The right approach would probably be to create a special interagency coordinator under a senior official reporting directly to the head of state. It is vitally important that whoever heads the office is well respected by international partners: a worthy counterpart to the likes of John Kerry of the United States.
The energy crunch in Europe; the knee-jerk accusations of Russia having engineered it to win early approval of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline; and the Kremlin’s riposte, pointing to the EU’s own policy failures, dominate the news. Yet one really important development remains underreported. Moscow’s official view of climate change and energy policy has just undergone a major reversal. Weeks before the COP-26 climate summit in Glasgow, Russia’s Economic Development Ministry has come up with a national goal of achieving carbon neutrality by 2060.
This is not a covert attempt by the in-system liberals to begin aligning Russia’s climate policy with the policies of the world’s major powers. Rather, it is the consummation of a sea change that has been brewing for the past couple of years in the Kremlin’s thinking. President Vladimir Putin announced the carbon neutrality goal in remarks at the recent Russian Energy Week in Moscow. Climate change denial is over. Debate about what exactly has caused it is considered politically irrelevant. What matters are the existing realities and the current trends, which amount to all the world’s major economies moving away from dependence on fossil fuels. As a result, the new nexus of efforts to deal with climate change, the energy transition those efforts center on, and the geopolitical impact of that transition are moving right to the top of the Russian foreign policy agenda.
Of course, this is not all or even mostly foreign policy. Energy transition, which is the core issue, will affect not just the oil and gas sector, which in 2020 accounted for 15 percent of Russia’s GDP, but the country’s entire economy and finances, its political economy, and the relative political influence of various vested interests. Given the coincidence of energy transition and the inevitable transfer of political power, this combination is likely to become one of the most important processes shaping Russia’s future for years and decades to come.
Still, the foreign policy aspect of the change is non-negligible. The carbon neutrality pledges already announced by Russia’s main economic partners—the European Union and China; the United States, Japan and others—as well as the UN climate conference in Glasgow next month are all compelling Moscow to come up with a strategy of its own, and soon. Such a strategy will aim to preserve the country’s position as an energy power, but on a much more diverse foundation.
Integrating climate science, energy issues, and geopolitical objectives to produce and pursue an effective strategy could be compared to the task faced by the Soviet Union in the late 1960s–1980s. Back then, Moscow had to come up with a practical way to link nuclear science and weapons development, military force posture and strategy, the capabilities of the defense industry, and wider foreign policy goals. The result was transiting from the sterile rhetoric of universal disarmament to a diplomacy of strategic arms control that eventually produced strategic stability between the Soviet Union and the United States.
What is needed today is for various parts of the Russian government to pool their resources. The offices of the president’s special representative for climate issues and the special representative for liaison with international organizations on reaching sustainable development goals are evidently too small to take control. The ministries of foreign affairs, economic development, and finance; the Russian Academy of Sciences; and the Security Council all have an interest and possess valuable expertise on the issues, but none of them can actually be charged with taking the lead on their own.
The right approach would probably be to create a special unit under a senior official reporting directly to the head of state. That unit would become an interagency coordinator among the many ministries that have interest and expertise on the relevant issues. Also, to borrow a page from the history books on Soviet arms control, a permanent mechanism could be organized of principals and deputies from various parts of the government to discuss and prepare decisions on these matters. This would be an analogue of the Big Five on strategic arms negotiations (the Party Central Committee, the Defense Ministry, the KGB, the Military Industrial Commission of the Council of Ministers, and the Foreign Affairs Ministry). It is vitally important that whoever heads the office has direct access to the president and is well respected by international partners. He or she needs to be a worthy counterpart to the likes of John Kerry of the United States.
The current hike in gas prices in Europe has motivated a number of people in Russia to sneer at green and alternative energy projects and reassert the continuing primacy of traditional sources of energy. Life is never linear, of course. However, even if future economic development does not completely close the books on fossil fuels (and it probably won’t, at least for a long time), the balance of energy consumption by some of the key buyers of Russian oil and gas will most likely change fast.
The speed of change means that temporizing now would undermine Russia’s chances of limiting the damage from the reduction of the world’s demand for its oil and gas. It would also prevent it from participating in developing new global norms and from taking advantage of its vast potential capabilities in such areas as hydrogen energy. Strategic decisions on that score have just been made, and this is a crucial positive step. The task now is to construct well-designed mechanisms to implement those decisions nationally and in foreign policy.
This article was published as part of the “Relaunching U.S.-Russia Dialogue on Global Challenges: The Role of the Next Generation” project, implemented in cooperation with the U.S. Embassy to Russia. The opinions, findings, and conclusions stated herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Embassy to Russia.
From our partner RIAC
Digging Down Into ‘Putin’s Corruption’
For years, I have been checking-out allegations of such things as ‘Putin’s Palace’ and ‘Putin’s Chef’, and so many other allegations of Putin’s ‘corruption’ (many of which are against friends and members of his Administration instead of against himself, because the allegations against himself fail to provide any documentation that he actually owns what the allegations attribute to him — there is far too much that is mere supposition in the direct accusations against him).
Therefore, recently, I checked out allegations that are commonly made that Russia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergei Lavrov, is corrupt.
This twitter string contains loads of allegations that his mistress since about the year 2000 has a daughter from her former marriage who is a multi-millionairess with no apparent cause to be such: “Polina Kovaleva. Polina is a 26-year-old glamorous Russian girl from London. She lives in a huge apartment in Kensington and loves to party, her instagram feed looks like a non-stop holiday.” Here’s that instagram feed, where Polina flaunts her glamour; so, she comes across as a European Kardashian-plus — but how many people use that flaunting to argue that America is corrupt? (There are lots better arguments to make such a case against the U.S. Government.)
The neoconservative “Vice” site headlined “Inside the Lavish London Lifestyle of Sergey Lavrov’s Stepdaughter: Polina Kovaleva bought a £4.4 million apartment with cash when she was just 21, according to campaigners. She happens to be the stepdaughter of Putin’s foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov.”
A more neutral site, the Moscow Times, bannered “Russian Foreign Minister’s Secret Mistress Wields Ministry Influence, Owns Elite Property – iStories”, and presented evidence that Polina’s wealth comes not so much from anything having to do with her stepfather Lavrov but from her mother, his mistress, Svetlana Polyakova, who was born in 1971 and who met Lavrove in around the year 2000.
Very little information is public about Polyakova. But, the neoconservative The Daily Beast site headlined “Top Russian Diplomat’s Secret Life With Millionaire Mistress Exposed: Sergey Lavrov, ‘the face of Russian diplomacy,’ has reportedly been living large while on ‘official trips’ to more than 20 countries with his ultra-rich mistress.” That report opened:
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has reportedly bankrolled his mistress’s travel abroad with him on official diplomatic trips to almost two dozen countries around the world, according to a new bombshell report from Russian opposition activist Alexei Navalny’s team. The report, entitled “Yachts, bribes and a mistress. What Minister Lavrov is hiding,” details a plethora of luxury digs and yachts enjoyed by the couple, including a yacht owned by the notorious oligarch Oleg Deripaska, which has been graced by the likes of Belarusian model Anastasia Vashukevich, better known by her pseudonym Nastya Rybka.
Navalny is a far-right-wing rabidly anti-Muslim Russian politician who has never had higher than 3% approval-rating in Russian national polls but whom U.S.-and-allied propaganda describe as “Putin’s main political opponent”, and as Russia’s leading anti-corruption activist. His ‘anti-corruption’ organization got caught trying to get UK’s MI6 intelligence agency to fund it. (The video that was shown in that linked-to news-report was removed from youtube and from the “Wayback Machine” Web-archive, so that that ‘archive’ is no longer a reliable archiving service, but what the video showed — I saw it while it was online — was devastating against Navalny, and the U.S.-and-allied regimes don’t deny its authenticity, but only block their publics from seeing and hearing it.)
The opening item in the present article — “This twitter string contains loads of allegations that his mistress since about the year 2000 has a daughter from her former marriage who is a multi-millionairess with no apparent cause to be such:” — comes from Navalny’s organization.
Then, The Daily Beast headlined “Britain Calls Out Russia’s Top Diplomat for Secret Family”, and reported:
In its list of the 65 new individuals and organizations targeted for “aiding Russia’s invasion of Ukraine,” the British Foreign Office appears to have made a point to call out Lavrov’s “secret family” in London, with its inclusion of Polina Kovalev, whom it describes as his stepdaughter.
Kovalev’s inclusion on the list appears to confirm exhaustive reporting by Kremlin foe Alexei Navalny’s team that Lavrov, 71, has been living a “double life” for nearly two decades. One that includes a “secret wife,” identified by Navalny’s allies as Svetlana Polyakova, an actress and a restaurateur with sway in Russia’s Foreign Ministry.
Britain’s neoconservative Daily Mail headlined:
REVEALED: Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov took secret millionaire mistress abroad more than 60 times on ‘diplomatic missions’ and bankrolled her luxury lifestyle
Russia Foreign Minister Lavrov bankrolled mistress Svetlana Polyakova’s lifestyle
He has taken her abroad on ‘diplomatic’ missions more than 60 times since 2014
She also appeared publicly with Putin and was cleared to be in ‘elite’ entourage
Details unearthed in an investigation were published by Kremlin critic Navalny
The U.S.-and-allied billionaires’ OCCRP.org, or “Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project,” is also on this case. The OCCRP is funded by billionaires and Governments such as Soros (Open Society Fdtn.), Rockefeller, Ford Fdtn., Denmark, U.S. Government, Bay&PaulFdtns./CIA, etc. Their article “Russian Foreign Minister Has a Longtime Female Companion With Over $13 Million in Unexplained Assets” reported:
For years, a source close to a foreign ministry official told reporters, she has had a very close relationship with Lavrov. Reporters found that, in addition to accompanying him around the Church of St. Sergius, she has travelled with him to Sochi and St. Petersburg. She has even appeared in cell phone address books under his last name.
Polyakova also has substantial assets that a mere “employee of the Foreign Ministry” would almost certainly not be able to afford. Property records show that she and her family own real estate in Russia and Great Britain worth about 1 billion rubles ($13.6 million).
Polyakova and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not respond to requests for comment. …
Until 2012, business records show, she was a co-owner of Consul, a restaurant located inside the foreign ministry’s diplomatic academy in central Moscow.
The restaurant received state contracts to provide meals for students, teachers, and visiting foreign diplomats. But according to financial records, the business was not especially profitable. Between 2015 and 2020, its total revenue was only 120 million rubles ($1.6 million).
Polyakova had several other companies listed as restaurant businesses, but they didn’t bring in high revenues either, according to their financial reports
A few sites mention that Svetlana Polyakova is a “restaurateur,” and so I looked to find details about “those other companies.” All that I could find was her position at McDonald’s, as follows:
Irish Times headlined on 19 November 2014 “McDonald’s restaurant in Moscow reopens after being shut” and reported:
McDonald’s largest restaurant in Russia reopened after local officials shuttered the location for three months, an optimistic sign for a company trying to return to business as usual in the country.
The outlet, situated in Moscow’s Pushkin Square, resumed business today, said Svetlana Polyakova, a spokeswoman for McDonald’s Russia.
The “Ad Forum” site shows her as “Advertising Manager at McDonald’s”. The Roscongress Building Trust describes her as “Chief Executive Officer, Charitable Foundation ‘House of Ronald McDonald’; Public Relations Director, McDonald’s Russia”, and says:
Svetlana started as an entry-level employee at McDonald’s in 1989 alongside studying at the School of Education of the Maurice Thorez Institute of Foreign Languages. In 1991, she taught at the Training Department. In 1993, she became a manager of the Marketing Department, and in 1997 she proceeded as a manager of the Public Relations Department.
In 2001, Svetlana was appointed the head of the company’s public relations department. In 2002, she received the highest corporate award of McDonald’s Corporation. For several years in a row, Svetlana was among the 1000 best managers, according to a study by the Managers Association of Russia and the Kommersant Publishing House. From the first days with the company, Svetlana was deeply involved in philanthropy assisting charitable and children support organizations.
In 2002, Svetlana became the General Director of the Ronald McDonald House Charities. For nearly 25 years, the non-profit organization has been implementing programmes aimed at supporting families in need. Under the Svetlana’s leadership, the Ronald McDonald House managed to raise about 1 billion roubles, which helped more than 250,000 Russian children and families. The Foundation implements several important programmes, such as Family Rooms in hospitals, a health and fitness training seminars for specialists working with children with disabilities, two inclusive playgrounds in Sochi and Moscow.
In 2013, with Svetlana’s close involvement, the first and so far the only family hotel in Russia Ronald McDonald House Kazan was opened for parents whose children are undergoing long-term treatment at the Children’s Republican Clinical Hospital of the Ministry of Health of the Republic of Tatarstan. Ronald MacDonald House has become a real home away from home for more than 9,000 parents and children.
For the implementation of this project, the Ronald McDonald House Organization became a three-time winner of the republic’s contest Philanthropist of the Year and received the diploma of the Best Social Project of Russia in 2018.
My Google seach for “Svetlana Polyakova” and “divorce” produced:
Svetlana Polyakova · 1. Woman must pay former husband €1.6m as part of divorce settlement, judge rules · 2. ‘This is not easy for me at all’: Gráinne Seoige makes …
and that article is the Irish Times article headlined on 19 November 2014 “McDonald’s restaurant in Moscow reopens after being shut”, but nowhere indicates anything like “Svetlana Polyakova · 1. Woman must pay former husband €1.6m as part of divorce settlement, judge rules · 2. ‘This is not easy for me at all’: Gráinne Seoige makes …”; so, perhaps her divorce settlement has been removed from the Web.
Possibly, she inherited at least her first wealth from her mother. If Svetlana was paying to her former husband, then she was probably wealthier than her husband.
The date of the divorce is likewise not publicly known.
Perhaps Svetlana is so intelligent and sophisticated a person, that her feedback and recommendations to Lavrov make worthwhile her traveling with him on his diplomatic trips. Nobody doubts that Lavrov has been extremely successful as Russia’s Foreign Minister.
In any case: my attempts to find reason to believe the accusations against Lavrov have been as fruitless as my previous attempts to believe that there is corruption at the top level of Russia’s Government. Maybe there is, but the U.S.-and-allied propaganda-organizations haven’t yet provided any evidence for it. By contrast, the documentation that the top levels of the U.S.-and-allied Governments are drowning in corruption is extremely abundant and conclusive, as I have documented in many articles.
Fidel Castro’s Political Struggle Unites Havana and Moscow
Under the auspices of an official state visit to attend the unveiling of a statue in memory of former leader Fidel Castro in northwestern Moscow, Cuban President Miguel Diaz-Canel Bermudez unreservedly expressed support for anti-American position taken by Russia, reminded the history of Cuba and the Soviet Union during the Cold War when shared the same stand.
Diaz-Canel Bermudez highlighted the significance of the visit to Moscow. Cuba and Soviet Union had similar experience, both were blockaded. “It takes place at a time when both Russia and Cuba have been subjected to unfair unilateral sanctions and have a common enemy, a common source which is the Yankee empire, which manipulates a large part of humankind,” he said. “We constantly condemn the sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation and the sources of the ongoing conflict so that people are not misled and do not blame Russia for this, and we also condemn what Europe is doing, being completely subordinate to US interests.”
Referring to the unveiling of the monument, he described it as a true reflection of Fidel Castro’s personality in the midst of struggle, just like in the midst of struggle today. He denounced the imperialist powers and further praised all efforts of the Russian Federation and, under such complicated circumstances, Russia’s role in orienting the world towards multi-polarity.
Russia can always rely on Cuba. Moscow and Havana will continue to strengthen cordial bilateral relations and defend the great values of freedom, equality and justice. The principle of continuity, not just a slogan or a motto, but to continue promoting relations with the Russian Federation. Cuban leader thanked Russia for its support for his country and spoke in favor of expanding economic cooperation between the two countries.
President Vladimir Putin noted in his speech that the bilateral relations between Cuba and Russia have been making steady headway in the past three years since the previous meeting in the Kremlin. He pointed to the appreciable developing cooperation between foreign ministries, parliaments and governments. State Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin visited Cuba quite recently.
The Russia-Cuba Intergovernmental Commission is working. It held its 19th session. There are plans for cooperation between the governments with many joint projects up to 2030.
Putin stressed that the Soviet Union and Russia have always supported and support the Cuban people in their struggle for independence and sovereignty. “We have always opposed any restrictions, embargoes, blockades and so on. We have always backed Cuba on international platforms. We are seeing that Cuba occupies the same position with respect to our country, to Russia,” he added.
All this is a result of the traditional friendship that was started by Comrade Fidel Castro. Today, Cuba and Russia agreed to have unveiled a monument to him. Indeed, this is a good memory of him, a true work of art. He is so dynamic, always in motion, moving forward. It definitely captures the look of a fighter that he had.
Putin really remembered his personal meetings very well, even the details with him. “He was an impressive man. I remember how during our first meeting in his office when we were freely discussing the current situation during lunch, I was stunned by his attention to detail and his knowledge of the nuances of ongoing events, even if they took place far away from Cuba,” he narrated the story.
“He was aware of and could analyse everything happening in the world. It was very interesting and useful for me to have these meetings with him. Relying on this firm foundation of friendship, we must certainly move forward and enhance our cooperation in the current conditions,” Putin said in conclusion.
Work on the bronze-made three-meter-monument lasted for six months and took place in the Russian capital. Castro is depicted seated on a rock with a stylized map of Cuba inscribed on it. The image reflects the heroic path of a person who stood up for the rights and freedoms of the Cuban people, according to the Kremlin’s press service fact sheet.
The Moscow city legislature approved the idea of such a monument on February 16. The initiative to erect a monument to Fidel Castro came from the leadership of the Russian Defense Ministry. The idea was supported by the Russian Military-Historical Society which held a closed artistic contest with 11 works participating.
The monument was erected on Moscow’s square named in honor of Castro. Fidel Castro was one of the leaders of Cuba’s revolutionary movement who chaired Cuba’s Council of Ministers from 1959 to 2008. The Cuban politician died in 2016.
Annexation of Ukrainian oblasts to undermine the Russian Constitution
On September 30, 2022, Russia declared its annexation of four Ukrainian oblasts – Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson. Not only none of the oblasts was under complete Russian control at the time of annexation, the unilateral proclamation of “new Russian territories” took place amid Russian military setbacks seen by many as one significant continuing retreat.
To make the annexation look legitimate, the Kremlin staged “referendums” in all four oblasts. Then, according to the “will of the people” there, the State Duma voted for admitting these four into the Russian Federation, with the Russian Constitutional Court acknowledging in a hasty overnight session on October 2, 2022, that four new treaties with “the newly-acquired territories” fully correspond to the Russian Constitution.
In the Kremlin’s view, this set of obviously illegitimate actions showed its complete legitimacy. It seems to have worked for the internal political agenda as Putin’s Goebbels-style propaganda gurus have used billions of dollars much more effectively than his military aides. At the same time, it has shown the absence of the Rule of Law with its basic presumption that no one – including the most highly placed officials – is above the law. The “legal documents” supporting the annexation prove that Russian authorities live in virtual reality.
February 21, 2022, Putin acknowledged the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk Republics to use it three days later as a pretext for the military invasion of Ukraine. But the document he signed stated that Russia recognizes the whole territory of Donetsk oblast as the Donetsk Republic, which means that for the Donetsk Republic to become a part of the Russian Federation, all people of Donetsk oblast should have been represented at the staged referendums. Failing to seize the Ukrainian regions of Donetsk oblast by the end of September, the Kremlin couldn’t do it. And neither the Kremlin nor the State Duma or should-be highly-professional judges of the Constitutional Court expressed any care for the fact.
The preamble of the Russian Constitutional Court’s approval of the four treaties states that as a consequence of arbitrary decisions of the Soviet government, the territory of the Ukrainian SSR was primarily comprised of lands with a predominantly Russian population without the will of the people. Moreover, according to the viewpoint of the Russian Constitutional Court, the situation in Ukraine began to deteriorate after the collapse of the Soviet Union. And it became even worse after the government change in Kyiv in 2014.
The Russian Constitutional Court also noted that “admitting belief in good and justice as one of the founding values of the multi-national people of the Russian Federation, and being a social state governed by the Rule of Law, Russia can not ignore massive facts of violations of the right to life and discrimination based on ethnic and linguistic affinity, more so on the territory with the population of which Russia has long-lasting historical, cultural and humane connections.”
This official statement provides legal grounds for the revision of the collapse of the USSR. The Russian Government may use this official legal ruling of the Constitutional Court to acknowledge the void of the Belovezh Accords of December 1991, which declared that the Soviet Union ceases to exist, effectively overturning the will expressed by more than 76% of the Soviet people, who in March 1991 voted for preserving the Soviet Union.
In 2017 Sergei Kiriyenko, head of the Kremlin internal policy team and an architect of the structure of the contemporary internal politics in Russia, declared that “the Russian state functions on principles different from the treaty principle.” His statement justified why the Kremlin did not want to re-sign a treaty between Tatarstan, a subject of the Russian Federation, and the federal center. The treaty that was refused to sign was approved by the Russian Parliament in 2007 to be effective for ten years, and to be re-approved in 2017. And the 2007 Parliament’s approval followed the 1994 Treaty signed by Tatarstan with the Kremlin, after Tatarstan refused to sign a Federative Treaty between the Kremlin and all Russian regions, which became the basis of the Russian Federation and its Constitution of 1993.
Openly loyal and Kremlin-supporting Chechnya never had any treaty signed with the Kremlin. After two wars there is not even a valid peace treaty between Chechnya and Moscow, let alone a Federative Treaty. May 12, 1997 Aslan Maskhadov, the then President of the Chechen Republic Ichkeriya signed a peace treaty signed with the Russian President Boris Yeltsin. That peace treaty provided legal grounds for controversies to be resolved only by peaceful means and according to the norms of international law (needless to remind you that Putin violated it three years later). It is interesting that Boris Yeltsin declared that the Treaty “put an end to the war and 400 years of conflict”.
This treaty followed the Khasavyurt Accords of 1996, titled “On principles of the basis of relations between the Russian Federation and the republic of Chechnya”. Both documents do not clearly define the status of Chechnya within or outside of the framework of the Russian Federation. The documents de-fact treated Chechnya as an independent state, and at the same time the Russian Parliament never ratified the documents, which is obligatory for international treaties and agreements.
This mix of misleading title and content demanded a particular provision of the Russian Constitutional Court stating on December 26, 1996, that the signed Khasavyurt Accords did not regulate any relations between the Russian Federation and one of its subjects, clearly leaving Chechnya outside the existing legal structure of the Russian state. Moreover, the Chechen Republic Ichkeria, whose President signed the treaty, was declared “ceased to exist,” replacing it with the Republic of Chechnya, leaving any documents signed before legally void.
As we see from the legal point of view there are at least two subjects of the Russian Federation that have no legally effective treaties with the central authority.
Most regions signed the Federative Treaty of 1992, which later was transformed into the Russian Constitution. The signing needed to repeat in a new format in 2002. The initial treaty provided for a later re-signing revision of approval only for the regions initially formed as Republics, and usually, these are ethnicity-based regions. But Putin’s negligence of the law when he felt that he had authority, which he already possessed in 2002, let the resignation issue out of his attention scope. In 2017 Tatarstan demanded this attention but only received Kiriyenko’s statement that the Russian Federation was not based on any treaties.
And this is when legal cover for acquisitions of new territories plays a role. In 2014 Moscow signed a treaty with the Republic of Crimea. In September 2022, four “new subjects of the Russian Federation” became its part through treaties.
Looking at the Russian state legal structure, we see one republic with a treaty not re-signed (Tatarstan) and another that changed its name without signing any legal treaty with Moscow (Chechnya). There are also 18 republics that initially signed the federative treaty. Still, later the Kremlin declared that there was no need to prolong it without talking any supporting legal actions. Finally, there are also three republics with existing treaties whose legitimacy is not recognized internationally (Crimea, Luhansk, and Donetsk republics), and of course, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts.
This context shows the total absence of the Rule of Law in Russia and undermines its Constitution and legal principles of interrelations between the regions and the Kremlin.
The current mobilization state of Russian politics and economy drives the Kremlin to re-organize its administrative structure based on purely economic effectiveness reasoning. An obvious target for future reforms will be ethnic republics, as now different level Russian media start spreading statistics proving the predominance of Russians in the historically ethic-based republic. A good example is a Krasnodar Krai discussion of why the Maykopsky district of the Republic of Adygea can’t be a part of Krasnodar Krai since 85% of people in the community are Russians, raising a question about Adygea as a whole with 65% of Russians leaving there.
This Kremlin-inspired discussion presents an existential threat to many smaller ethnicities abiding in Russia. Many ethnic people already feel they are being exterminated by the war in Ukraine, with just a handful coming back from hundreds sent to the frontline. And suppose they look closely at the legal grounds of why they live in the Russian Federation to find out their absence. In that case, the centrifugal forces of Russian internal politics, becoming increasingly evident with every war defeat, may become unstoppable.
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