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Comprehensive evaluation of the new Chinese government work report for 2022

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After the Chinese National Legislature opened its annual session on Saturday, March 5, 2022 in Beijing, in the presence of Chinese President Comrade “Xi Jinping” and other Chinese leaders, the opening of the (Fifth Session of the 13th National People’s Congress), which was held in the Great Hall of the People, State Council “Li Keqiang” new work report of the Chinese government for the year 2022, and the following are the most important points and observations in the new work of the Chinese government for the year 2022, as follows:

  Agreeing to make efforts to craft a plan that can stand the test of practice and history, and laying strong foundations and rules for formulating a plan based on a (comprehensive study of development in the next five years and compatibility with long-term goals until 2035), setting comprehensive plans and arrangements for the next two years that will help China restore economic growth to lay a solid foundation for future development.

  Determining the development goals correctly for the (next five-year plan period for China), provided that these goals are set in an encouraging and flexible manner at the same time, then (putting forward more measures to advance institutional openness), improve the environment for foreign trade and foreign investment, and enhance exchange and cooperation at the international level.

  Emphasizing the most important achievements made with great efforts during the year 2021 in China, as China achieved the main goals and tasks of economic and social development, so the (new plan will try to make efforts to develop a better understanding of the problems and challenges facing the country and recognizing that the Chinese economy is facing a state of uncertainty due to global challenges and risks), therefore, a higher priority must be given to achieving growth stability and a commitment to adhere to the basic trend of seeking progress while maintaining stability.

 Confirming the call for coordination between controlling the Corona pandemic and achieving social and economic development, strengthening (comprehensive structural adjustments and significantly supporting the implementation of macro policies, and applying more measures that lead to effectively driving demands, ensuring supplies and stabilizing market expectations). The Chinese officials have agreed on making a (serious work in 2022 to ensure success this year. Therefore, authorities at all levels are urged to strengthen support for companies, especially medium, small and micro enterprises and individual businesses, to provide policy support for sectors that create many jobs), for the employment who have severely affected by the pandemic, and to advance the progress of key projects.

  Despite the many severe shocks such as the new Corona pandemic (Covid-19) and the global economic recession, the Chinese economy recorded growth in the year 2021.  China’s GDP has exceeded 100 trillion yuan. In addition to (achieving success in stabilizing the economy, China has made historical achievements in building a moderately prosperous society in an all-round way, decisive victory in eradicating poverty, and achieving success in the 14th Five-Year Plan).

  The 14th Five-Year Plan period was considered as the first five years of China embarking on a (new journey to build a fully modern socialist country). Therefore, the emphasis was placed on the importance of understanding the (new development stage and working in accordance with the new development philosophy and the consolidation of the new development model).

  It was called for further progress in developing the economic structure, improving the people’s quality of life and promoting high-quality development, and making efforts to (implement the guidelines of the Fifth Plenary Session of the 19th CPC Central Committee in all fields of work, build broad consensus among all parties), and work to achieve a new victory in the whole construction of a modern socialist China.

  Motivation and encouragement to make the (action plan of the new Chinese government in 2022), as an exceptional plan in the history of the People’s Republic of China. They are agreeing to confront the complex and turbulent environment at the international level, and to (accomplish all those enormous tasks to support reform, development and stability at home), especially facing the severe impact of the novel coronavirus pandemic (Covid-19), in order to achieve satisfactory progress for the Chinese people, their leaders and their state to attract global attention.

  The necessity of (submitting various research reports periodically on all the various achievements and works, with attention to all comments and suggestions), which provides an important reference for the Chinese government to take scientific decisions and effective measures. The economic work carried out well in 2022, which is considered a (critical year in the modernization process in China). Advocating efforts to (promote high-quality growth and foster a new development mode, coordinate disease control with economic and social development, ensure both development and security), additionally the safeguard stable and stable economic development as well as social stability and harmony.

   Study and implement the guidelines of the (Fifth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, as well as make proposals for the formulation and implementation of the 14th Five-Year Plan), especially related to the implementation of economic work in the new plan for 2022. Emphasis on (strengthening guidance and building consensus to create a sound environment to embark on a new journey to fully build a modern socialist state).

   Maintaining the continuity, stability and sustainability of macro policies, providing the necessary support for economic recovery, and (ensuring the economy’s functioning in the appropriate range, promoting scientific and technological innovation, and supporting reform and openness), call for efforts to enhance corporate confidence, address public concerns, and guard against and avoid risks.

  The Chinese government believes in the need to seek opinions, and acquaintance of the most prominent concerns of the Chinese people and citizens and the advancement of companies, and the government will (make its policies and procedures more realistic and specific to the goal, to better show the scientific and democratic decision-making process, and further stimulate the vitality of market entities and social creativity). So, they’very agreed to (make efforts in the new plan for 2022 in order to effectively increase demand and employment, improve market adjustments), besides ensuring the transportation of coal, electricity, oil and gas.

  Facing many challenges and uncertainties, in order for the Republic of China to maintain its (overall policies and make them consistent, stable and sustainable, while intensifying the volume of reforms to achieve openness to meet the needs of market entities and the people). They’re agreed on providing suggestions on issues including (exploiting the country’s consumption potential and enhancing pollution controlled).

   Here, we find that the Chinese Prime Minister “Li Keqiang’s assertion” during the discussion of the work report of the new Chinese government for the year 2022, and on the occasion of the opening of the annual meeting of the Chinese Parliament, emphasised that: “the Chinese government should provide strong support for the development of national defense and armed forces”.

– The most important points mentioned by the new report of the Chinese government during 2022:

  The Leading Group of the State Council of China, which is charged with preparing the new report of the Chinese government during 2022, met shortly after the end of its preparatory meeting to (draw up a draft or general conceptualization of the form of the Chinese government’s new plan for 2022). Several decisions were mainly discussed, related to the agenda of the session of the “National People’s Congress”, and a number of other matters. The meeting day and new session of the National People’s Congress will be held from March 5 to 11, 2022. The most important points and observations raised by the 2022 report of the Chinese government, regarding the previous achievements and available alternatives and required to be implemented are, as follows:

  The most prominent major achievements of the Chinese state, its ruling Communist Party and its leaders have been identified, despite the multiple risks and challenges. China has (overcome difficulties and achieved a series of major achievements, as its economic growth in 2021 ranked first among the major economies).  Therefore, Chinese Premier “Li Keqiang” stressed the formulation of a five-year plan to deepen reform and opening-up.

  The Chinese Premier “Li Keqiang”  emphasized (adopting a pragmatic approach in formulating the 14th Five-Year Plan, from (2021-2025) for national economic and social development, taking into account the current and long-term situation, and promoting the deepening of national economic and social development.  reform and openness.  This was discussed by members of the (Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee), in meetings that included members of the leading group of the State Council, on drafting the five-year plan.

  • The main points addressed in the discussion of the new Chinese government work report for the year 2022 were, as follows:

Reviewing the report on the implementation of the 2021 national economic and social development plan, as well as the (draft 2022 plan for national economic and social development).

Reviewing the report on the (implementation of the central budget and local budgets in 2021 and the draft central budget and draft local budgets for 2022), as well as the draft central budget and draft local budgets for 2022 itself.

Discussing the (draft law on local people’s councils and local people’s governments).

Discussing the draft decision of the (Fifth Session of the 13th National People’s Congress on the number and election of deputies to the 14th National People’s Congress).

Discussing the (draft method for the elections of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region) at the 14th National People’s Congress.

Discussing the (draft method for the elections of the Macao Special Administrative Region) at he 14th National People’s Congress.

Discussing the (work report of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee).

In addition to discussing the work report of the (Supreme People’s Court and the work report of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate).

  Here, we will note the extent of the Chinese interest in introducing the most important previous achievements, and then adding to them in the new year, in order to determine a number of the (main expected objectives for the new year, and to conduct a comprehensive study and evaluation of what has been achieved), and what it intends to achieve to reach the desired goal.

The most prominent national economic and social achievements of China in the new Chinese government work report for the year 2022 on the previous year 2021 are, as follows:

  China has achieved a large number of achievements and goals during the year 2021, despite all these global challenges, risks and uncertainties after the spread of the “Covid-19” pandemic, which was actually referred to in the new report of the Chinese State Council and its Chairman “Li Keqiang”, such as:

  • China’s GDP growth rate is 8.1%.
  • The average share of the Chinese citizen’s disposable income increased by 8.1%.
  • Creation of about (13 million new job opportunities) in urban areas
  • Achieving a large number of (new tax cuts and fee cuts) which are exceeding to one trillion yuan
  • The full vaccination coverage of the “Covid-19” pandemic has increased, exceeding 85% of the total population.

As for the main objectives expected for 2022 in the new Chinese government work report, according to the following information:

  • Achieving a GDP growth rate of 5.5%
  • More than 11 million new jobs were created in urban areas
  • Consumer price increase by about 3%.
  • Maintaining grain production at a high level

The most important main works that will be achieved and planned in the Chinese government work report for the year 2022, which can be summarized in:

Finance: fixing the deficit rate for this year at about 2.8%.

Government investment: A plan has been drawn up to provide local governments with 3.65 trillion yuan of special bonds this year of 2022.

Tax cuts: The tax cuts for this year are scheduled to be about 2.5 trillion yuan, of which the tax refund amount will be about 1.5 trillion yuan.

Employment: Use of 100 billion yuan from the unemployment insurance fund to support the stability of employment and vocational training.

Consumption: Continuing to support the consumption of new energy vehicles.

Innovation: implementing a ten-year plan for basic research and implementing a three-year plan to reform the scientific and technological system.

Rural revitalization: Supporting the areas rid of poverty to develop distinctive industries and start rural construction work.

Opening up: promoting negotiation and signing of high-level free trade agreements with more countries and regions.

Environmental protection: improving energy saving, water saving, waste recycling and other policies to support the environmental protection industry.

Education: Continuing to reduce the burden of compulsory education.

Medical insurance: The criteria for financial support for medical insurance for individuals and for basic public health services will be increased.

Social Security: Improving measures supporting the three-child policy.

Housing: exploring new development models, accelerating the (development of the long-term rental market and promoting the construction of affordable housing).

Culture and Sports: Building sports facilities close to the masses.

Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan: Support Hong Kong and Macao to (develop their economies and improve people’s livelihood), and firmly oppose the separatist act of the so-called independence of Taiwan.

  From here, we can understand the nature of economic and social planning in China to (develop annual plans, five-year plans every 5 years, and also ten-year plans, ie for a period of 10 years), to reach the basic development goal of achieving a “well-being society and a prosperous life” by 2035.

Associate Professor of Political Science, Faculty of Politics and Economics / Beni Suef University- Egypt. An Expert in Chinese Politics, Sino-Israeli relationships, and Asian affairs- Visiting Senior Researcher at the Centre for Middle Eastern Studies (CMES)/ Lund University, Sweden- Director of the South and East Asia Studies Unit

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East Asia

What China Does Not Know about India

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Indian authorities said on April 30 that they discovered Chinese smartphone maker Xiaomi Group had made illegal remittances to foreign entities by passing them off as royalty payments. As a result, they seized USD 725 million from Xiaomi’s local bank account in India. I deemed that the Chinese smartphone company has a misunderstanding of India and how the Indians do business.

China still does not comprehend India. While the Chinese often consider their own country as an ancient and great civilization, Indians consider India as an even more ancient and greater civilization.

India established diplomatic relations with China in the second year of the establishment of the People’s Republic of China. Following this, New Delhi issued a statement supporting China’s entry as a permanent member of the United Nations’ Security Council. Many Chinese, therefore, often perceive that China-India relations were rather good at that time. If not completely incorrect, this is at least a subjective misunderstanding of India on China’s part.

In reality, India prided itself as a great country in the world, vis-à-vis with Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War. By recognizing China, India showed the two great powers that it has the authority to self-determination.

For a long time, China has created an impression within the country that it is the founder of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Back in 1955, Indian leader Jawaharlal Nehru had already issued a call for the creation of the movement to the world, which gained support from many developing countries, including China. The rest of the world, including India, sees China as merely a responder to NAM. The world, not least India, perceive China to be a mere member of the NAM, not a founder. As the initiator of NAM, Prime Minister Nehru naturally became its spokesperson and leader of the organization. He was especially responsible for delivering speeches in many developing countries on international affairs.

From the points of India’s view, the well-known Bandung Conference held in Indonesia in 1955 has its origin as India’s idea as early as 1947. It was only because of India’s help that China was allowed to attend the NAM conference, which introduced the People’s Republic to the world. These perceptions of India are indeed, largely true. The relationship between India and China at that time was far closer than that between Pakistan and China today.

On the international front, India would even be chosen as a mediator in the disputes between the United States and the Soviet Union. President Dwight Eisenhower also complimented India at the Indian Parliament, saying, “India speaks to the other nations of the world with the greatness of conviction and is heard with greatness of respect”. It is rare for any U.S. President to heap this kind of praise on a country. Much later, President Donald Trump also inherited this momentum and arranged for Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to jointly hold a session in the United States, where they were well-received by both Indians and Americans alike. This certainly added to India’s national pride.

The Soviet Union at that time also recognized India’s status in the world, and it actively wooed India. Being able to make friends with India was synonymous with having several NAM countries as partners, which was anything but trivial. Indeed, from the past to the present, from India-Soviet friendship to today’s India-Russia relations, the two countries’ friendly relationship has a history of more than 70 years, and it has not changed despite numerous trials. The Chinese would make a blunder if they believe that such relationships could be challenged solely through the use of money.

“India was, I guess, the most positive example of USSR’s connections with non-socialist states,” states Sergei Lounev, professor of Oriental Studies at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations. The professor was certainly not exaggerating. As early as 1971, the Soviet Union and India signed a Friendship Treaty, pledging to act against any military alliance or aggression directed against either of the two nations. For the Soviet Union, it was the first such treaty signed with a country that did not formally embrace socialism.

All of this is history. However, the Chinese appear to understand India poorly, and the same is true in India’s understanding of China, resulting in frequent misperceptions. With its strong nationalist sentiment, India believes it is stronger, wiser, and better than China, and its actions would naturally reflect this belief.

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Holding on to Uncle Sam: US-Taiwan Relations

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The bilateral ties between the United States of America and Taiwan or the Republic of China (ROC) have developed through a peculiar and complex course. The relationship, however ambiguous, continues to form a crucial aspect of security relations in East Asia.

Recognition, De-recognition

When the Communist forces led by Mao Zedong expelled Chiang Kai shek’s Nationalist regime, who fled to the isle of Taiwan in 1949,  US President Harry Truman decided to accept the inevitability of the Communist victory in China and even planned to work out a bilateral relationship with the newly established People’s Republic of China without heeding much to the plight of his former ally Chiang. It was the eruption of the Korean War (1950-1953), which displayed the strength and danger of a Communist alliance between the Soviet Union, China and North Korea, that made President Truman realise the importance of supporting the staunchly anti-Communist regime of Chiang’s Kuomintang (KMT)  as a bulwark against what became apparently the rising tide of Communism in the third world nations of Asia. The raison d’être of Chiang’s regime was to overthrow the Communist Party rule in Beijing and “reunify” Taiwan and Mainland China, an act that both the KMT and CCP believed would restore China’s historical rights over the island snatched away by the Japanese  and would redeem the historical injustices it faced at the hands of the colonial powers. Chiang constantly insisted for the United States to help him in waging a war against Mao to achieve this objective. However, Washington was not ready to support another war in the region.

Chiang finally succeeded in framing Mao’s maritime offensive acts during the early 1950s as a growing threat and pursued the Eisenhower administration to sign with him the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty which promised military protection for his regime. The United States abdided by Chiang’s One China policy under which it recognised that Chiang’s Republic of China was the sole legitimate representative government of the one China that exists on the face of the earth.

It was by utilising Washington’s vast diplomatic clout that Chiang did not just earn non-socialist allies but also found place in the United Nations Security Council as a Permanent Member.

However, the golden days couldn’t last long. The growing differences between China and the Soviet Union became more apparent by the 1970s and gave way to clear enmity as border clashes and ideological tensions ensued. The United States saw this development as an opportunity to crack the socialist international alliance and decided to turn the dynamics of the security triangle between itself, Moscow and Beijing in its favour by recognising the People’s Republic of China. US President Richard Nixon’s visit to Beijing in 1972 and the Shanghai Communiqué that followed stated that ‘Chinese on both sides of the border believe that there is but one China’ and that ‘Taiwan is a part of China’. Washington left it to the CCP and KMT to decide which one represented the “One China” and promised not to intervene. In 1979, came a decisive shift as the United States established official ties with the PRC. Following Beijing’s non-negotiable One China Policy, Washington broke away all official ties with the ROC and officially recognised the PRC as the sole legitimate representative of the one China.

This came as a major setback for Chiang not just as a great betrayal but also as following Washington, several non-socialist allies like Canada shifted to recognise Beijing. Chiang refused to budge on his One China policy and broke away all ties with any country who recognised Beijing which costed him much of his diplomatic standing.

A major shock came when the issue of the permanent seat at the UNSC was raised. Washington asked Chiang to accept simultaneous representation of both ROC and PRC but the latter refused it and as UNSC Resolution 2758 was raised at the 26th United Nations General Assembly to oust ROC, Chiang staged a walkout thus leaving the space for the PRC to gain. What followed was a period of diplomatic  isolation as by 1980s, the ROC was ousted from most major international organisations like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank as space was created for the PRC to be accomodated.

The only positive development for the Republic of China was the enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 by the US Congress as a response to the government’s decision to establish official ties with Beijing. Thanks to an active Taiwan lobby, many Senators opposed the government’s decision and claimed that Washington must retain unofficial ties with Taiwan. Under the TRA, Washington not only maintains robust socioeconomic and cultural relations with Taiwan which function through the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the US which function in more or less the same way as the embassy but also maintains that any resolution to the Taiwan issue in a way other than a peaceful measure would be considered by Washington as a threat on the Western Pacific, implying its security perceptions of an expanse covering the concerns of the United States of America.

Democracy hues: Reunification to  Independence

While the TRA brought some respite, Chiang Kai shek’s son Chiang Ching kuo, who took over the reins of governance after his father,  realised the importance of democratisation in order to not just enhance Taiwan’s soft power among the liberal West but to also make it appeal to the Mainland Chinese who had presented the demand for civil freedom and  democratic rights in the Tiananmen Square Movement of 1984. Hence, in 1987, the martial law was removed. Chiang’s successor, Lee Teng hui declared a unilateral end to the Chinese Civil war in 1991 thus, establishing socioeconomic and cultural ties with the Mainland and breaking away from the old KMT tradition of No Contact, No Negotiation and No Compromise with Communist China.

While the rhetoric of abiding by the  “One China Policy” was maintained, Taiwan inched closer to an independent status, thanks to the democratisation process which made it important for the regime to reflect on the popular opinion which turned heavily anti-unification. With a proliferation of governmental and indigenous  non-governmental organisations such as civil societies and political parties; deregulation of media and educational reforms among other changes led to the emergence of a new islander Taiwanese identity as distinct from Chinese ethnicity. For instance, in the 1994 White Paper Relations Across the Taiwan Strait, Taiwan dissociated Republic of China from One China for the first time while maintaining the rhetoric of abiding by the policy. Such sentiments further developed as the leader of the Democratic People’s Party (DPP) (which calls for Taiwan’s independence from the Mainland), Chen Shui bian, became the first non-KMT President in Taiwanese history. The growing strength of such sentiments is reflected in the eruption of the Sunflower Movement in Taiwan against President Ma Ying-jeou’s “viable diplomacy” with Mainland China which the protestors saw as making Taiwan increasingly economically dependent on Beijing which hampered the prospects for its  independence as well as in the election victory of DPP’s Presidential candidate Tsai Ing wen who remains a major pro-Independence figure.

Thus, during the Cold War itself, Taiwan’s Foreign policy has changed from pressing the United States to recognise it as the One China to the one of being recognised as an independent sovereign nation which historically developed distinctly from that of China. Ever since the fall of the USSR in 1991 and the end of the Cold War which made Washington the undisputed hegemon in the international order, the United States has shifted its focus away from Taiwan to other regions such as Afghanistan where it finds its national interests served best. Taiwanese foreign policy in such a scenario has been to hold onto the United States as much as it can so as to ensure regime survival.

Is Taiwan still important to the United States?

While the dilution of ideological politics and increased communication with China since its Reform and Opening up (改革开放) in 1978 and the fall of the USSR has decreased Taiwan’s relevance for the United States, it still remains important.

First and foremost is the strategic reason as access to Taiwan presents a wide maritime defense depth for launching both offensive and counteroffensive measures.

Second, Taiwan is a region rich in natural resources particularly coal, oil and gas.

Third, as a democracy which has remained favourable to it since the very beginning, the United States does not just feel obligated to protect Taiwan for ideological reasons  but also Taiwan’s presence as a flourishing democracy poses a major domestic political challenge to the CCP led PRC where the regime has taught its people that Western style democracy is unfit to Chinese culture and civilisational history.

Fourth and most importantly, the United States’ hegemony rests on its control of the Asia-Pacific region and though it might seem to be reducing its expanse, leaving China to take over Taiwan and the vast strategic importance it holds would be the last nail in the coffin of the era of US hegemony. The US hence, would fight till the last to maintain its relevance in the region by keeping Taiwan independent.

Is it important enough to go to war?

Though Taiwan is important to Washington, it puzzles many analysts if it would go to war with China in case Beijing tries to take over the island.

While the nuclear nature of both the nations is a huge deterrent which would, if at all, lead to a pyrrhic victory; the vastly enmeshed Sino-American economic relations is also a major reason where any hard blow on the Chinese economy would also hit Washington’s. If the United States loses the war, it would not just be immensely destroyed but would exit the world stage with a bang rather than a whimper making it harder to stand back as a world leader. Moreover, even if the United States wins, there would be no guarantee that China would not recuperate its forces and try another time to occupy the territory leading to more hostility and instability.

At the turn of the century, the United States realised China’s rise as an indisputable fact which meant that whether Washington liked it or not, it would constantly find Beijing on its way at every juncture. While such a development does not always mean confrontation or ensure cooperation, it shows the importance of dialogue and compromise in order to maintain stability which is mutually beneficial. Hence, while the United States would not sit back and watch Beijing take over Taiwan, it is also true that it would not rush to wage a war. Even though Beijing has stepped up its rhetoric of absorbing Taiwan with force if necessary, it realises that such a move would not be a cakewalk and hence is likely to consider other options before using force. The hard part of such developments is that it has reduced the central focus of Taiwan’s Foreign policy to holding onto the United States and by putting all its eggs in the American basket, Taiwan can hardly do anything substantial rather than wait for the two superpowers to decide on its future.

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U.S. Violates Its Promises to China; Asserts Authority Over Taiwan

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USA China Trade War

As Werner Rügemer headlined on 28 November 2021 and truthfully summarized the relevant history, “Taiwan: US deployment area against mainland China — since 1945”. However, despite that fact, America did officially issue a “Joint Communique” with China recognizing and acknowledging not only that Taiwan is a province of China but that for America or its allies or any other nation to challenge that historical fact would be unethical.

The U.S. regime hides this crucial historical fact, in order to hoodwink its masses of suckers into assuming to the exact contrary — that Taiwan isn’t a Chinese province. Here is how they do this:

The CIA-edited and written Wikipedia, which blacklists (blocks from linking to) sites that aren’t CIA-approved, is the first source for most people who become interested in what is officially known as the Shanghai Communique of 1972, or the 27 February 1972 “JOINT COMMUNIQUE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA”. That article, avoids presenting the Communique’s 1,921-word text, but instead provides, in its “Document” section, a mere 428-word very selective, and sometimes misleading, summary of some of the document’s less-important statements, and also fails to provide any link to the document itself, which they are hiding from readers.

The U.S. regime’s Wilson Center does have an article “JOINT COMMUNIQUE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA”, at which only the document’s opening 286 words are shown, while the rest is veiled and the reader must then do additional clicks in order to get to it.

The U.S. State Department’s history site, does provide the entire 1,921-word document, but under a different title, one that plays down the document’s actual importance, “Joint Statement Following Discussions With Leaders of the People’s Republic of China”.  (If it’s a “Joint Statement,” then whom are the “Leaders of the People’s Republic of China” “jointly” issuing it with — that title for it is not only false, it is plain stupid, not even referring to the U.S, at all.) Consequently, anyone who seeks to find the document under its official and correct title won’t get to see it at the U.S. State Department’s site.

Here are some of the important statements in this document (as shown below that stupid title for it at the State Department’s site):

With these principles of international relations in mind the two sides stated that:

               —progress toward the normalization of relations between China and the United States is in the interests of all countries;

               —both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict;

               —neither should seek hegemony in the Asia–Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony; and

               —neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states.

Both sides are of the view that it would be against the interests of the peoples of the world for any major country to collude with another against other countries, or for major countries to divide up the world into spheres of interest. …

The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.

The Wikipedia article’s 428-word summary of the “Document” did include parts of the paragraph which started “The U.S. side declared,” but the summary closed by alleging that the document “did not explicitly endorse the People’s Republic of China as the whole of China. Kissinger described the move as ‘constructive ambiguity,’ which would continue to hinder efforts for complete normalization.” How that passage — or especially the entire document — could have been stated with less “ambiguity” regarding “the People’s Republic of China as the whole of China” wasn’t addressed. In fact, the statement that “all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China” includes asserting that the Taiwanese people “maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China.” So: the U.S. did agree with that, even signed to it in 1972. If the U.S. refuses to agree with it now, then what was the U.S. agreeing to in that Communique, and under what circumstances does the Communique become null and void for either of the two agreeing Parties to it? When does it stop being binding? Perhaps the document should have added something like “The U.S. Government will never try to break off pieces of China.” But maybe if that were to have been added to it, then the U.S. regime wouldn’t have signed to anything with China. Is the U.S. regime really that Hitlerian? Is this what is ‘ambiguous’ about the document?

In fact, the affirmation that, “The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan.” is now routinely being violated by the U.S. regime. Here’s an example:

One of the leading U.S. billionaires-funded think tanks, the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), was co-founded by Kurt Campbell, who is Joe Biden’s “Asia co-ordinator” or “Asia Tsar” with the official title of “National Security Council Coordinator for the Indo-Pacific.” The other co-founder is Michèle Flournoy, who also co-founded with the current Secretary of State Antony Blinken, WestExec Advisors, which firm’s client-list is secret but generally assumed to be top investors in firms such as Lockheed Martin. That advisory firm’s activities are also secret. 

Perhaps nothing is more profitable than trading on inside information regarding corporations whose main, if not only, sales are to the U.S. Government and its allied governments. Trading on inside information needs to be secret in order to be non-prosecutable. The clients of WestExec Advisors might be extraordinarily successful investors, because they’ve hired people who have ‘the right’ contacts in the federal bureaucracy and so know where your ‘national security’ tax-dollars are likeliest to be spent next.

CNAS issued, in October 2021, “The Poison Frog Strategy: Preventing a Chinese Fait Accompli Against Taiwanese Islands”. It was written as-if the Shanghai Communique hadn’t prohibited this. The presumption there was instead that America and Taiwan would have so much raised the heat against China’s not being picked apart, so as for China to have militarily responded in order to hold itself together; and, then, a stage, “MOVE 2,” would be reached, in which:

The Taiwan and U.S. teams engaged in more direct communication, which aided the U.S. team in framing the crisis. By Move 2, the U.S. team had accepted that using military force to retake Dongsha would be too escalatory and might disrupt the formation of any counter-China coalition. Accordingly, the team reframed the takeover of Dongsha as an opportunity to expose Chinese belligerence and to encourage states to join together to balance against China’s aggressive behavior. The U.S. team’s decision to place U.S. military forces on Taiwan during Move 1 became a key driver for the rest of the game.

Then, 

By Move 3, both the U.S. and Taiwan teams were in difficult positions. The U.S. team did not want to let Chinese aggression go unpunished, both for the sake of Taiwan and within the context of the broader regional competition. At the same time, the U.S. team wanted to show its partners and allies that it was a responsible power capable of negotiating and avoiding all-out war. The Taiwan team was caught in an escalating great-power crisis that threatened to pull Taiwan into a war that it was trying to avoid. The Taiwan team had to balance its relationships and policies with the United States and China while simultaneously spearheading de-escalation. And in the early part of the game, before communication between the United States and Taiwan teams improved, the Taiwan team had, unbeknownst to the U.S. team, set up a back channel with the China team. At the same time the back-channel negotiations were ongoing, the U.S. team was still, in fact, considering additional escalatory action against the China team. …

Toward the end of the game, the U.S. and Taiwan teams’ main strategy was to isolate China diplomatically and economically and garner enough international backing among allies and partners to make that isolation painful. To this end, the Taiwan team focused on pulling in some of its regional partners, such as Japan, while the U.S. team reached out to its NATO allies.9 To avoid unwanted escalation or permanent effects, the U.S. and Taiwan teams limited their offensive military operations to non-kinetic and reversible actions such as cyberattacks and electronic warfare.

Under “Key Takeaways and Policy Recommendations” is:

Given the inherent difficulty of defending small, distant offshore islands like Dongsha, Taiwan and the United States should strive to turn them into what the players called “poison frogs.” This approach would make Chinese attempts to seize these islands so militarily, economically, and politically painful from the outset that the costs of coercion or aggression would be greater than the benefits.

The U.S. regime’s having in 1972 committed itself to there being only “a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves” has somehow now become a license for the U.S. regime to provoke “Chinese attempts to seize these islands” and yet to cause — by America’s constant further provocations and lying — this to be “so militarily, economically, and politically painful from the outset that the costs of coercion or aggression would be greater than the benefits.”

In other words: the U.S. regime expects to portray China as being the aggressor, and the U.S. regime as being the defender — but, actually, of what? It would be the defender of breaking off a piece of China to add it to the U.S. regime’s allies, against an ‘aggressive’ China that opposes America’s violating its own, and China’s, 1972 Joint Shanghai Communique — which prohibits that.

On May 19th, The Hill, one of the U.S. regime’s many propaganda-mouthpieces, headlined “China warns of dangerous situation developing ahead of Biden Asia trip”, and opened: 

China warned the U.S. that President Biden’s visit to East Asia this week could put their relations in “serious jeopardy” if officials play the “Taiwan card” during the trip.

In a phone call with national security adviser Jake Sullivan, China’s top diplomat Yang Jiechi warned the U.S. against speaking out on the independent sovereignty of Taiwan, a self-ruling democratic island in the Indo-Pacific that China claims is historically part of the mainland and should be under Beijing’s control.

China doesn’t claim that Taiwan “is historically part of the mainland and should be under Beijing’s control,” but that, just like Hawaii is NOT a part of “the mainland” but IS “under U.S. control,” and NOT “a self-ruling” nation, Taiwan is NOT a part of “the mainland” but IS (not ‘should be’, but IS) under China’s control, and NOT “a self-ruling” nation. Just as there is no “independent sovereignty of Hawaii,” there also is no “independent sovereignty of Taiwan.” How many lies were in that opening? (And this doesn’t even bring in the fact that whereas Hawaii is way offshore of America’s mainland, Taiwan is very close to China’s mainland.)

And how long will the U.S. regime’s constant lying continue to be treated as if that’s acceptable to anything other than yet another dangerously tyrannical regime — a U.S. ally, perhaps?

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