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The jihad after Afghanistan

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How will the jihadists’ global threat evolve after Afghanistan is back under Taliban rule? It should not be forgotten that the Taliban are the victorious expression of a people of over thirty million inhabitants. A people that is in no way represented by those few who are trying to flee the country and are crowding Kabul airport, as some Westerners in bad faith miserably try to propagandise. At the end of the 1970s the Vietnamese were not the few boat people, but the over forty million inhabitants who had liberated the country from foreign occupation.

What shape will Muslim radicalism take vis-à-vis the US-friendly anachronistic Arab monarchies, as well as towards the nationalist-secular Arab countries and towards Western countries?

The answer to this question is particularly complex because, while the bilateral confrontation between the USA and the USSR, prior to jihadism, which replaced the Cold War – as the bogeyman of the United States – was a contrast between two ideologies and two political practices that both stemmed from Western culture (liberal-bourgeois-capitalist law and socialist law), today what we see as the “global jihad” is completely unrelated to the above-mentioned systems. This symbolic, communicative, strategic and political extraneousness makes it difficult to understand Islamic law, whose ‘holy war’, the jihad, represents its own legal institution, which the “fine souls” and beautiful minds of our superficial Western world, consider to be out of time – just to use the words of the late Prof. Giorgio Vercellin, quoted in my previous article:

«Islam and the Muslim world are presented on the same archaeological level (and therefore devoid of evolution until today) as the ancient Greeks and Romans. […] The real crux is that the Society of Italian Historians has considered the “Muslim world”, so to speak, automatically as part of the “ancient world”».

Therefore, if the institutions of Muslim law are considered outdated by those who think that their own ‘Kantian’ law is an absolute value that must take precedence – especially with bombs – over the values of faith, morality and ethical economics, it is obvious that any hint coming from the East (people’s Republic of China and Russia included) is somehow beastly and brutal. Hence we should not be surprised that we, in turn, are given a taste of their own medicine and are paid back in kind.

While NATO and the Warsaw Pact were not superimposable but replaceable, today, instead, the ideological and political-military universe of the jihad is not only not superimposable to that of all the Western creeds and policies, but is even incomprehensible for the reasons mentioned above. This has led many Western governments to believe – again using a Kantian metaphor – that “a hundred possible thalers” were the same as “a hundred real thalers”.

In other words, the Western global bipolar confrontation with the Marxist-Leninist universe had its own codes, which allowed both detente and pressure from one side on the other up to the limit of the outbreak of nuclear war – while Marxism-Leninism was an ideology that promised to overcome capitalism and pick up “the flags that the bourgeoisie had dropped in the mud”, according to Stalin’s phrase taken up by Togliatti.

In the case of global jihad, there is not this structural affinity and similarity between the two ideologies in global contrast: they are two completely different aspects, which have neither mother nor father in common. On the contrary, there is a rejection of the entire West, both in its socialist and anti-capitalist variants and in its liberal and capitalist determinants.

It is therefore structurally difficult to apply the classic and infantile US Fukuyama-style crystal ball that, by predicting the end of history and Kantian universal peace, ignored a phenomenon that deliberately escapes these categories, as well as the time of analysis, while the perceptive and cultural incommunicability is part of Clausewitz’s “fog of war” and is also knowingly and institutionally used by the jihad as an irreplaceable instrument of psychological warfare.

Let us better analyse, however, how to thematize the structural dynamics of Islamic fundamentalism.  

The jihadist informal groups accept the radical Islamist ideology, generically called Salafist, that is defined by the practical and religious example of Prophet Muhammad’s first believers. The Salafists’ relationship is with the Muslim Brothers and with the Deobandi school, an interpretative tradition of Islam born in India in the second half of the 19th century. It is, therefore, a simplified Islam, which rejects both the atheistic and materialistic West and the long tradition – often Quietist and dialogue-oriented – which characterized the Islam of the Ottoman Empire.

The jihad has no leaders, and adapts rapidly to the transformation of the battlefield where it is actively engaged in various parts of the world, as well as to the penetration – with the same adaptive and operative rules and therefore maximum camouflage – into the Western world of destination, both as a still silent cell and as the initial nucleus of the jihad in the Dār al-kufr, the territory of unbelief.

The assumption of the jihad without leaders works well in the phase of penetration, indoctrination and training of the fundamentalist cells, which corresponds to the maximum cultural and operative camouflage with the world outside of the cell, while it is less effective in describing the operations on the ground.

The jihad, which is fundamentalist (and it should be recalled that the word “fundamentalism” originated in the sectarian tradition of US Protestantism), has not the predictive times and mechanisms – not to mention the objectives – of a movement with Western political roots, although extremely minority and violent.

It should also be recalled that, on the basis of the Sunni tradition of Ibn Taymiyyah‘s medieval commentaries, the jihad – by Muslim law – is the second duty of the Muslim after the Articles of Faith (Iman). It is a collective duty and concerns the simultaneous struggle against the external enemy (the crusaders allied with the Zionists) and against the internal enemy (the nationalist and secular Arab governments).

Here lies the issue of the “great jihad” (the spiritual effort of the individuals to improve themselves) and of the “small jihad” against the visible and external enemy, from which it follows that the corrupt rulers and “friends/servants of the West” no longer have any legal-religious authority to rule the ummah (the global community of believers).

This is a strategic and mental set-up that is completely different from that of the Western armies and political systems, which find themselves taken aback – from the first moment – by an enemy that is global and local, and has a chain of command unknown to the Western strategic tradition (and to much of the secularised and nationalist Arab tradition).

The global jihad is obviously not a Western strategy, nor is it a Sun Tzu-style Eastern one, in which the timescales of war are inevitably similar but shorter than those of politics. It is a cornerstone of Islamic law which, after the abolition of the Caliphate (March 3, 1924) has been resumed – in principle – in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse, and is essentially directed against “the crusaders and the Zionists”.

Furthermore, terrorism (the weapon of the poor) is not the essence of the jihad, but a simple tactic of recent implementation, according to the particular model of hierarchical and centre-periphery relations described above. The jihad is a geopolitical project that concerns the political-military unification of the Islamic ummah all over the world, both where it is the majority and where it is the minority, with all that this implies against the State of Israel and the Western economic power, trying to create a relationship of Wests’ geoeconomic subordination and subjection towards the Islamic world, both in the oil and financial fields.

Jihadism has therefore attracted – so as to later exhaust it, both politically and economically – the US global power in the most suitable areas, which have been the secular Iraq, Afghanistan and the socialist Libya of the Arab Jamāhīriyya, while the United States, the West and the allied Arab monarchies have attempted to destabilise the secular and socialist Syria to oppose the Chinese Silk Road.

The jihadist Islamisation, however, is currently unable to define precise and universally recognisable hierarchies, and it also maintains that, without a da’wa – an Islamic preaching that covers all social behaviour – the jihad is devoid of religious and legal foundations, and it is as worth and valid as the illegitimate taqfiri Islamic regimes that no longer follow the Koran guidelines in society, economy and law.

Islamism is based on the democracy=polytheism equation: hence the very essence of Western politics – in all its forms – is idolatrous and polytheistic taqfir.

The strategic objective is therefore very clear: the creation of a global Caliphate articulated in different areas, defined according to the majority or minority presence of Islamists within them. This would mean the dhimmitude of the other faithful, the People of the Book. I have been maintaining all this since ten years before the creation of ISIS, which was ultimately and fatally set up by the West to oppose Assad and China.

With reference to the Western logic of politics and the war clash, there is another dialectical pair that can help us build a probable future scenario of Jihadism and its moves. It is the centralisation-decentralisation pair.

For the West, decentralisation is peaceful devolution and political federalism, but always in a Clausewitzian logic of military confrontation. This sees two or more state elements opposed to each other and equivalent, within a “fog of war” that lasts for a short time and where the Clausewitzian triad of government, army and people becomes essential. In the case of jihad, the behaviour will be ever more decentralized and by autonomous poles of Mujahideen, with a maximum operative autonomy against Western targets. The strategic synthesis will regard propaganda, the management of the operations concerning the anti-Western psychological warfare, and the scanning of the pace and localization of the operations, through their own internal communication networks.

The variables which will lead to this scenario – which are not materially calculable today – concern: the share of militants who will be able to become operative; the persistence of the cover networks both in Islam and in the West; the shift – in the Western field – from a regional competition between the powers that have used the regional imbalance of the jihad to acquire new spheres of interest, to an active collaboration – on the North-South axis – against the global jihad.

While it is true that by now, the axis of the “holy war” involves all Central Asia (including the Chinese Xinjiang Weiwu’er) and Northern India, the variable that could overturn the jihadism strategic equation concerns the active collaboration between Russia, the People’s Republic of China, the European Union and the United States to avoid the South (and the Eastern Asiatic region) of the world becoming jihad areas at the moment in which what occurs is the combination between various Western economic and financial crises (with Chinese and Russian “after-effects”) and the current US defeat in Afghanistan, which would greatly favour Islamic fundamentalism.

In analytical terms, after the expulsion of the United States from Afghanistan, the jihadism global strategy is:

(a) to impose a network of structured militants, to be later turned into local caliphates (see the examples in Africa, after the destabilisation of Libya, and the strong Islamic minorities in Europe);

c) to extend the jihad to the secular and nationalist Islamic countries close to Iraq and Afghanistan (and here the variable of the Sunni hatred towards the Shiites becomes crucial vis-à-vis Iran – which, in the future, could channel the common interests of Israel and Iran);

d) to cause the final clash between the Middle East jihad and the State of Israel, which has wisely stayed out of Afghanistan.

A prospect which is coordinated with the jihadist project as far as the West is concerned, as well as the now takfiri Muslim countries, in which six phases can be identified:

1) the “Islamic awakening” which has caused the chaotic and irresponsible action of the United States;

2) the massive recruitment at the time of the maximum US and Western commitment in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria and Libya, which is matched – as a command-control-military management network – by the “electronic jihad“, which in fact has become massive in those phases;

3) the strengthening, to define a clash with the Islam geographically closer to the West and more secularised, such as Turkey, after having failed (together with the West) in Syria (protected by the Russian forces);

4) the real “economic war”, which would lead to the constant attack for the control of the Middle East’s oil infrastructure and hence to the collapse of the Arab Wahhabi monarchies which, however, are still friendly to the United States;

5) the declaration of an “Islamic caliphate” which will close its relations with the West and open – in all likelihood – economic ties with China and the growing medium-sized powers of East Asia (as is already being planned in the Emirate of Afghanistan);

6) finally, the confrontation with the West could be turned from regional – in the Islamic countries and in the Middle East – to global, with the “revolutionary” management of the Islamist networks in Europe and the United States.

What could make these jihadist scenarios fail? While it is true that phase 1) has laid the conditions for a chaotic US action, it is equally true that so far jihadism has not demonstrated, in fact, an ability of Islamist political synthesis of the Central Asian and Middle East regional jihads.

In other words, it is possible that the Chechen, Tajik, intra-Pakistani, Indian, Xinjiang Weiwu’er and Afghan jihads cannot be unified only with the glue of the radical Salafist Islam. The Pakistani interests of the jihad, for example, could not coincide with those of a foreseeable Afghan hegemony in the Central Asian jihad, which Iran has so far used to close the strategic leeway of its traditional and religious adversary, i.e. Pakistan.

The variable of the objective national and ethnic-tribal interests could make the Qaedist glue of “Asia’s Caliphate” completely decorative or purely ideological. Obviously, we are talking about concrete national interests, not about psychological or ideological national and ethnic identities. We do not believe that the victorious Afghan Emirate would agree with the jihadisms’ global strategy of destroying the logistic networks, which are essential for the survival of the Country.

Also in the case of the future clash in Turkey, the jihadist network could certainly create a severe situation of friction and weakening of the Anatolian strategic rampart towards the Persian Gulf area, and make the Mediterranean a “sea of jihad“. Here, however, there are two variables: the scarce cultural and religious homogeneity of the Turkish Islam, with the presence of many and strong minorities, of which the Alevis are one of the most numerous, and the immensity of the Anatolian plateau, which needs a mass of jihadists not easy to recruit so as not to conquer it, but only to control it with interdiction operations. We should also consider the role of the Kurdish minority between Iraq and Turkey that would certainly not be interested in relinquishing the US protection to be diluted in the jihadist melting pot, without achieving its own constituent objectives.

Indeed, after the closure of the Iraqi front, the expansion into Turkey is also less probable than the jihadists may imagine. In fact, we must not overlook the strategic correlation between unitary nationalism, which is more profound in many Arab States than we may believe, and the ethnic-religious dispersion, which does not permit a fast spreading of the global jihad.

It should be recalled that there are several non-Islamic religious minorities in the Arab world that can be divided into three groups: Christians (Monophysites and Catholics), Jews and the Heterodox (including, for example, the animist religions of Sudan), for a total of over 22 million people.

In this context, indeed, paradoxically it is precisely the “religious awakening” of the Salafists connected to the jihad that can lead to the rediscovery of the local, identity and ethnic roots that differentiate each group from the globalist metaphysics of the Caliphate’s “sword jihad”.

Therefore, on an ideological level and in terms of psychological warfare, the identity and Salafist call of Islam can be overturned counter-dialectically: the identity of the histories of tribes and nations – often preceding European colonialism – against the globalisation of the “sword jihad”, opposite and equal to the flattening and levelling of Western globalisation.

It should also be added that the destructuring and disruption of the dollar system starting from the oil area (an attempt that led to the execution of Saddam Hussein, who had opted for the euro) and the discontinuity of the crude oil supply from the OPEC countries to the West, as well as the transition to gold and, later, to a basket of currencies to replace the US dollar as lender of first and last resort, are still an effective threat. But the variable of the jihadist strategy is the following: how much and to what extent are the economies of the main OPEC countries really linked to the direct extraction of crude oil?

If – as is well-known – dependence on oil is bilateral, the scarcity of supply – natural or caused by the OPEC quota system – cannot go so far as to make the other non-oil energy technologies profitable, nor can it be in the interest of the OPEC system to see the backwardness of the oil-derived Western infrastructure, which can extend the lifecycle of wells, and improve oil extraction technology in the Islamic OPEC countries.

Hence there is an objective interest of the OPEC area in financial differentiation, but at the same time there is also an interest in not lowering the relative value of the US dollar too much. Indeed, the jihad strategies can be useful in a phase of friction between the oil Islam and the West, but they cannot become structural in the relations with the crude oil consuming countries, without risking diminishing the very strategic value of the “oil weapon”.

Furthermore, considering the strategic correlation between the US financial market and the People’s Republic of China, a choice by the jihadists to turn the Islamic oil market to China – once the Middle-East Caliphate is established – seems an option hard to be achieved and having significant, but not destructive, geostrategic effects.

Therefore, jihadism is capable of unifying the South of the world in “revolutionary” terms. This means it has the potential to become a global player of world geopolitics and, above all, of world geo-economics. It has the ability to force both the “crowds” and the Islamic governments, whether friendly or not, to make radically anti-Western choices and confront the USA, NATO and the EU. It can define actions of structural destabilization of the European countries and the United States, on the basis of the old “indirect strategy” model of Soviet tradition, by manipulating and organizing the Islamist or, anyway, extremist public of these countries. It is not foreseeable, however, that it can become a caliphate capable of incorporating the medium-sized Islamic OPEC powers and inserting itself – managing it for its own purposes – in the structural crisis of the Western geopolitical power, above all, the US one, in a phase of strategic non-polarity.

Jihadism is and will predictably be – in the future – an element capable of challenging and sometimes beating the West on the ground where it wants to call its adversaries. It will be a very strong frictional factor in the inter-Arab equilibria and in the management of the Arab crowds’ psychology. Finally, in all likelihood, it will be able to open a new front in Central and South Asia. Nevertheless, it is unlikely to succeed in replacing the Arab States’ system, and it shall always come to terms with a significant part of the Islamic world that does not intend to be incorporated or assimilated into the West.

Advisory Board Co-chair Honoris Causa Professor Giancarlo Elia Valori is an eminent Italian economist and businessman. He holds prestigious academic distinctions and national orders. Mr. Valori has lectured on international affairs and economics at the world’s leading universities such as Peking University, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Yeshiva University in New York. He currently chairs “International World Group”, he is also the honorary president of Huawei Italy, economic adviser to the Chinese giant HNA Group. In 1992 he was appointed Officier de la Légion d’Honneur de la République Francaise, with this motivation: “A man who can see across borders to understand the world” and in 2002 he received the title “Honorable” of the Académie des Sciences de l’Institut de France. “

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India’s Strategic Use of TTP to Undermine Pakistan’s Stability

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Image source: hindustantimes.com

Again, bloodshed in the city of flowers, with more than 90 martyrs and at least 250 injured in a suicide attack by the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan in Peshawar. India’s backing for the TTP and its participation in the group’s avowed jihad against Pakistan have emerged as the most important security challenges in South Asia, with significant ramifications for regional stability and peace.

The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), commonly known as the Taliban in Pakistan, is a Pakistan-based Islamist extremist group. The group, which was founded in 2007, has claimed responsibility for a number of fatal assaults against Pakistani civilians and military personnel. TTP has proclaimed war against Pakistan’s government and military forces, arguing that they are not Islamic enough.

TTP has become a major security danger to Pakistan over the years, spreading widespread fear and instability. The group’s constant strikes on civilians and military targets have resulted in hundreds of deaths and massive devastation. The rising frequency and savagery of TTP assaults has caused considerable alarm among Pakistanis and the international world. Despite significant international criticism, the TTP continues to carry out atrocities with impunity.

Evidence of India’s Support for TTP:

Over the last decade, Pakistani security services have often reported on the Indian intelligence agency (RAW) providing support to the TTP. This assistance has been reported to include financing, training, and weaponry, all of which have aided the TTP’s capacity to carry out strikes against Pakistan. Pakistani officials, security professionals, and independent investigators have claimed India’s participation with TTP, citing proof of Indian involvement in TTP activities and divulging the false flag operations.

TTP commanders obtaining safe shelter in India is another piece of evidence pointing to India’s connection with TTP. TTP commanders have been said to have crossed the border into India for medical treatment and then stayed for lengthy periods of time. The granting of safe haven to TTP commanders implies that India is not only supporting the organization, but also shielding its leaders from prosecution and reprisal.

In addition to the Indian intelligence agency’s direct backing for TTP, there have been claims of Indian media outlets distributing misinformation in favor of TTP. This has included interviews with TTP officials and positive coverage of TTP’s efforts by Indian news sources. The media coverage has been interpreted as a means for India to legitimize the TTP’s conduct and seek sympathy from the world community.

India is contributing to Pakistan’s instability by supplying TTP with the money, safety, and legitimacy it requires to carry out its assaults.

India’s Motives Behind Supporting TTP:

One of India’s key motivations for supporting the TTP is to undermine Pakistan’s government and military. By assisting the organization, India is able to undermine Pakistan’s ability to maintain security and stability, creating an atmosphere in which the TTP may operate with impunity. The ultimate purpose of this assistance is to weaken Pakistan’s military and political institutions, making it easier for India to achieve a regional advantage.

Another reason India backs the TTP is to create a political and security vacuum in Pakistan. By assisting the organization, India may foment turmoil and instability in the country, creating possibilities for India to exploit the situation. The political and security vacuum left by the TTP’s operations can then be utilized by India to further its own goals and acquire more influence in the area.

India’s backing for the TTP might also be interpreted as an attempt to shift attention away from its own human rights violations in Kashmir. By assisting the TTP and producing turmoil and instability in Pakistan, India is able to divert attention away from its own activities in Kashmir, which have been severely condemned for abusing the human rights of Kashmiris. By helping TTP, India can divert attention away from its own acts and position itself as a responsible regional actor.

The Consequences of India’s Actions:

One of the most serious consequences of India’s backing for the TTP is the worsening of terrorism in Pakistan. India is feeding the fire of terrorism in the area by supplying finance, training, and equipment to the group, making it easier for TTP to carry out its heinous actions. This has had a significant influence on Pakistan’s security and stability, as well as the safety of its population. Terrorism has exacerbated violence and loss of life, creating an environment of dread and insecurity throughout the country.

India’s backing for TTP worsens regional tensions and instability. The rise of terrorism in Pakistan has heightened tensions between Pakistan and India, as well as between Pakistan and its neighbors. This has produced a climate of insecurity and uncertainty in the region, threatening regional peace and security. As each side gets more entrenched in its stance, the international community’s ability to find a solution to the crisis has become more difficult.

India’s backing for TTP has had a significant influence on regional peace and security. The rise in terrorism and tensions has made it increasingly difficult to establish regional peace and stability. This has had a detrimental influence on the region’s economic development, social advancement, and people’s well-being. The continuation of violence and insecurity has also made it more difficult for the international community to address the underlying causes of conflict and work toward a long-term solution.

Conclusion:

The international community must take steps to confront India’s backing for TTP. India’s activities are clearly against international law and standards, and they endanger regional peace and security. The international community must strongly denounce India’s conduct and endeavor to hold those involved accountable for their acts.

Holding those involved accountable for their conduct is critical to preventing such incidents in the future. The international community must act to bring individuals who promote terrorism and destabilize the area to account. This involves investigating and punishing individuals responsible for supplying TTP with support, as well as those involved in planning and carrying out terrorist actions. Only by taking firm action can we expect to restore stability and security to the area and prevent such actions in the future.

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Cyberwar, Netwar: The Untouchable and Unpredictable

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Territorial integrity, sovereignty and non-interference are salient features of a just and secure state. For a state to exist, compete and survive in the international context, a country must be well equipped. The unbiased, neutral and non-aligned movement is the best way to reach heights, especially for small states. However, this is not an easy task, ‘everything has a price’. The existence and co-dependence of a state are made further vulnerable as well as strengthened by way of ‘information’. Unlike in past, when troops protected borders, at present country must face and react to content generated and disseminated on online platforms.

Cyberwar and Netwar are mechanisms that are used by certain individuals as well as entities to infiltrate systems, pass a message, steal information or change the material content. “Cyberwar” is the act of “disrupting, if not destroying, information and communication systems”. On the contrary, “Netwar” is to “disrupt, damage, or modify what a target population knows or thinks it knows about the world around it”.  These threats are vicious to national security. Since the whole world is digitalized, any information regardless of its credibility reaches a wide audience. There are various modes of cyberwar including Phishing, Ransomware, E-commerce data interception, Crimeware-as-a-Service, Cyber Scams and Crypto-jacking. (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1995) states, that a Netwar may focus on public or elite opinion, or both. It may involve diplomacy, propaganda and psychological campaigns, political and cultural subversion, deception of or interference with local media, infiltration of computer networks and databases and efforts to promote dissident or opposition movements across computer networks.

According to Blackfog’s 2021 State of Ransomware Report, government agencies were the top targets for cybercriminals, followed by education, healthcare, services, technology, manufacturing and retail. According to Curran, Concannon and McKeever (in Janczewski and Colarik 2008: 03) have pointed out; the LTTE became the world’s first terrorist outfit to attack a country’s computer system in 1998. Another example is India. In August 2013, Indira Gandhi International Airport (IGI) faced a Cyberattack. ‘Technical snag’ hit the operations of terminal no. 03. Nisar & StepovayaIn (2022) has cited (UNODC, 2021) which states that in September in Malaysia, a web-hosting service was the target of a ransomware attack demanding US$ 900,000 in cryptocurrency and In May, four subsidiaries of an international insurance company in Thailand, Malaysia, Hong Kong, and the Philippines were hit by a ransomware attack asking for US$ 20 million. Where that being said for cyber-war, net war is also a crucial problem. This is explicit in Russia and Ukraine conflict where information advantage is heavily discussed and debated. Byman (2022) has mentioned, “Confrontation between Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE (the so-called “Quartet”) and Qatar, for example, began in 2017 in part due to social media exploitation involving hacked email accounts and associated disinformation”. Sri Lanka too faces disinformation by LTTE and its international networks.

Threats, which occur on online platforms, are equally important as much as militaristic aspects of warfare. Where the militaristic aspect includes conquering and declaring power, Cyberwar and Netwar disrupt systems and brainwash people respectively. Since crimes conducted, are unpredictable, intangible and cross borders, ascertaining the criminal is daring. Due to these reasons, imposing liability as to whether it is collective or individual becomes strenuous. Furthermore, lack of experience, expertise in personnel, lack of technology and inadequate infrastructure can be identified as problems. Information illiteracy is another pertaining issue, which is the inability of individuals to recognize when information is needed and have the ability to locate, evaluate and use information effectively. Moreover, cyber-attacks are widely done due to their low cost and widespread nature.

With that being said, it is imperative to reiterate, that national security is threatened by Cyberwar as well as Netwar. Thus, any country must overcome the challenges mentioned afore. For that, to fight cyber war, enhancing technological infrastructure and technical capacity is important. In netwar, information literacy must be instilled to the population. Hence, people will be able to evaluate the quality, credibility and validity of the content. In addition, it is crucial to have a reporting mechanism for false content disseminated online. International cooperation is effective to combat Netwar and Cyberwar. Likewise, it is vital to sign and ratify necessary laws and follow resolutions in the international context. Furthermore, individuals, government, as well as private entities, must behave in a cyber-resilient manner that they are otherwise not incentivized to do.

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Operation Neptune Spear and the Killing of Osama bin Laden

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The founder and first leader of Al-Qaeda, And establishing 20-years republican government in Afghanistan: Neptune Spear was the secret name or code of the operation that was carried out under the leadership of the CIA on May 2, 2011 in the Abbottabad region of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa for killing of the leader of the Al-Qaeda group Osama bin Laden. This operation, which was carried out from Afghanistan to the territory of Pakistan by former President of the United States Barack Obama, is generally known as JSOC.

 Why this mission was named Neptune Spear? 

The reason why the operation to kill Osama Bin Laden, the leader of the al-Qaeda group, was given the name Neptune’s Spear is as follows: The mission was named Operation Neptune’s Spear because it was the emblem of the United States Navy Seal, and Neptune in classical mythology means the god of the sea. In addition, this operation is commonly known as JSOC, because the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) is a sub-command of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), which played an important role in the operation to kill Osama Bin Laden on May 2, 2011.

The Neptune Spear operation started on May 1, 2011 from the American military base in Jalalabad province of Afghanistan, and ended on May 2 in Abbottabad, Pakistan. Former President Obama, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, Vice President Joe Biden, Defense Secretary Robert Gates and members of the national security team were monitoring the operation online. All involved in Operation Neptune Spear were 23 SEALs, an interpreter, two helicopters and a combat dog. The operation started from a base of the American forces in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, on May 1, 2011 at 10:30 pm local time, and on May 2, 2011, after 40 minutes long operation, they ended by killing Osama Bin Laden before one o’clock. Who was Osama Bin Laden and how did he become a big threat to the world, especially the United States?  Osama bin Laden, the son of Muhammad bin Awad, was born on March 10, 1957 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, but some sources close to Osama believe that he was born in 1958. Osama bin Laden had five wives, his first wife was Najwa Ghanim, who married him in 1974, his second and divorced wife was Khadija Sharif, who married him in 1983, and His third wife was Khairya Saber who married Osama bin Laden in 1985. His fourth wife was Siham Saber, who married Osama bin Laden in 1987, and his fifth wife was Amal al-Sadah, who married Osama bin Laden in 2000.

 Osama had about twenty male and female children from his first four wives, but according to some sources, Osama had twenty-four male and female children from his fifth wife, and some put the number of children at 26, but the exact report is 24 about Osama’s children. Osama bin Al-Adeen studied economics at Abdul Aziz University, And in addition to this, after receiving education in the field of Civil engineering, politics and Shari’a, he studied partially in English literature at Oxford University in England, But intellectually, he was more encouraged towards the jihadist ways and intellectually he chose the jihadist way. Before Osama Bin Laden left Britain and went to Pakistan to choose the path of war, he showed intellectual interest in the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Moreover, during his university years, he financially supported jihadist groups in South Sudan, Egypt, Syria and a number of African countries, because he inherited 20 to 25 million dollars from his father, And Osama spends a part of that money on construction projects and financially supports terrorist groups with the money received from those construction companies. In 1979, Bin Laden went to Pakistan and stayed with his intellectual and jihadist teacher, Abdullah Azzam, and prepared for the war against the former Soviet Union in Afghanistan, after that, he became friends with Ayman al-Zawahiri and founded the (Maktab-Al-Khadamat) in 1984 with Abdullah Azzam, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Osama bin Laden. After that, he started recruiting fighters for Mujahideen against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and spent most of his wealth on financing terrorists. After that, Osama bin Laden started a massive effort to establish Al-Qaeda and started recruiting fighters from Africa, the Middle East and South Asia, And he accelerated the search for young people with a fighting and jihadist mindset from all over the world, and he focused on Egypt in order to attract Egyptian engineers. After extensive financial and armed cooperation with other jihadist organizations in Pakistan, in 1988, the Al-Qaeda armed group was activated by Osama, Not only did they continue their attacks in Afghanistan, but they also carried out many bloody attacks in the Middle East and Africa. The bloodiest attack was the 11th of September 2001 and the darkest day in the history of the United States. September 11 or 9/11, on September 11, 2001, 19 Al-Qaeda terrorists hijacked four commercial airplanes, and the first two commercial airplanes and suicide bombers targeted the New York City International Trade Center. The third plane targeted the headquarters of the Pentagon in Arlington County, Virginia, and the fourth plane planned to attack the federal government building in Washington DC, but did not reach the target, And in four attacks, around 3000 Americans were killed and up to 25000 Americans and foreigners were injured. After this attack, Osama was included in the list of the most wanted terrorists by the United States and the Western alliance, a list controlled by the FBI.

 After 10 years of intense investigations and intelligence investigations, on May 2, 2011, the US government avenged 9/11 by killing Osama at the ISI’s most secure location in Abbottabad, Pakistan. However, Osama’s body was thrown into the sea before his body should be presented to the intelligence agencies of the world as evidence. But there is some confidential information that Osama bin Laden, the American dictator and the founder of al-Qaeda, was recruited by the CIA in 1979 at the beginning of the US-sponsored jihadist war against Afghanistan, And he was 22 years old and trained in a CIA-sponsored guerrilla training camp. In any case, Osama’s entry into Afghanistan led to the fall of the first Taliban regime, and at the same time, a person who was famous for so dear to Westerners came to power in Afghanistan.

How did Hamid Karzai get from immigration to the presidency?

 Common understanding between former President Hamid Karzai and the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States and some untold facts: When the Al-Qaeda group carried out the deadly attacks in New York, Washington and Pennsylvania on September 11, 2001, and the leader of this group, Osama bin Laden, took refuge in Afghanistan. In addition, the first Taliban regime of Afghanistan at that time, under the leadership of Mullah Omar Mujahid, accepted the refuge of Osama Bin Laden. Not only that, the American people knew that the United States and the security agencies of this country would not remain silent, and would soon start preparing for revenge. But before that the United States, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Army, and the Special Operations Command of the United States Army started a response plan, they first proposed to the Afghan government to hand over Osama Bin Al-Adeen to the United States. Nevertheless, the leader and founder of the Taliban, Mullah Omar Mujahid, rejected their request, and for the second time, the United States tried to mediate the Saudi Arabia. The US asked the Taliban government to hand over Osama to the government of Saudi Arabia, but Mullah Omar Mujahid said that handing over Osama Bin Al-Aden to Saudi Arabia means handing over to America.

Furthermore, after rejecting the second proposal, the plan to attack Afghanistan was started by the United States and its allies on October 7, 2001. Just 15 days after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, CIA and US Special Forces personnel were sent to northern Afghanistan, to meet local tribal leaders and local commanders such as Abdul Rashid Dostum and work together, to start a war against the Taliban, who controlled the country and gave shelter to Osama bin Laden. A CIA team arrived with $3 million in $100 bills to use to recruit tribal leaders and strengthen the war against the Taliban, and teams of military units came from the fifth Special Forces Group. The then President of the United States, George W. Bush, together with the head of the CIA, George J. Tenet, made a coordinated decision to overthrow the Taliban government by appointing an influential person from the southwest zone of Afghanistan after the formation of a new government in the country.

That person was Abdulhad Karzai’s son Hamid Karzai who spent a lot of time in exile in Pakistan,  not only  he was the national leader for the Pashtuns of this side of the border, but he also had a special status among the Pashtuns of that side of the border in Pakistan. This position made him a target of the CIA. After October 7, 2001, members of the Central Intelligence Agency began to secretly visit Hamid Karzai’s house in Quetta and Chaman, Baluchistan, Pakistan, as a result, in July 2002, Hamid Karzai came to power in Afghanistan under the warm support of the CIA and the West, and he remained the president of Afghanistan until September 2014.

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