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Russia’s nonproliferation policy and global strategic stability

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While the weight of accumulated problems and troubling instabilities in strategic sphere is significant, relations among nuclear powers are very far from being well-tempered. The situation is heavily overshadowed by disintegration of the arms control architecture, mostly due to the destructive course of the previous U.S. Administration. The New START Treaty is practically the last surviving pillar.

Active diplomacy has provided some glimpse of hope earlier in 2021. The understandings reached by the Presidents of Russia and the U.S. opened a window of opportunity for constructive interaction of two major stewards of nuclear arsenals.

First, the two leaders agreed to extend the New START. They also reconfirmed in a Joint Statement the principle that nuclear war cannot be won and should never be fought. They highlighted the priority to reduce the risk of any armed conflict between our countries. These are very important and long-awaited steps that Russia has been persistently advocating for. It is also noteworthy to mention that Russia and China have also publicly at the highest level come out in favor of the inadmissibility of nuclear war, as well as of any armed conflict involving nuclear powers. Now, we believe it is high time for the whole P5 to jointly reiterate this formula. We would see it as a significant political message both to each other and to international community.

The above-mentioned steps on a bilateral U.S.-Russia track have created a basis for further endeavors. A necessary momentum was achieved, as President Putin and President Biden at their June meeting in Geneva instructed their respective interagency teams to resume the strategic stability dialogue (SSD). The Presidents expect this dialogue to be integrated, deliberate and robust. The sides will seek to lay the groundwork for future arms control and risk reduction measures. This means that we have to address a broad spectrum of intertwined issues on strategic agenda in a holistic way, including new and emerging challenges to the security of our countries. The task is difficult and time-consuming, but this should not prevent us from making all possible effort.

We have just started. Two bilateral interagency meetings were held. They were mainly about identifying “default settings” and actual structure of the dialogue. As a first substantial step, we initiated discussions on our respective threat perceptions and security concerns. Next, it would be logical to outline possible ways to address these concerns on a mutually acceptable basis, including through arms control and risk reductions measures. In terms of defining common goals for the interaction both delegations actually agree that this process should serve to stabilize bilateral relations in the strategic area, ensure predictability, prevent arms race, build up arms control, and reduce risks of armed conflicts.

With that, it is yet to be proved by practical steps that the U.S. is ready to change its destabilizing course and pursue the above-mentioned ambitious goals through interaction on an equal basis. It remains to be seen whether the U.S. is actually ready to take into account our legitimate security interests and concerns.

We tend to believe that there is a chance for pragmatic approach to prevail and for the U.S. to engage with Russia in good faith with a view to seek balanced and mutually acceptable solutions. So far, we note the professional and business-like atmosphere at the SSD meetings. As a positive sign we also see the understanding reached on establishing two exert-level Working Groups – on principles and objectives for future arms control and on potentials and actions with strategic effect.

On our part, we have presented a vision on how to frame the SSD, and what is desirable to achieve as a result thereof. The underlying idea is to jointly develop a “new security equation” that would cover all factors affecting strategic stability. We want to embrace the entire spectrum of both nuclear and non-nuclear, offensive and defensive arms with strategic capability.

As for offensive arms, we need to pay particular attention to nuclear and high-precision conventional systems that could be used in a counterforce strike against the territory of the other side with a view to weaken or even neutralize its deterrent. Our strong conviction is that discussions should focus on delivery vehicles and associated platforms, as well as deployed warheads that pose direct operational threat.

Speaking of strategic defensive systems, I obviously refer to respective missile defence assets. The principle of inseparable interrelationship between strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms remains to be the crux of the very concept of strategic stability. It is enshrined in the New START Treaty. This is why there is no way to avoid addressing the issue of missile defence in the framework of the “new security equation”.

Another indispensable topic is “post-INF dynamics” and possible efforts to mitigate the damage inflicted upon the international security by the U.S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty. We continue to stick to our mutual verifiable moratoria initiative that is designed to ensure restraint and predictability in this area.

It is also important to develop common approaches to preventing arms race in outer space and ensuring security of space activities.

The concepts and ideas on the American side, seem to be somewhat immature at this stage due to the ongoing review process initiated by the new Administration with regard to doctrines, postures and strategies. But both delegations believe that in the meantime there is still enough space for discussions.

It is of no surprise that so far the two sides have many discords and opposite views, with only a few points of convergence. But it is just the beginning of the journey. If political will and readiness for creative diplomacy prevail, then there are no unbridgeable gaps.

The NPT remains the cornerstone and an integral element of the international security system. More than half of a century of the Treaty existence is, in our view, by itself a strong evidence of stability and effectiveness of the NPT. During this period the Treaty has demonstrated that it serves the interests of all Participating States, both nuclear and non-nuclear.

As a State Party to the NPT and one of its depositories, Russia fulfills its obligations and confirms its strong and unwavering support for the Treaty. In particular, Russia is fully committed to the goal of nuclear disarmament. It has been consistently reducing its nuclear arsenal and diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in its national defense policy. We intend to continue working in that direction, as well as to maintain a balance between mastering “the peaceful atom” and strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime. In this context Russia provides support and shares its extensive experience in the area of peaceful nuclear cooperation with other Participating States, as well as contributes to strengthening of the IAEA safeguards system, which ensure reliable verification that States fulfill their NPT obligations.

We are approaching the 10th NPT Review Conference which will be held on January 4-28, 2022, New York, in a complex setting. In recent years, the NPT regime has been undergoing serious tests and challenges. On the one hand, countries that continue to stand on extreme anti-nuclear positions are reinforcing their disarmament rhetoric without taking into account the on-ground situation in the area of international security. On the other hand, the existing system of nonproliferation and arms control treaties and agreements is being a target for dismantlement or destruction efforts. The INF Treaty has been destroyed by the U.S. The future of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on the Iranian nuclear programme remains unclear. We see again and again shamelessly open attempts to use the NPT as an instrument to exert political pressure or settle political scores with States.

This year marks the 25th anniversary since the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was opened for signature. Nevertheless, the Treaty has not yet entered into force, and we are concerned by not only the lack of any tangible progress in this process but even by the serious deterioration of the situation. The responsibility lies with those eight states on the so-called “List of 44 countries” whose ratification and/or signature are necessary for the CTBT to enter into force. The most destructive role in this context, again, plays the U.S., which has become the only state that has officially refused to ratify the CTBT.

We recall that Russia signed the CTBT in 1996 and ratified this Treaty in 2000, and we are working hard on making it truly universal both in bilateral and multilateral formats. As you may know the construction of the Russian segment of the international monitoring system nears completion. To date, 29 out of 32 stations of monitoring in the Russian segment of the system have been certified.

The situation around the previously rather non-contentious issue the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ) – becomes more complicated. The additional protocols to the NWFZ Treaties traditionally contain binding assurances that prevent the use or threat of use by nuclear states of nuclear weapons against States – Parties to particular zone (so-called negative assurances). At the same time, nuclear states, with the exception of China, make traditional reservations when signing or ratifying protocols to the Treaties. The pressure on the nuclear weapon states to renounce the above-mentioned reservations has sharply increased in recent years.

All reservations are made by Russia when signing the additional protocols in full conformity with the “letter and spirit” of the NPT and do not contradict globally shared norms of international law. They only clarify that the security assurances given to the States Parties to the NWFZ treaties will not be valid in case of any misuse of the relevant provisions of the Treaties, as well as when these provisions are misused by other nuclear powers.

Now as a consequence of the recently established AUKUS partnership we are facing a new risk of developing of nuclear infrastructure of nuclear weapon states in a State Party to the Rarotonga Treaty. This case became for us a clear confirmation of our political understanding that certain reservations to the Protocols to the Treaties on Nuclear Free Zones are fully justified.

Another major challenge to the nonproliferation regime and a key agenda point for the upcoming 10th NPT Review Conference is the issue of establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear and all other WMD and their means of delivery (WMDFZ). The resolution on the Middle East, adopted in 1995 at the NPT Review and Extension Conference, is viewed by the Arab states as part of a package solution, another element of which is the indefinite extension of the NPT.

In December 2018, the UN General Assembly, on the initiative of the Arab states, adopted a respective decision to convene such a Conference. Russia supported this decision. The 2019 conference on a WMD-free zone became a first practical step in many years towards the establishment of a such zone. We took part in this Conference as an observer. The next step was taken shortly. The second Conference on WMD free zone was held in New York from November 29 to December 3, 2021, where Russia participated as an observer at the meeting.

We note with regret that the negative position of the United States and Israel on the issue of establishment of WMDFZ remains unchanged. This will undoubtedly have a negative impact on the discussion of the topic during the NPT review process. We remember well that the WMDFZ issue became a stumbling point at the drafting process of the final document of the 2015 NPT Review Conference.

Russia has always advocated the settlement of any regional challenges to the nonproliferation regime exclusively through diplomatic means, and on the basis of the NPT. It is from this position that we consider the nuclear problem of the Korean Peninsula. We believe that it is necessary to intensify the dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang. At the same time, it is important to understand that the settlement of the nuclear issue of the Korean Peninsula is possible only through providing reliable international legal guaranties for the DPRK.

For many years Russia has been providing its unwavering support to the IAEA as the only international organization with the authority and the necessary technical capabilities to implement verification measures within the scope of the NPT. However, the situation here is also far from what we would like to see. Unfortunately, the roots of subjectivity have sneaked into the Agency. The Syrian issue at the IAEA may serve as showcase for this. Allegations against this state were raised without any clear evidence but only on the basis of statements justified by “highly likely” and “very likely”. Nothing in particular, we see that the incident with disappearance in Japan of weapons-grade plutonium has been neglected and the IAEA makes public very controversial broader conclusions for countries where the U.S. nuclear weapons are located. In this context we are seriously concerned by the ongoing comprehensive reform of the IAEA’s safeguards system. We believe it may enforce and enlarge the already existing subjectivity in the Agency’s verification mechanism. Under this complicated and highly conflicting conditions, it is important for all States to look at the international nonproliferation and arms control agenda for topics that can unite, but in no way split, the States Parties to the Treaty. This is highly relevant to the upcoming 10th NPT Review Conference. We will work hard and in cooperative manner to draft and adopt a final document of the Review Conferece. 

From our partner RIAC

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What is behind the Recalibration of Japanese Security Policy?

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image source: Lockheed Martin

On December 16th, 2022, the Japanese cabinet approved three crucial national security documents: 1) National Security Strategy, 2) National Defense Strategy, and 3) Defense Buildup Program. The documents collectively identify challenges and threats to Japan’s security and propose counteractive measures to be undertaken during the next five years, essentially marking a paradigm shift in Japan’s security policy and military posture.

The transformation: according to new policy documents, Japan would increase its defense spending to meet NATO’s standard of 2% of GDP by 2027 meanwhile spending a sum of $314 billion during the period on defense buildup. For the first time in decades, Japan would acquire long-range “counterstrike” capability to deter attacks besides pledging grand investments in developing cyber and space capabilities. To bolster counterstrike capability, Japan would acquire more F-35 aircraft capable of vertical landing and would invest in developing hypersonic weapons, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), and 6th generation fighter jets — last in collaboration with Britain and Italy.

From its humiliating defeat in World War II until the 1970s, Japan maintained a low military profile and relied on the USA’s security umbrella for its defense. During the 1970s, Soviet military buildup in the Pacific and the USA’s growing engagements elsewhere compelled Japan to increase its military spending and by the end of the Cold War, Japan has transformed itself into the “world’s foremost military powers”. The steady buildup of military capabilities continued through the unipolar era given the regional threats — especially those emanating from North Korea and to some extent China — did not subside in all respects. 

Changing Japan’s security outlook via revising Article 9 of the Japanese constitution has long been a goal of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, which considers Japan’s constitution as reminiscent of WWII defeat and subsequent occupation by the USA. Nevertheless, the memories of Japan’s militaristic past and its aftermath long haunted the Japanese public, which remained vociferously averse to any such emendation. Therefore, despite having a two-thirds majority at one time, Liberal Democratic Party under the late Shinzo Abe as prime minister fell short of introducing any changes to Japan’s constitution.

The Abe government, however, did reinterpret the constitution and initiated a makeover of Japan’s security posture during its eight years reign (2012-2020). As James Stavridis puts it, “Shinzo Abe’s real legacy is military, not economic”. In 2014, the Abe government authorized Japanese troops to act in aid of an under-attack ally. The same year, Abe relaxed the ban on the export of arms, however with the caveat that the exports would only be allowed if they “contributed to the global peace”.

In 2018, the Abe government created National Security Council, which significantly enhanced Prime Minister’s authority in security affairs. Besides making institutional and organizational changes, Abe’s era saw a steady increase in Japanese defense spending by leveraging the country’s economy, which remains third biggest in the world. Tokyo acquired cutting-edge weaponry including missile defense systems, new-generation radars capable of detecting targets at a long-range, and fifth-generation F-35 fighters, mostly from the USA.

The recent policy documents mark the culmination of Shinzo Abe’s nearly decade-long efforts and essentially purpose to transform Japanese security posture from pacifist to more assertive. Propitiously for the Liberal Democratic Party, in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, public opinion in Japan has reportedly shifted in favor of changes in security policy.

On the top of the internal predisposition to get away with the memories of WWII humiliation, the external security environment of Japan is also undergoing unprecedented changes, which made the aforementioned modifications inevitable.

China — categorized as the “greatest strategic challenge” in the Japanese National Security Strategy — now wields the world’s largest navy by the number of vessels and is speedily expanding to its military footprint in the Western Pacific. Likewise, nuclear-armed North Korea — classified as a threat in the NSS — has grown in belligerence as well as the capabilities. The communist aloof country conducted the highest number of ballistic missile tests during 2022 — one of which flew over Japan last October. Moreover, Russia has recently added Japan to the list of unfriendly countries after Tokyo joined Western sanctions against Russia. Moscow is not only increasing its military presence in the Pacific but is carrying out joint naval drills and air patrols with Beijing evoking anxieties in Tokyo. It goes without saying that the security environment for Japan has become more challenging and complicated than 1970s.

Although the USA has been trying to reorient itself towards the primary theater of Great Power rivalry i.e. Western Pacific, the transformed European security environment owing to war in Ukraine would likely inhibit the Washington’s unqualified reorientation towards the Pacific. Moreover, despite Japan under Abe smartly weathered the Trump assault against the US allies, the eccentric real estate tycoon did galvanize Japanese leadership to be prepared for another isolationist inhabiting the Oval Office. Hence the intent to share more burden in the alliance besides taking an assertive role in the regional security matters.

In essence, Japan now seeks to assume primary responsibility for its security meanwhile enjoying the shelter of the USA’s security umbrella and extended deterrence. At the same time, Japan is exploring options beyond the alliance with USA by expanding military partnerships and collaboration with other likeminded countries. The project to develop 6th generation fighter jet in collaboration with Britain and Italy, and the recent military drills with India underscore Japan’s inclination to expand its military partnerships beyond Washington.  

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The US tanks deal to Ukraine and the Sino-Russian military alliance

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Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, image by the Presidential Press and Information Office, the Kremlin, via Wikipedia

After the warnings of the Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council, “Medvedev”, of the possibility of establishing a Russian-Chinese military alliance against Washington, the most important questions and analyzes that arise in this regard revolve in their entirety around:

Will Russia implement its threats to establish that alliance?

What are the countries likely to ally with Russia to confront America?

And in the event that Russia implements its threats against the United States of America by establishing that joint military alliance with China, does this mean a weakening of American hegemony in world politics?

Then, what is the relationship of the tank deal that the United States and Germany intend to send to Ukraine with the order of that joint military alliance between China and Russia, and does China really accept a solid and joint military alliance in confronting Washington militarily?

  In order to answer these questions, we will find that there is already an existing and joint strengthening of military cooperation between the Chinese and Russian sides, through Russian President “Putin” stressing to his Chinese counterpart “Xi Jinping” the importance of geo-strategic cooperation and technical-military cooperation between the two countries in the wake of the “interaction joint maneuvers” in 2022 between the two countries, which took place in the East China Sea in December 2022, with the assertion of the commander of the Russian forces participating in the joint military exercises with China, that it comes as a response to the violent increase in the number of US forces present in the Indo-Pacific region in the American concept or the Asia-Pacific region in the Chinese and Russian concept. This means that Russia is ready to cooperate closely with Beijing, in response to the American efforts to surround China, through the establishment of American military and technological alliances to confront China, such as the American quadruple alliance with India, Japan and Australia, or through the US nuclear defense Okus alliance with Australia and Britain, or from  Through Washington’s military support for Taiwan in the face of Beijing and the increase in US arms and military equipment sales to the Taiwanese side, which arouses China’s ire.

   In recent years, China has also taken the initiative to enhance cooperation between the Chinese People’s Liberation Army and the Russian Armed Forces by conducting joint exercises and coordinated patrols in the area around Japan.  As for the Chinese army, its cooperation with the Russian army and the Russian armed forces would contribute significantly to the implementation of the military, security and defense reforms that Chinese President “Xi Jinping” seeks to achieve, which aims to transform the Chinese People’s Liberation Army into one of the largest fighting forces in the world to be comparable in strength to the US Army.

 We find that there is already existing and joint military cooperation between the Chinese and Russian parties in the field of joint military exercises, which has witnessed a clear increase in the recent period, and this cooperation in the security and defense field between China and Russia has acquired clear geopolitical connotations. In May 2022, China and Russia conducted joint sorties and air maneuvers over the Sea of ​​Japan and the East China Sea, which coincided with the summit of the leaders of the Quadruple Strategic Dialogue, known as “Quad” in Japan, which is a forum for political cooperation through which Washington seeks to turn it into a military alliance against China.  Therefore, the joint maneuvers of Moscow and Beijing came to confirm that the two countries are cooperating militarily in the face of Washington’s attempt to establish military alliances against them, on top of which is the US Aukus nuclear defense alliance with Australia and Britain in the face of China.

 Also, all the recent summits that took place between Beijing and Moscow focused, in their entirety, on Russian military cooperation with Beijing, as well as the two parties meeting to strengthen their strategic partnerships in the face of Western threats, and on their intention and desire to establish a multipolar international system, with what that means in the end. The US-dominated world order, which Washington seeks to respond to by pushing the NATO military alliance to adopt policies to besiege the Chinese and Russian countries.

 China and Russia have conducted several joint military exercises in the Chinese Shandong Peninsula, and they were mainly focused on anti-terrorism exercises, and it was agreed after that to conduct peace mission exercises annually under the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which consists of (China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan).

 Then this was followed by several joint naval exercises that took place on a permanent basis, and it was called joint seas exercises and maneuvers (or a joint Russian-Chinese naval interaction, as the Russians called it), and it was mainly concentrated in the Yellow Sea region off the Chinese Shandong Peninsula, with the participation of many  Warships from both countries, in exercises simulating joint air defense, anti-submarine warfare, and search and rescue missions.  Since then, joint seas exercises have been held annually between the Chinese and Russian sides (except for 2020), and their content is constantly changing.  Since 2013, the geographical scope of the Russian-Chinese exercises has expanded, to include areas outside the immediate periphery of China, including Europe, and in chronological order those locations were:

  (Sea of ​​Japan in 2013, East China Sea exercises in 2014, Mediterranean and Sea of ​​Japan in 2015, South China Sea in 2016, Baltic Sea and Sea of ​​Japan in 2017, South China Sea in 2018, Yellow Sea in 2019, Sea of ​​Japan in 2021)       

 China also participated in the “Russian Vostok joint military exercises” in 2018, which were held in the Eastern Military District of Russia and about 3,200 Chinese soldiers from the Chinese People’s Liberation Army participated.  The Chinese and Russian militaries also carry out coordinated and periodic military missions in the geographical and territorial area surrounding the seas and in the airspace around Japan.  Most of the joint military exercises and missions between China and Russia take place in the eastern part of the Sea of ​​Japan, through the northern Tsugaru Strait (between Honshu and Hokkaido regions), along the Pacific coast of Japan, and then west through the Osumi Strait in southern Kagoshima Prefecture.

 The main objective of conducting such military maneuvers between China and Russia, as declared by both parties, remains to unite forces against the United States of America and its allies, especially after its strained relations with both countries.  In addition to Russia’s dispute with the United States of America and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization since the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014.  Recently, US tensions with Russia have exacerbated, due to the latter’s invasion of Ukraine.

 Bearing in mind that Chinese President Xi Jinping did not respond directly to Russia’s desire for joint military cooperation, but merely referred to Beijing’s willingness to increase strategic cooperation with Russia.  At the same time, there are US assurances that Washington has not monitored any indications of Chinese support for Russia in its war against Ukraine, unlike the case with North Korea and Iran, which Washington has accused of providing Moscow with ammunition and drones.

  Here the message of the Russian President “Putin” to his Chinese counterpart “Xi Jinping” by expressing Russia’s desire for a military rapprochement between the two countries to confront what he called unprecedented Western pressure, with President Putin affirming the right of the two countries to preserve their positions, principles, and aspirations to build a just international order, in a Russian reference to the multipolar system, which will mark the end of American unipolarity, the Russian side assured its Chinese counterpart that military cooperation between the Chinese and Russian sides will support international peace and security.

 Here, Washington expresses its concern about such cooperation, which may cover any shortage of military supplies that Russia needs to continue its war against Ukraine. It was remarkable that Western officials ignored this time threatening China if it sought military cooperation with Russia.

  There is an official Chinese assertion through the official Chinese government media affiliated with the ruling Communist Party, that Beijing will continue to adhere to its objective and fair position on the war in Ukraine, which is based on the fact that the West caused this conflict by insisting on spreading NATO bases to countries located in the immediate vicinity from the Russian borders, which is in line with and confirms the Russian point of view, and contradicts its Western counterpart, which views the Russian-Ukrainian war as an assault by Moscow on a sovereign country.

 We will find that after the summit talks between President Xi Jinping and Putin (shortly before Russia started its invasion of Ukraine), both the Chinese and Russian sides oppose further NATO expansion, and stand against the formation of closed blocs and opposing camps in the Asia-Pacific region.  In this way, China signaled its support for Russia in its power struggle with NATO against Washington and the West.

 On the other side, the economic and military cooperation between China and Russia has also been increased, since the start of the Russian military operation against Ukraine in February 2022, despite the United States’ threat to Beijing at the beginning of the war, to work to help the Russian economy find alternatives that help it avoid the repercussions of Western sanctions,  However, it became clear that Beijing did not heed these American threats.

 Here, China and Russia succeeded in arousing Washington’s military wrath, through Moscow conducting several multilateral maneuvers with the participation of China and India at the end of 2022, in order to confirm that Washington’s attempts to militarily weaken the relationship between Moscow, New Delhi, and Beijing will not succeed.

 Hence, we can say that the relations between Russia and China have witnessed a remarkable growth in the military aspects in recent times, exceeding the limit of statements to the level of action and practical moves in the Indo-Pacific region or the Pacific and Indian oceans, as a joint Russian-Chinese response to confront the US alliances with its regional allies.  In that region, accusing the American side of seeking and targeting the strangulation of the two countries in the first place.  Especially after the series of security, political, economic and military alliances that the United States of America established against China and Russia in their regional region, led by the Aukus-Quad alliances against the interests of China and Russia mainly, coinciding with the escalation of the American provocations in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, with the policy of continuous American mobilization of its allies in Europe, and the imposition of several packages of sanctions against Moscow to paralyze the Russian economy after the Ukraine war.

  Therefore, the Chinese-Russian response, on the other hand, was to strengthen their network of military and diplomatic relations in light of their tense relations with the US side and its allies, through political and economic partnerships and joint and extensive military exercises, and Moscow and Beijing’s keenness to conduct regular naval maneuvers between the two sides as threatening messages directed mainly at Washington.

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SCO in an Era of New-Regionalism



The growth of SCO may have emerged as the most victorious Eurasian Organization but it still has a long way to go. Since the day of its inception, SCO has been struggling to address some of the organization’s major concerns such as maintaining cohesion among member states and addressing economic issues besides strengthening its institutional basis. However, it has expanded its regional profile and managed to portend in an era of New Regionalism.

The recent summit of the Eurasian Economic, Political, and Security Forum (on 15-16th September 2022) is of utmost importance considering the current serious political, and economic transformations happenings across the Eurasian Continent. This summit has marked new aspects of Regional Cooperation, and Economic Potential for SCO in the Changing International Environment.

The key takeaways of the recent summit: –

  • Inclusion of Iran as a permanent member of SCO
  • Turkey to pursue permanent membership of SCO
  • Gulf states to gain the status of SCO Dialogue Partner

Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei said, “One of our priorities today in foreign policy is preferring East to West, neighbors to remote countries”. As the world’s biggest regional organization, SCO may use its institutional capacity and political power to counter economic sanctions and assist with financial instability in countries like Iran. Also, Iran has the potential to be a ‘Hub Country’ playing a key role in East-West and North-South transportation routes. The inclusion of Iran as a permanent member of the SCO demonstrates the rise of anti-Western narratives. Iran and Russia have expanded their connections in recent decades, including non-energy links, defense collaboration, and weapons sales. Therefore, Iran’s willingness to pursue better ties with China and Russia (the SCO’s two major countries) opens up a new wave of ‘Multi-literalism’ in the Eurasian Region. The energy crisis caused by the Ukraine war can be met by Iran (which has the world’s fourth biggest oil and natural gas reserves) as Iran’s commerce with SCO member states has risen to $37 billion by 2021. Iran’s inclusion in SCO has strengthened China’s policy of “Asia people to uphold Asian security” in changing geopolitical climate. It will enhance International North-South Transport Corridor- a shifting gear in Eurasian connectivity. Besides these positive aspects, there are other prospects for Iran’s inclusion in SCO. Above all,  SCO members have to deal strictly with three evils “Terrorism, Extremism, and Separatism” where Iran has been blamed for providing nuclear support for terrorism, and cross-border violence support by the West. Hence, Iran may face staunch opposition from the west to perform dexterously in the region. Although SCO has accomplished much in terms of multilateral growth, it does not appear to be capable of taking strong moves in the face of US-Iran antagonism, given the organization’s structure, powers, and aims. Still, SCO does accrue economic and geopolitical benefits for Iran, allowing it to maintain its position in the Middle East.

Turkey’s president Tayyip Erdogan said, “Our relations with these countries will be moved to a much better position with this step. Of course [membership], that’s the target”.

Turkey, a NATO member since 1952, indicates a distant possibility of becoming a permanent SCO member. However, its relations with the United States will determine its standing in the SCO. The recent SCO summit has shown Turkey’s bid to get permanent membership of SCO. which might be because Turkey has grown closer to Moscow, both politically and commercially, in recent years, including acquiring an S-400 defense system. Ankara has also become economically dependent on Moscow to avoid a balance-of-payments catastrophe before the 2023 elections. However, in the SCO, Turkey will serve as an “Energy Hub” connecting Caspian and Central Asian producers with European customers.

China, SCO major power, is open to Turkey’s accession besides Turkey’s standing on the Uyghur issue (that might strain the future of China-Turkey relations). On the Syrian upheaval, clashes between Turkey and two SCO leading states Russia and China are possible. Turkey opposes Assad’s dictatorship (and even supports humanitarian action), whilst Russia and China encourage non-interference. Membership in the SCO may enhance Islamist imperatives in Turkish internal politics, affecting its path to democracy. Turkey in SCO will have an influence on India’s, Pakistan’s, and Iran’s policies in Central Asia. Furthermore, Turkey has the second biggest military force among NATO countries, after the United States, with around 445,000 troops. Turkey is home to five NATO headquarters in Izmir, as well as a US military-led airport. It also acts as an American security policy in the Middle East and the Balkans due to its key geographical position. Consequently, Turkey’s departure does not appear to be a possibility so far. In “The Clash of Civilizations, and the Remaking of the World Order,” Samuel Huntington described Turkey as a “torn country” because “its leaders typically wish to pursue a bandwagon strategy and to make their country a member of the West, but the country’s history, culture, and traditions are non-western.” All of this would impede the SCO’s ability to achieve its fundamental aims, which have already been hampered by tensions among SCO member nations

For Gulf nations, the SCO has increased its need considering China as the global economic powerhouse, Russia as the world’s second-biggest producer of natural gas, and Central Asian states with virtually unexplored oil and natural gas potential. Gulf States analyst, Ali Ahmad said “All of the countries involved do see china as a rising power and country that is potentially going to have a rising power in the region, and elsewhere” The SCO’s recent success in the Arab world is due to China’s expanding economic impact in the area. According to the United Nations COMTRADE database on international commerce, China’s exports to Saudi Arabia are over US$30.32 billion. The safe access to its essential energy resources and marine trade routes, in addition to major seaports like Dubai, through which 60% of its traffic heading for Europe and East Africa flows, is a crucial driver of China’s interest in the Gulf.

Also, US policy toward Gulf states, particularly after 9/11, has made these countries concerned for their future.  The many Gulf States now wish to price some oil contracts in non-dollar-dominant countries. Where SCO, states reiterated their commitment to promoting national currencies in bilateral commerce in a recent summit, as China and Russia have boosted trading in rubles and renminbi since 2014. There has been a GCC-China free trade deal; if this agreement comes to fruition, it will undoubtedly benefit tarns-regional connectivity. Hence, Gulf states in SCO will catalyze Eurasian connectivity.

However, Institutional, infrastructural, and trade issues remain unresolved for SCO. Another critical question is SCO’s expansion: should it be a regional or global organization? Is it to be a global future, as Russia wants, or a regional future, as China desires? Concrete policies and closer coordination are required, depending on the extent to which domestic and member state impacts converge, as well as their significance in addressing future security and economic concerns for the furtherance of SCO.

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For the past few years, Egypt-China bilateral trade has witnessed a big leap where Egypt has opened up its markets...

Economy12 hours ago

Pakistan’s elite and the current economic crisis

Former Pakistan Finance Minister Miftah Ismail in a media interview made some very interesting points. While Ismail lashed out at...

Science & Technology14 hours ago

New discoveries and scientific advances from around the world

In July 2022 the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) announced the first batch of colour photos taken by the...