Given the recent and ongoing full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, one may be reminded that war is nothing but the continuation of politics – the famous aphorism of Claude von Clausewitz, the decorated Prussian military general and strategist of the Napoleonic wars. Clausewitz’s refrain still rings true today. The scale of the invasion is already the biggest Europe has witnessed since 1945, and the true impact of the conflict will linger and haunt the continent for decades to come. The current conflict, already leading to a humanitarian catastrophe, has the potential of altering political geography, reshaping the global security infrastructure, starting a new Cold War, leading to an enhanced arms race and re-militarization, igniting other dormant conflicts and territorial claims, and may deal the coup de grace to the global governance architecture that arose from the Atlantic Charter – all compounded by the looming threat of a nuclear holocaust. The invasion of Ukraine demonstrates how little we have learnt from our shared history – and how much we can still learn from it. Hence, this article is a piecemeal attempt to trace the current conflict to lessons we have learnt (and keep forgetting) in history.
While the root causes of the current Russo-Ukrainian war are many, in Clausewitz’s terminology – it is the continuation of politics, particularly bad politics. In hindsight, the symptoms were many and the warnings were apparent before the “dye was cast.” The current geopolitical environment in Europe has an eerie resemblance to Europe as it braced for war before 1914. Barbara Tuchman, in her magnum opus – The Guns of August (1962) describes the balance of power in Europe before the Great War, and provides a detailed narrative of the threats Germany perceived vis-à-vis their encirclement or Einkreisung (by France and Russia), and the delusion of grandeur that possessed the German minds apropos their divine place under the sun, fueled to date by the philosophical narratives of Hegel, Fichte and Nietzsche, and the military ambitions of Bismarck, Clausewitz and Schlieffen. It was evident by the turn of the century that the balance of power system in Europe established post 1814 (Concert of Europe) and the security guarantees and maneuvers made by then great powers in Europe would not be enough to prevent a full-scale war.
More than a hundred years on, the geopolitical spectacle in Europe has hardly changed other than the players. Russia (not Germany) feels encircled by the rapid expansion of NATO post 1991. While many have tried to guess in vain the true intentions of Russia and of Vladimir Putin – they do not need to look beyond the element of national interest. It has always been the cold and unsentimental geopolitics of ‘national interest’ that has dictated Russian grand strategy – and Russian national interest dictates that it cannot allow for the sake of its own survival – any compromise or incursions into its sphere of influence. The Chechen wars (1999-2000), the conflict with Georgia (2008), the support for Lukashenko in Belarus, and the annexation of Crimea (2014) all bear testament to Putin’s resolve regarding the above. This also includes Ukraine joining the NATO, a complete no-go for Russia that considers Ukraine as a vital part of their sphere of influence (since the time of Peter the Great) and a cradle of their civilization. Like Germany before 1914, Russia under Putin has also transformed itself into a revisionist state, one that epitomizes power and yearns for superpower status. Russia has rebounded after its post-Soviet slump of the 1990s under Putin with rapid modernization of its military capabilities. Putin’s Russia is also cognizant of the divisions and disunity amongst western powers, and the over-reliance Europe has on its gas exports. Therefore, one may argue that Putin has bided his time till this moment – maybe years if not decades. To literally take a page out of Leo Tolstoy’s Bethink Yourselves – time and patience have been Putin’s most powerful warriors. And like Germany before the world wars, Putin has imperialistic plans for Russia. Many experts mistakenly pin Putin’s hegemonic ambition to the reconstruction of the Soviet Union. Although Putin has stated before that the dissolution of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical disaster of the 20th century, he has no affinity towards the erstwhile Soviets. He is more endeared towards the imperialistic visions and grandeur of Peter the Great (Fergusson, 2022).
Furthermore, the events leading to the current Russo-Ukrainian war (since 2014) has an uncanny resemblance to the situation in Europe leading to the second world war, particularly the events that transpired in 1938. Under the Munich Pact, in September of 1938, Sudetanland – a part of Czechoslovakia, where more than 3 million Germans lived, was handed to Hitler as appeasement and to “buy time”. Little did the allies realize the true intentions of Hitler, who despite the peace pact, in time forced Czechoslovakia to grant independence to Slovakia, and eventually annexed Bohemia and Moravia on the Ides of March 1939. By the end of that tragic day, Prague had fallen to German hands. The current Russo-Ukrainian conflict is a return to Munich 1938 in many senses. Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 after calculating the weakness of Western response, and in the past 8 years it has slowly incorporated within itself, despite the Minsk Agreements – the two Ukrainian provinces of Luhansk and Donetsk where the majority of Russians in Ukraine live. Over the past year, as the presence of Russian military buildup at the borders of Ukraine commenced, the west remained guessing – confused and rudderless – almost thinking wishfully – while all signs pointed to the eventual annexation of Ukraine. The current Russian attempt to march into Ukraine with impunity mirrors the events of 1938 and 1939.
Even from the perspective of military strategy, the ongoing Russian onslaught on Ukraine has an unnerving resemblance to the strategy propagated by German Field Marshall Alfred von Schlieffen – who as a dedicated follower of Clausewitz advocated a “decisive battle” or Vernichtungskrieg over battles of attrition or protracted battles. The objective of such decisive battle is the use of overwhelming force to subdue the adversary to surrender at the soonest. The current Russian military strategy against Ukraine also bears similarities to the Schlieffen plan (invasion of Belgium and France) of outflanking the adversary from different sides.
And the western response? Again, we find anecdotes and similar lessons to be learnt in history. Since 2014, first with the annexation of Crimea followed by the Russian infiltration in the separatist Ukrainian provinces of Luhansk and Donetsk, the west at best responded with sanctions, empty rhetoric and trying to predict Putin’s next move – while the foreboding clouds of war loomed over Ukraine. If the west had only learnt from history. Sanctions hardly work, and at best requires time to take effect. On the other hand, sanctions entrench differences (not build bridges), creates vested interests in their perpetuation, and generally affects the general population or the vulnerable in society. Given the type of regime in Russia, where both the political as well as the economic elites do not much care for the general masses, such sanctions have the opposite effect and further emboldens such authoritarian regimes. Moreover, we have witnessed in history where economic sanctions placed on countries had little effect. Take the example of Italy and Japan in the 1930s. Both were permanent members of the League of Nations. Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931 and Italy invaded Abyssinia in 1935. The response of other members, albeit some sanctions were placed, was that of complacency. In the case of Japan, it rejected the Leagues findings and unilaterally quit the League in 1933 (although no sanctions were placed) – and while sanctions were placed on Italy, they were minor and never operationalized that emboldened Mussolini further to take Italy out of the League. The fact that great powers could act with impunity further encouraged Hitler to follow his devious plans. Hopefully in 2022, we will not see a repeat of the events of the 1930s. Hopefully we will not see Russia following the path to self-destruction. Hopefully we will not witness other powers taking a page out of Russia’s aggression – such as the possible annexation of Taiwan by China, and hopefully we will be able to avoid the catastrophic consequences of a third world war. And hopefully, Europe (and the World) will not turn a blind eye towards Ukraine as it did to Czechoslovakia (1939), Poland (1945), and Hungary (1956). Since bullies only respond to force, the time is ripe for the west to stand up (with force) against the current authoritarian regime in Russia. Some success in this regard has already been witnessed in the last few days – such as Germany reversing its erstwhile policy and placing sanctions against Russia, providing armaments to Ukraine, and pledging to increase defense expenditures (NATO) to 2% of GDP.
Sadly, as Ukraine becomes the crucible and flashpoint of great power politics in 2022, it will be the complacency and non-responsiveness of the west that will finally challenge the survival and legitimacy of the western collective security architecture (NATO), as well as people’s faith in the overall global security architecture (UN Security Council) will permanently diminish. While all wars come to an end, politics will continue – and the war in Ukraine will be the litmus test that will shape and colour global political relations for times to come. This has far-reaching consequences that evades even the best of political and security analysts at present. But as we tread carefully into the future, let our collective history be a guide for such maneuvers.
