The world is not pleased with Russia’s decision on Ukraine. In the last few days, thousands of clips showing the plight of Ukrainians have been doing the rounds on news channels, social media platforms, and private messaging apps worldwide. The situation has escalated faster than a lapse video but what is happening in Ukraine is an exposition of just the visible aspect of the problem. The problem is far deep-rooted and complex, with many years of latent contesting between two ideologies. A quick overview of the EU-Russia strategic partnership might help uncover this ideological contestation that had been dormant on the outside but was strongly blazing underneath the surface.
Russia is the largest country bordering Europe and an important trade partner to the EU. After the end of the Cold War, the two sides acknowledged one another’s importance in the new era and mutually decided to rise above Cold War politics to pursue common goals. This inclination towards a new beginning resulted in the “EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)” in 1997 which is considered to be the first legal document establishing the EU-Russia bilateral relations. On the EU side, its official Russia strategy was published in 1995, three years before the PCA came into force. This strategic paper was titled “The European Union’s strategy for future EU-Russia relations”. This document demonstrated the EU’s interest in guiding Russia towards reforms in order to integrate Russia into the community of free and democratic nations. The language used in the document can be considered as one of the early red flags in the EU-Russia bilateral ties. Similarly, scholars who have studied the EU-Russia PCA in details also point out that there is a sense of inequality between two partners. In many of the earlier documents, the EU comes across as the more successful partner responsible for guiding Russia which is struggling and in need of help. The phrase “strategic partnership” was not used in the PCA document.
The EU-Russia bilateral ties were described as a strategic partnership for the first time during the EU-Russia summit in 1998 in Vienna. In 1999, the Presidency conclusions of European Council again used the phrase “strategic partnership” and in the same year an important EU paper titled “Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia” (1999) called for EU- Russia cooperation to solve “continental problems” and “welcomed Russia’s return to the rightful place in the European family”.
After the end of the Cold War, the EU along with its western allies have established a strong belief that an international order with liberal values and a rules-based order is the one and only path ahead. This sense of subtle supremacy of the liberal ideology is visible in many of the EU’s communications with countries like Russia and China. Javier Solana’s speech in 1999 as the High Representative designate of the European Union serves as a good example. Solana remarks,
“Russia is a country in transition towards democracy and market economy. It is strongly in our interest that this transition is successful so that we can live in harmony with Russia. The EU, with its trade on the basis of mutual economic self-interest, has the best means of supporting this process of transition and helping Russia achieve the necessary reforms”
Documents such as the EU’s Declaration on Chechnya (1995) and the EU’s Resolution on Chechnya (1999) also played a crucial role in inhibiting close ties between Russia and the EU. The liberal values endorsed by the West strongly emphasizes on the promotion of democracy and protection of human rights but authoritarian countries believe it to be an internal matter.In the EU’s resolution on Chechnya, in one section, the EU stresses on the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and its right to fight terrorism and in another section, it strongly criticizes human rights violation by Russia.
The EU’s stance on Russia mirrors the West’s political posturing towards Moscow and such an overtone from the West was not going unnoticed in Russia. Additionally, in 1999, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) which comprises of a majority of EU member states decided to expand despite Russia’s strong opposition.
In 2000, the EU-Russia strategic partnership took a new turn when Vladimir Putin came to power. Under Putin’s stewardship, Russia refused the EU’s interference in its domestic affairs, including its economic policies, or the Chechnya conflict. The “Foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation” published under Putin talked about the EU as a key partner but not the ‘only’ key partner. Putin’s reconstruction of Russia’s image as a “great power” changed the EU-Russia dynamics. Finally, the EU-Russia strategic partnership was a partnership between two equals. Putin announced the end of ’the younger brother’ policy and soon his assertive foreign policy led the EU to acknowledge Russia’s strengths. In the EU-Russia summit held in Moscow in 2000, the EU remarked that crisis management operations in the future would benefit from Russia’s participation. In the 2001 joint summit statements, the EU reaffirmed its support for Russia’s inclusion in the WTO. However, this phase of rapprochement between the EU and Russia was short lived. In 2004, NATO decided to expand further by including seven Central and Eastern European countries. Russia’s strong disapproval of NATO expansion was disregarded once again. This brings us to the present context.
How is this power tussle between two strategic partners relevant to the Ukraine crisis? The war on Ukraine finds its origins in the same ideological underpinning that hinders cordial ties between the EU and Russia – West’s belief that all states should follow their footsteps and become a part of the liberal order. According to Prof. Mearsheimer, the West sought to accomplish its goal through NATO and EU expansions bringing Ukraine and Georgia into the West’s fold.
In 2008, the Bucharest Summit Declaration announced yet another round of NATO enlargement, this time involving Ukraine and Georgia. As Russia shares its border with Ukraine, it strongly voiced its opposition and in 2014, the situation escalated and involved the use of force. Russia being a powerful actor with a determined leader decided to leave no stone unturned to ensure that Ukraine would not join NATO. While this cannot be a justification for starting a war, in international politics it is not an uncommon strategy. “Realpolitik” and “Security Dilemma” are two basic concepts of international politics that explain how and why countries act the way they do. As explained by Prof. Mearsheimer, the 2008 Bucharest Declaration rattled Moscow resulting in tension between Russia and NATO. In 2014, the situation escalated when Ukraine’s pro-Russian President Yanukovych was ousted by protesters in favour of better Ukraine-EU and Ukraine-NATO ties. The ousting of President Yanukovych who consequently fled to Russia sparked an immediate unrest resulting in Russia’s annexation of Crimea including the port city of Sevastopol which is an important naval base in the region. With a pro-Russian President out of power, the West’s involvement in Ukraine increased. The involvement took a military shape when the Trump administration decided to heavily supply antitank missiles and provide other military assistance to Ukraine. In 2018 alone, it sold Ukraine USD 47 million worth of antitank missiles and approved many more of such deals in the following years. These deals between the West and Ukraine threatened Russia’s position in the region. The actions taken by Russia as well as the West serve as an apt example of the theory of Security Dilemma; which suggests that a security measure taken by one state is often interpreted as a security threat by another state resulting in the increased security measures in the second state ultimately leading to escalation.
As a country positioned between two ideologically opposing powers, Ukraine is currently caught in the tug of war between the East and the West. Up until now, West’s liberal hegemony was unchallenged but of late we have seen a rise in differing worldviews. The West’s staunch belief in the supremacy of the liberal democratic world order has time and again ruffled feathers in countries that are not liberal democracies. Victims of such power contestations are generally bordering countries, in this case Ukraine simply because of its geographic location. As authoritarian regimes grow stronger around the world, the liberal order is struggling to adjust to a world with opposing values. The differences between the East and the West is likely to be more defined in the coming future. Nonetheless, mechanisms such as strategic partnerships aid in providing a platform for dialogues between two opposing parties. For now, the EU- Russia strategic partnership is at one of its lowest points as EU has recently announced an array of sanctions against Moscow.
