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Russian Far East and Arctic: Emerging Arenas for India-China Competition?

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In a speech this year in Moscow, Indian Foreign Secretary highlighted the three strategic geographies- Eurasia, Indo-pacific and the Russian Far East (RFE), and the Arctic, which will be the key emerging theatres of geopolitics that upcoming diplomats will be engaged in throughout their careers. He further stressed that not only is Russia crucial to all the three regions, but there is also an inherent need of multi-polarity for the security and prosperity of these regions. Also, a multipolar world and a multipolar Asia is not possible without India and Russia.

Did the Foreign secretary underline the increasing Chinese ambitions in these regions and the need for countering these ambitions by pointing towards the necessity of multipolarity in Asia? Several questions arise when we take in consideration the recent rejuvenation in the relationship between India and Russia, and the narrative that strategic hedging against China is the main motive behind this rejuvenation. 

For answering these, one needs to understand why China is interested in these regions and what has been China doing in these key areas. Further, what are India’s stakes in these regions and whether India can think of competing with China here. Moreover, how Russia looks at the competition if it exists. This piece tries to analyze these questions and highlight the ongoing geopolitical dynamics in the RFE and Arctic and the pertaining Indian and Chinese foreign policies, in their past, present, and future goals.

Importance of RFE and Arctic

Geographically, RFE comprises of the Far Eastern Federal district that is the easternmost territory of Russia sandwiched between eastern Siberia and the Pacific Ocean. The district shares land borders with Mongolia, China, and North Korea to the south and shares maritime borders with Japan to its southeast and with the US to its northeast.

Having never known serfdom, this region has been culturally, religiously and politically different from Moscow and the Russian heartland for a major part of history, by virtue of more entrepreneurism and autonomy. Today there exists an additional dimension to this ‘difference’ between the RFE and the center. In the Soviet period, the region was tied to Europe economically but in past decade it has become increasingly clear that several of the Far Eastern krais and oblasts (units of governance in Russian political system like districts), especially those bordering China are now economically dependent more on Asia than on European region. This situation is compounded by migration related demographic issues. For more than a decade now the region has witnessed exodus of ethnic Russian population and seen a growing influence of Chinese businesses and migrants. The extent of this phenomenon is widely visible as over the years large tracts of land in this region have been leased to Chinese for farming, infrastructure projects and energy exploration, with a low tax regime and a considerable amount of autonomy over the activities. As a result, the region has witnessed  emergence of Chinese run farms which look like fortresses, surrounded by high fences and red flags.

The Arctic is deemed as the northernmost region on Earth. While most part of this region used to remain covered with snow for a major part of the year, this phenomenon has been on a downfall due to changes being purported by climate change. The Arctic region not only contains plethora of mineral resources but is extremely important from strategic point of view. During the cold war era, the Arctic held a prominent place in the political and military standoffs between the two superpowers- US and USSR. The region observed a drop in the geopolitical and geostrategic relevance in the 1990s and remained of ‘low tension’ due to commitments made by the Arctic states to keep the Arctic a zone of peace.

The unfreezing of snow makes way for the possibility of opening of the Northern Sea Route which can provide a cost-effective and shorter duration alternative for global shipping routes. Also, scientific developments taking place in hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation can lead to full-scale utilization of the resource base of the Arctic in near future.

Moscow’s Approach  

Since the rise of Vladimir Putin at the helm of Russian Federation, Moscow’s approach towards development of the RFE has been to inject money into existing industries which according to many analysts of the field has not worked due to the lacunae in addressing the problems of infrastructure and regional integrity. Moscow desires to integrate the region with the broader Asia-Pacific region to solve the problems of development, investment, and connectivity.

 In last few years, Moscow has taken decisions like encouraging the return of Russian ‘compatriots’ from Central Asia to accelerate large scale projects. It has also created Special Economic Zones with low tax regimes, focused on modernizing the ‘Trans-Siberian railway’ network, and emphasized on plans to invite investments in the region from nations like India and Japan, beyond the biggest investor in the region- China.

It has to be noted that any developments in the RFE cannot be in isolation from that in Arctic. With the aim of developing both the regions in concurrence, Moscow created the ‘Ministry of the RFE and the Arctic’ which is now working on creation of a corporation in order to supervise the economy and to assume control over elements like ports and exchanges.  For the Arctic, Russia rolled out its ‘Strategy for Developing the Russian Arctic Zone and Ensuring National Security through 2035’ in October last year, which aims to advance the development of the region’s abundant resources (especially oil and gas), and improve living conditions for the population. As a long-term objective, Russia hopes to establish the Northern Sea route as a new global shipping lane. These aims and policies need to be considered while understanding Chinese and Indian policies and ambitions and the emerging geopolitical triangle between the three countries, resulting in both cooperation and competition.

The India-China Competition

 The perception of China has seen a rise and fall in the last three decades in Russian society. Unlike the 1990s, when there was much skepticism regarding a rise in Chinese immigration, Russia became less wary of engaging with China when relations with the west deteriorated in the aftermath of conflicts in Georgia in 2008 and in Crimea in 2014. Gradually, China became the leading source of foreign direct investment in the region as well as the leading exporter to the districts at the Russia-China border. The extent of asymmetry in terms of trade resulted in a situation where while the exports from this region are diversified among the three northeast Asian states- South Korea, China and Japan, the imports are heavily dominated by China, mainly consisting of machinery, equipment and metals. This imbalance has been further aggravated by factors such as sanctions by the west- leading to declining investment from European nations, and the dramatic rise of China in realm of manufactured goods- which has led to stagnant conditions for the local industries of these regions which are now dependent on export of mainly raw materials and minerals.

As observed by some experts, Beijing’s interest in the region increased after the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 when the Chinese investment was followed by an influx of Chinese migrants in the five districts at Russia-China border, namely- Amur oblast, Jewish autonomous region, Primorsky Krai and Khabarovsk Krai. From amongst these regions, Amur oblast has the largest gold reserves in Russia, while in another near-border district of Oktyabrsky, there are large Uranium deposits. Adjoining Amur is Sakha (or Yakutia), which carries the world’s largest diamond deposits.

 However, mineral resources are not the only source of motivation for Chinese investment in the region. RFE contains huge potential for infrastructure development in realm of power generation (where Chinese electric companies have already shown interest to gain foothold), and upgradation of railway infrastructure which can connect the RFE, Northeast China and Japan with Europe with a land-based network and thus reduce the sea-dependence. Invariably, there has been an increasingly accepted reality that like the Russian Asia-Pacific policy, the policy in RFE too might become lopsided due to the factor of overdependence on China.

 Kremlin on its part remain aware of the increasing dependence on export of raw materials to China. China on the other hand is working actively in diversifying its own energy imports and is now seeking to compete with Russia in realm of exports to traditional Russian markets for weaponry and technology. Ideas like temporary placement of skilled manpower from India in RFE are being explored. Besides this, the pledge by India for a $1 billion Line of Credit for development of the RFE highlights the importance being placed by the two countries to make this region a source of renewed cooperation.  For now, the plans have been in phase of conceptualization and once the implementation stage arrives, China’s stance towards the potential competition here will be interesting to observe.

Unlike the case of RFE, the changing dynamics and increasing Chinese interests in the Arctic region have been debated and speculated much more in the global geopolitical arena. In the last two decades, not only has Beijing accumulated memberships in all Arctic-related regional associations in some form, but Beijing has also made it a surety that China actively participates in all international organizations whose responsibilities cover the Arctic Ocean and laws related to it. To this end in the past decade, Beijing has started projecting its interest and speaking up on issues pertaining to Arctic. The extent of this activism can be verified by the aims and objectives mentioned in the white paper published by China on 26 January 2018, titled ‘China’s Arctic Policy’. This policy paper very explicitly states that China will participate in regulating and managing the affairs and activities relating to the Arctic, and that ‘respect’ is the key basis for China’s participation in Arctic affairs.

Beijing has made it clear that it has formulated policies and have interest in every realm in the Arctic, ranging from development of shipping routes, exploration and exploitation of oil, gas and minerals, conservation and utilization of fisheries, tourism, as well as strengthening her leadership credentials by having a say in Arctic governance. In totality, if RFE is a region for China’s increasing influence in Russia’s domestic landscape, Arctic is much more of an opportunity to put on display the increasing clout and aspirations for being accepted as a ‘great power’ who now has interests in every corner of the world. India, even if starting to present itself as an alternative to China in the RFE, will find it difficult to match the Chinese position in the Arctic.

 In January this year, India rolled out a draft Arctic policy of its own and highlighted that India seeks to play a constructive role in Arctic by leveraging its vast scientific pool and expertise in Himalayan and polar research. India remains aware that Arctic might be becoming an arena of increasing power competition.  But beyond planning, goal setting, and utilizing the existing mechanisms for scientific development, in coming years, the economic base of India will not let New Delhi go all-out for claiming a position on the Arctic high table. This is bound to increase tensions in Moscow who would not want a challenge to its hegemony in the Arctic by an increasingly ambitious China.

Conclusion

 On its part, Moscow has taken several steps to develop the RFE region to reduce its overdependence on China. However, remoteness of the region, outmigration and difficult business environment are some other issues which append the complex dynamic of the region. Beijing is aware of the benefits available due to scarce ethnic Russian labor, lack of investment from other sources for Russia, the geographical difficulties for nations like India for smooth access, and the absence of deep pockets like China for other nations. In case of the Arctic, Beijing is going for proactive diplomacy and wooing the smaller states. Although Beijing would not want to come to blows with Washington or Moscow in any ways, creating a discourse where China starts being seen as a ‘Arctic’ and not just a ‘Near-Arctic’ state will be a big win for China even before any other advantages as mentioned above are realized. India while looking to initiate presence in RFE can be deemed capable to some extent, but the credentials in case of Arctic region seems no match to that of China. Russia on her part, will want India to at least think about trying to punch above its weight and rise to the task of providing Moscow a way for hedging against Chinese hegemonic ambitions. Recently, India has expressed interest in cooperating with other nations like Japan in these key strategic areas. How Moscow responds to these plans by New Delhi will shape the geopolitical dynamics between Moscow, Beijing, and New Delhi in these two emerging regions which look all set to witness a competition in the coming years.  

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East Asia

Xi Jinping’s visit to Russia and America’s hostile policy towards China-Russia rapprochement

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The visit of Chinese President “Xi Jinping” to Russia will be organized, which will most likely take place after the end of the sessions of the Chinese Parliament, which are traditionally held annually in early spring in February of each year.

  It seems to me that the Chinese comrade “Xi” himself deeply admires Putin on a personal level.  But it seems to me that the most worrying thing about Putin himself is that China, despite the strength of its relationship with him, is also seeking to set a high price for support. For example, Beijing wants to restrict Russia’s highly lucrative arms sales to India, a sworn enemy of China across the Himalayan range on the Sino-Indian border.  Despite this, the Chinese company, Huawei, is building Russian fifth-generation networks, while Russia requires Chinese cooperation on everything from aircraft parts to currency swaps in the local currencies of the two parties.

 Relations between Russia and China, which the two sides describe as a “borderless” partnership, have gained great importance after the launch of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. While Western countries imposed unprecedented sanctions on Russia, China refrained from condemning Moscow’s military crackdown and merely emphasized the need for peace. Russian energy exports to China have increased dramatically since the outbreak of the war, and Moscow has become the single largest supplier of oil to China.  However, there are very serious limits to the pattern of “boundless” relations between China and Russia.  For now, China assures Western countries that at least it does not sell weapons or aircraft parts to Russia.  Beijing is desperate not to fall victim to the same sanctions imposed on the Russians after the Ukraine war.  So it sets limits to the relationship with Moscow.

 Beijing has so far been careful not to provide direct support that could make it vulnerable to Western sanctions over Russia’s war against Ukraine. At a summit held in September 2021 in Uzbekistan, Putin acknowledged the concerns of his Chinese counterpart “Xi Jinping”, about the situation in Ukraine.

 The visit of Chinese President “Xi Jinping” to Russia is an affirmation of Beijing’s solidarity with Russia during the continuation of its military campaign in Ukraine. This visit will show the world how close Russian-Chinese relations are.

  With China’s readiness, according to what Beijing officially confirmed, about its willingness to increase strategic cooperation with Russia against the background of the difficult situation in the whole world.  According to Chinese state media analysis.

  In a previous video call between Presidents “Xi Jinping” and Putin, it was confirmed that the road to peace talks on Ukraine will not be easy, and that China will continue to uphold its objective and fair stance on the issue, according to the official China Central Television broadcast in Beijing.

  It is expected that Russian gas supplies to China will increase after that visit.  This was confirmed by Russian President “Putin” that Russian-Chinese cooperation is increasing as a factor of stability in the international arena with Putin’s statements about the importance of continuing joint military cooperation with Beijing, to enhance regional security and work to develop it in the future.

 The visit of Chinese President “Xi Jinping” to Russia will be a joint declaration of the “borderless” partnership, which was announced between the two parties during the February 2022 summit, at the time of Beijing’s hosting of the Winter Olympics, as both sought to challenge the influence of the United States of America and pressure for a multipolar world.

  Here, Moscow and Beijing present themselves as a geopolitical counterweight to the United States of America and its other allies. Moscow and Beijing also conducted several joint military maneuvers and exercises in their nearby areas of influence, including naval maneuvers in the East China Sea, as a warning message to America and its allies about the Taiwan Strait.

  Likewise, during President Xi Jinping’s visit, China will try to increase the benefit from Russian supplies of gas to the Chinese economy, given that Beijing is the main consumer of hydrocarbons, at a time when the Europeans are trying to get rid of their dependence on Russian energy.

Here, China holds the cards when it comes to Russian gas.  Just before invading Ukraine, Putin signed an agreement with Xi to increase Russian natural gas exports to 48 billion cubic meters annually as a future deal, instead of capping a modest 4 billion cubic meters in 2020.  Russia is also planning to build a new pipeline, known as (Power of Siberia 2), which may lead to the transfer of Russian gas exports from Europe more easily to China.

 Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Moscow will also reflect an affirmation of Beijing’s refusal to publicly condemn Russia’s war against Ukraine, with China instead accusing the United States of provoking Russia by pressing for NATO’s expansion to the east into the regions.  direct Chinese Russian influence.

   But on the other hand, with no indications that the conflict in Ukraine is about to end at the present time, President Xi has taken steps to distance himself from his Russian counterpart, including China’s signing of a statement during the G-20 summit, in November 2022 in Bali.  Indonesia, China, along with its other member states, reaffirmed their strong condemnation of the war in Ukraine.

 The summit that took place between President Xi Jinping and his counterpart, US President “Joe Biden”, on the sidelines of the G20 meetings, also helped ease tensions between the two largest powers in the world, as the two leaders jointly warned the Kremlin in Russia, because of a Russian statement,  About the imminent outbreak of a nuclear war against Ukraine.

 The first American comment on the event of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Russia came through a State Department spokesperson, in a statement, to express Washington’s concern about China’s alliance with Russia, in light of Moscow’s continued brutal and illegal invasion of Ukraine, according to the official American  statements.

 Here came the United States and Europe’s warning to China of the consequences of providing any military assistance to Russia in its war against Ukraine or helping it evade internationally imposed sanctions.

 Here came the joint declaration between Moscow and Beijing to continue strengthening their strategic and comprehensive partnership relations, emphasizing the rejection of attempts to build a unipolar world dominated by Washington, because that American hegemony has acquired an ugly form in recent times.  The Chinese Foreign Ministry’s response also came with an emphasis on China’s support for Russia in strengthening its position as a major power in the international arena.

During Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Russia, it will be emphasized that China is ready to continue to provide mutual support to Russia on issues related to their core interests, such as:

  (Sovereignty and security, intensification of strategic coordination between the two countries, and strengthening communication and coordination in the main international and regional organizations in whose membership they participate, such as: “The United Nations, BRICS Group, Shanghai Cooperation Organization”)

  Here, Russian President “Putin” opposes any attempts by any external forces to interfere in China’s internal affairs, such as the situation in Xinjiang, Hong Kong and Taiwan, with his Chinese counterpart, “Xi”, asserting that Beijing has always made independent judgments regarding Russia, foremost of which is its war against Ukraine.

 During the visit, Chinese President “Xi Jinping” is expected to call on all parties to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine to find a peaceful solution, with the Chinese leadership willing to play a constructive role in this process. And while the Chinese government called earlier to adopt peace between Russia and Ukraine, it stressed at the same time its understanding of Russia’s security concerns, and its condemnation of the supply of weapons from the West to the capital, “Kyiv”.

  At the end of February 2022, Beijing abstained from voting on a UN Security Council resolution condemning the Kremlin’s actions regarding Ukraine.  And this is despite Washington’s pressure on Beijing to adopt a position more in line with the Western position, but China refused to take any hostile stances or measures towards Russia, which it always describes as a “strategic partner”.

 Hence, we conclude the extent of the great Chinese political solidarity with Moscow. With the increase in the overall Chinese trade movement with the Russian side, and China essentially abandoning Ukraine’s support despite their previous relations in favor of Moscow, Beijing also expanded its financial transactions with the Russians without using the currency of the dollar or the euro, and doubled future cooperation for the development of military technology with Russia while conducting the Joint Russian-Chinese military exercises in the Pacific region.   In my personal belief, the American concern itself is not from a joint official Russian-Chinese alliance, but rather the fear of the compatibility of the policies of the two countries, which follow two different authoritarian regimes according to the classification of America and the West, and oppose the world order that the United States of America controls internationally in the recent time. The two parties together may impede the ability of the United States of America to implement some of its international goals, and thus influence the American influence internationally.             

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Chinese Communist Party and the path of “high-quality development” at Guangdong Province

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A night view of Shenzhen, Guangdong province, on March 10, 2018. (PHOTO / VCG)

During the meeting of “Huang Kunming”, Secretary of Guangdong Provincial Party Committee mentioned that it is significant for Guangdong embark on a path of high-quality development fit for its own situation. According to my highly understand of China’s high-quality development and analysis to the nature of the Chinese society and the polices of the Communist Party of China regarding the development is meaning (all-round building a strong modern socialist country) and all-round rejuvenation of the Chinese nation still need to rely on development.

 With the continuous development of the Chinese economy and the deepening of reforms, China put forward a new expression of “high-quality development” for the first time at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2017, which indicates that China’s economy has moved from a stage of rapid growth to a stage of high-quality development.

 Changing China’s economic development strategy is an inevitable choice in line with the law of development and the demands of its development. Now, China is seeking to change its previous development pattern of relying on a large number of factors of production to focus more on quality and efficiency.  It has begun to adhere to the implementation of the new development philosophy that emphasizes innovative, coordinated, green and open development for all, and to build a new development pattern that relies on domestic trade and promotes integration between domestic and foreign trade to enable the Chinese society to complete the building of a strong modern socialist country in an all-round way, Chinese side should stick to advancing high-quality development as the top priority, as President Comrade “Xi Jinping” stressed in the report.

 High-quality development mainly depends on the economy’s vitality, innovation and competitiveness.  In order to improve these capabilities, China is accelerating the implementation of the innovation-driven development strategy, intensifying its efforts to achieve a high level of self-reliance in scientific and technological research, mobilizing forces and focusing on solving intractable problems in original and pioneering science and technology research to achieve breakthroughs in some crucial and pivotal technologies, which are guided by these strategies, China has achieved good results in manned space industry, lunar and Mars sounding, deep-sea and land exploration, supercomputers, satellite navigation, quantum information, electro-nuclear technologies, large-scale passenger aircraft, medicine, biopharmaceuticals and other fields over the past years, and joined the ranks of innovative countries in the world.

 Green development is an important symbol of the transition of China’s economy from the stage of rapid growth to the stage of high-quality development. In recent years, China has pushed the green transition to a development mode, implemented the comprehensive rationalization strategy, developed green and low-carbon industries, and advocated green consumption.

  The bright future of China’s economy stems from more flexible and high-quality development. In 2021, China calmly responded to changes in the world as well as the COVID-19 epidemic, took new steps to build a new development pattern, achieve new results in high-quality development, and achieve a good start for the 14th Five-Year Plan. China has maintained a leading position in the world in economic development and in epidemic prevention and control, accelerated the growth of national strategic scientific and technological forces, improved the flexibility of the industrial chain, continued to deepen supply-side structural reforms, and made solid progress in the green transformation of the low-carbon economy and prosperity subscriber.

  Here, with the strong leadership of the Communist Party of China, the significant advantages of the socialist system with Chinese characteristics, the technological foundation accumulated since reform and opening up, the extremely large market advantage and domestic demand potential, and with huge human capital and human resources, the Chinese economy will continue to grow steadily on the path of high-quality development, enabling China to contribute in achieving a steady and stable progress in the recovery of the global economy.

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China’s Deflating Population: The Economic Marvel in Eclipse?

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So China’s population shrank last year. I admit my first instinct was … well, isn’t this a good thing? I mean, during the entire 1960s and 1970s, global discourse misted around how the world population kept growing beyond the finite resources of this world. And how food scarcity and poverty would create a social depression. China, with a population of roughly 1.4 billion people, was specifically a focal point of population reduction strategies. After the widespread catastrophe of the Great Leap Forward, a debilitating social program orchestrated by Mao Zedong in the late 50s, China’s population was on the up and up in the following decade, to the point that the infamous ‘One-Child Policy’ was introduced in the late 70s to inhibit the burden of a growing population – and concomitant poverty. Since then, however, China has dynamically transformed into an economic powerhouse – a factory floor for global manufacturing. And here lies the answer to this population conundrum: Shrinking population in China is a problem now!

According to the data released by the Chinese government last week, China’s population contracted by circa 850,000 people in 2022; with 9.56 million births against 10.41 million deaths, it was the first time in more than half a century that deaths outnumbered births in China. The initial thought would be to blame it on the pandemic. But that would be a blinkered assumption without gauging the stunted birth rate. It was the sixth consecutive year that the number of births fell, down from 10.6 million in 2021, according to the National Bureau of Statistics. Many demographers and statisticians warned for years about a population decline on the cards, albeit much later in this decade. This presage was why the government reposed its one-child policy in 2016 and extended the limit to three children in 2021. Local governments offered tax rebates and outright cash handouts to couples having children. The source of anxiety was partly social and partly economic – or maybe socioeconomic is the correct juxtaposition.

China is a rising economic power, the world’s second-largest economy, and the strongest contender to dethrone American supremacy. But in listing all the superlatives, we sometimes forget that China is still a developing economy. Despite its phenomenal evolution from endemic poverty, its average population still earns less than the average earnings in advanced economies. And the shrinking population is a two-pronged issue that could constrict China, like other leading developing economies, into a middle-income trap.

Just by simple inference, we can judge that a declining population is also an aging population. Impressive modernity in China’s healthcare system has led to an increase in life expectancy. Meanwhile, a decades-long hiatus in birth-conducive policies and changed mores of young Chinese couples, often antipathetic to having children altogether, have led to a sharp decline in births. A combination of these factors has invited a conspicuous outcome: Shrinkage in China’s working-age population. In fact, China’s working-age population has been in decline since 2015; according to a government spokesman, it could fall to roughly 700 million (approximately 23%) by 2050. This factor would be particularly problematic for China, which has long been a competitive labor market for manufacturing heavyweights like Apple and Microsoft. But moreover, a bulging elderly population amidst falling tax receipts would pose a challenge to government finances, especially given the comparably underdeveloped social safety net programs in China. Therefore, either taxes ought to be raised sharply or state pensions to old-age dependents would hit the skids – a spartan policy dilemma either way.

We can draw apt comparisons from Japan – the world’s third largest economy – which has notoriously suffered from a lopsided aging population and accompanying anemic economic growth since the asset bubble burst of the 1990s. I mean, China’s real estate market does look like a financial crisis just waiting to happen. But post-boom Japan has tried virtually every bizarre economic strategy – from negative interest rates to yield curve control – yet has failed to spark demand-led inflation. Strangely, however, China has sustained its bustling economy on prohibitive rates of investment rather than consumer demand, which has remained relatively lukewarm due to policymakers’ reluctance to pass the complete scope of economic growth to households. Nonetheless, a contracting labor force would perhaps accelerate the exodus of manufacturing from China unless the government finds alternatives to sustain China’s unrivaled productivity levels.

We could blame China’s ‘zero Covid’ policy for strangling economic growth. It is no surprise that China’s economy grew by a modest 3% in 2022, its slowest rate in nearly four decades, barring 2020. Intermittent lockdowns and pedantic mass testing regimes cast a pall over economic activities. And higher interest rates imposed by the Federal Reserve and other central banks have dampened global demand and diluted appetite for Chinese imports. According to government officials, year-on-year Chinese exports fell by 9.9% in December. While an economic turnaround is widely expected later this year, a falling working-age population; a skyward old-age dependency ratio; and the ongoing trade tussle with the United States could cost China many more decades to supersede the American edge. However, China has been an iridescent success story, an economic miracle of sorts. And therefore, if the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) could somehow prioritize economy over national security; social reforms over governmental control; and collaboration over confrontation, I reckon China can again defy the odds and achieve its dream.

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