S. and its allies have a robust military presence.

Being part of the U.S.-led alliance system, including the “Five Eyes” intelligence-sharing network and the recent AUKUS pact, Canberra has become a lynchpin of Washington’s evolving Indo-Pacific strategy to counter growing Chinese assertiveness and stated offensive intentions vis-à-vis Taiwan, the South and East China Seas, and also the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with India. Australia is also due to the host the third in-person Quad leaders’ summit later this year.

As the “threat perception” of China in the West continues to rise day by day, the extent to which an AUKUS-centered deterrence is possible in Asia remains to be seen in the years to come.

Defense

Anti-Satellite Weapons: Risks and Regulations

Published

1 week ago

March 15, 2023

Sameer Ali Khan

Today, outer space is characterised as an increasingly congested, contested, and competitive domain. This is because of an unprecedented increase in satellites and actors operating them. 13 countries now possess the capability to launch satellites compared to only two in the late 50s. In 1959, there were only two man-made objects in outer space but as of 30^th April, 2022, Union of Concerned Scientists’ database included 5,465 active satellites. The number stood at 3,372 on 31 December 2020 – indicating an increase of 62%.

The growing dependence over space-based assets for day-to-day activities, like communication, navigation, and weather forecasts etc. indicates that the numbers are likely to grow exponentially. The environment that these satellites face is not benign by any standard. The biggest threat emerges in the form of space debris which are any human-made objects in orbit around the Earth that no longer serve any useful purpose. 60 years of human activities in outer space have generated over 29,000 human-made objects of larger than 10cm, while even a 1cm object can collide with a satellite to cause damage comparable to a hand grenade. While some of the debris generation is inevitable, Destructive Anti Satellite Weapons (DA-ASATs) testing has been a leading source of debris creation – something that can be prevented.

DA-ASATs, part of the counterspace capabilities which help a state in establishing space superiority while denying the same to its adversary, are essentially missiles which either directly hit a satellite in outer space or destroy it through proximity detonations. Use of this capability generates debris in outer space and threatens sustainable utilisation of outer space for peaceful endeavours. Other non-kinetic counterspace capabilities include physical non-kinetic capabilities like lasers and High Power Microwaves (HPMs) that damage on board circuitry of satellites, electronic counterspace capabilities which affect the satellites’ communications channels and cyber capabilities which target the data.

In November 2022, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) passed a non-binding resolution banning testing of DA-ASATs. The resolution was supported by an overwhelming majority of 154 states. The resolution was tabled by the United States (US) that had already announced a unilateral moratorium on such testing in April of that year. While the earliest demonstrations of such a capability date back to early Cold War, only four states have demonstrated this capability so far – the US, Russia, China, and India. While Russia and China voted against the resolution, India abstained from voting but expressed its preference for a legally binding treaty over self-declared moratoriums. Russia and China, on the other hand, objected to the resolution’s shortcomings over development of such a capability and lack of disarmament when it comes to states that already possess this capability. The two have also pointed out how the issue of non-kinetic ASATs was left out.

While the effort to mitigate debris-generation through banning the testing of DA-ASATs is praiseworthy, leaving out the continued possession, production, and development of DA-ASATs and more advanced non-kinetic capabilities is worrisome. In a way, the emerging trend of unilateral moratoriums and UNGA resolution is akin to establishing DA-ASAT ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’ as was the case of nuclear non-proliferation regime. A taboo on testing of these technologies is likely to emerge, making it difficult for other states to enter this club. Such an outcome would be desirable if the intent was to avoid an arms race in outer space and move towards disarmament of existing capabilities. However, that does not seem to be the case.

France, for instance, joined the US in announcing a moratorium on testing of DA-ASATs – in a way surrendering its option to demonstrate this capability. However, in 2019, French Defence Minister had publicised a French plan to develop anti-satellite laser weapons stating that, ‘If our [French] satellites are threatened, we intend to blind those of our adversaries.’ Lasers and other non-kinetic means present a different set of challenges for space security. Possession of such capabilities is difficult to verify, it is difficult to establish attribution once such weapons have been employed, and their non-destructive nature lowers the threshold of use. In case of electronic and counterspace capabilities, the barriers to entry are lower and the risks of proliferation are higher. If other states with significant stakes in outer space emulate the French approach, it is only going to increase the likelihood of warfighting in outer space.

The emerging taboo on non-testing of DA-ASATs is not shared by three of the four states which have demonstrated this capability so far. Notwithstanding the American divergences with Russia and China, there is merit in the position that the latter have taken. The next step, therefore, needs to be disarmament of existing DA-ASAT capabilities and a ban on their development. Alongside, the issue of non-kinetic counterspace capabilities also needs to be addressed. Without a comprehensive approach towards space security and addressing the concerns of all stakeholders, there is no way to ensure that contestation in outer space will not escalate to undesirable levels.