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The neoliberal project strikes back: Upcoming regime-change in post-pandemic Bulgaria?

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In the last few years, Eastern European politics has hit the headlines around the world rather often. However, commentaries on the topic have been everything but flattering — and not without reason. Usually, journalists and politicians lament the ‘democratic backsliding’ affecting the region and the lack of Western-minded leaders. But the fluid political situation in Bulgaria seems to offer a first chance for neo-liberal elites to strike back. Will it really happen?

The laments of the (neo)liberal media — Introduction

Since the 2010s, several commentators in the US and Europe have suddenly become experts on Eastern Europe writing bitter pieces. Usually, the region hits the headlines only due to the surreptitious regime change still undergoing in Poland and Hungary. Namely, commentators posit the likes of Orban and Kaczyński as dictators forgetting that most voters supports them (Figure 1). Meanwhile, few remind that the European Union is also to blame for the region’s growing unacceptance of the ‘liberal’ values. For instance, the region’s underrepresentation in EU institutions does “severely undermine support for the EU‘s institutions, values and policies”. But most of these ‘experts’ prefer to focus on how “populist” leaderships are making Budapest and Warsaw “worse” than Brexit. Rarely do they emphasise the many “fragile spots that require further discussion on multiple levels” in Eastern Europe’s post-socialist democracies.

Actually, the simple truth is that these attacks stem from a clear ideological agenda — which some reproduce unwittingly. In the end, those who demonise Eastern European leaders for their “machoistic attitude are simply sorrow losers. In fact, they echo local neoliberal elites’ lamentations for their inability to harness consensus (Chart 1).

Neoliberals’ comeback — Is Hungary an exception?

However, despite non-trivial differences amongst anti-government formations, a united ‘opposition’ bloc in taking shape in some illiberal Eastern European democracies. Interestingly, this strategy may yield the first concrete, positive results where illiberalism is at its apogee: Hungary. As to “put an end” to Orban’s rule, social-democrats, centrists and other neoliberals have agree to put their “differences aside”. So much so, that this rainbow coalition including six Hungarian parties is celebrating its primary at the time of writing. As of now, they are likely to select Budapest’s liberal-green mayor as their joint candidate to the prime ministership. Few people would make a starker contrast to the Orban and his strong appeal to rural constituencies. But Hungary is an almost unique case. Besides rigging the economic game in favour of its allies, Orban has rewritten the constitution making it much more ‘illiberal’.

Hence, the wind of history seems to be changing direction, at least in Hungary. But illiberal leaders in the rest of Eastern Europe have had a less spectacular and more recent success than Orban. Especially in those countries that are members of the EU such as Poland, Slovenia, Czechia, and Bulgaria. For instance, many criticise the Slovenian Prime Minister for having “repeatedly and publicly attacked the country’s” main public media outlets.” Whilst Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal face strenuous condemnations for considering EU law’ subordination to the constitution and its politicisation. Whereas, the exact same things have happened in Hungary without anyone complaining about it. Thus, expectations of a weaker and slower rejoinder are only natural.

The second piece of the puzzle: Bulgaria

Against this background, the transformations of the Bulgarian centre-right acquire a completely new meaning and a much more far-reaching significance. In fact, neo-liberal elites seem intent to exploit the pandemic-induced crisis to hold on power beyond Hungary as well. Apparently, the first stepping stone in this process of ‘reconquest’ of the region will be Bulgaria. After all, the protracted institutional crisis the country is facing grants immense potentiality for emerging new leaders advocating for radical changes. For a while now, neoliberal forces are on the verge of allying with left-leaning parties in the upcoming election. Perhaps, this almost-cohesive coalition will manage to form a stable government after three consecutive snap elections in early 2022.

Therefore, it is worth giving more attention to what exactly is happening in Bulgarian power politics. Namely, to identify which leaders are on the rise, what agenda do the advance and what their vested interests are.

The shrinking left opposition

Since the auto-golpe of the Communist Party in the 1990s, fair and competitive elections have taken place regularly in Bulgaria. At the first few democratic election of their life, voters lent the victory to the former-communist Bulgarian Social Party (BSP). Notably, unlike the German SPD and other Western-European socialists and social-democrats, the BSP’s agenda combines social conservatism and economic interventionism. Actually, since the devasting hyperinflation of winter 1996–1997, the BSP has managed to win only one lection, in 2005. Nevertheless, the party remains the main political force of the traditional left floating between 15% and 25% of the votes. Thus, the BSP and its leftmost fractions have represented the only real opposition to Prime Minister Boyko Borisov since 2009.

Or they did until April 2021, when the party ranked third in the general elections for the second time ever. Then, the party barely avoided slipping to the fourth place at the snap elections in July 2021, a colossal debacle. However, the BSP’s lost votes have not migrated compactly to another leftist party. In fact, the only likeminded list on the left, ISNI, gathered just around 5% of all votes in July. Hence, the Bulgarian left of the centre has shrunk to no more than 18% of the electorate. In order to find out where did these votes go one needs to look what is happening on the right. In fact, the socially and economically liberal right of the centre seems to have been thriving during the pandemic.

The centre-right between feckless populism …

The Bulgarian centre-right has been quite effervescent ever since the end of real socialism. Not least because the anti-systemic bloc exploded in a myriad of smaller fraction earlier than elsewhere in Eastern Europe. To be exact, the anti-communist coalition called Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) lost its hegemony as early as 2001. Subsequently, the UDF won slightly less than 9% of the vote in 2005 before disappearing from the electoral maps. In less than a decade, the Bulgarian centre of the right moved beyond the UDF and its irrelevant successor parties. So Boyko Borisov, the populist mayor of Sofia, took the helm of this political segment with his personal party, GERB. From 2009 and until 2021, the party has won commanding majorities of the popular vote (Figure 3). Thus, GERB has long dominated the Bulgarian centre-right as a whole forcing smaller parties to accept its overreaching patronage.

This equilibrium tuned unstable in 2020, when Democratic Bulgaria (DB), a coalition of neoliberal parties, gained massive prominence. Thank to a mostly favourable coverage on many opposition media, DB rallied many of those Borisov’s long tenure had disillusioned. Namely, at the latest election it gathered about 12% of the preferences, ranking close fourth behind the BSP. Clearly, in doing so DB became GERB’s number one adversary ‘officially’. But last month, DB has proved its decisivenss for the formation of any government; making it a kingmaker of sorts.

… and neoliberal elitism

But the story does not end of the story for Bulgaria’s neoliberal elites. In fact, this camp has a new rising leader: Kiril Petkov, former caretaker finance minister between May and August 2021. Actually, Petkov was a complete novice in politicking before his presidential appointment to a cabinet-ranking post a few months ago. However, he has learnt rather quickly how to hide his secrets behind a thick smoke courtain or counter-allegations and dissimulation. Most recently, he has proved these new skills during the ‘affaire’ concerning his alleged – then ascertained – double citizenship. In fact, Bulgarian ministers cannot hold any other citizenship by law; but Petkov was a Canadian national until April 21. Still, he did not disclose the renounciation to his Canadian citizenship until some parlamentarians raised the issue publicly. Eventually, Pertkov managed to get out of the woods by steering the attention on a different topic: his new party.

In fact, Perkov and fellow caretaker economy minister Asen Vasilev, announced the plarform ‘Let’s Continue the Change(Prodolzhavame promyanata, PP). By now, there can be little doubt that PP is a neoliberal party addressing mostly well-educated workers and liberal-minded youngsters. First of all, Petkov distanced himself and his project from the popular, but quite conservative President Rumen Radev immediately. Second, Bulgaria was amongst the signatories of the OECD’s proposal to raise the minimum corporate-tax rate to 12.5%. Yet, PP will not support any tax increase despite the fact that Bulgaria adopting a 10% flat-rate corporate tax. Moreover, the focus of PP’s programme is on the businesses environment and foreign investments rather than redistribution and social rights. Coherently, the first formations to support Petkov and Vasilev’s project are ‘Volt’ and ‘Middle European Class’ — both pro-EU and neoliberal.

Neoliberals raising their heads in Eastern Europe — Conclusion

All things considered Petkov and Vasilev launched PP officially just in time to participate in the next elections in November. And PP may win at least 9% of the votes, even though the list of candidates is not available yet. Together with DB’s expected 15–16%, PP may tip the parliamentarian balance in favour of the neoliberal right. Meanwhile, both the traditional and the populist left are likely to buckle visibly. Even if the BSP manages not to slip below DB, ISNI is still lingering over the 4% electoral threshold. Thus, economically progressive forces could hold no more than 48 – and probably 40 – on the 240 available seats. Meanwhile, the neoliberal centre-right could gather as many as 60 seats and no less than 50, making it decisive for any realistic majority.

In conclusion. Boyko Borisov could become the first illiberal, but democratically elected, Prime Minister of an EU country to be ousted by such an electoral bloc the EU- and US-financed opposition defeated Vladimir Mečiar in the 1999 Slovak presidential election. Eventually, Bulgarian illiberalism could be the first victim of neoliberalism’s revanche in post-pandemic Eastern Europe.

Fabio A. Telarico was born in Naples, Southern Italy. Since 2018 he has been publishing on websites and magazines about the culture, society and politics of South Eastern Europe and the former USSR in Italian, English, Bulgarian and French. As of 2021, he has edited two volumes and is the author of contributions in collective works. He combines his activity as author and researcher with that of regular participant to international conferences on Europe’s periphery, Russia and everything in between. For more information, visit the Author’s website (in English and Bulgarian).

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Iceland’s Historic(al) Elections

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The morning of September, 26 was a good one for Lenya Run Karim of the Pirate Party. Once the preliminary results were announced, things were clear: the 21-year-old law student of the University of Iceland, originating from a Kurdish immigrant family, had become the youngest MP in the country’s history.

In historical significance, however, this event was second to another. Iceland, the world champion in terms of gender equality, became the first country in Europe to have more women MPs than men, 33 versus 30. The news immediately made world headlines: only five countries in the world have achieved such impressive results. Remarkably, all are non-European: Rwanda, Nicaragua and Cuba have a majority of women in parliament, while Mexico and the UAE have an equal number of male and female MPs.

Nine hours later, news agencies around the world had to edit their headlines. The recount in the Northwest constituency affected the outcome across the country to delay the ‘triumph for women’ for another four years.

Small numbers, big changes

The Icelandic electoral system is designed so that 54 out of the 63 seats in the Althingi, the national parliament, are primary or constituency seats, while another nine are equalization seats. Only parties passing the 5 per cent threshold are allowed to distribute equalisation seats that go to the candidates who failed to win constituency mandates and received the most votes in their constituency. However, the number of equalisation mandates in each of the 6 constituencies is legislated. In theory, this could lead to a situation in which the leading party candidate in one constituency may simply lack an equalisation mandate, so the leading candidate of the same party—but in another constituency—receives it.

This is what happened this year. Because of a difference of only ten votes between the Reform Party and the Pirate Party, both vying for the only equalisation mandate in the Northwest, the constituency’s electoral commission announced a recount on its own initiative. There were also questions concerning the counting procedure as such: the ballots were not sealed but simply locked in a Borgarnes hotel room. The updated results hardly affected the distribution of seats between the parties, bringing in five new MPs, none of whom were women, with the 21-year-old Lenya Run Karim replaced by her 52-year-old party colleague.

In the afternoon of September, 27, at the request of the Left-Green Movement, supported by the Independence Party, the Pirates and the Reform Party, the commission in the South announced a recount of their own—the difference between the Left-Greens and the Centrists was only seven votes. There was no ‘domino effect’, as in the case of the Northwest, as the five-hour recount showed the same result. Recounts in other districts are unlikely, nor is it likely that Althingi—vested with the power to declare the elections valid—would invalidate the results in the Northwest. Nevertheless, the ‘replaced’ candidates have already announced their intention to appeal against the results, citing violations of ballot storage procedures. Under the Icelandic law, this is quite enough to invalidate the results and call a re-election in the Northwest, as the Supreme Court of Iceland invalidated the Constitutional Council elections due to a breach of procedure 10 years ago. Be that as it may, the current score remains 33:30, in favor of men.

Progressives’ progress and threshold for socialists

On the whole, there were no surprises: the provisional allocation of mandates resembles, if with minor changes, the opinion polls on the eve of the election.

The ruling three-party coalition has rejuvenated its position, winning 37 out of the 63 Althingi seats. The centrist Progressive Party saw a real electoral triumph, improving its 2017 result by five seats. Prime-minister Katrín Jakobsdóttir’s Left-Green Movement, albeit with a slight loss, won eight seats, surpassing all pre-election expectations. Although the centre-right Independence Party outperformed everyone again to win almost a quarter of all votes, 16 seats are one of the worst results of the Icelandic ‘Grand Old Party’ ever.

The results of the Social-Democrats, almost 10% versus 12.1% in 2017, and of the Pirates, 8.6% versus 9.2%, have deteriorated. Support for the Centre Party of Sigmundur Gunnlaugsson, former prime-minister and victim of the Panama Papers, has halved from 10.9% to 5.4%. The centrists have seen a steady decline in recent years, largely due to a sexist scandal involving party MPs. The populist People’s Party and the pro-European Reform Party have seen gains of 8.8% and 8.3%, as compared to 6.9% and 6.7% in the previous elections.

Of the leading Icelandic parties, only the Socialist Party failed to pass the 5 per cent threshold: despite a rating above 7% in August, the Socialists received only 4.1% of the vote.

Coronavirus, climate & economy

Healthcare and the fight against COVID-19 was, expectedly, on top of the agenda of the elections: 72% of voters ranked it as the defining issue, according to a Fréttablaðið poll. Thanks to swift and stringent measures, the Icelandic government brought the coronavirus under control from day one, and the country has enjoyed one of the lowest infection rates in the world for most of the time. At the same time, the pandemic exposed a number of problems in the national healthcare system: staff shortages, low salaries and long waiting lists for emergency surgery.

Climate change, which Icelanders are already experiencing, was an equally important topic. This summer, the temperature has not dropped below 20°C for 59 days, an anomaly for a North-Atlantic island. However, Icelanders’ concerns never converted into increased support for the four left-leaning parties advocating greater reductions in CO2 emission than the country has committed to under the Paris Agreement: their combined result fell by 0.5%.

The economy and employment were also among the main issues in this election. The pandemic has severely damaged the island nation’s economy, which is heavily tourism-reliant—perhaps, unsurprisingly, many Icelanders are in favor of reviving the tourism sector as well as diversifying the economy further.

The EU membership, by far a ‘traditional’ issue in Icelandic politics, is unlikely to be featured on the agenda of the newly-elected parliament as the combined result of the Eurosceptics, despite a loss of 4%, still exceeds half of the overall votes. The new Althingi will probably face the issue of constitutional reform once again, which is only becoming more topical in the light of the pandemic and the equalization mandates story.

New (old) government?

The parties are to negotiate coalition formation. The most likely scenario now is that the ruling coalition of the Independence Party, the Left-Greens and the Progressives continues. It has been the most ideologically diverse and the first three-party coalition in Iceland’s history to last a full term. A successful fight against the pandemic has only strengthened its positions and helped it secure additional votes. Independence Party leader and finance minister Bjarni Benediktsson has earlier said he would be prepared to keep the ruling coalition if it holds the majority. President Guðni Jóhannesson announced immediately after the elections that he would confirm the mandate of the ruling coalition to form a new government if the three parties could strike a deal.

Other developments are possible but unlikely. Should the Left-Greens decide to leave the coalition, they could be replaced by the Reform Party or the People’s Party, while any coalition without the Independence Party can only be a four-party or larger coalition.

Who will become the new prime-minister still remains to be seen—but if the ruling coalition remains in place, the current prime-minister and leader of the Left-Greens, Katrín Jakobsdóttir, stands a good chance of keeping her post: she is still the most popular politician in Iceland with a 40 per cent approval rate.

The 2021 Althingi election, with one of the lowest turnouts in history at 80.1%, has not produced a clear winner. The election results reflect a Europe-wide trend in which traditional “major” parties are losing support. The electorate is fragmenting and their votes are pulled by smaller new parties. The coronavirus pandemic has only reinforced this trend.

The 2021 campaign did not foreshadow a sensation. Although Iceland has not become the first European country with a women’s majority in parliament, these elections will certainly go down in history as a test of Icelanders’ trust to their own democracy.

From our partner RIAC

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EU-Balkan Summit: No Set Timeframe for Western Balkans Accession

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From left to right: Janez JANŠA (Prime Minister, Slovenia), Charles MICHEL (President of the European Council), Ursula VON DER LEYEN (President of the European Commission) Copyright: European Union

On October 6, Slovenia hosted a summit between the EU and the Western Balkans states. The EU-27 met with their counterparts (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Kosovo) in the sumptuous Renaissance setting of Brdo Castle, 30 kilometers north of the capital, Ljubljana. Despite calls from a minority of heads of state and government, there were no sign of a breakthrough on the sensitive issue of enlargement. The accession of these countries to the European Union is still not unanimous among the 27 EU member states.

During her final tour of the Balkans three weeks ago, German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated that the peninsula’s integration was of “geostrategic” importance. On the eve of the summit, Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz backed Slovenia’s goal of integrating this zone’s countries into the EU by 2030.

However, the unanimity required to begin the hard negotiations is still a long way off, even for the most advanced countries in the accession process, Albania and North Macedonia. Bulgaria, which is already a member of the EU, is opposing North Macedonia’s admission due to linguistic and cultural differences. Since Yugoslavia’s demise, Sofia has rejected the concept of Macedonian language, insisting that it is a Bulgarian dialect, and has condemned the artificial construction of a distinct national identity.

Other countries’ reluctance to join quickly is of a different nature. France and the Netherlands believe that previous enlargements (Bulgaria and Romania in 2007) have resulted in changes that must first be digested before the next round of enlargement. The EU-27 also demand that all necessary prior guarantees be provided regarding the independence of the judiciary and the fight against corruption in these countries. Despite the fact that press freedom is a requirement for membership, the NGO Reporters Without Borders (RSF) urged the EU to make “support for investigative and professional journalism” a key issue at the summit.”

While the EU-27 have not met since June, the topic of Western Balkans integration is competing with other top priorities in the run-up to France’s presidency of the EU in the first half of 2022. On the eve of the summit, a working dinner will be held, the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, called for “a strategic discussion on the role of the Union on the international scene” in his letter of invitation to the EU-Balkans Summit, citing “recent developments in Afghanistan,” the announcement of the AUKUS pact between the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom, which has enraged Paris.

The Western Balkans remain the focal point of an international game of influence in which the Europeans seek to maintain their dominance. As a result, the importance of reaffirming a “European perspective” at the summit was not an overstatement. Faced with the more frequent incursion of China, Russia, and Turkey in that European region, the EU has pledged a 30 billion euro Economic and Investment Plan for 2021-2027, as well as increased cooperation, particularly to deal with the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic.

Opening the borders, however, is out of the question. In the absence of progress on this issue, Albania, North Macedonia, and Serbia have decided to establish their own zone of free movement (The Balkans are Open”) beginning January 1, 2023. “We are starting today to do in the region what we will do tomorrow in the EU,” said Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama when the agreement was signed last July.

This initiative, launched in 2019 under the name “Mini-Schengen” and based on a 1990s idea, does not have the support of the entire peninsular region, which remains deeply divided over this project. While Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro are not refusing to be a part of it and are open to discussions, the Prime Minister of Kosovo, Albin Kurti, who took office in 2020, for his part accuses Serbia of relying on this project to recreate “a fourth Yugoslavia”

Tensions between Balkan countries continue to be an impediment to European integration. The issue of movement between Kosovo and Serbia has been a source of concern since the end of September. Two weeks of escalation followed Kosovo’s decision to prohibit cars with Serbian license plates from entering its territory, in response to Serbia’s long-standing prohibition on allowing vehicles to pass in the opposite direction.

In response to the mobilization of Kosovar police to block the road, Serbs in Kosovo blocked roads to their towns and villages, and Serbia deployed tanks and the air force near the border. On Sunday, October 3, the conflict seemed to be over, and the roads were reopened. However, the tone had been set three days before the EU-Balkans summit.

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German Election: Ramifications for the US Foreign Policy

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Image source: twitter @OlafScholz

In the recent German election, foreign policy was scarcely an issue. But Germany is an important element in the US foreign policy. There is a number of cases where Germany and the US can cooperate, but all of these dynamics are going to change very soon.

The Germans’ strategic culture makes it hard to be aligned perfectly with the US and disagreements can easily damage the relations. After the tension between the two countries over the Iraq war, in 2003, Henry Kissinger said that he could not imagine the relations between Germany and the US could be aggravated so quickly, so easily, which might end up being the “permanent temptation of German politics”. For a long time, the US used to provide security for Germany during the Cold War and beyond, so, several generations are used to take peace for granted. But recently, there is a growing demand on them to carry more burden, not just for their own security, but for international peace and stability. This demand was not well-received in Berlin.

Then, the environment around Germany changed and new threats loomed up in front of them. The great powers’ competition became the main theme in international relations. Still, Germany was not and is not ready for shouldering more responsibility. Politicians know this very well. Ursula von der Leyen, who was German defense minister, asked terms like “nuclear weapons” and “deterrence” be removed from her speeches.

Although on paper, all major parties appreciate the importance of Germany’s relations with the US, the Greens and SPD ask for a reset in the relations. The Greens insist on the European way in transatlantic relations and SPD seeks more multilateralism. Therefore, alignment may be harder to maintain in the future. However, If the tensions between the US and China heat up to melting degrees, then external pressure can overrule the internal pressure and Germany may accede to its transatlantic partners, just like when Helmut Schmid let NATO install medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe after the Soviet Union attacked Afghanistan and the Cold War heated up.

According to the election results, now three coalitions are possible: grand coalition with CDU/CSU and SPD, traffic lights coalition with SPD, FDP, and Greens, Jamaica coalition with CDU/CSU, FDP, and Greens. Jamaica coalition will more likely form the most favorable government for the US because it has both CDU and FDP, and traffic lights will be the least favorite as it has SPD. The grand coalition can maintain the status quo at best, because contrary to the current government, SPD will dominate CDU.

To understand nuances, we need to go over security issues to see how these coalitions will react to them. As far as Russia is concerned, none of them will recognize the annexation of Crimea and they all support related sanctions. However, if tensions heat up, any coalition government with SPD will be less likely assertive. On the other hand, as the Greens stress the importance of European values like democracy and human rights, they tend to be more assertive if the US formulates its foreign policy by these common values and describe US-China rivalry as a clash between democracy and authoritarianism. Moreover, the Greens disapprove of the Nordstream project, of course not for its geopolitics. FDP has also sided against it for a different reason. So, the US must follow closely the negotiations which have already started between anti-Russian smaller parties versus major parties.

For relations with China, pro-business FDP is less assertive. They are seeking for developing EU-China relations and deepening economic ties and civil society relations. While CDU/CSU and Greens see China as a competitor, partner, and systemic rival, SPD and FDP have still hopes that they can bring change through the exchange. Thus, the US might have bigger problems with the traffic lights coalition than the Jamaica coalition in this regard.

As for NATO and its 2 percent of GDP, the division is wider. CDU/CSU and FDP are the only parties who support it. So, in the next government, it might be harder to persuade them to pay more. Finally, for nuclear participation, the situation is the same. CDU/CSU is the only party that argues for it. This makes it an alarming situation because the next government has to decide on replacing Germany’s tornados until 2024, otherwise Germany will drop out of the NATO nuclear participation.

The below table gives a brief review of these three coalitions. 1 indicates the lowest level of favoritism and 3 indicates the highest level of favoritism. As it shows, the most anti-Russia coalition is Jamaica, while the most anti-China coalition is Trafic light. Meanwhile, Grand Coalition is the most pro-NATO coalition. If the US adopts a more normative foreign policy against China and Russia, then the Greens and FDP will be more assertive in their anti-Russian and anti-Chinese policies and Germany will align more firmly with the US if traffic light or Jamaica coalition rise to power.

Issues CoalitionsTrafic LightGrand CoalitionJamaica
Russia213 
China312 
NATO132 

1 indicates the lowest level of favoritism. 3 indicates the highest level of favoritism.

In conclusion, this election should not make Americans any happier. The US has already been frustrated with the current government led by Angela Merkel who gave Germany’s trade with China the first priority, and now that the left-wing will have more say in any imaginable coalition in the future, the Americans should become less pleased. But, still, there are hopes that Germany can be a partner for the US in great power competition if the US could articulate its foreign policy with common values, like democracy and human rights. More normative foreign policy can make a reliable partner out of Germany. Foreign policy rarely became a topic in this election, but observers should expect many ramifications for it.

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