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The Neo-NAM: From Vision to Reality

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source: kremlin.ru

The latest Putin-Modi Summit was a global geostrategic game-changer unlocking the potential for the two great powers to jointly assemble a new Non-Aligned Movement (“Neo-NAM”). Their meeting came against the backdrop of both countries recalibrating their respective “balancing” acts. Russia has been engaged in high-level diplomacy with the U.S. while India defied America’s CAATSA sanctions threats by remaining loyal to its S-400 air defense deal with Moscow. These two countries are signaling to the world that they’re strategically autonomous in the U.S.–Chinese New Cold War. Furthermore, they have complementary grand strategies when it comes to maintaining the balance of interests in Eurasia.

Not only that, but clause 93 of the 99-point “Partnership for Peace, Progress, and Prosperity” that the leaders agreed on during their summit announced that “the sides agreed to explore mutually acceptable and beneficial areas of cooperation in third countries especially in the Central Asia, South East Asia and Africa.” This can be interpreted as their interest in jointly facilitating the balancing acts of third countries in those regions (including their local Eurasian and South Asian ones) that are struggling to remain neutral in the New Cold War. The paradigm through which they can advance this vision is the Neo-NAM, something that the author has elaborated on in detail earlier.

Background Briefing

He co-authored an academic article for Vestnik, the official journal of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO, run by the Russian Foreign Ministry), titled “The Prospects Of Russian And India Jointly Leading A New Non-Aligned Movement”, and released a follow-up for the Indian military magazine Force titled “Towards Bi-Multipolarity”. These pieces lay the basis upon which the present analysis will be built. To simplify the insight shared within them, the author argues that Russia and India are the only great powers capable of pragmatically balancing the two superpowers in the New Cold War and facilitating others’ respective balancing acts.

The game-changing Putin-Modi Summit and the complicated geostrategic context in which it took place confirms both countries’ intentions to do so, particularly when it comes to the earlier cited 93rd clause of their reaffirmed special and privileged strategic partnership. Therefore, their permanent military, intelligence, and diplomatic bureaucracies (“deep states”) will likely prioritize the convergence of their shared grand strategy of balancing Afro-Eurasian affairs in the coming months. To assist with this, the author decided to expand upon his earlier blueprints for bringing this pragmatic vision about. The present analysis should serve as a starting point for initiating joint activity in this direction.

Ground Zero: The Russian Far East

The first order of business should be to agree on flagship projects in the Russian Far East where India unprecedentedly extended its strategic partner a $1 billion line of credit in September 2019 during Prime Minister Modi’s attendance at the Eastern Economic Forum (EEF) as President Putin’s guest of honor. The leaders also announced the Vladivostok-Chennai Maritime Corridor (VCMC), which is expected to serve as Russia’s connectivity concept across what India describes as the Indo-Pacific but which Moscow still officially regards as the Asia-Pacific. It is of the highest priority that the two make progress on this, since the VCMC won’t attract any third parties without proving its viability in the Russian Far East first.

India could be of special service to Russia if it succeeds in leveraging its strategic partnership with Japan for the purpose of convincing Tokyo to invest in this region irrespective of resolving what that East Asian nation considers to be the “Kuril Islands Dispute” but which, Moscow maintains, shouldn’t be an issue at all following that country’s defeat in World War II. India and Japan jointly unveiled the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) a few years ago—however, the project has yet to make any major investments anywhere. It would therefore be in all the three countries’ interests to focus on the Russian Far East since the host country needs the investment and those other two need to prove the viability of their concept.

The Mechanics of The Neo-NAM

Three Tracks

No matter whether India proves successful in convincing Japan to invest in the Russian Far East, Moscow and New Delhi should establish a platform for coordinating their activity in third countries in order to maximally optimize the vision articulated in the 93rd clause of their latest partnership agreement. It would be advisable to make it as flexible as possible in the sense of proceeding along three tracks: the bilateral Russian-Indian one, a number of trilateral tracks for coordinating joint investments in third countries, and a multilateral one for managing all of the aforesaid. Upon reaching enough trilateral investment deals in third countries, the platform could then serve to coordinate all of their other activities.

“Economic Diplomacy”

To explain, economic engagement is the inroad through which the Neo-NAM can eventually become a political force through which Russia and India can facilitate its partners’ balancing acts between China and the US in the New Cold War. To be absolutely clear, this mustn’t ever be instrumentalized to influence the balance of interests between those two superpowers, but solely to ensure the greatest level of strategic autonomy for the countries caught in the middle of their global competition. Just like the NAM from the Old Cold War balanced its members’ relations between the American and Soviet superpowers, so too should the Neo-NAM in the New Cold War do the same with the US and China.

Joint Investments

In practice, this could most immediately take the form of joint Russian-Indian investment projects serving as a pragmatic “third way” for such states who feel compelled to choose between American (“Build Back Better World”, B3W) and Chinese (Belt & Road Initiative, BRI) connectivity initiatives. Some might already have ties with one, the other, or perhaps eventually soon both, but they’d have a natural interest in diversifying through the Neo-NAM’s potentially proposed projects as well in order to balance between those superpowers and maintain as much strategic autonomy. This would help them preemptively avert any future disproportionate dependence on either superpower.

UN Coordination

Since the New Cold War has many political dimensions, the third countries caught in the middle of this competition might feel compelled to side with one of them at the UN or in other multilateral fora. In that context, the Neo-NAM could serve as a voting bloc of truly neutral states that collectively refuse to get involved in those superpowers’ rivalry. They would eventually realize that they can effect more meaningful change if they stick together and vote (or not vote) as one instead of scattering to side with the U.S. or China. This could, in turn, prompt those two superpowers to appreciate the Neo-NAM’s countries even more, which might reduce the pressure they feel to side with either of them.

“Military Diplomacy”

Militarily, the Neo-NAM might eventually seek to circulate more jointly produced Russian-Indian weapons among its many members in order to relieve the pressure that they’d feel to purchase American or Chinese ones. After all, whether or not either of those superpowers politicizes their arms exports, the other will certainly take notice if any given country purchases their rival’s. This is especially true for Chinese exports to West Asia and American ones to the ASEAN states. In order to avoid inadvertently offending either of those two, the Neo-NAM’s countries might opt to purchase jointly produced Russian-Indian arms instead in order to signal that they’re truly militarily neutral states.

Going Forward

Having explained the mechanics of the Neo-NAM, the rest of the analysis will discuss the means through which Russia and India can engage over half a dozen countries that might be most interested in joining their informal network across Afro-Eurasia. The informal aspect is emphasized because there might be certain political sensitivities with openly declaring their Neo-NAM intent even if their expert and media communities end up using this term for simplicity’s sake. That’s because China would almost certainly object to any such formal announcement, and neither Russia nor India wants to inadvertently risk having that country view their truly neutral grand strategic intentions with suspicion.

Vietnam

To begin, it deserves mentioning that Russia and India each have strategic partnerships with the centrally positioned ASEAN state of Vietnam. It would therefore be best if they incorporated that country into the VCMC and began trilaterally coordinating with it. The Vietnamese President was just in Moscow where he and his host agreed to renew their strategic partnership. Of particular interest was their joint declaration’s mentioning of UNCLOS, which speaks to Russia’s regional neutrality and unwillingness to take sides in the South China Sea issue despite its strategic partnership with China. This makes Moscow a trustworthy partner for all ASEAN states.

Vietnam was the first country to reach a free trade agreement with the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAU) with which India plans to launch free trade talks sometime next year according to their recently renewed strategic partnership. The BrahMos supersonic missiles that Russia and India jointly produced as their flagship military-industrial project will be exported to the Philippines according to Deputy Chief of the Russian Mission in India Roman Babushkin in November 2020 in spite of that country being America’s mutual defense ally. If those two will sell such arms to that country, then it follows that there shouldn’t be a problem exporting them to their shared Vietnamese partner too.

Maintaining the Vietnamese-Chinese balance of power in the South China Sea could encourage both claimants to continue pursuing a political solution to their dispute. It would also counteract the US’ divide-and-rule strategy of trying to pit ASEAN states against the People’s Republic. Since Vietnam already has official trade ties with the EAU and India will soon work on reaching its own, it shouldn’t be that difficult to coordinate trilateral projects in that regional state through the VCMC. Doing so would serve as a proof of the economic viability of that concept as well as the larger Neo-NAM within which that corridor would serve as a key connectivity project between many of its proposed members.

Bangladesh

Moving westward into the Indian Ocean, Russia and India are already jointly building a nuclear power plant in Bangladesh, which testifies to how close those two are with Dhaka. That country became independent half a century ago shortly after the Indo-Soviet “Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation” in 1971. All three therefore have time-tested relations that stretch back to Bangladesh’s inception. This could transform that country into the Neo-NAM’s top South Asian partner and make it a major node along the VCMC that this concept’s joint leaders plan to advance. Bangladesh is also balancing between China and the US so it would clearly be attracted to the Neo-NAM’s neutral “third way”.

Afghanistan

The next point of convergence between Russia and India is Afghanistan, and it’s here where Moscow could repay New Delhi’s favor for possibly getting Tokyo to invest in the Russian Far East irrespective of resolving the so-called “Kuril Islands Dispute”. India evacuated that country in August following the Taliban’s lightning-fast takeover after investing $3 billion in over 400 socio-economic development projects in every one of Afghanistan’s provinces. The Taliban, which is still officially designated as a terrorist group by Moscow despite the Eurasian Great Power pragmatically engaging with it in the interests of peace and security, hopes that India can return to help it balance China and Pakistan.

Although that country’s de facto leaders have excellent ties with those two countries, it’s concerned about becoming disproportionately dependent on them in the future. Average Afghans also generally have very positive views of India, advanced to a large extent by its hundreds of socio-economic development projects that directly improved their lives. The Moscow peace process that resulted in the Extended Troika between that host country, China, Pakistan, and the US could prospectively be expanded to include India, which is what Foreign Minister Lavrov once again proposed following the game-changing Putin-Modi Summit.

Russia envisions relying on India and their shared Iranian partner to pragmatically counterbalance China and Pakistan in Afghanistan, which fully aligns with the Taliban’s undeclared policy as well. Considering this, de facto Taliban-led Afghanistan would therefore be a perfect partner for the Neo-NAM balancing network that Russia and India are jointly assembling. It doesn’t want to take sides between anyone nor become too dependent on any of the many stakeholders in its success. This explains why the group will likely be attracted to the neutral “third way” that Russia and India could soon propose for it in order to make Afghanistan their network’s most important Central Asian partner.

Iran

At this point, it’s worthwhile talking about Iran, which was mentioned earlier with respect to Russia’s repeated proposal to have it join the Extended Troika on Afghanistan. The Islamic Republic enjoys equally excellent relations with Russia and India but also clinched a 25-year strategic partnership with China last spring. It was also announced several months ago that Iran will join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in which those three Great Powers also participate. Even though Tehran is presently renegotiating the nuclear deal with Washington, it practices a fiercely independent foreign policy and plays a crucial role in geographically bridging the Russian-Indian Strategic Partnership.

It does this through the North-South Transport Corridor (NSTC) alongside neighboring transit state Azerbaijan. Although Baku and New Delhi have recently experienced some turbulence in their relations after Azerbaijan publicly supported Pakistan’s position on Kashmir and India began expanding its relations with that country’s Armenian rival, the NSTC still remains geographically viable since Russian-Indian trade could traverse the Caspian Sea. In addition, since Iran sits in the center of this connectivity corridor, it could also host trilateral investment projects, especially upon a successfully renegotiated nuclear deal that removes the US’ secondary sanctions threats that have thus far impeded this.

The UAE

Across the Gulf lies the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which should also be approached by Russia and India to gauge its interest in joining their Neo-NAM. That country has recently expanded relations with both of them as part of its rapid rise to regional power status that’s the result of its visionary leadership’s geopolitical ambitions. It’s also extremely wealthy and has a lot of influence in the Horn of Africa, a region that will soon be discussed when talking about the Neo-NAM’s African dimension. The UAE is improving relations with Iran, managing increasingly difficult ties with the US, exploring a rapprochement with Turkey, and recently recognized Israel so it should be interested in the Neo-NAM.

Israel

Israel was just talked about and it’s also a perfect candidate for the Neo-NAM. Even though it’s regarded as among America’s top allies anywhere in the world, it bravely defied Washington’s pressure to sanction Moscow in solidarity with the West. In addition, Tel Aviv and the Eurasian Great Power have quietly become de facto allies after the Kremlin agreed to a so-called “deconfliction mechanism” with it in September 2015 immediately prior to its anti-terrorist intervention in neighboring Syria in order to coordinate actions above that third country’s airspace. This led to Israel carrying out literally hundreds of strikes against Iran and its allies since then who it claims are stockpiling weapons there to attack it.

This fact means that Russia has indirectly done more to ensure Israel’s most pressing national security interests than even America has in recent years. From there, trust between these former Old Cold War rivals reached unprecedented heights, with President Putin personally managing his country’s de facto allied relations with Israel. He’s on record proudly speaking about the crucial role that the Russian diaspora there played in building the people-to-people ties upon which their relations are expanding. President Putin is also extremely passionate about fighting anti-Semitism and World War II revisionism all across the world, which are two of the most sensitive subjects for Israel.

The US’ interest in renegotiating the nuclear deal with Iran made Israel suspicious of its traditional ally’s grand strategic interests. After appreciating how Russia ensured its most pressing national security interests in Syria and thus rewarding it by refusing to comply with America’s demands to sanction Moscow in solidarity with the West, the opportunity has certainly arisen for seriously considering Israel’s inclusion in the Neo-NAM. Iran’s possible participation shouldn’t be any obstacle since both it and Israel are also actively exploring free trade deals with the EAU and each have excellent relations with India as well. If Israel joins the Neo-NAM, then it would truly make this network a force to be reckoned with.

Ethiopia & South Africa

The last part of the world where the Neo-NAM can truly make a geostrategic difference is Africa, and it’s here where Ethiopia and South Africa can serve as its most important members. Both have excellent relations with China but are eager to diversify their ties as much as possible. Ethiopia has recently experienced unprecedented pressure from its nominal American ally to politically compromise with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) that Addis Ababa officially considers to be terrorists. This upset the balancing act that that country was practicing up until the start of last year’s conflict and thus necessitates an urgent recalibration, which is where Russia and India can quickly step in.

Both of them defended Ethiopia at the UN, which were gracious political acts that Addis Ababa truly appreciated. India also already has some investments in Ethiopia while Russia is exploring such. Moscow and Addis Ababa used to be allies during the second half of the Old Cold War and even enjoyed special relations back during their imperial eras. All of these can be the bases upon which Russia and India can engage Ethiopia to gauge its interest in trilateral investment projects, after which that country could seriously consider joining their Neo-NAM network across Afro-Eurasia. Ethiopia has historically supported anti-imperialism and pan-Africanism so its membership would be especially symbolic.

As for South Africa, it participates in BRICS alongside Russia and India. As an Indian Ocean state, that country is also within the region that India considers to be its “sphere of influence”. Russia has historically close relations with it too stretching back to the former Soviet Union’s support for the anti-apartheid freedom movement. As one of the continent’s largest economies, it’s a natural point of convergence between Russia’s and India’s economic interests and would add hefty weight to the African component of their Neo-NAM. Just like Russia, India, and China coordinate through RICs, so too could Russia, India, and South Africa coordinate through a special format in the proposed Neo-NAM.

Concluding Thoughts

The New Cold War is intensifying across all dimensions, especially across the economic domain after the U.S. unveiled its B3W and the EU just announced its complementary “Global Gateway” (GG). Those two will likely coordinate to compete with BRI all across Afro-Eurasia, with a particular emphasis on the first-mentioned continent due to its much more urgent developmental needs. Russia and India are late to the infrastructure game and will have to do a lot to catch up with their great power peers, but it is never too late to start. Should they succeed in proving the viability of joint projects in the Neo-NAM’s Russian Far Eastern core and expand the VCMC to Vietnam and Bangladesh, African countries will pay attention.

The VCMC could then become the centerpiece of Russia’s Indo-Pacific policy and the vehicle through which it and India jointly approach African countries, after which they’d likely rebrand that project or at least the African dimension. They also both have very close ties with the UAE and Israel, which have immense influence in the Indian Ocean half of the continent, so the possibility emerges to explore the chance for quadrilateral or even five-party projects in some capacity. If that’s not feasible given how ambitious such a proposal is and the difficulty in coordinating so many stakeholders’ interests, then Russia and India might individually advance trilateral projects with one or the other in African states.

The VCMC or whatever its proposed African expansion might be called will therefore serve as the connectivity vehicle for economically attracting countries to the Neo-NAM. The Afghan and Iranian dimensions can be advanced through the NSTC, while the Emirati and Israeli ones could see new concepts being created, perhaps even through Russian investment in facilitating the proposed “Arab-Mediterranean Corridor” between the EU and India via those West Asian countries. Upon establishing joint projects in third countries, the host states can the be encouraged to participate in the Neo-NAM’s diplomatic and military initiatives that were earlier explained in the mechanics section of this analysis.

Altogether, the Putin-Modi Summit was truly a global geostrategic game-changer because it extended enormous credence to the author’s earlier proposal for them to jointly lead an informal network of neutral states across Afro-Eurasia for the purpose of collectively facilitating their respective balancing acts. This Neo-NAM could eventually become a third pole of influence in the emerging bi-multipolar world and serve the irreplaceable function of relieving pressure upon the countless countries caught in the middle of the two superpowers’ global competition by presenting a pragmatic “third way” between them. Hopefully, Russian and Indian experts will prioritize research into the author’s ambitious proposal.

From our partner RIAC

Andrew Korybko is a political analyst, journalist and regular contributor to several online journals, as well as a member of the expert council for the Institute of Strategic Studies and Predictions at the People’s Friendship University of Russia. He has published various works in the field of Hybrid Wars, including “Hybrid Wars: The Indirect Adaptive Approach to Regime Change” and “The Law of Hybrid War: Eastern Hemisphere”.

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Can BRICS Underpin a New World Order?

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Amid an unprecedented spike in global geopolitical risks, the world is becoming increasingly aware of the fact that the architecture that underpins the old world order is giving way to a new configuration of international relations and regional blocs. The countries of the Global South are establishing their own institutions, alliances of regional integration, and payment systems, with them turning into a crucial force in the transforming global economy. The largest developing markets, primarily the nations of BRICS, are among the leaders here. In March 2022, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Sergey Ryabkov said that BRICS will form the foundation of a new world order, saying “I think that the BRICS states, totaling almost half of the world’s population and accounting for a large chunk of the global GDP, will be among the backbones of the new emerging world order.”

However, for the BRICS states to become the foundation of a new world order, the bloc has to offer other countries in the world economy new paradigms of development on a global scale. Such areas in the new economic architecture may include relaunching globalization on a platform of new states and regions, establishing a new institutional system for modernizing nations engaged in the global economy, agreeing on a new reserve currency pool with currencies of developing countries, creating a global development track as an alternative to the one promoted by the West, and forming new regional blocs and platforms to coordinate and develop those blocs.

Virtually all possible global-scale paradigms could be implemented within the broad BRICS+ format that offers BRICS states various options for cooperating with other states in the global economy. Spearheaded by China in 2017, BRICS+ still has to acquire its tangible development outlines in many ways, although some possible models for cooperation within BRICS+ have already been announced by representatives of the BRICS states. China’s 2022 BRICS presidency forms a favorable foundation for facilitating BRICS+, with China’s representatives having stated that they are considering the options of developing the BRICS+ concept within interactions, among other things, between regional integration alliances of the countries of the Global South.

As regards the idea’s implementation, a format that appears most suitable for BRICS+ is an alliance of three pancontinental alliances: the African Union, CELAC (the community of Latin American states), and the SCO/SCO+ in Eurasia. Such an alliance spans the largest possible number of countries across the Global South, while it requires no in-depth and complex economic integration or alignment of economic interactions across all three continents. Such an extended format offers developing countries an opportunity to coordinate interaction on the international stage, advancing the Global South’s priority agenda in sustainable development.

This year, we are seeing quite favorable conditions for the emergence of such an extended circle of interactions between developing states: Argentina, currently presiding in CELAC in Latin America, has recently stepped up its efforts to set up interactions with BRICS. Brazil suspending its CELAC involvement in 2020 is a limiting factor, though, but it will mostly likely be temporary. Uzbekistan, now presiding in the SCO throughout 2022, is increasingly involved in integration processes in Eurasia following a period of being closed off. The African Union presidency of 2022 has passed to Senegal, a nation that actively promotes coordination and cooperation of regional integrational alliances and builds tangible interactions with BRICS states, primarily with China.

A platform for interactions between regional integration blocs involving BRICS states could become another track of interaction within BRICS+. Such a platform could include priority projects of regional integration involving BRICS states, such as MERCOSUR, SACU, BIMSTEC, the EAEU, as well as the RCEP or the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area. All these regional blocs could cooperate in coordination, moving toward aligning their standards and creating a more open economic space for trade and investment by BRICS states and their regional partners. It is important to notice that most BRICS states currently choose to shape their foreign policies in the form of regional integration blocs (Russia – the EAEU, Brazil – MERCOSUR, South Africa – the SACU), and, consequently, BRICS+ based on “integration of integrations” is the only possible format for economic integration and for opening markets between BRICS states.

The spirit of multilateralism and of building a new architecture that suits the interests of the entire Global South is important in establishing such platforms. Attempts to base BRICS solely on the narrow national interests could adversely affect the development prospects of BRICS+ as such and of other multilateral initiatives spearheaded by BRICS states. As a new format of interaction between BRICS states, BRICS+ hinges for its success on multimodal interaction formats within BRICS+ that would account for the entire range of national interests and priorities for BRICS states and their regional partners.

Therefore, BRICS+ could shape two tracks for interaction between nations of the Global South: the SCO + the AU + CELAC, the most inclusive one geared toward broad interactions between developing states within international organizations; such a format may possibly reflect predominantly China’s vision its Minister for Foreign Affairs Wang Yi announced back in 2017 when he proclaimed BRICS+ to be the most inclusive interaction platform for developing states. A platform for “integration of integrations” between regional economic groups led by BRICS states may become another development track for BRICS+. This format is a better reflection of Russia’s BRICS+ concept that Sergey Ryabkov announced in early 2018, “We suggest that our partners consider BRICS+ as a platform for developing what could be termed an ‘integration of integrations,’” Ryabkov said. If China’s vision of BRICS+ provides the broadest horizontal span of the Global South, Russia’s vision of BRICS+ prioritizes the depth and alignment of integrating BRICS states’ priority regional projects.

Generally, the number of tracks and formats for interaction between developing countries may be far greater, reflecting the globalizing vision of every BRICS member. In other words, unlike the unipolar approach to integration in developed states, BRICS+ may serve as a foundation for diversifying the models and platforms of development and economic integration. In this regard, in order to develop BRICS+ as part of diversifying development models, it is important for India, Brazil, and South Africa to also present their visions of BRICS+ and of globalization in the Global South and outside it. It is possible that India, Brazil, and South Africa see a more appealing option in expanding the membership in BRICS’ New Development Bank by admitting regional partners; this paradigm has been used after Egypt was admitted to the NDB as South Africa’s partner in the African Union, Uruguay was admitted as Brazil’s partner in MERCOSUR, and Bangladesh as India’s partner in BIMSTEC and the South Asian Free Trade Area.

Improving the functioning of BRICS Provisional Monetary Reserves Pool (PMRP) could also be a direction of ramping up international activities of BRICS. Recently, BRICS’ PMRP has stepped up coordination with other regional financial organizations (RFOs) within regular consultations the IMF holds with RFOs. At the same time, BRICS’ PMRP was significantly less active in its responses to crisis phenomena in BRICS states compared to BRICS’ NDB. Another option is considering, as part of BRICS+, the possibility of bolstering BRICS’ PMRP’s mandate to monitor the macroeconomic situation in BRICS’ states, to develop coordinated anti-crisis measures, and to interact with other RFOs from developing states and BRICS states’ regional partners. In particular, there could be formed a regular coordination mechanism including BRICS’ PMRP, the Eurasian Fund for Stabilization and Development (EFSD), ASEAN’s Chiang Mai Initiative and their regional partners (CMIM), and Latin American RFO FLAR. Another area here could be expanding BRICS’ PMRP membership by admitting BRICS states’ regional partners, including several states admitted to BRICS’ NDB.

On the whole, the prospects of transforming the world economy today are tightly bound to coordinating the activities of the largest countries of the Global South, primarily the BRICS states. However, a global restart of global economic development requires a larger interaction format, BRICS+, that will make it possible to engage other developing countries in the process. In this case, the process of reformatting the world economy will become truly inclusive and stable. The “integration of integrations” format involving cooperation between regional integration blocs of the Global South may become an important tool in scaling the global economic transformation. China’s 2022 BRICS presidency may give an additional impetus to building platforms for interactions between regional groups of developing states.

Progress achieved by the BRICS nations in moving toward new platforms for cooperation between alliances of developing states may form the foundation of a common cooperation platform for all the states of the Global South. This expanded platform could advance inclusivity and openness in the development of the Global South countries, accelerate dynamics and structuring of the integration processes, could fill the gap and the lacunae on the map of integration processes in the developing world. So far, we can but state that developed countries are far better provided with dynamic and well-structured integration alliances than the countries of the Global South.

From our partner RIAC

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Understanding The Strategy and Use of Military Diplomacy by Nepal

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Authors: Harsh Mahaseth and Ananya Shukla*

From the very inception of Nepal as a modern nation state, its geopolitical status was clear and in response, the role of military diplomacy in securing Nepali sovereignty from the Great Powers of the time was anticipated by its founders. The predominance of Military Diplomacy in Nepal’s foreign policy naturally arose from Nepal position as a buffer state landlocked between the two Great Asian Military Powers of India and China. The Gorkha Kingdom, the precusor state to modern Nepal was founded by Prithvi Narayan Shah, who established the Kingdom in 1768 with the conquest of the dominant power in the region at the time, the Kingdoms of the Kathmandu valley.

King Shah famously quipped that the unified kingdom that he had founded was “a yam between two boulders”. Shah’s aphorism contrasts the small squishy starchy tuber of Nepal against the two massive boulders of the Qing Empire and an ascendant British Raj. Though the internal political structure of Nepal has shifted dramatically several times since its founding, Nepal’s status as the proverbial yam persists though the boulders have morphed into modern day India and China. Though the two massive boulders to the North and South seem like they will eventually absorb the soft vulnerable yam, not only has Military Diplomacy played a leading role in securing Nepal’s sovereignty in the Colonial Context, it has also served the Nepali National Interest in the Post- Colonial Era.

From a purely geopolitical perspective, Nepal exists only as a buffer state between the two historical military powers of the Asian Continent, India and China. The Himalayas being the highest peaks on the planet have separated these two great powers for millenia though the himalayan branch of the silk route served to connect their peoples through trade. While the Chinese remained a unified political polity under the Mandate of Heaven for millenia, the Indian Sub-Continent was a patchwork of Kingdoms of vastly differing sizes, cultures, languages, religions until they were forcibly consolidated by the Mughals and the British, giving rise to modern day India, Bangladesh and Pakistan. While rule of over India was slowly and effectively consolidated by the British Colonialists, the Chinese were going through what they refer to as “the Century of Humiliation”, in which Chinese supremacy was toppled. A resurgent China in seek of “National Rejuvenation” will naturally come in conflict with the national security interests of India.

However, after reform and opening up of the Chinese Economy under Deng Xiaoping, India has found itself with a powerful geopolitical, ideological, economic rival to its North for the role of the Asian Hegemon. The Point of contention lies in the nebulous terms of the 1950 treaty, especially considering the Since Nepal was declared a Federal Democratic Republic by first Constituent Assembly in 2008, Nepal-China defense co-operation has increased significantly.

Being landlocked, Nepal has suffered many trade embargoes for political reasons. The Indian hegemony has made Nepal turn to China for trade diversity, which has been wrongly interpreted by the Indian establishment as Nepal playing China card. With India too facing the same adverse situation of salami-slicing tactics by China on its Ladakh border, it has been a realization for both countries that relations had to be prevented from going down further.

Military diplomacy is a very important concept for the Nepalese Army especially in the Buffer zone of Nepal. When it comes to Nepal’s military diplomacy towards the neighborhood and beyond, it’s better to acknowledge the fact that Nepali Army has been conducting joint military drills with different countries, most importantly with the USA, India, and China for many years. Essentially, Nepal’s vibrant role in exercising military diplomacy with the great and emerging powers is immensely triggered by neutrality and non-alignment, which are also the foreign policy objectives of Nepal. Unforgettably, having almost six decades of experience in peacekeeping operations around the world, the Nepali Army has effectively enhanced the image of Nepal through the UN peacekeepers.

*Ananya Shukla is a penultimate year law student of Chanakya National Law University. She is an executive member of CNLU Pro Bono Club which provides legal support to the underprivileged and underrepresented. 

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Where Have The Soft Powers Of Western Nations Gone?

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Labeled as ‘soft power’ and measured in terms of “culture, politics and foreign policy” within a given nation; Joseph Nye introduced the concept of “soft power” in the late 1980s. Today, where have all the soft powers of Western nations gone? Which free democracy or Western nation is a shiny example? 

The term, “culture” already in the meat grinders, squeezing out into casings of ‘political correctness’ sandwiched between mesmerized and hypnotized folklores in styles of riots or metaverse

The term, “Politics” mostly about licking self-inflicted fresh wounds of mismatched promises, costumed and rehearsed leadership parades in the house of cards.

The term, “Foreign Policies” mostly about how to crush down local citizenry or how to hurt overall humankind when proclaimed as vision.

Ignoring humanity, diversity and tolerance, without civility and respect while dancing in costumes is not culture, it is circus. Ignoring citizenry while selling national policies to highest bidders is not politics, it is tyranny. Ignoring humankind, while destroying other nations is not foreign policies it is stealing, where deception rules and fakery respected. 

New definitions and new measurements are now mandatory; after all, when dumbness silences the smartness but accepted as social victory, when critical analysis becomes offensive, as it demands comprehension, when visible idiocy refuses to dialogue or discuss options to change, a global transformation must occur.

There are 36 nations having a National Election in 2022… a new world with unstoppable new economic thinking is emerging.

As a new world is awakening, the “soft power of a nation” is now melting into “people power of a nation” it is all about real value productivity, national grassroots prosperity in hands of local citizenry, where governments have already let them down. People Power is the most valuable power of any nation.

Within the earlier decades of this century alone, in places, culture, like a historic pearl, nicely saved inside an oyster, politics like a library of manifestos and institutionalized practices, and foreign policies designed to expand national and global prosperity. Is there where all the soft powers of the western nations and free democracies disappeared?

In time, masses treated as herds, populations as hungry mouths, and local public opinion only as noise. Just observe how such thinking helped Machiavellian fantasies morphed into constant live streaming of chaos, fragmented tribalism, divide, and conquer doctrine to shakedown the foundations of humankind.

Observe the proclaimed hallucinations of creating global democracy during the last century. Nations must align their priorities and declare their own nation building as top priority over exporting armed-democracies to disturb other nations.

The “soft power of a nation” now melting into “people power of a nation” but how? 

As technology advances, nations surrender to digital intellectualism and virtualization of economies, as the digitized 24x7x365 live platforms forcing bureaucracies into meritocracies. The citizenry starts to turn into trained armies of entrepreneurial out of box thinkers with the job creator mindsets. The world already have enough resources for every single person, it is the fair distribution this is jammed.

After all, nations with most digital platforms on global highways, upskilled government agencies, and talented entrepreneurial citizenry, with upskilled manufacturing and high-speed create the citizenry to cope with the future with productivity power to claim ‘people power’ as their biggest assets.

Never imagined before, now, growth hidden in digitization, robotization and commercialization, along with liberalization of borderless human talents create brand new models. Especially, when multiplied by five billion connected alpha dreamers, eager to form the largest group of informed mindshare ever assembled, such triangulations become the more powerful reservoir greater than of all the soft powers of the world combined.

How does this translate into simple applicability? What such ideas translate into national prosperity? What it takes to mobilize national entrepreneurialism on digital platforms to upskill exporters and reskill manufacturers and quadruple small medium business economy. Study more on Google. The rest is easy

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