Central Asia

China’s Disjointed Foreign Policies Concede Agency on Kazakhstan Discourse Control

Published

1 year ago

February 16, 2022

The most credible scenario of the cause of the January Kazakhstan unrest is an abortive attempt at a palace coup from intra-Nur Otan factional clan infighting. The ongoing political purge of the Nazarbayev clan members situated in top positions is indicative of who the victorious Tokayev faction blames. Discussing this transparently though is neither in the interest of the ruling Nur Otan party, China’s CCP or United Russia. Operating within spaces of shadow truth then has meant that each of the three state institutional actors has had to craft competing narratives of events, actors, their agency and both the real and the desired outcomes. Constructing and controlling these narratives means first establishing and defending discourse formation control. Assessing the relative success of the three state actors’ abilities to project narratives and control discourse, China has come a distant third to not even particularly convincing or strong narrative formation by the dominant Russia or the subordinate Kazakhstan.

Actual narratives on domestic Kazakh politics center on the politically falling or self-exile of members of the Nazarbayev clan. During the violence though, the Tokayev faction of Nur Otan Party maintaining rule over Kazakhstan immediately opted for a narrative of foreign militants and terrorism. This line from the Kazakhstan capital to explain both the use of violence against the government and the government’s use of violence, remains unconvincing. Defining the threat as foreign was a necessary step to legitimise CSTO deployment, with a secondary path-dependency of having to identify foreign actors. Neither the foreign designation nor the identification of terrorism are in any way convincing. However caught between a domestic audience and the pseudo-legality of the CSTO, the Tokayev discourse is limited in its imaginatory scope. Kazakhstan’s discourse has thus centred on shifting agency away from both the factional power struggle as well moving culpability away from the incensed local citizenry whose initial legitimate protests appear to have been hijacked by political opportunism.

Russia’s emerging narrative has been to position its intervention rhetorically against an overt ‘revolution’ and implied Turkic nationalist elements, a deft game, attempting to meld an entirely domestic Kazakh political event into Russia’s wider regional balance of power games with Turkey in Syria, Karabakh, Ukraine and Africa. Outside observers have tended to focus on either Russia’s potential remilitarisation of the post-Soviet space or on exploring idiosyncratic perceptions of the Sino-Russian relationship in Central Asia. Neither seem concerned with subnational institutions, their competing frictions, or evidence. While the political theatre of Central Asian authoritarian discourse control fools no one in the domestic audience forced to consume it, it does have the institutional outcome of crowding out space for late-comer discourses to form.

This leaves no space but China’s domestic media for the attempt to inject the ‘Three Evils’ policy rhetoric into the information stream or to belatedly begin to engage with the easiest of Pan-Islamist rhetoric. China’s Near-abroad policy towards ethnic Kazakhs in Xinjiang and Kazakhstan alike centres on the outdated Three Evils policy language formation. These Three Evils of terrorism, separatism and extremism manifest as an acute on the Uyghur and Kazakh ethnic minorities in Xinjiang, stressing the threat to the state from Islam, ethno-nationalism and the largely imagined violent pursuit of separatist causes which utilise either of these symbolic representations of power. However linking the recent Republic of Kazakhstan unrest to China’s Three Evils proxy rhetoric alienates China from either the Kazakhstan or Russian narratives. China’s current foreign policy statecraft is not deft enough to align this anti-Turkic, anti-Islamic rhetoric with its geoeconomic policy toward Republic of Turkey, a key geoeconomic hedge against Russia in the Belt and Road policy. Neither does the discourse blaming domestic Islamic separatism have the agility or grapple or to latch on to the combined Russian and Kazakh narratives. Turkey’s Pan-Turkic agenda though does takes a legitimacy hit and a relegation in discourse formation ability due to the Kazakhstan unrest.

China’s foreign policy position on the 2022 Kazakhstan unrest seems to have been much the same as with the 2020 Karabakh War, wait to see who emerges victorious, and back the winner. Such persistently reactionary foreign policy though leaves no space for China to pursue long-term geoeconomic policy. It is also at odds with China’s concomitant internal security integration policy in Central Asia as well as its Eurasian geoeconomic policy. China’s foreign affairs, internal security, and geoeconomic policy mechanisms have thus found themselves institutionally disjointed when focused on this Kazakhstan crisis. The three major sources of China’s foreign policy in Kazakhstan are the Political and Legal Affairs Commission, Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in that order. They respectively control policy formulation in near abroad internal security, geoeconomics and traditional foreign policy.

China’s differentiated foreign policy apparatus and dialogue equivalents in Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan’s state foreign policy apparatus is weak, but the counterpart in China is also very weak. The strongest elements of China’s Party foreign policy institutions though tend to ignore Kazakhstan as too small, while the strongest actual connection between Kazakhstan and China is through the domestic security integration framework, between the Politics and Legal Affairs Commission on the China side and the Security Council on the Kazakhstan side.

More widely, China effectively has four disparate but convergent institutional sources of foreign policy institutional sources. Great power politics, the policy weather of which emerges from the Party Leading Groups and Commissions; Near Abroad foreign policy emanating from the Politics and Legal Affairs Commission, traditional diplomacy which operates more as international political theatre, centred on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and finally the practical geoeconomic policy which is almost exclusively the foreign policy domain of the Minister of Commerce. While Republic of Kazakhstan is generally too low on China’s foreign policy priorities to warrant upper Party attention, China’s greatest strength in Eurasian policy development and deployment is in a growing institutional integration with Kazakhstan in internal security. However in traditional foreign policy and concomitant security China is weak to the point of absenteeism in Eurasia. The culmination of this disjointed foreign policy deployment is that China lacks institutional strength to develop discourse in Eurasian foreign policy.

China’s Political and Legal Affairs Commission has direct institutional integration with the Security Councils of all the Central Asian states and Russia through the Minister of Internal Affairs or its equivalent liaising directly with the Chinese counterpart. In Kazakhstan Erlan Turgumbayev is at the end of this international security communication line, perhaps suggesting why has kept his place in Tokayev’s cabinet. This domestic and foreign security integration between China and Kazakhstan is much more important than any foreign ministry statements. In China, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has very little power in setting or enacting policy. Where China did exercise agency in the Kazakh unrest though was in the very low ordinate geopolitical games of Uyghur and Kazakh detention, and in reinforcing Kazakhstan economic diplomacy subservience to Beijing.

At the executive level, General Secretary Xi did call Nur Otan Chairman Tokayev expressing support for the incumbent, but this was on January 7, two days after Tokayev requested support from the CSTO thus guaranteeing his Presidency would survive any internal challenge. When there was then no jeopardy in China’s exercise of state agency, it was both deferential and directed to the Russian Federation. State Councillor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s call to Russia’s Sergei Lavrov expressing the possibility for SCO forces to be deployed demonstrates the genuflection involved—the hollow offer on January 10 was well after Russian CSTO troops had been deployed with boots already on the ground. On the same day Wang Yi also called Kazakhstan Minister of Foreign Affairs Mukhtar Tileuberdi, where Tileuberdi was expected to pledge support for China’s crackdown on Kazakh minorities in Xinjiang. Wang later issued a statement of solidarity with Kazakhstan in an attempt at great power diplomacy, but again this high level China statement only came after both the Kazakhstan domestic power struggle was already over and after the international security order had been established through Russian leadership.

For the Foreign Affairs source of policy, Kazakhstan’s ambassador to China, Gabit Koishibayev, also spoke on the January 10 press conference on foreign affairs to assure the domestic narrative centred on China investments in Kazakhstan that the violence and political unrest was under control and that it would neither spillover to Xinjiang nor damage China’s economic interests in Kazakhstan. Wang Wenbin, China Foreign Ministry spokesperson also followed up questions on the Kazakh ambassador’s positions on 12 January, reiterating that nothing had happened, and that if it had, then it was now over, saying merely that the domestic turmoil in Kazakhstan was caused by local riots which had turned violent. The China state diplomatic apparatus stuck to the line fed to it that there was no internal power struggle in Kazakhstan, maintaining a veneer of loyalty to the Tokayev administration. Hugely unpopular in Kazakhstan, the China ambassador to Kazakhstan Zhang Xiao issued no statement through the unrest and emerged with only a characteristically unconvincing statement of hollow support for the winner in Chinese media on January 12.

This small China speaking softly with no stick is very different from the grandiose visions and statements of Eurasian geoeconomic predominance which have defined Belt and Road analysis. Liu Hui, China’s special envoy for Eurasia, with a direct counterpart on the Kazakhstan Security Council in Marat Shaikhutdinov, met with Tokayev in the Kazakh capital in only the end of December 2021, and yet has been absent from the discourse on the current Kazakhstan political turbulence and subsequent Russian stabilisation. Tokayev’s expression at that meeting of a Kazakhstan-China ‘all-weather friendly relationship’ may have proven optimistic—Kazakhstan is at the ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partner’ level in China’s foreign policy hierarchy.

Who China does speak with seriously on the Kazakhstan side though is not in diplomacy but precisely in the world of domestic security which Tokayev has blamed for the attempted palace coup.

For Tokayev’s Kazakhstan, a major challenge ahead of consolidating domestic power will be to keep the lifeline economy compliant with the expectations of capital-starved Kazakhstan’s international investors, particular its state planned-economy partners. However, if a radically different faction had usurped power and formed government in Kazakhstan, China would not now be in any foreign policy position to assert its economic interests. Not playing a hand and allowing Russia to assume the geopolitical risk may well have been strategic calculation. However, through inaction, China has now narrowed the institutional space to shape either this or future narratives. In an information space already crowded with Russian and Kazakhstan discourse formation there is diminishing space for China’s multi-institutional conflicting foreign policy typologies to construct themselves into the Eurasian discourse.

From our partner RIAC

Central Asia

The CSTO and the U.S. in Central Asia

Published

1 week ago

March 18, 2023

Yekaterina Strakhova

Image source: Aram Nersesyan / Sputnik / RIA Novosti

The Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) is becoming more active amid growing instability in the wider Eurasian region. Imangali Tasmagambetov, who became CSTO secretary general at the beginning of this year, has met with the secretaries of the Security Councils of Russia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, as well as with the heads of member states (except Russian President Vladimir Putin).

Tasmagambetov might have come to Yerevan as well, but they have recently tried to distance themselves from the CSTO. This year, Armenia refused to host the “Unbreakable Brotherhood” exercise and also decided not to take up the quota of deputy secretary general of the organisation.

Tasmagambetov is tasked with examining the difficult operational environment. On the western flank of the CSTO, there is a growing external threat from Ukraine and Poland, which could draw Belarus into a conflict between “the West” and Russia; in the southeast, there is the possibility of renewed conflict on the Kyrgyz-Tajik border and a growing Afghan factor. All this could have a negative impact on collective security.

On the European track, the urgent tasks of preventing and defending against aggression will first and foremost be handled by the regional grouping of troops from Belarus and Russia, which has been deployed since 2022.

As to the border problem between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the Russian expert Alexander Knyazev believes[1] that the CSTO should focus on demilitarization of the “conflict” areas and take them under the control of the Organization’s monitoring group and peacekeeping contingent. It is likely that Tasmagambetov visited both republics with these proposals.

The Afghan problem is multifaceted and requires a unified approach among the CSTO member states to curb it.

In addition to exploring challenges and threats in CSTO areas of responsibility, Tasmagambetov began promoting the topic of military-economic cooperation[2] among CSTO member states.

At a meeting with Russian Minister of Industry and Trade Denis Manturov, he suggested forming multilateral cooperation among military-industrial complex enterprises of CSTO countries to jointly develop and produce weapons and military equipment and establish service centres for their maintenance and repair.

Military and economic cooperation within the CSTO is an important component of integration, since it implies not only equipping the armed forces with the latest weapons, but also developing military engineering in all CSTO states and, importantly, maintaining common arms standards.

Tasmagambetov’s initiative will update the Concept for Standardisation of Armaments and Military Equipment within the CSTO, i.e. it will launch the work of defence enterprises under unified technical standards, ensuring compatibility of armaments on various parameters.

In addition, the CSTO itself is gradually being modernised. Ratification of the documents is underway, which will allow the military alliance to interact more effectively with the UN. Once ratification is complete, the CSTO will be able to form peacekeeping contingents and conduct operations under the auspices of the “coordinating state” with a UN mandate.

In February 2023, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov announced[3] that the CSTO was developing peacekeeping capabilities. He noted that “on Kazakhstan’s proposal we are making an addition” to the Agreement on CSTO Peacekeeping Activities, “because it says that CSTO peacekeeping forces are deployed by agreement and with the sanction of the UN Security Council. In Sergey Lavrov’s opinion, this norm is redundant and he believes that only an appeal by one of the member states to the Collective Security Council is sufficient.

Looking at the text of the Agreement on the Peacekeeping Activities, Article 3 notes that CSTO peacekeeping operations are authorised by the Collective Security Council (the CSTO body) if they take place on the territory of member states, as for example in Kazakhstan in January 2022, or by the UN Security Council if they take place on the territory of a non-member state of the CSTO.

The point of the forthcoming amendments to the CSTO documents, to which Lavrov referred, is that the CSTO could independently decide to conduct a peacekeeping operation on the territory of non-member states without consulting the UN.

It is not simply a question of stepping up CSTO activities. Increased instability in wider Eurasia points to the ineffectiveness of the universal global institutions for conflict prevention and resolution, which is the UN Security Council. At least in the form in which it currently exists. Therefore, the CSTO is now probably seen by the political elites of the member states as the basis for an autonomous regional security system.

It is not a question of a permanent break with international institutions such as the UN. The format of interaction with them will remain, and this is what the provision of a “coordinating state”, which will act under a UN mandate, is introduced for.

There is a risk that a peacekeeping operation will be vital, but the UN mandate will be blocked in the Security Council by some other countries. This is why the CSTO is planning to expand its mandate to carry out politico-military activities beyond the borders of its member states.

It is clear that it is not about distant “peacekeeping marches”. The CSTO is interested in the situation in neighbouring states where collective security may be threatened. If we talk about Central Asia, it is Afghanistan, from the territory of which militant groups can begin to carry out military and terrorist acts against CSTO member states.

The revival of the former Soviet-era cooperation between the defence establishments of the CSTO countries, which the Secretary General recently updated, may be aimed at creating a resource base for this autonomous security system in the region.

To prevent the development of military-economic and military-technical cooperation within the CSTO, the United States has initiated a discussion that Russia will at some point be unable to supply Central Asian countries with ammunition and weapons for border protection because of the ASW. In particular, US Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Donald Lu stated[4] this. The former U.S. ambassador to Kyrgyzstan noted that there is a debate on where the countries of the region could obtain defence equipment if needed, citing the United States, Japan and South Korea as possible arms suppliers.

Washington clearly understands that the revival of the military industry within the CSTO increases the level of independence of the member states. To prevent this, the U.S. is planning to get some CSTO member states put on the “arms needle”, possibly initially free of charge.

Armenia’s ‘special position’ in the CSTO is probably a phenomenon of the same order, which, according to some experts, is evidence of the desire of the country’s political elite to leave the Organisation. It is clear that this desire is motivated by the West, which seeks to prevent the emergence of an autonomous security system in our region. But according to [5]Yerevan expert Grigor Balasanyan, a country’s withdrawal from the CSTO would not be in the interests of the Armenian people.

So far, with the exception of Armenia, the other CSTO members have demonstrated their readiness for further evolution of the organization, which may be joined by other states. For example, Serbia and Afghanistan are currently observer countries at the CSTO Parliamentary Assembly. In addition, the SCO has a strong interest in developing cooperation with the CSTO, as these organisations have many overlapping lines and areas of responsibility.

[1] https://www.eurasiatoday.ru/expert-opinions/12769-одкб-разместит-миротворческий-контингент-на-территории-кыргызстана.html

[2] https://inbusiness.kz/ru/last/tasmagambetov-vyskazalsya-o-sovmestnoj-razrabotke-vooruzhenij-v-stranah-odkb

[3] https://ria.ru/20230202/odkb-1849206032.html

[4] https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/17221079?utm_source=yxnews&utm_medium=desktop&utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fdzen.ru%2Fnews%2Fsearch%3Ftext%3D

[5] https://verelq.am/ru/node/123321

Central Asia

Competition of U.S.-China in Central Asia & its Implications for Pakistan

Published

2 weeks ago

March 10, 2023

Muhammad Adan Nisar

US-China rivalry will affect various states, which have good relations with both (China and U.S). After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, China and the U.S. have been ambitious in strategically influencing the Central Asia region. Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a part of China’s grand strategy in Central Asia, which has intensified the importance of this region. Further, China’s influence in this region has increased through regional organizations such as Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Pakistan is an important pivot of China’s regional strategy. China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is the flagship project of China’s BRI. However, US’s grand strategies are phase 1.0 policy to 2.0 policy and C5+1 (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan with the United States of America) is also part of the US’s grand strategy in Central Asia.

China’s connection with Central Asia can be traced to an ancient times, but established during the Soviet. In 1992, the Ashkhabad summit intensified China’s role in this region.

China joins this region through Xinjiang, an autonomous region with a majority Muslim population. It also falls into the Central Asian region. Xinjiang shares its border with three Central Asian states (Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan).

The collapse of the Soviet Union curtailed security threats to China’s national security from Central Asia. However, in 1991, the victory of the US in the Gulf War and the emergence of the New World Order was an alarming situation for China. This situation pressed China to discover a role, particularly in regional affairs in newly born states of Central Asia.

In the New Great Game, China has comprehensively increased its national strength politically and economically and has influenced this region culturally. China has utilized classical geopolitical concepts, reviving the Old Silk Road, and divide and rule strategy. Silk Road is China’s identity, which connects Asia and the West by the terminus in Xinjiang.

In 2002, Former Secretary of the State Colin Powel once remarked in House Foreign Affairs Committee that we would enhance our presence and interest in Central Asia that we had not dreamed of before.

US grand strategy falls into two phases towards Central Asia. 1.0 Phase means to protect Soviet Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), protect the sovereignty of newly born states from Russian aggression, to break Russian monopoly over transit routes and gas pipelines. In this phase, the US should have paid more attention to its geopolitical approach towards Central Asia and had fewer priorities in this region.

11 September 2001 brought huge changes in US strategy towards Central Asia, and it introduced the 2.0 phase, which means that the agenda of the US towards Central Asia is political and economical. However, the military prevailed over this policy due to US’s military presence in Afghanistan, conducting an operation against terrorism. The US has utilized this policy for military cooperation in this region.

Strategic competition between U.S. and China will directly impact Pakistan’s national security at the broader level, such as economy, military and politics.

At the political level, it impacts Pakistan’s relations with China, Iran, Russia, and the Gulf States. At the military level, Pakistan’s geostrategic location enhances Pakistan’s importance. Pakistan has been an important ally of the US against the war on terror and played its role as a frontline state against this war. At the economic level, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a game changer for Pakistan’s economy. It will create opportunities for the economy of Pakistan.

The bigger challenge for Pakistan is how it can maintain its relations with China and the US. Pakistan needs help to maintain good relations with both (US and China). If we see a historical perspective, in the 1970s, Pakistan built a bridge between US and China. Strategic affairs experts strongly believe that Pakistan can defuse the tension between the US and China.

Pakistan has few policy options through which Pakistan can maintain its good relations with both countries.

China is Pakistan’s strategic partner, which addresses Pakistan’s regional strategic concerns in all fields, such as defense, economy, politics and security sectors. CPEC has formed strategic interdependence. Pakistan cannot afford to be the part of the US’s grand strategy to contain China.

Good Pak-US relations are required for regional security. These are guarantors to bring peace in Afghanistan and can counter terrorism and extremism in this region. It is difficult for Pakistan to uncouple from the US. However, the US has a great influence on IMF and World Bank. Pakistan is in negotiation with IMF to get a loan. The US can assist Pakistan with IMF. However, Pakistan has serious concerns over Indo-US growing strategic relations, creating an imbalance in the South Asian region. India is utilizing Indo-US strategic relations as a tool against Pakistan, which concerns Pakistan’s national security. However, good Pak-US relations depend on the US that how it wants to conduct its relations with India and China.

The last option for Pakistan is that it should only place some eggs in one’s basket. Pakistan needs diversifying approach towards all major powers. Although it would be difficult for Pakistan, Pakistan can maintain its relation through an issue-based relationship. It will not affect Pakistan’s relations with anyone rather than choosing one side. This option would protect Pakistan’s regional strategic interests and address Pakistan’s security concerns.

Central Asia

The Strategic Importance of Central Asia and India’s influence in the Region

Published

1 month ago

February 19, 2023

Subrat Sarma

Long-standing historical, cultural, political, and economic ties between India and Central Asia have evolved into a solid, experienced, and transformative connection over time. In light of the COVID-19 epidemic and the shifting global order, India’s proximity to and growing convergence on concerns with the five Central Asian nations of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan has led to increased collaboration on these issues. The two sides have simultaneously intensified their discussions and cooperation on issues like trade and connectivity, economic development, energy security, regional concerns of shared interest, and the shared geopolitical worries of both sides regarding new challenges in Afghanistan.

Trade significantly impacts India’s relationships and influence in the Central Asian Region. India’s trade with Central Asian countries helps to foster economic ties and strengthens political and cultural relations. India’s imports from the area, such as oil, gas, and minerals, provide the country with access to critical resources. In contrast, its exports, such as textiles and agricultural products, give the region market access.

Geostrategic Importance of the Central Asian Region

Central Asia is strategically important due to the location at the crossroads of Asia and Europe, making it a critical link between the two continents. The Region also has significant energy reserves, including oil, natural gas, and coal, making it a substantial energy supplier to Europe and Asia. Central Asia is also home to several major transportation and communication networks, including the historic Silk Road, connecting the Region to the rest of the world and making it a hub for trade and commerce. The Region’s proximity to several regional and global powers, such as Russia, China, and India, further highlights its strategic importance.

Central Asia is strategically located in the middle of both Asia and Eurasia. It connects Asia and Europe as a bridge between Eastern and Western nations. Central Asia’s importance is acknowledged due to its geopolitical, geoeconomic, and geostrategic position. The Central Asian states have historically been a centre of trade, rivalry, and warfare due to geography. It now serves as a bridge connecting North and South and East and West. In addition to its strategic location, the Central Asian Region is also seen by outsiders as the new global geopolitical and economic battleground. Over 2000 years of conflict have been etched into its history as the past great empires struggled to control the Silk Route, the vital trade route between Europe and Asia.

India’s Policy for growing its potential in the Central Asian Region

India’s trade with Central Asia also has the potential to help balance China’s growing economic influence in the Region. India has been actively pursuing a policy of economic engagement with Central Asian countries and working to increase investment, trade and energy ties with these countries. Several factors, including energy security, access to raw materials, and regional economic integration, have driven India’s engagement with the Region. India has made efforts to increase trade and investment flows with the Central Asian countries, which includes establishing trade agreements and participating in regional economic forums. Regional politics, competition with other major powers such as China, and regional security have also influenced the trade relationship. By engaging in trade with Central Asia, India can tap into the Region’s resources, enhance its economic footprint, and contribute to regional stability and prosperity. Drug trafficking, fundamentalism, and religious extremism threaten the strength of these communities and the wider area. Water, security, environmental, and immigration issues have all become urgent. The Region is threatened by more recent acts of narcoterrorism coming from Afghanistan. Russia, China, the U.S., Turkey, Iran, Europe, the E.U., Japan, Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan are all claimed to have significant economic and security interests in the Region, making the area a “theatre of the great game” where this and other conflicts are being played out. A significant obstacle to fostering and growing ties is that India still needs to have a shared land border with any of these states. Direct travel from Pakistan to either Afghanistan or Central Asia is prohibited. Thus, China is the transit country for time- and money-consuming land trade. India has made significant headway towards enhancing connectivity by signing a security cooperation agreement for the refurbishment of Chabahar port, the creation of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), and accession to the Ashgabat Agreement. This gap is expected to be closed by India’s involvement in both the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

The India-Central Asia Summit was presided over by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in January 2022 in the presence of all five Central Asian heads of state. The online meeting showed India’s dedication to its “Extended Neighborhood Policy”, which mandates that New Delhi diversify its geopolitical allies and diplomatic objectives, as well as its readiness to cooperate with its Central Asian partners on several fronts.

Overall, trade helps to position India as an essential player in the Central Asian Region and contributes to its regional and global significance. More interaction is anticipated to enhance regional economic growth and mutual security. Economically, Central Asia offers India’s industry a “near abroad” market, overland links to the Middle East’s and Russia’s rich resources, and considerable energy supplies at comparatively close ranges. Suez and the Mediterranean Sea are both shorter than the INSTC corridor route. This Region is projected to become more significant as competition with China for resources increases.

The increased trade can also help India to reduce its dependence on other areas for energy supplies and increase its bargaining power in the global market. It aimed at improving the flow of goods, services and investment between the two regions and also to tapping into the vast energy resources of Central Asia. Additionally, more significant business can lead to infrastructure development and job creation, thereby improving the economic conditions in both regions. However, it also faces challenges such as competition from other countries and the need for a well-developed transport and communication network in the area.