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Chinese and Gulf states rapprochement with Syria

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We find that throughout the years of the Syrian war, there were a number of indications of (secret cooperation) between some Arab governments in secret with the regime of President Bashar al-Assad, and accusations were also leveled indicating the involvement of other governments in supporting and arming Syrian opposition groups against the Syrian regime), especially  the Gulf countries that sought to revenge against the regime of President “Bashar Al-Assad” for Syria’s close alliance with Iran, which is the sworn enemy of countries in the Gulf region. Here we can analyze and understand the following:

The desire of the Gulf countries and the UAE to open prospects for trade with Syria, and most importantly (reducing Syria’s strategic dependence on Iran) is the most important reason for their recent attempt to rapprochement with Damascus.

The UAE rapprochement with Syria comes as part of a Gulf strategy called (the almost certain regional rehabilitation of Bashar Al-Assad). Here, we find that “the speed of the train of Arab and Gulf normalization, mainly with Syria, has increased significantly”, and what is deeper than that can be analyzed by confirming that “a number of Arab governments have not completely severed their ties with Damascus since the beginning of the events in Syria”.

The “state of Jordan” is currently considered one of the most prominent of those Arab countries that exert pressures for normalization with the capital “Damascus” as Jordan’s neighbor in terms of its northern borders, where recent indications are that (the Kingdom of Jordan is on the verge of restoring full relations with the Syrian regime). In fact, it is possible to analyze the reasons for the start of the Jordanian capital, “Amman”, as a close ally of the United States of America, to open the way for Washington’s other allies in the Gulf region to rapprochement with Syria, in order to (neutralize the Syrian regime and exert subsequent pressure on the Iranian side to accept the American conditions in the Iranian nuclear file).

On the other hand, (Lebanon needs the Syrian energy networks to help alleviate the fuel crisis that has paralyzed Beirut). We can as well identify (Syria’s situation in the strategy of supplying Lebanon with fuel as a result of the current Lebanese fuel crisis) has an important analytical aspect, especially after (Jordan’s approval on October 6, 2021, to send the surplus of Jordan’s electric power to Lebanon through the Syrian network, which indicates the American flexibility regarding  relating to the relations imposed on Damascus).

However, there are fears from a number of Lebanese forces and currents of allowing an increase in Iranian and Syrian influence in Lebanon, especially with (a previous public condemnation of Hezbollah for bringing Iranian fuel into Lebanon through Syria, describing it as a “violation of the country’s sovereignty”).  Likewise, the public positions of the Lebanese government not to visit or normalize relations with Syria without the blessing of the international community, stressing Lebanon’s desire to distance itself from conflicts in the region.

We find here (the support of the Lebanese Shiite movements in Lebanon for President Bashar Al-Assad). In particular, the “Iran-backed Hezbollah movement is the main supporter of rapprochement with Syria”, especially with (the role of Hezbollah militias in Lebanon, along with the Russian air force, in changing the course of the civil war in favor of Bashar Al-Assad inside Syria). The political bureau of the “Amal Movement in Lebanon”, the other main Shiite party in Lebanon, renewed its calls for strengthening relations with Syria in an official statement on October 4, 2021. On the other hand, there are other Lebanese political forces that have remained staunchly opposed to what they see as Syrian and Iranian interference in their country’s affairs.

Here, we find that this new shift in the UAE’s Gulf position for rapprochement with Syria is due to the visit of the Jordanian monarch (King Abdullah) to the United States of America in July 2021.  He will remain in office, and then the international community will have to deal with him one way or another.

From my analytical point of view, according to objective indicators, (King Abdullah) has obtained permission from the United States of America to resume Jordan’s commercial ties and relations with Syria, so that Jordan is excluded from the sanctions regime that targets any country that has commercial transactions with Damascus, which is known as (Caesar’s Law). A series of talks between Syrian and Jordanian officials in September 2021 led to the reopening of the (Jaber-Naseeb border crossing), and also opened the door to negotiations on October 3, 2021, related to trade, energy and agriculture, moving from mere (economic ties to fully resuming political relations between Jordan and Syria). This is in line with the desire of the capital, Amman, to (return Damascus to the Arab League before the next Arab summit, which may be held in 2022).

Here, too, the indicators point to the agreement (Jordan and Egypt with Syria) to start (rehabilitating and operating the Arab Gas Pipeline to export Egyptian gas to Lebanon via Jordan and Syria, and then to Europe via Turkey), which is mainly for the benefit of reviving the Egyptian economy, and thus encouraging Egypt to rapprochement with Damascus for economic interests.  As well as the meeting of the Egyptian Foreign Minister “Sameh Shoukry”, with his Syrian counterpart “Faisal Miqdad”, in September 2021, during his participation in the meetings of the United Nations General Assembly, and his declaration after that of his “support for the return of Syria as an active party in the Arab framework”. Also, the geopolitical considerations for the Egyptian side, driven by the network of economic interests, and Egypt’s desire to (play a role in profitable deals for the reconstruction of Syria may be an important factor for Egypt to rapprochement with Damascus).

As scholar, I have reached an important analysis here, which can be monitored through the desire of a number of Arab countries to (maintain the government of “Bashar Al-Assad as another military force in opposition to the Arab revolutions or what is known as the revolutions of the Arab Spring) may also stand behind the efforts of a number of Arab countries to normalize with the side  Syrian.

As for Iraq, the “Iraqi side has openly opposed the isolation of Syria”, and has repeatedly declared that it supports its return to the Arab League.  Iraq did not sever its ties with Syria, and in 2011 Iraq abstained from voting on a decision to expel it from the university, and Iraq kept its embassy in Damascus throughout the war. We find as well that (the Iraqi government coordinated with President Bashar al-Assad in cross-border operations against the Islamic State, or what is known as ISIS).  There are still several (Iraqi militias backed by Iran on the Syrian-Iraqi border), and some are also inside Syrian territory (in the context of efforts led by Iran to put pressure on the American forces there, to support Assad and to keep transport corridors open).

The benefits of the Syrian-Emirati rapprochement come through what the (UAE Ministry of Economy) announced that “it has agreed to strengthen economic cooperation and explore new horizons with Syria”. A few weeks after the meeting between the Emirates ministers and his Syrian counterpart in Dubai to discuss about the issue of the (reconstruction of Syria), Emirates officials stated that they hoped the situation in Syria would return “to what it was before the crisis” that erupted in 2011.

In March 2021, both the UAE and Saudi Arabia demanded the “return of Syria to the Arab fold”.  Coordination is currently underway on new horizons for Emirates and Gulf cooperation with Syria, especially in vital sectors, in order to “enhance investment partnerships”.

The Saudi indication also came that its geopolitical interests in Syria are still strong, with the statement of Crown Prince “Mohammed bin Salman” in March 2018, that:

“President Bashar Al-Assad will remain in his place, but “Bashar Al-Assad’s interests” will not be to allow the Iranians to stay to play a role, although the restoration of all diplomatic relations remains a remote possibility, the Syrian-Saudi relations are witnessing a warmth”

We find the most prominent indicators of Saudi rapprochement with Syria, representing in (the visit of the Syrian Minister of Tourism to Saudi Arabia in May 2021, which is the first visit of a Syrian government official to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia since 2011).  At about the same time, the director of Saudi intelligence met his Syrian counterpart in Damascus.

However, one of the challenges facing Riyadh is (the strong opposition within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the pro-Iranian Baathist regime of Damascus). We find the position of the Saudi media strongly opposing the Assad regime in Syria, with the Saudi criticism directed against the Syrian government’s actions against the Sunni majority. Knowing that this Saudi orientation was reciprocated with the Syrian regime, with previous accusations from the official Syrian media outlets loyal to the regime of President “Bashar Al-Assad” for criticizing what they described as “an active Saudi and Qatari role in provoking sectarian strife and fueling the civil war in Syria”.

But on the other hand, the Syrian-Arab consensus on a number of issues by following the (pragmatic method) in solving political and economic issues is enough to guarantee its return to the Arab League, including consensus with President “Bashar Al-Assad” on a number of issues, foremost of which are: (Syria’s steps to form a stable government agreed upon by various political forces, including the political opposition, attempts to return Syrian refugees from abroad, the urgent need for Syrian fuel for the Lebanese, and the latter restricting Iranian influence in Syria and curtailing “Bashar Al-Assad’s relations with Tehran).

    Here, in my personal analytical viewpoint and analysis of the reality, all of the above points have become important indicators to push officials in a number of Arab countries to try to (reach political understandings with their Syrian counterparts and be more openly with the dialogue).

Associate Professor of Political Science, Faculty of Politics and Economics / Beni Suef University- Egypt. An Expert in Chinese Politics, Sino-Israeli relationships, and Asian affairs- Visiting Senior Researcher at the Centre for Middle Eastern Studies (CMES)/ Lund University, Sweden- Director of the South and East Asia Studies Unit

Middle East

The Qatar World Cup: Soccer upsets, politics, and sensitive situations

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Barely out of the starting blocks, the Qatar World Cup has already produced a fair share of upsets as well as politically and personally sensitive situations and incidents.

Qatar’s 2:0 loss to Ecuador in the tournament’s opening match will have reinforced critics’ conviction that the Gulf state should never have been awarded World Cup hosting rights, among other things, because of its alleged lack of a soccer legacy.

Leaving aside the merits of the allegation and Qatari disappointment, the jury remains out on what Qatar’s return on its massive investment in organising the World Cup will be regarding reputational capital.

For Qatar, the ultimate evaluation of the return will largely depend on how it manages the tournament and potential flare- and hick-ups as dissidents try to turn Iranian matches into venues of protest, activists seek to capitalise on the opportunity to campaign for their cause, and fans refuse to play to Qatari soft power objectives, let alone possible incidents of intoxication, rowdiness, and LGBT-related issues.

So far, the picture constitutes a mixed bag.

Addressing Iranian concerns, Qatar refused to accredit for the World Cup, Iran International, a Saudi-backed, London-based satellite television broadcaster, that the Islamic republic accuses of fomenting months-long anti-government protests that security forces have been unable to squash.

Similarly, to prevent matches from turning into platforms for protest, Qatar stopped Iranian fans from bringing Iran’s pre-revolutionary flag into the country’s first World Cup match against England.

The flag, dating from the time of the shah, toppled in the 1979 Islamic revolution, is viewed as a symbol of protest against Iran’s theocratic government.

That didn’t halt fans holding up signs in the stadium demanding freedom in Iran and pictures of demonstrators killed by security forces.

However, there was little Qatar could do when the Iranian national team refused to sing the country’s national anthem at the beginning of the game.

“I would like to express my condolences to all bereaved families in Iran. They should know that we are with them. And we support them. And we sympathize with them regarding the conditions,” the team’s captain, Ehsan Hajsafi, told journalists hours before the match.

While Qatar’s state-run domestic broadcaster avoided showing female supporters with their hair uncovered in the stadium, Iranian state television interrupted its live broadcast as the Iranian and Ecuadorian anthems were played.

For weeks, footballers have signalled support for the protesters by not celebrating Iranian League goals, wearing black wristbands, and expressing support for the Iranian people without mentioning the protests to evade government retaliation.

Nevertheless, current and former players have been questioned by authorities, detained, or charged with “acting against national security.”

The refusal to sing the national anthem and the team’s embarrassing 6:2 loss to England fed the Iranian government’s worst fear that the World Cup would turn out to be a global platform for dissent rather than a moment of unifying national celebration.

The national team was emboldened by their manager, Carlos Queiroz, who, breaking with FIFA’s fictional separation of politics and sport, insisted that “players are free to protest as they would if they were from any other country as long as it conforms with the World Cup regulations and is in the spirit of the game.”

Overall, Iran has lost in more ways than just on the pitch.

At the start of the year Iran, which sits across the Gulf, had hoped to attract World Cup tourists like the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Oman, and proposed the crafting of a joint tourism plan with Qatar. Tehran even agreed to forgo the visa requirement for World Cup visitors.

That hope was dashed by the anti-government protests, the failure to revive the 2015 international agreement that curbed Iran’s nuclear program, and Iran’s inability to complete necessary infrastructure on its Kish Island.

The match against England could prove to have been a cakewalk compared to potential friction when Iran meets the United States on the Qatari pitch on November 29 in what is likely to be one of, if not the most politically charged match of the World Cup.

Similarly, Arab fans, reflecting sentiments among some Qataris, made clear that the World Cup would not be a bridge-building event, at least not when it came to relations with Israel and Israelis.

Arabs largely refused to be interviewed by Israeli media. Footage circulating online showed two Saudi fans, a Qatari shopper, and three Lebanese fans walking away from Israeli reporters in a demonstration of the limitations of soccer as a vehicle to build bridges. In another incident, Palestinians chanted “go home” when approached by Israeli reporters.

Qatari media published some videos of sharp encounters between Arab fans, Qatari nationals, and visiting Israelis with the caption: “No to normalization.”

“Sure, most countries in the Arab world are heading towards normalisation – but that’s because most of them don’t have rulers who listen to their people,” said Saudi football fan and oil worker Khaled al-Omri, who travelled to Qatar to support the kingdom’s national team.

The fans’ refusal to engage with Israeli reporters dashed hopes that ten Israeli charter flights ferrying up to 20,000 fans from the Jewish state to the World Cup, the first ever between Tel Aviv and Doha, would herald a new milestone in the normalisation of Arab-Israeli relations following the 2020 establishment of diplomatic relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan.

Qatar, like Saudi Arabia, has made the conversion of informal ties into formal relations conditional on a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Under FIFA rules, Qatar was obliged to grant entry to fans irrespective of whether the Gulf state recognizes the country issuing a supporter’s passport.

In line with the rules, authorities allowed Israeli channels to broadcast from Doha, but unlike other major foreign networks did not provide them with a formal studio.

Protest was not the preserve of Iranians and pro-Palestinian Arabs. Prominent Qataris made statement of their own by wearing a pro-Palestinian armband at the Germany-Japan match after being told that German Interior Minister Nancy Faeser would sport a One Love pro-LGBGT band.

Ironically, Ms. Faeser was sitting in the stadium’s VIP section next to FIFA president Gianni Infantino, who had just banned players from wearing the One Love band on the pitch in support of LGBT rights.

In response, Germany’s players covered their mouths for the team photo before their opener against Japan.

Mr. Infantino, unmoved by Ms. Faeser’s gesture, apparently saw no contradiction between his ban and FIFA’s opening days later of disciplinary proceedings against Ecuador over homophobic chanting by their fans in the match against Qatar.

Meanwhile, the Qataris had likely forgotten their loss in the euphoria sparked by Saudi Arabia’s 2:1 defeat of favourite Argentina 2:1 the first of two initial World Cup upsets.

“Looking forward to the Japan-Saudi final,” quipped Israeli journalist Anshel Pfeffer after Japan, in a second soccer upset, beat Germany 2:1.

The New York Times noted in a tweet that the Saudi upset put Argentinian player Lionel Messi, widely viewed as one of soccer history’s best players, in “a strange position” given his agreement to promote Saudi tourism and potentially the kingdom’s joint bid together with Egypt and Greece for the hosting of the 2030 World Cup.

Mr. Messi would potentially be campaigning against his home country, with Argentina planning a rival joint bid with Uruguay, Paraguay, and Chile. So far, Spain, Portugal, and Ukraine are the only ones to announce their joint interest officially.

The tweet and a headline in The Athletic, a sports publication that was recently acquired by the Times that accused Mr. Messi of selling himself to the devil, sparked a furious tweet by Mohammed Alyahya, former editor-in-chief of Al Arabiya English.

Staggering racism. It implies Arabs are incompetent & can’t win. It accuses a Latino world hero of corruption. Messi is the greatest footballer today, wealthy & only concerned about legacy. But according to the NYT, he’s a venal traitor in a shady deal with rich Arabs. Shameful,” Mr. Alyahya said.

Contrasting the Saudi victory with the Iranian defeat, author Lee Smith opined:

“The people of the Middle East recognize a strong horse when they see one: That horse is clearly not Iran. By attempting to reenter the Iran deal, fill the regime’s war chests with billions of dollars, and legitimize its nuclear weapons program, the Biden administration is doing something even worse than backing sectarian tyrants who spread death and destruction. It’s backing losers.”

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Middle East

Further Setbacks over Fragile Iran Nuclear Negotiations Following Death of Mahsa Amini

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image source: Tehran Times

Authors: T-Fai Yeung and K. H. Wong*

On September 13, 2022, Mahsa Amini, a 22-year-old Iranian woman, was arrested by the religious morality police of Iran’s government in Tehran, the capital of Iran, for allegedly wearing a hijab that did not meet the standards established by the Iranian authoritarian regime. She died in hospital three days later. Once her death became known, there was public outrage because numerous Iranian people believed that her death was attributed to police brutality. More fundamentally, the Iranians have held numerous grievances due to the long-term oppression of the country’s government. Amini’s death has given rise to large-scale demonstrations in Iran.

Unsurprisingly, the Iranian regime has attempted to suppress the protests, while also accusing the United States and Israel of provoking unrest, with the aim of undermining Iran’s stability. Nonetheless, the official tough stance has yet to crackdown on the so-called “hijab protest”. Analyses suggest that this anti-government protest is different from previous protests in Iran, because it is large-scale and the participants are determined to push for political reform. Given that the Iranian government has failed to curb this civil unrest, some foreign media have suggested a potential government collapse.

However, similar speculations have appeared since then-US President Trump re-imposed US sanctions on Iran. However, it is difficult to judge how far the Iranian regime is from collapsing at this time. It is relatively safe to claim that the hijab protests will hinder negotiations between the West and Iran for the resumption of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), otherwise known as the Iran nuclear deal.

Tensions between the West and Iran Have Been Unavoidable

In retrospect, the US, UK, and EU had hoped that the normalization of trade with Iran would be lucrative enough to end the development of the country’s nuclear weapons. However, with Trump at the helm, he unilaterally withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal and reactivated sanctions against the country on the grounds that the relevant agreement was full of loopholes, leaving the possibility of Iran developing its nuclear weapons secretly. Iran has reacted by increasing the production of enriched uranium in a high-profile manner, claiming that this breach of the agreement by the US is the main cause for its action.

It is certainly true that Joe Biden, who defeated Trump in the 2020 US presidential election and assumed office in 2021, has repeatedly shown his desire to re-negotiate with Iran regarding the nuclear deal. However, as some emphasize that Iran is getting closer to possessing nuclear weapons, it would be negligent for the West to re-join the agreement without adding any additional clause. Worse still, Iran’s rigged presidential election last year allowed Ebrahim Raisi (aka the “Butcher of Tehran”) to become president. This sent a signal to the West that the Iranian government has little intention to make compromise. As expected, subsequent negotiations have slowly continued.

It is perhaps true that there is no eternal enemy in international politics; but even if there are common interests, it does not mean that it will help much in narrowing the divergences between two sides. Soon after the West’s sanctions against Russia following its invasion of Ukraine, the US allegedly wanted to reduce sanctions on Iran to ease the global energy crisis. However, the actual progress of this strategy was not as smooth as rumored. The nationwide hijab protests in Iran have made it even more difficult for the West to ignore Iran’s human rights abuses.

Notably, Biden’s visit to Saudi Arabia in July this year was severely criticized because he had violated his promise of punishing Saudi for its killing of dissident journalist Khashoggi. If Biden made a tolerant gesture towards the Iran authoritarian regime amid the large-scale hijab protests, further criticism of the US president would be a certainty.

Additionally, Iran has recently been blamed for sending attack drones to support Russia’s war in Ukraine. Consequently, the West have been left with little choice but to maintain or even expand sanctions on Iran. Although the EU has not formally echoed the US sanctions against Iran, many European companies have already cut ties with Iran over concerns that they will be sanctioned for maintaining trade relations with Iran. It is therefore likely that relations between the West and Iran will further deteriorate, regardless of the EU’s position on sanctions against Iran.

The West Now Pay the Price for Downplaying Energy Independence in the Past

Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Iran are three of the world’s major energy exporters, but now the West are going through an energy crisis. Furthermore, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries and Russia announced earlier that they would cut oil production to protect their own interests. This move may further harm the West’s efforts to mitigate soaring oil prices. Arguably, the energy crisis in the West is the result of overconfidence in global trade liberalization and failure to address the importance of energy independence. Once the major authoritarian energy exporting countries reduce their supply of energy, the hasty response of the West will be like “digging a well when they are thirsty”. The Economist recently warned that Europe’s energy crisis is unlikely to end after this winter, because it is difficult to find alternative sources of energy in the short term.

The West must face its energy and economic crisis; this issue is why many conservatives have claimed that strongman rule has the potential to replace democratic politics. Unfortunately, this type of false dichotomy often misleads many people, and has the potential to push the world to an even more dangerous level.

*K. H. Wong has been a researcher at the Global Studies Institute Hong Kong since March 30, 2022. His commentary articles have appeared in the Hong Kong Economic Journal, Linhe Zaobao (Singapore) and Ming Pao Daily News.

An earlier Chinese version of this article appeared in print on October 18, 2022 in Section B, Page 10 of Ming Pao Daily News. 

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Middle East

What Can Baku Expect from Netanyahu’s Return to Power?

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Whenever Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was in power, Azerbaijani-Israeli relations always moved in the right direction.  He realised  that Azerbaijan was very strategic for the free world, as a Caspian Sea nation rich in oil that borders the Islamic Republic of Iran and Russia.  Indeed, 40% of Israel’s oil originates in Baku, the capital city of a nation that serves as Israel’s  shield against Iran, a country whose leadership butchers and tortures its own people while routinely chanting “death to America” and “death to Israel.”

Relations between Azerbaijan and its southern neighbor Iran have worsened at a time when Netanyahu, who was chosen for his harsh attitude towards Iran, is coming to power for the third time.  One of the most important results of the Second Karabakh War was that the masks were torn off. Of course, the number one friend and ally of Azerbaijan is Turkey. At the same time, during the war, the Azerbaijani state and people witnessed that Israel was a loyal friend and partner of Azerbaijan. Israel did not give the modern weapons it gave to Azerbaijan to another state. Indeed, these are the best examples of friendship and strategic partnership.

The Israeli-Azerbaijani friendship is based on such solid foundations that it has a pace of development regardless of who is in power in Israel. Nevertheless, in any case, one should not forget that Azerbaijani-Israeli relations have been developing especially vigorously during the time when Netanyahu was the prime minister.  Higher results were achieved in the issues of energy and military security, as well as military-technical cooperation. The victory of Netanyahu’s party in the elections can be assessed as a happy event for Azerbaijan and Azerbaijan-Israel relations will most likely rise to a new level, as there are serious grounds for this today. In the meantime, it can be stated that the foundation of Azerbaijan-Israel relations was mainly laid by Netanyahu, notwithstanding the relations between Israel and Azerbaijan have been positive during all Israeli governments.

Cooperation in the security and military fields has been at a high level, especially after the establishment of an Azerbaijani Tourism and Trade Office in Tel Aviv, with a new Azerbaijani Embassy soon to be opened. One cannot expect anything will change here. However, Netanyahu can come to an agreement with some countries around Iran and create a coalition against this state. And due to Iran’s behavior and foreign policy, the surrounding countries except Armenia have become unfriendly countries to the mullah  regime. For Israel now, an alliance with the countries around Iran is more important.  The US has not fully fulfilled Israel’s hopes in the case of Iran. There is an objective reason for this. Today’s US administration still hopes that it will be able to sign a nuclear agreement with Iran.  One can believe that if there is any military operation against Iran, it will affect Azerbaijan as well. Furthermore, now there exists a grounded euphoria in Azerbaijan that Iran will be divided and a whole Azerbaijan will be created.    

Considering this, the government of Israel this time must make Azerbaijan even closer to us and to do everything to make peace in this vital region, as well as to help them stop the extremism within their borders.   The recent arrests of Iranian spies in Azerbaijan are an important step that helps to weaken the Iranian axis in our region.   The establishment of an Azerbaijani Embassy in the State of Israel will be the next step, as it will show Tehran that their fear-mongering and hatred does not intimidate neither Jerusalem nor Baku.   United, Azerbaijan and Israel will stand together in union, working to halt Iran’s hegemony in the region under the alliance of the new Netanyahu-led government and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev.

I think Israel has an interest to make the Turkic areas and wherever they speak Turkic languages to be in an alliance with us. Creating an independent South Azerbaijan is of critical importance, as it will help to tear apart the mullah’s regime and bring peace and prosperity to our region. Another step that Netanyahu should take is to continue to improve the relationship with Turkey. During the last few months, Turkey has moved back in the right relationship with Israel.  Israel should use this in order to build an alliance against Iran among Turkic countries, who form a strong block in union against Tehran.       

On top of that, I think that Israel must help Azerbaijan to develop Karabakh and to give them different technologies to rebuild the area.  Israeli technology can help to make Karabakh arable and ripe for agriculture again, which will help to address the global grain crisis that was caused by the war in Ukraine.   Just as Azerbaijani oil is the solution to the oil crisis caused by the war with Ukraine, Azerbaijani grain can also be used to fight against the rapid inflation in grain prices caused by the shortages in such a basic staple of food, which is causing hunger among the poorer elements in many developing countries.

According to the World Food Program, “The world is facing a food crisis of unprecedented proportions, the largest in modern history. Millions are at risk of worsening hunger unless action is taken now to respond at scale to the drivers of this crisis: conflict, climate shocks and the threat of global recession. The interplay of these drivers is making life harder each day for the world’s most vulnerable and reversing recent development gains.  As many as 828 million people go to bed hungry every night. The number of those facing acute food insecurity has soared – from 135 million to 345 million – since 2019. A total of 49 million people in 49 countries are teetering on the edge of famine.”

Karabakh has the potential to produce enough grain to address this global crisis.   I know for I was there on two separate occasions.   But in order for that to be possible, Israel must help them to find a solution to the landmine problem, which has left large areas of Karabakh uninhabitable for close to thirty years.   But Israeli robots can easily detect and eliminate these mines even in the absence of landmine maps, which will enable the area to be used for agriculture on a massive scale, especially if used in unison with Israeli agricultural technologies that can help the soil be cleaned up and replenished while overall reducing pollution in the area.  Already, an Israeli-Italian dairy farm is operating in Karabakh and Israel should do more to help improve the agricultural outputs in the region.  

Israel must help Azerbaijan with everything for combatting Iran, the enemy of all the free world which is willing to destroy Azerbaijan just as much as it wishes to destroy us.  This is because Iran sees a majority Shia Muslim country that champions multiculturalism, religious tolerance and women’s rights as a threat to its very existence in the region.  We must give the Azerbaijanis what is necessary in cyber security, satellite, etc. and give them all of the support, so that Tehran and its proxies can be defeated once and for all.    

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