The rise to power of the Taliban (a terrorist organization banned in Russia) in August 2021 has raised a number of questions about how the world community should deal with the organization, an ardent proponent of Islam that calls for an all-out Sharia system to be established in Afghanistan. As a case in point here, many experts and media outlets refer to the Taliban as either a structure linked to the terrorist Islamic State (banned in Russia) or as a legitimate Sharia state, much like Saudi Arabia or Iran. The group is seen as both jihadist and traditionalist. All these differing and often mutually exclusive assessments make it difficult to identify the group’s ideological leanings within Islam. At the same time, accurate forecasts of its influence on the world of political Islam—and on the global processes at large—will depend on a correct understanding of the Taliban’s role and place in the many-faceted world of Islam.
The Taliban and Salafi-jihadis
The most accurate definition to characterize the various international terrorist organizations purportedly acting on behalf of Islam is that of “Salafi jihadism,” which was introduced in 2002 by the scholar Gilles Kepel to describe a “hybrid Islamist ideology” developed by volunteers from Arab and Muslim countries during the first Afghan War (1979–1992) . Salafism came to be the spiritual, doctrinal and methodological foundation of this radical movement.
This fundamentalist and conservative trend in Islam originated in the 18th century in Najd, Arabia, and was formulated by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. It then acquired not only its own doctrinal but also theological attitudes that differ from other schools of Islam, including the Sunni school. Essentially, all international jihadists are mostly followers of the teachings of Najdi Salafism. This also applies to Al-Qaeda and the IS (both banned in Russia), as well as other organizations. Besides, Salafism seems to be a fairly moderate movement, like in Saudi Arabia or Qatar, unless it is tied to the ideology of global jihad, which otherwise turns it into Salafi jihadism.
The Taliban, however, do not adhere to the Najdi school of Salafism, which puts them beyond the jihadist mainstream. They consistently support the Hanafi madhhab and Maturidi Kalam (Maturidism), both being typical of Afghanistan. Many affiliates of the Taliban studied in religious institutions—primarily, in the Deobandi madrasah “Hakkaniya” in Pakistan. They mostly arose as a branch of the Islamic university in Indian Deoband that occupies a special place in the Hanafi school of Islam, giving its name to a trend in Hanafism.
At this point, it should be borne in mind that insurmountable doctrinal and theological contradictions stand between the Hanafi-Maturidis and the Salafis. For instance, some Salafis see Maturidites as heretics because of their stance on the divine properties and attributes, in the interpretations of which they allowed allegory (ta’wil). In turn and for the very same reason, Hanafis-Maturidites regard Salafis as Mujassim, impious anthropomorphists. In addition, discrepancies related to the permissibility of Sufi practices, the celebration of Mawlid, the use of rosaries and amulets are unacceptable innovations from the point of view of the Salafis. This is often accompanied by mutual accusations of disbelief, which severely limits the potential for interaction between Salafi jihadists and the Taliban.
Such differences appeared before the rise of the Taliban, during the first Afghan War as well as in the disputes between the founders of Salafi jihadism, Abdullah Azzam and Abu Muhammad al Maqdisi, who arrived in Afghanistan to help the Mujahideen. While Azzam adhered to Salafism, he believed that the Afghans still remain Muslims, be they Hanafi-Maturidis or Sufis. Meanwhile, al Maqdisi insisted that they must first be forced to abandon their own views and “innovations” to be turned to Salafism. That is, they should first be taught “monotheism”, only then followed by military sciences. Subsequently, Azzam’s position was also adopted by Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, who became the leaders of al-Qaeda, although it resulted in a split in al-Qaeda’s ranks, since other representatives and spiritual leaders, such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and his mentor Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, opposed any ties with non-Salafis.
Several of the jihadists, for example, Abu Musab al-Suri, tried to settle this conflict. In his publications, he tried to refute the thesis that the Taliban are Maturidites in theology and “convinced Hanafis” in the madhhab. He attempted to prove that the views of the Taliban do not contradict the teachings of Salafism and that they are open to partnerships. This was done, of course, through distorted facts and false arguments, with suitable episodes and quotes selectively used, while the words of Pakistani Islamic scholars who dealt with the Taliban, those that did not fit his arguments, were omitted. The purpose of such publications was to preserve the global “unity in the ranks” of Salafi jihadism.
The Taliban put an end to this dispute, though. In the course of the negotiations in Doha, its representatives demanded that the Hanafi madhhab be the only school of jurisprudence in Afghanistan.
In turn, the fact that some in the Taliban leadership are Maturidites was also emphasized by Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of al-Qaeda, when referring to Mullah Omar in his letter to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. After the capture of Kabul, it turned out that the Taliban had banned the activities of the Salafis in Afghanistan. In particular, they were forbidden to preach, build mosques and declare their beliefs in the open. The Internet has even seen videos where Afghan Salafis were forced to publicly recant their beliefs in front of the Taliban.
As for the very recognition of the existing world order and the architecture of international relations on the part of the Taliban, they—unlike Al-Qaeda, Islamic State and other Salafi jihadists—have never advocated for its dismantling, willing to fit into it instead.
Between Modernism and Traditionalism
Thus, falling back on traditional legal and theological schools of Islam in the region and using them to find ground for their actions, the Taliban does not fit into the framework of either Salafi jihadism—or, as some researchers go on to suggest, Islamism itself.
The anthropologist Olivier Roy, for one, believes movements such as the Taliban to be “neo-fundamentalist”, distinguishing them from what can be seen as another set of Islamic movements, often called “Islamist.” Limited, as his argument goes, by the “simple application of Sharia” in matters of ritual, dress and behaviour, these “neo-fundamentalist” movements differ from Islamist parties primarily because the former have neither a systematic ideology nor a global political agenda that would be oriented towards the external environment, to one degree or another. They might be more accurately labelled as “Islamic traditionalists.”
At the same time, the Taliban have provisions that distinguish them from the traditional Islamic organizations and trends that existed in Afghanistan. This, first of all, implies their attitude to Sufism, which is widespread in Afghanistan. The Taliban tried to minimize the role of the Sufi orders in the religious affairs of the regions under their control, far from welcoming any preservation of ties between their members and the Sufi tariqahs. The Taliban also criticized and banned many Sufi practices that were considered excessive. The leadership of the Taliban, though, was not opposed to Sufism as such, resorting to the heritage of the Sufi sheikhs in their writings and appeals.
Likewise, the Taliban, originally a Pashtun movement, have completely abandoned the use of Pashtunwali, the Pashtun customary law. This contributed to the marginalization of the role of the Pashtun tribal leaders and their elders in the affairs of the movement, while opening the door for representatives of other peoples of Afghanistan to join the movement.
Despite the various “modern” particularities in the methodology and the doctrines of the Taliban, the movement can be considered fundamentally traditionalist, focused on attracting conservative residents of Afghanistan living in accordance with the established Islamic traditions. But, on the other hand, one cannot simply ignore the fact that the beliefs of the movement were initially alien to the Afghans. These beliefs were better masked and more in tune with the local dynamics than what the government in Kabul was trying to introduce. Therefore, it would also be correct to characterize the Taliban as a “hybrid” movement, which means that both Islamism (and not necessarily radical) and the consolidation of traditionalism in its ideology are plausible options.
The Takings of Kabul and Other Analogies
In fact, given that the Taliban is not a Salafi jihadist movement, it cannot (and will not) become a banner under which to rally for these forces in their struggle. Nevertheless, there are examples of events similar to the capturing of Kabul by the Taliban that have triggered transformation (or unrest) in the whole Islamic world.
Of course, the events surrounding the presence and withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan appear at first glance to be similar to those of the Soviet campaign in Afghanistan (1979–1989), and it was the first Afghan War (1979–1992) that sparked the rise of the global jihadist movement. However, there are rather few grounds to suggest that the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan will have similar consequences.
In contrast to 1989 (or 1992, if we take the collapse of the pro-Soviet regime as the endpoint), the recent success of the Taliban belongs to them alone. There are no foreign volunteers acting in the ranks of the movement to “share the victory.” Of course, the “Afghan Arabs” (Arab volunteers in the ranks of the Afghan mujahideen in 1979–1992) did not play any significant role in the military operations of the first Afghan War but, having dispersed across their countries, they still emerged as welcomed guests to hold lectures and visit mosques, becoming heroes for young people and launching the appropriate discourse. At the same time, the impetus for the international Salafi jihadist movement to emerge was not provided by the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from the country but rather by the fact that the army of “Mulhids” (atheists, non-believers) entered the Islamic lands. Therefore, the current analogies with the post-Soviet period, including the collapse of the Najibullah regime, will probably be not entirely correct.
If we compared the capturing of Kabul by the Taliban with the Iranian Revolution of 1979, an important element would be missing. The Taliban movement does not call for a global expansion of its ideology, unlike the Islamic Republic of Iran, having attempted to export the revolution. Of course, we can say that the Iranian Revolution awakened, for example, the Syrian Islamists, pushing them into an armed struggle, but there is no direct evidence of this. The Muslim Brotherhood of Syria (a terrorist organization banned in Russia) launched military operations against the government even before the Iranian Revolution in 1976, although they stepped up their activities at around the same time as the revolutionary events unfolded in Iran. Rather, both the Iranian Revolution and the uprising of the Muslim Brotherhood of Syria were links in the same chain, attesting to the growth of Islamist sentiments in the Middle East.
Today, the various groups that stand for moderate Islam are wondering whether it was a mistake to strive towards democracy, using its institutions to seize power. We are, in fact, referring to the events in Egypt in 2013 and Tunisia in 2021, when Islamists were ousted from power. Their supporters, who held machine guns and rifles instead of seats in the government, somehow managed to maintain their presence on the game board, whether in Libya or Syria. Therefore, it is possible that a completely new round of the “Arab Spring” will lead to a radicalization of some previously moderate Islamic movements in terms of their readiness to embark on the path of an armed struggle. This, we should say, will come as the result of their independent and convergent evolution, regardless of any influence from the Taliban and its successes.
Finally, if we compare the implications of the Taliban takeover and the 9/11 terrorist attacks, we should not forget that it was these attacks that brought the Americans to Afghanistan. This terrorist act, which “awakened” many jihadists, was rooted in the element of surprise, a strike on U.S. soil, to help it echo around the world in such a profound way. The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, having begun back in 2014, was no secret—just as everyone, the Americans included, predicted the government in Kabul would stay afloat for more than six months, a year max, following the withdrawal of international forces. Ss such, the government’s collapse was then not a direct blow to the Americans but to the pro-American government only.
After all, the Taliban itself does not call on anyone to continue the “jihad” against the United States—on the contrary, it advocates for dialogue and cooperation, seeking recognition from Washington. This aspect cannot be ignored. Yet, it is precisely this approach that has led to the Taliban being seen as apostates from the idea of jihad, especially after negotiations with the United States were launched in Doha. This stance is common to many jihadist leaders, not only IS but also people like Abu Muhammad al Maqdisi.
The Threats and Challenges of the “Taliban Myth”: Real and Imaginary
The promotion of the Taliban myth, capable of “awakening” the radicals, is mainly hindered by the Taliban itself, who refuse to make jihadist calls for the Muslim Ummah. They are instead setting an example of how dialogue with global powers, such as the United States or Russia, rather than a “global jihad” can guarantee them success. Accordingly, the absence of such appeals makes it impossible for other radicals to conduct any activity on behalf of the Taliban, otherwise significantly reducing the propaganda effect.
Of course, many extremist movements have come out in support of the Taliban. One example is Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (a terrorist organization banned in Russia) in Idlib, Syria. In this case, though, it is worth mentioning that Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham has adopted the Taliban’s approach in terms of its own legitimization and deradicalization, assuring the world community that they do not plan to expand outside of Syria, being open to establishing relations with all countries, should they so desire. Thus, the Taliban’s example has already served as the basis for Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham to change the rules of the game, trying to go global and starting to play by the rules of the international community.
Therefore, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, like the Taliban, will avoid embittering the world community with any form of aggression. On the contrary, they will seek support from the United States and Turkey by taking measures to suppress other radical and terrorist groups in Idlib, while choosing not to target the official Damascus. The Taliban has taken similar steps since they first made contact with the United States, albeit more successfully, as they have never been a branch of IS or Al-Qaeda, unlike Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham.
Although other Idlib-rooted radical groups, including those directly associated with al-Qaeda, celebrated the success of the Taliban, their spokespeople quite tellingly noted that they see Afghanistan as a refuge where they can move and live as civilians rather than a place to continue their military activity, seeing that the Taliban would not support any aggressive actions. In this context, it cannot be ruled out that the Taliban’s influence might lead to the abandonment of the “global jihad,” and not the radicalization of certain groups. Therefore, the “Taliban myth” might threaten the very ideology of Salafi jihadism.
For example, the ousting of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in Somalia after the Ethiopian invasion in 2006 led to the emergence of the Salafi jihadist Al-Shabaab group. Today, however, radical Somali Islamists might refute this globalist project, returning to the “Islamic traditionalism” of the times of the ICU. It should be noted that not all groups have the power and influence of the Taliban to seize power. Yet, following the path of the Taliban, these groups might initiate dialogue with official governments, thus launching the reconciliation process.
It is still possible that the Taliban’s attempt to integrate into the world system may cause turmoil. If the organization fails to receive international recognition and retains its terrorist status, the living standards of the local population will deteriorate under the pressure of sanctions. This could provoke the Taliban to take more active external steps, which could pose a threat not only to neighboring countries but also to the world community more generally. This could come in the form of attempts to harbor international terrorists to, with their help, overthrow the governments of neighboring states, winning a “living space.” Of course, this threat is most palpable for the Central Asian countries. Although in this case, the initiative lies with the world community to control the process and avoid this negative scenario.
The Taliban might also seek to transform Afghanistan into a new centre of Islam, using soft power to promote their influence. It would seem that that there is demand for a new Islamic centre of power in the Muslim communities of some states in Central Asia, the South Caucasus, Russia’s North Caucasus and the Volga Region as well as across the Arab world. Such a centre would reject Salafist ideology, opting for the traditional for most Muslims of the listed regions madhhabs in aqidah and fiqh. At the same time, that demand would involve advocating for a Sharia state, open to the use of force (jihad) against the external enemies of Islam, albeit not through terrorist methods and not with the goal of external expansion. This is mostly about a “traditionalist” variant of Salafi Saudi Arabia or Shiite Iran as the Taliban and their project of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan do in many ways meet similar expectations.
Against this background, the Taliban is often seen in Muslim circles as a force against the foreign occupation of the country, on the one hand, and “Saudi Wahhabism” on the other, which can serve to promote the interests of the United States and the West. Conversely, it can become a platform to create global terrorist networks (such as IS or Al-Qaeda). Thus, globally, the ideology of the Taliban—as far as it relies on the traditional schools of Islam (four madhhabs) and the preservation of national characteristics, while establishing a comprehensive Sharia system based on traditional madhhabs—can challenge global Salafism.
The Taliban lack the necessary funding to promote their ideas as compared to the Gulf monarchies, but they do not yet seek to do so. Nevertheless, their success has earned the respect of many Muslims, leading them to believe that it is the “traditional” Islam, rather than imported Salafism, that is responsible for this. Therefore, it is tempting to contain the spread of the influence of Saudi theologians, focusing on the schools of law traditional for certain regions, although with a more consistent implementation of the Sharia principles, as the Taliban do.
Thus, although the “Taliban myth” is not a global threat, there is reason to believe that it might be effective at the regional level or within a particular state. At the same time, the bigger threat facing the Central Asian countries is not the possibility of an invasion by the Taliban or other more radical groups but rather the example set by the Taliban with their recent success. When joining a radical organization in the past involved converting local Muslims to Wahhabism and a breach of local Islamic tradition, then now, as the example of the Taliban shows, organizations based on local traditional Islamic schools may emerge, albeit without its participation or approval. This will create a much broader base of hypothetical supporters, though: they will not set global goals, rather pursuing the goal of regime change in a particular country.
At the same time, the authorities in some Central Asian states are taking action to restrict rights and freedoms, increase repression, and suppress Islamic organizations that follow moderate Islam. In addition, they may introduce restrictive measures aimed at prohibiting hijabs or beards for certain categories of the population, which can further popularize the methods and ideas of the Taliban amongst some citizens, thereby prompting more radical groups to emerge locally.
- “Jihadist-Salafism” is introduced by Gilles Kepel in his Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2002).
- Ken Guest, “Dynamic Interplay between Religion and Armed Conflict in Afghanistan,” International Review of the Red Cross, Selected articles from issues 880–881, December 2010 – March 2011.
- Chernova, “The Impact of the Islamic Revolution on Monarchical Regimes in the Persian Gulf.” Bulletin of the Herzen State Pedagogical University of Russia, 161 (2013): 26.
From our partner RIAC
Operation Neptune Spear and the Killing of Osama bin Laden
The founder and first leader of Al-Qaeda, And establishing 20-years republican government in Afghanistan: Neptune Spear was the secret name or code of the operation that was carried out under the leadership of the CIA on May 2, 2011 in the Abbottabad region of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa for killing of the leader of the Al-Qaeda group Osama bin Laden. This operation, which was carried out from Afghanistan to the territory of Pakistan by former President of the United States Barack Obama, is generally known as JSOC.
Why this mission was named Neptune Spear?
The reason why the operation to kill Osama Bin Laden, the leader of the al-Qaeda group, was given the name Neptune’s Spear is as follows: The mission was named Operation Neptune’s Spear because it was the emblem of the United States Navy Seal, and Neptune in classical mythology means the god of the sea. In addition, this operation is commonly known as JSOC, because the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) is a sub-command of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), which played an important role in the operation to kill Osama Bin Laden on May 2, 2011.
The Neptune Spear operation started on May 1, 2011 from the American military base in Jalalabad province of Afghanistan, and ended on May 2 in Abbottabad, Pakistan. Former President Obama, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, Vice President Joe Biden, Defense Secretary Robert Gates and members of the national security team were monitoring the operation online. All involved in Operation Neptune Spear were 23 SEALs, an interpreter, two helicopters and a combat dog. The operation started from a base of the American forces in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, on May 1, 2011 at 10:30 pm local time, and on May 2, 2011, after 40 minutes long operation, they ended by killing Osama Bin Laden before one o’clock. Who was Osama Bin Laden and how did he become a big threat to the world, especially the United States? Osama bin Laden, the son of Muhammad bin Awad, was born on March 10, 1957 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, but some sources close to Osama believe that he was born in 1958. Osama bin Laden had five wives, his first wife was Najwa Ghanim, who married him in 1974, his second and divorced wife was Khadija Sharif, who married him in 1983, and His third wife was Khairya Saber who married Osama bin Laden in 1985. His fourth wife was Siham Saber, who married Osama bin Laden in 1987, and his fifth wife was Amal al-Sadah, who married Osama bin Laden in 2000.
Osama had about twenty male and female children from his first four wives, but according to some sources, Osama had twenty-four male and female children from his fifth wife, and some put the number of children at 26, but the exact report is 24 about Osama’s children. Osama bin Al-Adeen studied economics at Abdul Aziz University, And in addition to this, after receiving education in the field of Civil engineering, politics and Shari’a, he studied partially in English literature at Oxford University in England, But intellectually, he was more encouraged towards the jihadist ways and intellectually he chose the jihadist way. Before Osama Bin Laden left Britain and went to Pakistan to choose the path of war, he showed intellectual interest in the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Moreover, during his university years, he financially supported jihadist groups in South Sudan, Egypt, Syria and a number of African countries, because he inherited 20 to 25 million dollars from his father, And Osama spends a part of that money on construction projects and financially supports terrorist groups with the money received from those construction companies. In 1979, Bin Laden went to Pakistan and stayed with his intellectual and jihadist teacher, Abdullah Azzam, and prepared for the war against the former Soviet Union in Afghanistan, after that, he became friends with Ayman al-Zawahiri and founded the (Maktab-Al-Khadamat) in 1984 with Abdullah Azzam, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Osama bin Laden. After that, he started recruiting fighters for Mujahideen against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and spent most of his wealth on financing terrorists. After that, Osama bin Laden started a massive effort to establish Al-Qaeda and started recruiting fighters from Africa, the Middle East and South Asia, And he accelerated the search for young people with a fighting and jihadist mindset from all over the world, and he focused on Egypt in order to attract Egyptian engineers. After extensive financial and armed cooperation with other jihadist organizations in Pakistan, in 1988, the Al-Qaeda armed group was activated by Osama, Not only did they continue their attacks in Afghanistan, but they also carried out many bloody attacks in the Middle East and Africa. The bloodiest attack was the 11th of September 2001 and the darkest day in the history of the United States. September 11 or 9/11, on September 11, 2001, 19 Al-Qaeda terrorists hijacked four commercial airplanes, and the first two commercial airplanes and suicide bombers targeted the New York City International Trade Center. The third plane targeted the headquarters of the Pentagon in Arlington County, Virginia, and the fourth plane planned to attack the federal government building in Washington DC, but did not reach the target, And in four attacks, around 3000 Americans were killed and up to 25000 Americans and foreigners were injured. After this attack, Osama was included in the list of the most wanted terrorists by the United States and the Western alliance, a list controlled by the FBI.
After 10 years of intense investigations and intelligence investigations, on May 2, 2011, the US government avenged 9/11 by killing Osama at the ISI’s most secure location in Abbottabad, Pakistan. However, Osama’s body was thrown into the sea before his body should be presented to the intelligence agencies of the world as evidence. But there is some confidential information that Osama bin Laden, the American dictator and the founder of al-Qaeda, was recruited by the CIA in 1979 at the beginning of the US-sponsored jihadist war against Afghanistan, And he was 22 years old and trained in a CIA-sponsored guerrilla training camp. In any case, Osama’s entry into Afghanistan led to the fall of the first Taliban regime, and at the same time, a person who was famous for so dear to Westerners came to power in Afghanistan.
How did Hamid Karzai get from immigration to the presidency?
Common understanding between former President Hamid Karzai and the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States and some untold facts: When the Al-Qaeda group carried out the deadly attacks in New York, Washington and Pennsylvania on September 11, 2001, and the leader of this group, Osama bin Laden, took refuge in Afghanistan. In addition, the first Taliban regime of Afghanistan at that time, under the leadership of Mullah Omar Mujahid, accepted the refuge of Osama Bin Laden. Not only that, the American people knew that the United States and the security agencies of this country would not remain silent, and would soon start preparing for revenge. But before that the United States, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Army, and the Special Operations Command of the United States Army started a response plan, they first proposed to the Afghan government to hand over Osama Bin Al-Adeen to the United States. Nevertheless, the leader and founder of the Taliban, Mullah Omar Mujahid, rejected their request, and for the second time, the United States tried to mediate the Saudi Arabia. The US asked the Taliban government to hand over Osama to the government of Saudi Arabia, but Mullah Omar Mujahid said that handing over Osama Bin Al-Aden to Saudi Arabia means handing over to America.
Furthermore, after rejecting the second proposal, the plan to attack Afghanistan was started by the United States and its allies on October 7, 2001. Just 15 days after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, CIA and US Special Forces personnel were sent to northern Afghanistan, to meet local tribal leaders and local commanders such as Abdul Rashid Dostum and work together, to start a war against the Taliban, who controlled the country and gave shelter to Osama bin Laden. A CIA team arrived with $3 million in $100 bills to use to recruit tribal leaders and strengthen the war against the Taliban, and teams of military units came from the fifth Special Forces Group. The then President of the United States, George W. Bush, together with the head of the CIA, George J. Tenet, made a coordinated decision to overthrow the Taliban government by appointing an influential person from the southwest zone of Afghanistan after the formation of a new government in the country.
That person was Abdulhad Karzai’s son Hamid Karzai who spent a lot of time in exile in Pakistan, not only he was the national leader for the Pashtuns of this side of the border, but he also had a special status among the Pashtuns of that side of the border in Pakistan. This position made him a target of the CIA. After October 7, 2001, members of the Central Intelligence Agency began to secretly visit Hamid Karzai’s house in Quetta and Chaman, Baluchistan, Pakistan, as a result, in July 2002, Hamid Karzai came to power in Afghanistan under the warm support of the CIA and the West, and he remained the president of Afghanistan until September 2014.
World Economic Forum and India steered Indo-pacific Strategy-Centric Policy
According to the sources, CIA members have gone to Switzerland to lead the security of the WEF meeting due to a possible attack. While the meeting of the World Economic Forum or WEF begins on January 16 in Davos, the Swiss Army has started security preparations under the leadership of CIA in the field for the annual meeting of the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos. For the WEF meeting in Davos, the Parliament has approved the preparation of 5000 soldiers, and now about 500 soldiers have been deployed to guard the meeting place, led by members of the United States’ Central Intelligence Network. The identities of the CIA Ops are not clear, because if the anti-western countries talk about the WEF meeting, that the security responsibility of the WEF meeting has been handed over to the CIA and only the soldiers will be from Switzerland, then it will increase the challenges to the WEF meeting. Intelligence experts and analysts of intelligence reports believe that this time, the war between Russia and Ukraine in Eastern Europe has led to the possible targeting of the WEF meeting in Switzerland, because in this international economic meeting, a number of economic topics will be also discussed against of Russia and its allies.
What is purpose of the Annual meeting of WEF?
This annual meeting, which is hosted by the Swiss country of Europe, is very important because the international economic companies and political bonds are led through the annual meeting of the World Economic Forum, and for years to come, this World Economic Forum engages leading political, business, cultural and other community leaders to shape global, regional and industry agendas. On the other hand, this annual meeting faces a number of possible risks and challenges, such as the religious war between Muslims and non-Muslims, which affects the economic forum, and the sabotage of the WEF annual meeting by terrorist and intelligence groups.
In addition, after the terrorist attacks in France in November 2015, the biggest challenge to the security of international meetings in Europe, and the current sensitive situation in Europe, the flames of war have started. The impact of the Russia-Ukraine conflict is being felt at the annual meeting of the World Economic Forum in Davos, and European and American business organizations and political processes may use tough measures against Russia. The political and business leaders of the world are worried about the economic future of Europe, because, the series of power division in Eastern Europe is going on rapidly, along with religious extremist non-militant and armed groups are also increasing in Europe, which can easily increase violence in Europe under the pretense of freedom of expression and religion. A clear example of which is the expansion of the Muslim Brotherhood and Hizb-ul-Tahrir groups in Britain, France and Germany. On the other hand, the economic and industrial promptness in Europe is increasing day by day, and at the same time, due to the war between Russia and Ukraine, the lack of energy and the trend of economic stagnation have created a sense of depression among many business leaders.
Other investment destinations also seem uncertain, but India has emerged as a region of both economic dynamism and political stability under the support of the United States, which is currently trying to include India in the P-5+1. Eager to capitalize on this current mood as an economic marketer, India is drawing the attention of world leaders to its reform decisions, and to the rapid pace at which a new unicorn is being created in the country.
Because the West is also trying to weaken the economic side of the European Union, And transfer the European economic and trade zone from Europe to South Asia and open a new economic zone by connecting Iran’s Chabahar port and Gwadar port in the future country of Baluchistan.
In turn, China is reaching the Caspian Sea through Northern Afghanistan to expand its trade with the Middle East by using the Caspian, until to leave and forget of Pakistan’s Gwadar. And the United States is preparing to give a large share in the new economic zone to its close allies from the continent of Europe, such as France, Germany, England and a number of other countries, And before that, with the support of the United States, the UAE signed an agreement with France in the field of energy. In this way, the European allies of the United States will be included in the economic contracting countries of the new economic zone, in order to reach this point; there are now efforts to disrupt the economic agreements under the umbrella and leadership of the European Union.
The current World Economic Forum is looking at a different world than it did in the past, and this is a reason for India to find itself in the sweet spot and take advantage of Europe’s current external status to emerge as a new economic leader. Chain’s future role in the WEF and what will be its alternative approach against India. Before this, Chinese President Xi Jinping focused on the Davos summit; And Xi Jinping again presented China as a champion of free trade, while the United States under the leadership of Donald Trump was seen on the other side of the fence. However, with the end of Trump’s reign, the relations between the China and the West led by the United States have become more complicated, and the challenges to China’s economic development have increased.
Because of that, China is not present as a leading trader in the current Davos summit and is standing behind, and the main reason is China’s tough stance against Taiwan, So the focus of WEF next annual meeting has shifted to India, and India is enjoying potential benefits as an alternative investment destination. In bringing India to this position, the United States has lost its closest ally in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia, and the main reason was the United States allowing India to emerge as the star of EVs in the global economic competition against China until 2030.
Apart from this, another important topic for India is the renewable energy of green hydrogen. Green hydrogen is hydrogen made with renewable energy, India’s plan aims to replace fossil fuels with hydrogen in the production of fertilizer and steel, mix it into city gas supplies and promote its use in transportation. While India’s current production of green hydrogen is low and comes from a few pilot projects, But the country wants to produce 5 million tons of green hydrogen by the end of this decade. The Narendra Modi-led government has recently approved the National Green Hydrogen Mission, which is expected to open up new opportunities towards net-zero goals in the next five decades, which will further reduce the role of China’s green hydrogen market in the international trade market. And India’s economy is estimated to grow by $20-30 trillion over the next three to five decades, which is in line with India’s net-zero commitment. Companies that want to promote India’s green hydrogen policy include Adani New Industries Ltd, Reliance Industries Ltd, Indian Oil Corporation Ltd, ONGC, GAIL India Ltd, Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd, NTPC Ltd, Larsen & Turbo, and Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd, Started investing in green hydrogen innovations. These are the economic developments that can introduce India’s presence at the next WEF meeting.
What will be the position of the economic embargo of the United States against Venezuela and Iran at the 2023 World Economic Forum meeting?
After 2022, there is still a big question whether the United States will ease the sanctions on Venezuela and Iran in order to get oil alternative for the economic sanctions imposed on Russia due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Earlier, US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken said on March 6, 2022 that the US and its European allies might impose a ban on Russian oil imports in response to the war in Ukraine.
The administration under the leadership of US President Biden was ready to improve relations with Venezuela and ease sanctions after the 2022 WEF meeting because the United States needed Venezuela’s energy reserves. However, currently the question is the relationship between Iran and Venezuela, the negative effects of which can once again make the relationship between the United States and Venezuela difficult, meanwhile, the President of Venezuela, Nicolas Maduro, has recently expressed his willingness to close relations with the United States. However, Iran’s President Ibrahim Raisi, on Sunday, January 8, 2023, in a meeting with the new Venezuelan ambassador in Tehran, warned Venezuela to avoid closer relations with the United States. In addition, the tension in relations with Venezuela will complicate the security situation in Latin America, and these all were the most important factors to the security of the WEF annual meeting, which is currently receiving increased attention.
Heathrow nuclear shipment?
Last month, during routine scanning of cargo at the Heathrow Airport, the British police came across a “very small quantity of uranium “package. The undeclared material was discovered on a passenger flight on December 29, 2022. The Indian news agencies and Daily Mail Online reported “it was destined for an Iranian business with premises in the UK (David Barret, Home Affairs Editor for the Daily Mail and Brittany Chain for Mail Online, Published January 10, 2023). Being “not of weapon grade” the uranium was incapable of being used for improvising a “dirty bomb” (a radiation dispersal device). However, some news agencies and uncanny experts tried to whip up “dirty bomb” scare out of the incident. Hamish De Bretton-Gordon, former commander of the UK’s nuclear defence regiment lent credence to the unfounded scare. He said: ‘Uranium can give off very high levels of poisonous radiation. It could be used in a dirty bomb. Indian news agencies and the Daily Mail Online, in their reports, magnified “a very small quantity” into “several kilograms” of uranium. It was claimed that the package “originated” in Pakistan though it was headed for an Iranian business in Britain.
British Police Commander, Richard Smith clarified: ‘I want to reassure the public that the amount of contaminated material was extremely small and has been assessed by experts as posing no threat to the public. ‘Although our investigation remains ongoing, from our inquiries so far, it does not appear to be linked to any direct threat.
‘As the public would expect, however, we will continue to follow up on all available lines of enquiry to ensure this is definitely the case.
‘However, it does highlight the excellent capability we and our partners have in place to monitor our ports and borders in order to keep the public safe from any potential threats to their safety and security that might be coming into the UK.’ ‘The material has been identified as being contaminated with uranium.’
It is unfortunate that India in cahoots with some foreign media is always in the forefront to exploit such incidents and portray Pakistan as a nuclear rogue. For instance, Time magazine, in its article ‘Merchant of Menace’, reported some uranium hexa-flouride cylinders were missing from the Kahuta Research Laboratories (February 15, 2005). Pakistan’ information minister and foreign-office spokesman both refuted the allegation. The information minister told Geo TV channel, “We have checked all the records and no cylinder is missing from the KRL”. Masood Khan (foreign office) told reporters, “The story is a rehash of several past stories”. May read N-Terror Threat the News International, August 27, 2009
India’s own record is dismal. Let us reminisce a few incidents It is not understood why loss of radioactive material from Indian labs is always out of the magazine’s focus _ According to international media reports (February 25, 2004),
India itself reported 25 cases of “missing” or “stolen” radio-active material from its labs to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Fifty-two per cent of the cases were attributed to “theft” and 48% to “missing mystery”. India claimed to have recovered lost material in twelve of total 25 cases. She however admitted that 13 remaining cases remained mysterious.
Pot calling kettle black:India’s radio-active bazaar
India has a sprawling civil and military nuclear programme that spreads over several states. In an article in The Diplomat, Sitara Noor highlighted shortcomings in safety and security of India’s nuclear facilities (India’s radio-active bazaar: Recurring incidents involving theft and sale of nuclear materials demonstrate why India must develop an independent nuclear regulatory body.)
<thediplomat.com/2022/03/India’s radio-active bazaar> [Accessed 14 January 2023].
She says: ‘While global markets are taking a dip due to economic recession, India’s illicit uranium market seems to be flourishing. In February, eight people including two Indian officials were apprehended in Nepal for illegally possessing and attempting to sell“uranium like substance”. The material was reportedly smuggled from India. This was not just one-off incident _ theft and sale of nuclear and radioactive material in India is a recurring phenomenon. Earlier in May 2021, reports of the seizure of 7 kilograms of highly radio-active uranium worth 210 million Indian rupees from a scrap dealer raised serious concern about India’s nuclear security capabilities. Over the past two decades over 200 kilograms of nuclear and radio-active materials has reportedly disappeared from Indian facilities. Frequent incidents of loss and theft of nuclear and radio-active materials in India indicate the failure of the nuclear security systems at multiple levels. First there seems to be a gap in the material accounting and control systems to ensure that not even an iota of material is left unaccounted. Second, the nature of incidents in India hints at the involvement of insiders_ someone working at the nuclear facilities or mining sites working independently or colluding with an outsider. This indicates the serious risk of insider threat and a failure of the personnel reliability program. Third, the recurrence of nuclear security lapses with such impunity indicates serious issues with nuclear security culture in India…’
Is Dirty bomb a hoax?
Opinion about the effects of a dirty bomb is divided.
A report by Henry Stimson Center, Washington (followed by several other reports) laments “…Nuclear and radiological terrorism remains a frightening possibility in India and Pakistan, and the source material for nuclear terrorism could come from illicit transactions of poorly protected materials originating outside the region, as well as material from within the region used for military or civilian purposes”.
This report was provided to the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee to facilitate the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program on nuclear proliferation in South Asia.
The report concludes that “although India and Pakistan have established regulatory bodies to deal with the safety and security of their nuclear materials,’ these may not be sufficient to protect against every potential threat”.
Another report, authored by Kishore Kuchibhotla, Ph.D (Biophysics) from Harvard, and Matthew McKinzie, a nuclear physicist serving as a staff scientist with USA’s Nuclear Program at the Natural Resources Defense Council, argues that “…three other types of events could prompt unintended escalation in South Asia: a terrorist use of RDDs (radiological dispersal devices); a terrorist detonation of a nuclear weapon; and the accidental explosion of nuclear arms — for example at military bases in either India or Pakistan… The report points out that while nuclear weapons themselves are closely guarded, all sorts of radioactive material could be found in research laboratories and hospitals that could provide the basic materials for the making of a dirty bomb…. Nearly 10,000 radioactive sources are used throughout India of which about 400 are particularly worrisome…” The report predicts that “…dirty bomb detonation in Karachi, New Delhi, Mumbai and Islamabad” could result in “casualties that at the very minimum would number in the tens of thousands”. It is eerie to note that The Time (Pentagon) correspondent Mark Thompson asserts in his article what is a ‘Dirty Bomb, “It’s unlikely to kill 10,000 people”.)
It appears that the concern about the “dirty bombs” is overblown. History of terrorism reflects that “terrorists” are interested in symbolic targets (which could yield widespread publicity), not in mass killing (vide Verindre Grover’s Encyclopaedia of International Terrorism).
A “dirty bomb” is not known to have been tested by any country or detonated by any “terrorist” anywhere in the world. So, its composition and scope of its destructive power is shrouded in mystery. However, it is generally believed to “consist of a bomb made of conventional explosives such as TNT, salted with radioactive material”.
Contrary to the “dirty bombs”, fall-out of the tested A-bombs is well recorded. The major powers declared moratoriums on nuclear-bombs testing only in 1992. The pre-1992-period test scoreboard of the USA, former Soviet Union, France, and Britain is an explosion every 18 days, 21 days, 61 days, and 331 days (R Venkataraman Nuclear Explosion and its Aftermath).
It is much easier and cheaper to make a chemical or biological bomb than a “dirty bomb” (It is believed that the chemical bombs used by Saddam’s Iraq against Iran were made with Indian know-how). Though a “dirty bomb” has never been used by any “terrorist”, a bio/chemical bomb was actually used by Japan’s former doomsday-cult Guru Shoko Asahara. The Guru stands sentenced to death “for masterminding the deadly 1995 nerve/chemical gas (sarin) attack on the Tokyo subway and a string of other crimes that killed 27 people”.
The cult’s quest for biological weapons was overshadowed by its chemical attack capability. The cult members were trying to develop botulinum toxin by utilising toxin of green Mamba snake and poisonous mushroom spores,
Regarding use of chemical/biological weapons by “terrorists”, Professor Ramesh Chandra points out in his Global Terrorism (volume 1, page 27), “The US government indicates that these weapons are well within the reach of terrorists. According to the Central Intelligence Agency, ‘Terrorist interest in chemical and biological weapons is not surprising, given the relative ease with which some of these weapons can be produced in simple laboratories… Although popular fiction and national attention have focused on terrorist use of nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons are more likely choices for such groups’”.
Not only sarin, but also several other chemical agents like mustard, tabun, soman and VX are capable of dual use as pesticides and as a chemical weapon. Chandra (op. cit., page 30) points out, “chemical warfare agents ‘can quite literally be manufactured in a kitchen or basement in quantities sufficient for mass-casualty attacks”. Experts agree that it is more difficult to manufacture Sarin gas, used by the “terrorists” in Japan, than mustard, tabun, soman, et al. To some experts, an effective bio-terrorism facility could be built at $ 200,000 to 2 million.
Biological weapons, too, are easier to manufacture than “dirty bombs”. Viruses could cause smallpox, Venezuelan equine encephalitis and hemorrhagic fevers like Ebola. The threat of biological weapons is obvious from the fact that: (1) The charges for anthrax, Q fever (Coxiella burnetti) and Venezuelian equine encephalomyeletus cultures from a leading US culture collection are about $ 45, $ 80, and $81 respectively. Besides, nature abounds with microscopic killers. Bacillus anthracis resides in hides and carcasses of wild or domesticated animals and plagues in prairie dogs, chipmunks, black rats, deer mouse and coyotes. Chandra (op cit) states that “The cost estimates for a bio-terrorism facility vary quite widely from $ 200,000 to $ 2 million…Instructions for how to mass produce, purify, and concentrate microbes can be found in textbooks and scientific journals”.
The Heathrow nuclear material is now seen as ‘deadly’ but the UK-based media agency reported that the uranium was ‘not weapons-grade’ – and so could not be used to manufacture a thermo-nuclear weapon, as per sources.
It appears that disproportionate emphasis on mythical “dirty bombs” vis-à-vis chemical / bio- bombs is meant to press and exploit non-major or nuclear-threshold states. “Dirty” or clean bomb attacks by “terrorists” need to be understood and explained within the broader frame of “terrorism”.
The US authorities have recorded over 175 cases worldwide of nuclear materials (not bombs) being smuggled out of former Soviet Union territories and other countries. The Federation of American Scientists, nevertheless, admits that “radiological attacks could result in some deaths but not hundreds of thousands of casualties that could be caused by a crude nuclear weapon” .
The US scientist concluded, “Significant quantities of radioactive material have been lost or stolen from US facilities during the past few years. Radiological materials are stored in thousands of facilities around the US, many of which may not be adequately protected against theft by determined terrorists’ ‘. Materials like Iridium-192, Cobalt 60 (Gamma emitter), Cesium-137 (Gamma emitter), Americium (Alpha emitter) and even plutonium could still be stolen from over 21,000 laboratories, food irradiation plants, oil drilling facilities and medical centres in the USA. But, it is not an easy job to make an effective “dirty bomb”.
It appears that “dirty bomb” is a hoax to exploit nouveau-nuclear or nuclear-threshold nations. It could be a weapon of mass disruption, but not a weapon of mass destruction. Real threat emanates from chemical or bio-weapons.
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