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The Moral Implications of the Ukraine Invasion

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Image source: war.ukraine.ua by Milan Jaros

Authors: Lukian De Boni, Sahasranshu Dash, and Victor Wolemonwu*

Russia invaded Ukraine on the 24th of February after months of military build-up across its border. Alarming scenes of siege and destruction, heroic resistance, unprecedented sanctions, skyrocketing oil and gas prices and the spectre of nuclear Armageddon have kept the world on edge ever since. But how would future historians and philosophers see this, given that the world has lived through similar cataclysms in Iraq, Libya, Syria, Myanmar, and Yemen? How will Putin’s so-called ‘special military operation’ reshape global norms and our collective moral a prioris?

In just 4 weeks of conflict, the UN High Commissioner for refugees, Filippo Grandi, confirmed that 10 million people have fled their homes in Ukraine: a quarter of the population. 3.5 million of these have fled the country, which underlines in stark utilitarian terms the extreme urgency of the unfolding human catastrophe. For comparison, in 10 years of conflict, the Syrian civil war caused 5 million Syrians to leave the country.

Vladimir Putin’s jus ad bellum (‘right to go to war’) was predicated upon the Russian Orthodox Church’s just war doctrine, itself a corollary of similar thoughts expressed earlier by St. Thomas Aquinas. In a televised address, Putin stated his twin objectives as being the ‘de-Nazification’ and demilitarisation of Ukraine. This neo-Kantian justification of war against an aggressor as a form of defence hinges on the understanding that states are moral entities whose moral obligations are to promote peaceful co-existence amongst the citizens, to ensure that their rights are protected, and more fundamentally, to protect the state’s existence and independence.

Thus, Putin’s assumption was that having waged a just war, he would be greeted on the streets of Ukraine as a liberator from neo-Nazis that had been suppressing Russian-speaking Ukrainians. However, the pulverisation of ethnically Russian Volnovakha and war crimes on an industrial scale in predominantly Russian-speaking Mariupol and Kharkiv give a lie to any such pretensions. The assumption that Ukraine needs de-Nazification is further problematised by the fact that neo-Nazi parties won a mere 2% of the vote in comparison with much larger percentages in established democracies such as Germany, the US, India, and Sweden. Furthermore, the Ukrainian president is of Jewish origin and his grandfather died fighting the actual Nazis led by Hitler. What is more, Putin’s Russia itself has turned more towards ‘early-stage fascism’ as recognised by major Russia scholars such as Anton Oleynik, Alexander J Motyl, Mikhail Iampolski, and Vladislav Inozemtsev. In Putin’s Russia, dissidents like Vladimir Kara-Murza, Alexei Navalny, Alexander Litvinenko, and Boris Nemtsov are often poisoned or shot dead. Or we take the case of the journalist Anna Politkovskaya: she reported on Chechnya where Putin killed a quarter million Chechen Muslims during the bombing of Grozny in 1999 and where egregious human rights violations have become routine under Putin-appointed warlord Ramzan Kadyrov- including anti-gay purges, restrictions on women’s rights, and regular forced disappearances, torture, and extrajudicial assassinations. In 2006, on Putin’s birthday, Politkovskaya was gunned down outside her apartment. Not long after this, in 2009, the Russian president personally consecrated the grave of Ivan Ilyin, the early 20th century Russian philosopher and proponent of ‘redemptive fascism.’ Putin’s favourite contemporary philosopher and public intellectual Aleksandr Dugin is a self-declared opponent of liberalism and in 2014 called for genocide to be committed against Ukrainians because they are ‘a race of bastards that emerged from the sewer manholes,’ echoing similarly chilling statements made by Goebbels in the 1930s. If the categorical imperative of de-Nazification actually held, President Putin would have done better to start at home, within the internationally recognised borders of the Russian Federation. His recent threat to undertake a ‘national cleansing’ of ‘traitors’ and ‘scum’ sounds a lot more Nazi than anything he is accusing the Ukrainians of.

An added ‘realist’ theory of international relations popularised by the likes of John Mearsheimer justifies the invasion on the basis of NATO ‘encroachment’ upon the Russian ‘sphere of influence.’ This position has some superficial merit in that it attempts a stable Hobbesian equilibrium between major powers and delivers peace. However, in treating individual states as pieces on a chessboard, we deprive them of the sovereign right to choose their destiny. This right is essential to a Kantian understanding of humanity being not just a means to a desirable end, but as a moral end in itself, with intrinsic value and dignity. Cuba in 1962 had a right to choose Soviet influence- after the missile crisis, the US abandoned all plans to invade and hasn’t reneged in 50 years unlike Russia, which reneged upon the 1994 Budapest Agreement that denuclearised Ukraine in exchange for security guarantees. Likewise, Ukraine has a right to choose a more European and democratic future away from a country that killed 3.9 million Ukrainians in the Holodomor and has repeatedly sought to extinguish its national identity.

But in just war theory, jus in bello (‘the way that war is conducted’) is often more important than the initial jus ad bellum. In using thermobaric weapons, threatening tactical nuclear warfare, and bombing maternity hospitals and a theatre in Mariupol outside which ‘Children’ had clearly been written in Russian, Putin’s troops have shown themselves capable of causing intentional harm to combatants and non-combatants alike. Recent reports confirm that over 4500 Ukrainians are being forcibly sent to distant parts of Russia without their passports and forced to sign documents enjoining them to work for free for 2 to 3 years. The International Red Cross confirmed that Russian troops had deployed butterfly mines on humanitarian corridors. Much like the carnage in Yemen, this runs the risk of setting a dire precedent for the 21st century.

The moral depravity of the Second World War led to the Nuremberg trials and the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The moral depravity of the Cold War led to the globalisation of democratic norms in the wake of the fall of the Berlin Wall. The moral depravity of the Srebrenica massacre of Bosnian Muslims led to the trial and conviction of Slobodan Milošević and his cronies. Will we see something similar for unconscionable war crimes in Ukraine and Yemen, or blanket impunity? Jus post bellum (‘justice after the war’) must ensure not just lasting peace, but also dignity for survivors and culpability for depraved actions.

Last but not least, intense media coverage of the Ukraine war and the ensuing refugee crisis reminds us of our implicit hierarchies of concern. Poland, which was deploying its military against non-white refugees a few months ago, has accepted over 2 million Ukrainian refugees in a matter of weeks. Russia’s unconscionable bombardment of Aleppo and Grozny and extreme humanitarian crises in Yemen (famine and destruction) and Libya (open air slave markets) were overlooked. If a 1945-style moral reconstruction is to be attempted at the end of the gruesome war in Ukraine, we must insist on our generation’s version of ‘Never Again.’ But it must apply all over the world.

The recently deceased anti-apartheid campaigner Archbishop Desmond Tutu once said: “If you are neutral in situations of injustice, you have chosen the side of the oppressor. If an elephant has its foot on the tail of a mouse, and you say that you are neutral, the mouse will not appreciate your neutrality.” The Rawlsian difference principle, applied on an international scale, also requires that social justice must benefit the least favoured in society. A civilised world must recognise its obligations to refugees and non-combatants and victims of repression. This puts a constraint on state sovereignty and makes the neutrality of bystanders morally untenable.

Failing that, we move back into the dark, mediaeval normative realm of Thucydides’ maxim ‘The strong do what they will and the weak suffer what they must…’ God forbid.

*Sahasranshu Dash is a research associate at the South Asia Institute of Research and Development, Kathmandu, Nepal. Victor Wolemonwu is a PhD candidate in Bioethics and Social philosophy at the University of Sheffield

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Eastern Europe

A Weapon of War: Rapes in the Ukraine-Russia Conflict

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Warfare has always involved violent activity. It is the state-sanctioned, societally accepted form of murder determining which nation-state or non-state actor has power over an enemy. Like any area of society, however, warfare is governed by a series of laws and regulations (commonly known as the Law of Land Warfare) being codified in international law in 1899, 1907, and 1929 and by individual nation-states afterward. While these rules are often followed by at least one entity in a military conflict, there usually is a violation of the Law of Land Warfare in any military action.

While every violation is incredibly serious and important, one that often stands out in military conflicts is sexual assault or rape.

While it is one of (if not the) most abhorrent criminal actions known to man, rape has and always will be a commonality in warfare and violent conflicts. It is practically as old as warfare itself. According to Encyclopedia Britannica, “… [wartime] rape was long considered an unfortunate but inevitable accompaniment of war—the result of the prolonged sexual deprivation of troops and insufficient military discipline” with the Second World War being a prime example of wartime rape on both sides of the conflict. Until the prevalence of international law in the late 20th century, wartime rape was “mischaracterized and dismissed by military and political leaders—in other words, those in a position to stop it—as a private crime, a sexual act, the ignoble conduct of one occasional soldier, or, worse still, it has been accepted precisely because it is so commonplace”, according to academics writing in Johns Hopkins University’s SAIS Review of International Affairs.

Partly due to an increase in unconventional conflicts involving non-state actors, “the international community began to recognize rape as a weapon and strategy of war, and efforts were made to prosecute such acts under existing international law” including Article 27 of the Geneva Convention and multiple declarations by the United Nations (UN) Commission on Human Rights, the Fourth World Conference on Women, the International Criminal Court, and the UN Security Council. These declarations and codifications further allowed for the protection of men, women, and children in combat zones from rape in addition to making crimes of sexual assault eligible to be considered as crimes against humanity or war crimes.

While international law is clear and the penalties for such actions heavy, nation-states and non-state actors can choose to disregard such laws. This is best exemplified in the current era with the Ukraine-Russia Conflict.

While most persons first heard of the rape of Ukrainians by Russian troops in mid to late April of 2022, roughly two months into the invasion, reports and developments on wartime rape by Russian troops was circulating heavily. The UN’s Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), looking at information received and vetted between the 22nd of February and 26th of March, reported there were “heightened risks of conflict related sexual violence (CRSV)” in addition to “a high number of women and girls [who are feeling Ukraine] face high risk of human trafficking and sexual exploitation”. While these reports were based on secondary sources or “made by alleged witnesses”, it is worth noting that Ukrainian law enforcement and the Prosecutor General of Ukraine all began investigating multiple reports of sexual assault of Ukrainians by Russian troops and that, generally, victims of rape may not report for a variety of reasons.

Other international entities, including Human Rights Watch, the New York Times, and BBC News, all reported further allegations of rape by Russian soldiers in Ukraine, yet these were relatively overshadowed by the news of active combat.

One of the first major outlets to report on this was The Guardian on 4 April 2022 which documented reports from victims and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) on rape in Ukraine. Interviewing Kateryna Cherepakha, the president of sexual assault charity La Strada Ukraine, “We have had several calls to our emergency hotline from women and girls seeking assistance, but in most cases it’s been impossible to help them physically. We haven’t been able to reach them because of the fighting … Rape is an underreported crime and stigmatised issue even in peaceful times. I am worried that what we learn about is just going to be the tip of the iceberg”.

Throughout April and into May, rapes in Ukraine were reported on more heavily as victims, Ukrainian officials, and every day Ukrainians were speaking up. This drew the attention of many international entities including the International Criminal Court which launched “a war crimes investigation”, citing the rapes as being a key piece of evidence, and the European Parliament which condemned the use of rape as a weapon. The UN’s special representative on sexual violence in war also received “reports, not yet verified” concerning the sexual assault of men and boys throughout Ukraine stating “It’s hard for women and girls to report [rape] because of stigma amongst other reasons, but it’s often even harder for men and boys to report … we have to create that safe space for all victims to report cases of sexual violence”. The UN as a whole has demanded the allegations “be independently investigated to ensure justice and accountability”.

Throughout this military endeavor, Russia has denied allowing the rape of civilians (or any such war crimes) to occur, these denials being bolstered by various American and Western podcasters and questionable news sites. While Russia and other Putin apologists can try to deny such war crimes or illegal violations of the law of land warfare is taking place, others experienced in the field of sexual assault and human rights have contested this. Hugh Williamson with Human Rights Watch (HRW), speaking to CBC Radio, said HRW was “being very cautious … It’s taken us some time to piece it together, to make sure we are absolutely sure it is true and verifiable. We’re not saying this is very widespread, but we worry that it could be”.

While it is still quite difficult to ascertain what exactly is occurring in Ukraine, given the fact that a full on war is being exercised, it is likely to believe that some manner of war crimes, including sexual assault, is occurring. The fact that Russia has historically engaged in misinformation campaigns, knowingly spread false information in regards to the Ukraine crisis, and in the past engaged in war crimes throughout Eastern Europe in the post-Cold War era all indicate strongly that Russia can and will do whatever possible to try and conceal any negative news or obscure any real actions occurring.

Looking at this from a legal perspective, the case for Russian culpability in regards to war crimes and particularly sexual assaults in Ukraine is already being made. With the UN’s special representative on sexual violence in war accurately asserting “Today’s documentation is tomorrow’s prosecution”, proving such crimes will be difficult. Speaking to Dara Kay Cohen, a professor at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government, NPR reported, “It is very rare to ever have smoking gun evidence that rape was ordered from the top down … There is some degree of accountability, but it is rare. But I think that that does not imply, however, that we shouldn’t be doing our best to collect all of the documentation that we possibly can in order to potentially hold perpetrators accountable”.

Proving or disproving sexual assault in wartime is a difficult task, even more so given the fact that the armed conflict is still occurring. It is without question that there is animosity between the Western world and Russia, which makes there a certain degree of speculation about how prevalent these assaults are. However, at this point, one must look at the facts on the ground.

It is very well documented that multiple Ukrainians are reporting assaults from a wide variety of locations and their stories all follow a similar tone common in military conflicts. The forensic information already collected by independent Ukrainian doctors, prosecutors, and the UN who examine the bodies of those deceased indicates multiple assaults by Russian troops. Intercepted telephone calls from the family of Russian soldiers to the soldiers currently taking part in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine also indicate a condoning of such illegal and brutal activities.

At this point, it is undeniable that these reports are impossible to ignore with the forensic, eyewitness, technical, and historical evidence all painting a sinister picture of rape in Ukraine.

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Eastern Europe

The Media Fog of War: Propaganda in the Ukraine-Russia Conflict

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The current conflict between Russia and Ukraine has once again opened up the old wounds of east vs. west, continuing the long-established tradition of distrust and sometimes even open hatred from these two centers of power. This can be seen across the spectrum of media outlets in the west along with their counterparts in the east, as both sides push forth propaganda and favorable coverage so as to always show their side in a favorable light. With western media outlets, their coverage of the war has been very positive for the Ukrainians while showing the exact opposite when considering Russians. Western media quickly picks up Ukrainian propaganda pieces and repeats them for their audiences at home, who then take to social media to gloat over Russian losses and embarrassments. 

Stories like the “Ghost of Kyiv,” the Ukrainian soldiers on Snake Island, and others which have later proven to be inaccurate or not based in truth spread like wildfire across media outlets (Thompson, New York Times, Washington Post, etc). Certainly, a story about a Ukrainian fighter pilot shooting down several Russian jets is noteworthy and a country facing assaults from a greater power needs to boost morale every chance it gets. However, the willingness to circulate the Ghost of Kyiv tale across western media outlets displayed a clear bias for the Ukrainian side of the war in the west and, even though many have poked holes in the myth of this mysterious fighter pilot, people still disregard its “fake newsiness.” Thompson pointed out that some users on social media shared a willingness to believe in the propaganda, even knowing that it was made up: “if the Russians believe it, it brings fear. If the Ukrainians believe it, it gives them hope,” remarked one user on Twitter. This set a dangerous precedent as truth became a casualty in the war in favor of people wanting to simply find stories that would support their favored narrative and consequently ignore more accurate reporting.   

Propaganda can be a useful tool for any country fighting to protect itself, but it can also lead to the spreading of falsehoods abroad and even lead some westerners to become inspired to take up arms in a conflict they probably should not get embedded within. Over 20,000 foreign fighters have signed up to fight for Ukraine in an International Brigade after President Volodymyr Zelenskyy issued a call for help. Many of these people have little to no combat experience but were persuaded to fight for Ukraine so that they could be on “the right side of history” or combat injustice in a conflict that has been lauded as a brave underdog battle between the aggressor state Russia – longtime enemy of the west – and the small “noble” nation of Ukraine (Llana, Christian Science Monitor). Propaganda tales amplified by the media are largely responsible for bringing these foreign soldiers into a complex situation that they are not prepared for, ultimately risking an exacerbation of the war rather than a resolution of the conflict.

Stories like these have fortified in the minds of western audiences a strong dislike for Russia, its citizens, and its military. On social media channels, people were quick to put up symbols associated with Ukraine, most commonly, the Ukrainian flag, to show their support for its struggle as many, especially those in America, seemed to instinctively root for any underdog in a war. Support for Ukraine, though, naturally leads to discrimination toward Russians. Disregard for the suffering of Russian soldiers, a willingness to ignore the reasons for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the ostracizing of Russian citizens from the rest of the world – whether physically via travel or economically via sanctions – will have negative repercussions for the international community for years to come. Many celebrate every victory that Ukraine scores against Russia, heedless of the human cost of the war in general. This may very well deepen the divide between east and west before the war ends and force many average Russian citizens into a retributive hatred for those in Europe and North America who treated their country so harshly when they themselves were powerless to stop or prevent the Ukraine-Russia war.  

Russian businesses have also been subject to discrimination in the west. Companies like Starbucks, Coca-Cola, PepsiCo, General Electric and McDonald’s all announced that they were temporarily suspending their operations in Russia due to its invasion of Ukraine (Williams, Fox10 Phoenix). Sanctions laid down on Russia in an effort to stagnate its economy also extend to banks, legislators, and even oligarchs but will leave a much more powerful and profound effect on the general populace. This punishment will trickle down to Russian citizenry who have played no part in the conflict at all but will suffer the most from these economic sanctions, simply because they live in the aggressor country.  

This negativity against Russia and its people already existed prior to the Ukrainian-Russian war, but was reignited by the conflict. Many people in the west find it easy to fall into the camp of attacking the long-standing “enemy” due to the history left behind by the Cold War, by the psychologically-imprinted suspicion of those across the sea who threatened us with nuclear weapons for so long. In places like the U.S., there almost seems to exist a willingness to not hear the other side’s point of view, a refusal to acknowledge the sufferings of very human foes who are not so different from their adversaries. The question of why many Americans would even feel the need to take a position in a conflict that has little bearing on their everyday lives could have more than one answer. The need to cheer on an underdog in a pitched struggle, the old hatred left over by the Cold War, or possibly a need to satisfy the age-old good guy vs. bad guy complex which has been hardwired into many people’s minds through television, movies, literature, and other parts of our pop culture. For many, there exists a need to satisfy one’s own moral superiority, a need to establish good from evil. The recent conflict between Ukraine and Russia has given many the outlet they seek for this vindication.  

The question of whether this treatment of Russia is justified or not lies primarily with an individual’s perception of the country as a belligerent at the international level or a nation trying to clearly define where its sphere of influence begins and ends. Russia invading Ukraine and starting a war rife with human tragedy on both sides was not done simply because Russia as a state is a villain or it gets its kicks by starting wars randomly. A deeper examination of the “whys” surrounding Russia’s invasion is desperately needed, where the proffered reasons are given legitimate analytical consideration. So far, this type of analysis has not been done. Ultimately, why it matters is because reaching into that understanding may help prevent a country like Russia in the future from feeling the need to invade at all.  

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Eastern Europe

When Will the War in Ukraine End?

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Predicting the beginning and the end of a war is always a difficult task.

Many people would think of the usage of models and data, which would most likely refer to data on combat power, staff computing operations etc. A more advanced approach for some would include the super-complex model such as war games. Overall, the use of these methods depends on the target audience. The approach and delivery are different for the media or academia, in which the use of data would be necessary for the audience to understand and verify the forecasted results.

If the target audience is neither the media nor the academia, the use of different approaches would be necessary. The results would be tested on the battlefield rather than relying on statistics in the decision-making circles. A practical example given here is making predictions through information analysis.

The focus of such analysis, is naturally, information. The first important piece of information about when the war in Ukraine will end is to refer to the news from Moscow that it plans to end the war in September 2022. The second piece of important news is that Russia has about 1,200 to 1,300 missiles in its inventory.

Combining these two pieces of information allows us to do a simple analysis. If we calculate the average number of missiles that Russia uses on the Ukrainian battlefield every day, we find that at least 300 missiles are launched in a month by the Russian army. Now we are in the month of May, and after 5 months, Russia’s missile inventory will be exhausted. This means that, by October 2022, the Russian military will have almost no effective weapons to attack Ukraine. By then, of course, or maybe at a sooner date, Russia will have to attempt to end the war.

A question that naturally follows this is, can’t the Russian army use other methods to continue the war?

The answer is no. Because the Russian Air Force has gradually lost its advantage in the Ukrainian sky, if the air force is used to penetrate the battlefield, the losses will be heavy. Hence, the offensive force that Russia can rely on now is only to project missiles from combat aircraft outside the line of sight. Another approach is to use the small but large number of World War II period artillery to bombard indiscriminately, yet the areas assaulted will be ranging from zoos to children’s playgrounds. Therefore, the Russian army seems to have fewer battlefield options than what most people imagine.

Based on some key information, together with an analysis on the information of Russia’s missile inventory, the conclusion is clear. All indications point toward the end of the war in Ukraine from around September to October 2022.

The accuracy of the forecast will be verified as the event unfolds, and this is positivist style of thinking.

For some people, models and data are the only way to forecast the future, rather than simpler methods like information analysis. In this situation, the outcome may be determined with the use of all available data after the war is over. However, we now have a clear and convincing conclusion used to judge the prospects of war.

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