People have expressed disappointment at how Afghanistan was packaged and handed over to the Taliban like Santa’s Christmas gift. However, President Biden “stands squarely behind [his] decision” to withdraw “because…it’s the right decision for our [Americans] people.” Perhaps, Biden was right. The swift collapse of the Afghan government despite 20 years of support and military training validates his skepticism that US presence and continued efforts would ever have enabled the government to stand. The withdrawal is probably a blessing as it might have saved American lives. US troops had been reduced from about 15,500 to 2,500, while “the Taliban was at its strongest militarily since 2001” Based on the evidence that the Afghan troops did not have the will to fight, we can say that the American forces would have been in great danger had they been there at the time of the seizure.
However, some scholars argue that a “‘Real chance’ Afghanistan withdrawal ‘destroys’ Biden presidency.” Some journalists believe that it is “Donald Trump’s policy, but it’s Joe Biden’s implementation, and he will pay quite a price for the shambles that is unfolding.” Others claim that it highlights America’s failures in military planning, intelligence, nation-building, and most importantly, failure to protect those it has sworn to defend, leaving them to fall to their death from a moving aircraft.
How will the Afghanistan situation affect the long-term US-Taiwan relations? Will Afghanistan encourage Taiwan to seek its security or seek diplomatic measures towards China? Will the US use Afghanistan to validate why Taiwan needs to continue living under the US security umbrella? This piece argues that the Afghan problem is likely to have a dire consequence on American credibility in Taiwan among the public. However, although leaders will show “over-attention” – the US will become a larger part of their world, paying attention to every little US decision – they will not change much in top-level political policies, and the existing trend will prevail.
Since the Nationalists under Chiang Kai-Shek fled to Taiwan in 1949, their return to the mainland – as rulers – has remained an illusion, dissipating with time. Since a military return isn’t feasible, Taipei has decided to assert independence, calling the mainland to see the reality of the time and “set aside the baggage of history and engage in positive dialogue.” A move Beijing rejects. The mainland has made conscious efforts to reunify while both sides continue to “respect each other’s choice of development path and social system.” However, the US props Taiwan since the 1950s, and Taiwan exists because of the US security umbrella. The US support was to neutralize the communist threat in the Pacific area. This strategy persists because the US argues China poses a substantial threat, exacerbated by its economic growth and associated externalities.
Through history and legality (the 1992 Consensus), China regards Taiwan as a breakaway province that needs to be brought back at all costs, including force, without any compromise. Aaron Friedberg argues that because America’s support for Taiwan upsets China and China’s Asia domination is inevitable, “the US should stop making Taiwan an irritant in Beijing-Washington relations” to expand China-US cooperation. However, others see China as a power with strategic aims beyond Taiwan and that if the US withdraws, China’s global and regional challenge will persist and grow.
The images from Kabul airport, showing chaos and people’s fear as they flee the country, could send chills into Taiwan’s public, pondering what would happen if the US similarly abandons them. Taiwan’s youth has bought into Taiwan’s independence mantra, in a direct divergence with their compatriots in the mainland. The youth suspect their leaders might cave into China’s pressure for reunification. Thus, they demand more scrutiny in all agreements with China, adequately supervised and monitored by the people to protect their hard-fought democracy and independence ambition. This was the primary demand when they stormed the Taiwanese parliament in 2014. These youth would likely begin to suspect the US’s credibility and willingness to protect them, taking inspiration from Kabul. Afghanistan may sow doubts, shaping the notion that one cannot count on the US. Steven Erlanger agrees that “Afghanistan’s Unraveling May Strike Another Blow to US Credibility,” thus “compounding the wounds of the Trump years and reinforcing the idea that America’s backing for its allies is not unlimited.” Indeed, this “hesitation will now be felt all the more strongly among countries in play in the world, like Taiwan.”
In March 1973, the US military left South Vietnam after signing the Vietnam Peace Agreement. Soon, the governments that the US had supported in Indochina fell to Marxist governments. Marxist successes cascaded into the Global South, including Africa and Latin America. In 1979, the Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan to support the pro-communist/pro-Soviet regime rattled by internal rebels. The rebels defied the combined Afghan and Soviet forces to make the conflict extraordinarily costly for the Soviets. The Soviet troops began to withdraw in May 1988, paving the way for the rebels to overthrow the Soviet-backed government in 1992. A weakened Soviet withdrawal preceded the collapse of Marxist regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union itself in December 1991. Therefore, it is not surprising that the US withdrawal from Afghanistan led to the fall of the regime Washington had constructed and propped. President Biden was clear about its anticipation: “there is no chance that 1 year — 1 more year, 5 more years, or 20 more years of US military boots on the ground would’ve made any difference.” However, the speed of the fall is noteworthy: “The truth is: This did unfold more quickly than we had anticipated.”
Although these precedents exist, Taipei will unlikely change its existing US policies despite leaders’ over-attention because Afghanistan and Taiwan conditions are dissimilar. The US and Taiwan enjoy a robust unofficial relationship and a unique security partnership. The US also ally with others whose security is bounded with Taiwan, such as Japan. The US-Afghanistan relationship was a bilateral partnership guided by the Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement (economic and political commitments) signed in 2012. We cannot deny that alliances can lead to entrapment (entangled in another’s war) or abandonment (abrogating the alliance contract or failing to make good on explicit commitments). However, it is unlikely that the US would abandon Taipei as it did in Kabul, looking at the strings of alliances related to Taiwan and its influence on the US global power. In case of withdrawal, the US would implement appropriate diplomatic measures with Beijing, similar to when it switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei in 1979.
Moreover, the US and Taiwan have a common perceived threat – China – thus, they have similar strategic objectives. Taiwan is concerned with the increasing threat to its independence. Recently, the US is also overly concerned about China’s growing regional and global strength. Apart from the direct security threat, China’s helping hands abroad seem to have elevated its perceived global influence, likely to win friends. Thus, President Biden hopes to repair alliances and engage with them to “meet today’s and tomorrow’s [challenges]… including the growing ambitions of China to rival the United States.” However, the US has argued that its strategic objective in Afghanistan was “counterterrorism – not counterinsurgency or nation-building,” which is achieved. Therefore it had no basis in staying in Afghanistan, as both Trump and Biden administrations concluded. Thus, it does not mean that the US is prepared to see its allies fall. Nevertheless, leaders in Afghanistan had no specific interest aside from enriching themselves under the US cover.
Finally, we need to take cognizance that the US-trained Afghan forces were not defeated on the battlefield. They became moles through corruption and betrayed their country. The security forces saw the government as corrupt and illegitimate, prompting them to be corrupt themselves. The semiannual report to Congress in June 2020 reported rampant corruption remained a critical challenge. 80% of Afghans believe that the government was corrupt. The corruption resulted in attritions of 66% of the army and 73% of the police between December 2019 and May 2020. The US was made to believe that Afghan security forces were 352,000. However, the Afghan government could confirm 254,000. Afghan commanders created ghost names for profit. They enriched themselves with serving officers’ salaries. Thus, some officers were not paid for six to nine months.
The Taliban brokered deals with some government officials. Taliban leaders offered money – $150 – in exchange for government forces to hand over their weapons or join them. Since commanders were enriching themselves, “most troops chose to cut deals with the Taliban, surrender, or simply melt away rather than risk their lives for a hopeless cause.” Therefore, it was no surprise that no one was prepared and willing to fight and die for that corrupt and illegitimate government. “Everyone was just looking out for himself.” While Afghanistan ranks 165th on Transparency International’s corruption perception index 2020, Taiwan ranks 28th. Moreover, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit, Taiwan is the most democratic country in Asia, ranking 11th globally. Thus, it is unlikely that the corrupt practices that made Afghanistan fall could slide Taiwan. Nevertheless, leaders in Taiwan would seek US assurances through its Asia Pacific democratic partners.
The Demise of a French Sub Deal: Is China a Threat?
The conflict between emerging and existing powers is almost as old as time. Labeled the Thucydides Trap, it first recounted the 5th century BC Peloponesian war and its inevitability as Sparta, the dominant power, feared the rise of Athens. Is something similar about to transpire between the US and China?
The latest war of words is about nuclear submarines. When armed with ballistic missiles, they become a hidden mortal danger. So the US also deploys nuclear attack submarines which shadow rival nuclear ballistic submarines … just in case.
Australia was in the process of acquiring 12 French conventional attack submarines (a deal worth $37 billion) when the US and UK stepped in with the AUKUS deal. Intended to counter China, it offers Australia advanced nuclear propulsion systems and an opportunity to construct nuclear subs of their own with the technology transfer. Australia will then become the seventh country in the world to build and operate nuclear submarines.
The fear of the ‘yellow peril’ is ingrained in the Australian consciousness from the days when they were afraid of being swamped by Chinese immigrants. It led to restrictive immigration policies for non-whites.
Much of the concern with China is due to the forceful nature of Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s policies. In Xinjiang the Uyghur population is a minority in its home province due to the influx of Han Chinese. Moreover, Uyghurs feel discriminated against, in jobs and the progress they can make. Some have rebelled causing many to be put in re-education camps where there are tales of torture although denied by Chinese authorities. Biden has declared it a genocide and introduced sanctions on leading Chinese officials there.
China’s proactive foreign policy, renewed interest in Afghanistan, its warships patrolling all the way across the Indian Ocean to Africa are further evidence.
The new Afghan leaders, at least many of them, spent their exile in Pakistan giving the latter influence with the new government. And Pakistan is effectively a Chinese client state. The mineral wealth of Afghanistan, if it is to be developed, is thus likely to include Chinese help.
The UN General Assembly holds its first debate of the new session on the third Tuesday of each year; the session then runs through to the September following. As leaders converge, one of the questions being asked of those involved in AUKUS is how they are going to pacify an angry France. It has recalled its ambassadors from Australia and the US — in the latter case a move without precedent in almost 250 years of diplomacy.
If the French feel the Australians have been duplicitous, the Australians for their part claim they are obligated to do the best for the people who elected them. The new deal brings jobs, technology and a greater role for Australia in dealing with an increasingly powerful China
It would be a great shame if the West in trying to shore up its interests in the Indo-Pacific region loses a crucial ally — France — at the very least in wholehearted support. Is Mr. Xi smiling and quoting some ancient Chinese proverb, perhaps Lao Tzu, to his colleagues?
Japanese firms’ slow and steady exit is sounding alarm bells in Beijing
Last year in March, former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe had indicated Japan would initiate measures to reduce the country heavily relying on China for factory production. Since July 2020, Japan has rolled out subsidies totaling over 400 billion Yen to move its enterprises out of China to Southeast Asia and beyond. It is yet to be seen if the scale of incentives has actually triggered a major change in where Japanese companies relocate production. On the other hand, experts in China continue to wonder why would Japanese companies which are on average making 17% profit diversify into the ASEAN nations, where in 2019, their rate of return on direct investment was a mere 5%?
In less than ten days, Japan is going to have a third prime minister within a short span of twelve months. On September 1 last year, when Prime Minister Shinzo Abe resigned on health grounds, Yoshihide Suga was chosen as Abe’s successor. At the time, China’s leadership did not show any worrying signs as the new Japanese leader was expected to continue with the foreign policy of the previous government. But one year later, Suga’s unexpected departure is leaving Japan’s diplomatic relations with China considerably strained over Taiwan. Yet the leadership in Beijing is not going to lose sleep over the next prime minister’s public stance on the Japan-Taiwan “alliance.” What China will be closely watching is how many more billions of Yen and for how long a new leader in Tokyo will carry on with rolling out subsidies to lure away Japanese businesses out of China?
Interestingly, on assuming office Prime Minister Suga had promised continuity in domestic policies and that he will respect Abe’s foreign policy. However, Suga’s promised commitment to further improve relations with China was viewed differently in the People’s Republic. Writing in an article on the day Yoshihide Suga took office in Tokyo, Zhou Yongsheng, professor of Japanese studies at Beijing’s China Foreign Affairs University, observed: “[Under Suga] Japan will continue to align with the US as far as international relations and security affairs are concerned, and continue to back the US policy of containing China It is under these preconditions that Japan will seek cooperation with China.”
In sharp contrast, reviewing Suga’s foreign policy performance after two months, NIKKEI Asia’s foreign affairs analyst Hiroyuki Akita wrote in November 2020: “Suga has not said much publicly about his views on diplomacy but he has urged his aids to continue Abe’s diplomacy as it is at least for one year.” Akita gave a thumbs up to this approach and recalled a Japanese saying to describe it: “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.” However, not everyone agreed with Akita praising Suga’s brief record in diplomacy as flawless. Having spent seven years in the Abe cabinet as Chief Cabinet Secretary, Suga’s image was that of “a fixer, not a leader.” Suga did everything in diplomacy in his early phase as the prime minister what Abe had been espousing for the past seven years.
But as Toshiya Takahashi, professor of IR at Shoin University in Japan had predicted within a few weeks of Suga becoming the top leader, “Abe’s shoes were too big for Suga to fill.” Why so? Mainly because unlike Abe, not only Suga was not ideological, he was also far less diplomacy driven. “Suga is not an ideologically driven revisionist — he is a conservative politician, but his attitude has no relation to ideology. He does not seem to hold any specific cherished foreign policy objectives that he is willing to push with all his political capital in the way that Abe did in 2015 with the passage of the security-related bills,” Takahashi had commented.
To observers and experts in both Japan and China, Prime Minister Suga’s (he will relinquish office on September 30) non-enthusiastic approach to foreign policy might have much to do with the current state of strained relationship between Japan and China. Asahi Shimbun opinion poll last year claimed foreign policy and national security as among the two most popular elements of Abe’s legacy. No wonder, critics in Japan have been pointing out that Suga’s cabinet did not have the luxury and support Abe enjoyed in foreign affairs of having in the government someone like Shotaro Yachi – the former secretary general of the National Security Secretariat. In China too, reacting to Suga’s first policy speech after taking office, scholars such as Lü Yaodong, Institute of Japanese Studies, CASS in Beijing had observed, “Suga seems not to be as enthusiastic about China-Japan ties as Abe. Compared with Abe’s administration, Suga may walk back China-Japan ties.” (Emphasis added)
Remember, as already mentioned, the LDP had succeeded in pursuing policy of (economic) cooperation and avoiding confrontationist diplomacy with China under Abe. But Suga government’s failure to effectively fight coronavirus pandemic and its perception that China was increasingly becoming aggressive in SCS, are being cited as reasons why Japan was compelled to take strong steps against China. It is too well-known by now how Tokyo angered Beijing by referring to the importance of Taiwan to regional security in the recently released 2021 Defense White Paper. In fact, a Chinese scholar had warned as early as within a month of Suga taking over as prime minister from Shinzo Abe, saying that “Japan will take a more offensive stance against China over maritime boundary disputes under the incitement of the US” (emphasis added).
Hence, it is of extreme import to mention here China’s top diplomat Wang Yi’s recent trip to four ASEAN nations. Apparently, the second visit by the Chinese foreign minister in quick succession in the neighborhood had aroused the global media attention as it was soon after the recent visit to the region by the US vice president Kamala Harris. However, according to a Chinese commentator, Wang Yi’s recent visit to ASEAN countries must be viewed in the context of the region turning into a “battle ground” for rising economic one-upmanship among big powers. “Just a day after Wang Yi’s departure, Vietnam reached an agreement on defense equipment and technology cooperation with Japan,” the commentary noted.
Furthermore, whilst under the previous Abe government, Japan consistently increased its investments in the ASEAN nations, except in the year 2016, all through from 2014 until last year, Japan’s investment in the region far exceeded that of China’s. Contrary to his vows, since coming into office in September last year, especially following his meeting with President Biden in the White House in April this year, Prime Minister Suga’s quiet agenda has been to confront China in both political and economic arena. In Japan, the Suga agenda was interpreted by analysts as “rebuilding Japan-US industrial chain, decoupling economic ties with China.”
A policy report released by Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) in March 2021, revealed three important facts: first, in the year 2019, total Japanese investment in ASEAN nations stood at USD 265.5 billion – 14% of the country’s overall overseas investment, i.e., USD 1,858.3 billion.; second, in 2000, Japanese investments in ASEAN totaled USD 25 billion as against its USD 8.7 billion investment in China – a gap of USD 16.3 billion. Whereas in 2019, Japan invested USD 135.2 billion more in ASEAN as compared with China. As pointed out by one Chinese analyst, this gap is hugely significant, especially as the overall size of the ASEAN economy is a little over one-fifth of China’s GDP; third, followingthegovernment’s new strategy last year to encourage Japanese businesses to move out of China to new locations in ASEAN nations, the new guidelines also entailed reducing investments into China. A large part of the investments was diversified into ASEAN markets.
Finally, what is beginning to worry the Chinese authorities is the trend and direction of slow exodus of Japanese businesses out of China going back to Japan and towards Vietnam and Indonesia on one hand, and widening gap in Japanese investments between ASEAN and the PRC, on the other hand. At the same time, it was beyond anyone’s imagination in China that Japan would be acting foolish and risking “economic security” by diversifying businesses and investments into less profitable “barren” markets. But then who could anticipate what political and economic policy-rejigging coronavirus pandemic would bring about?
Overall, China’s more immediate and bigger concerns are firstly the sudden departure of Prime Minister Suga – in spite of Suga having made it clear he had no will to change or reverse “decoupling” policy he had been pursuing, and secondly, whoever emerges as the new leader of the four contenders by the month-end, analysts in Japan believe Tokyo is unlikely to change its “anti-China” political and economic policies.
How China Exacerbates Global Fragility and What Can be Done to Bolster Democratic Resilience to Confront It
Authors: Caitlin Dearing Scott and Isabella Mekker
From its declared policy of noninterference and personnel contributions to United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping Missions to its purported role in mediating conflicts, China has long sought to portray itself as a responsible global leader, pushing narratives about building a “community of common destiny” and promoting its model of governance and economic and political development as a path to stability. This narrative belies the reality. Chinese Communist Party (CCP)-style “stability,” whether to protect Belt and Road Investments (BRI) or regimes with favorable policies towards China, in practice facilitates authoritarianism and human rights violations, contributes to environmental degradation and corruption, and undermines democratic governance, all of which can fuel instability, intentionally or otherwise.
In pursuit of its true goal – “a world safe for the party” – China has leveraged its diplomatic and economic power to weaken the international human rights system, bolstering support for illiberal regimes, contributing to democratic decline and exacerbating global fragility in the process. Nowhere is this more apparent than in conflict-affected contexts.
Conflict Resolution, CCP Style
Although China brands itself as a ‘promoter of stability, peace, and unity’, its very definition of stability is built on its authoritarian model of governance. This, plus its concerns about non-interference in its own domestic issues, informs its conflict resolution approach, which emphasizes host state consent and political settlement, two-ideas that can be laudable in theory, depending on the context. In practice, however, China’s conflict mediation efforts in some instances have provided support to incumbent regimes who are perpetuating violence and conflict, promoting a ‘stability’ that disregards the voices of vulnerable populations and the need for inclusive governance. In the case of the Syrian civil war, China’s “political solution” meant maintaining China-friendly Bashar al-Assad’s grip on power, while blocking resolutions condemning the regime’s brutality against its citizens.
“Stability” promoted by China can also come at the expense of human rights. China (and Russia) have previously pushed for cuts to human rights positions within peacekeeping missions, endangering the capacity of these missions to protect civilians in conflict. In Myanmar, where the military is committing unprecedented human rights violations against its own citizens, China initially blocked a UN Security Council statement condemning the military coup and other international efforts to restore stability at a time when a strong international response was much needed. This was in line with China’s previous engagement in the country, working closely with the military regime to “mediate” conflict near the Chinese border in a way that preserved China’s interests and influence, but did little to actually address conflict. After a growing humanitarian crisis began to threaten its investments on the Myanmar side of the border, however, China changed rhetorical course, showing where human rights violations stand in its hierarchy of stability.
Advancing China’s Interests, Undermining Governance
China’s policies in fragile states mirror its unstated preference for expanding its economic and political interests, even if securing them sidelines the stated imperative of addressing fragility. In some instances, China has lobbied for UN policies in conflict-affected contexts that appear to support its own agenda rather than – or sometimes at the expense of – peace. According to the U.S. China Economic and Security Review Commission’s 2020 report to Congress, “China has shown an apparent willingness to leverage its influence in the UN peacekeeping operations system to advance its economic interests in African countries, raising the possibility that Beijing is subverting UN norms and procedures in the process.” Per the report, the most notable example of this was in 2014 when China lobbied to expand the UN Mission in South Sudan to protect oil installations of which the China National Petroleum Corporation held a 40 percent stake.
Moreover, China’s pursuit of its interests sets up countries on unstable trajectories. China’s economic investment policies and initiatives exacerbates governance deficits and increases fragility by encouraging corruption, facilitating authoritarianism and human rights violations, and contributing to environmental degradation, all key drivers of conflict. Two cases from Nigeria and Pakistan highlight the point.
In Nigeria, China’s investment projects have exacerbated corruption and fueled distrust in local government – key drivers of conflict and intercommunal violence in the country. China has exploited poor regulatory environments and worked within illegal and corrupt frameworks, often tied to armed groups and criminal networks. In one illustrative example, China state-owned timber trading companies offered bribes to local officials to illegally harvest endangered rosewood. Members of local communities have cited feelings of exploitation by officials accepting bribes from Chinese businessmen, further stressing fragile ties between local government and citizens. Such business practices also demonstrate a blatant disregard for the environmental consequences of illegally harvesting endangered flora and fauna. Moreover, the inherently opaque nature of these projects that are tied to CCP interests makes it difficult to demand accountability.
Similarly in Pakistan, a 62-billion-dollar project known as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) aimed at linking Xinjiang to the Arabian sea, has exacerbated tension in conflict-affected provinces. The project plans to build infrastructure and extract resources from several less developed regions, while overwhelmingly benefitting industrial and political hubs such as Punjab. Many provinces, including Balochistan and Sindh, have accused political elites of altering the route of the corridor in their own interests, thus further marginalizing their communities. Separatist groups have launched several attacks throughout the country, not only fueling conflict between Pakistani ethnic groups but also leading to attacks against Chinese expatriates. Recently, prominent voices from within China have called for a military intervention in Pakistan. CPEC has increased military presence throughout small villages, sparked an uptick in violent conflict along the route, and further eroded trust in local government institutions.
These cases may of course signal more opportunism and indifference by China to the impact of its engagement on stability in any given country, as opposed to an explicit attempt to undermine democratic governance (as it has done elsewhere in support of pro-China interests). Regardless of the intent, however, the impact is the same. China’s focus on political leverage and profits first and foremost undermines stability – and China likewise can benefit from instability in states with corrupt politicians interested in trading local resources for short-term political gains.
What Can be Done: Bolstering Democratic Resilience to Address Fragility and Foreign Influence
Foreign authoritarian influence has a compounding impact in conflict-affected contexts, further undermining governance structures, institutions, and processes that can mitigate or exacerbate fragility. Good governance, on the contrary, can not only help countries prevent and manage conflict, but can also help countries address the myriad challenges associated with foreign authoritarian influence. Strong democratic institutions help societies respond positively and productively to threats both domestic and foreign.
Targeted investment in democracy in conflict-affected contexts vulnerable to foreign authoritarian influence offers an important opportunity for utilizing the Global Fragility Strategy in support of US foreign policy initiatives and advancing the Biden Administration’s policy priorities to tackle climate change, prevent authoritarian resurgence, confront corruption, and prevail in strategic competition with China. An investment in support of democracy and good governance to address any one of these issues will reap dividends across each of these issues – engaging in conflict prevention and stabilization programming will both advance global democracy and advance US goals vis-à-vis China and other authoritarian rivals. Such investments, which must be long-term to account for the compounding impact of foreign authoritarian influence in already fragile environments, should include:
- Supporting governments, civil society, and citizens to better understand, expose and counter foreign authoritarian influence, particularly in conflict-affected contexts where data and research efforts can be challenging. An understanding of China’s playbook is critical to countering CCP influence operations;
- Helping independent media to investigate and expose foreign authoritarian influence and how it fuels conflict, whether through training, financial support, or other protections of the civic and information space, to raise public awareness of the impact of such engagement on conflict dynamics and promote transparency and accountability in dealings with foreign actors;
- Developing evidenced-based tools to prevent and mitigate foreign authoritarian influence in fragile contexts;
- Strengthening electoral institutions, political parties, legislative bodies, and judiciaries to uproot elite capture and mitigate malign influence;
- Leveraging diplomacy to build political will and incentives for government officials to resist foreign malign influences. Such diplomatic efforts can include increased outreach and contact with countries previously neglected by the US – but prioritized by China – and public diplomacy to both expose the CCP’s misleading narrative and advance narratives about what democracy can deliver; and
- Coordinating with similarly-minded donors such as the European Union, Japan, and Australia, to implement a unified approach to match the scale of Chinese investment and maximize the impact of any intervention.
Only democracy can help countries navigate the nexus of domestic and foreign threats to their stability. In the era of COVID-19, authoritarian resurgence, and climate crisis, supporting countries to develop these “resilience” fundamentals is a sound – and necessary – investment.
*Isabella Mekker is a Program Associate with IRI’s Center for Global Impact, working on countering foreign authoritarian influence and conflict prevention and stabilization programming.
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