The United States, the self-proclaimed leader of world affairs for a fairly long period of time now, is going through a crisis of credibility with the fall of US-backed democratic government in Kabul to the Taliban forces on August 15, an incident that drew parallels from various corners of the world to the fall of Saigon in 1975 that concluded the Vietnam War. Even though both these incidents are entirely in different politico-historical backgrounds, the perceived debacle of world’s strongest military superpower remains a common factor. This raises a lot of questions of the dependability of the US among its vastly spread global network of allies and partners, particularly in Southeast Asia, the backyard of China.
US Vice-President Kamala Harris in Singapore and Vietnam
It is in the aforementioned context Kamala Harris pays her maiden visit to Singapore and Vietnam as US Vice-President, the second-most important person in the Biden administration, which comes only a week after the fall of Kabul. This is the first visit by a US Vice-President to Vietnam, which has tense relations with Beijing, owing to the latter’s actions in the South China Sea and the Mekong River. However, India, the land of her ethnicity, is saved for another day.
The Biden administration seeks to reset ties in Asia after the turbulent and unpredictable presidency of Donald Trump by reassuring Washington’s role as a stabilising force in the region, particularly considering China’s belligerent and revisionist moves that attempt to disrupt the status quo of peace. V-P Harris said in Singapore, “The reason I am here is because the United States is a global leader, and we take that role seriously.”
Harris aims a lot at convincing her hosts of American regional security role in Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific by addressing apprehensions on the same. Biden’s first six months were largely dedicated to recalibrating the transatlantic alliance, reassuring European allies, and to open a new channel of dialogue to discuss differences with rival China as seen in the high-level Alaska talks held in March. The limelight is now again on Asia, a region central to US security.
The preceding high-level visits in July
The last month witnessed the visits of two high-profile officials in the Biden administration to Asia. US Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman travelled to Tianjin, a city in north-eastern China and Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin travelled to Singapore, Vietnam, and the Philippines – the three countries in Southeast Asia that are most strategically aligned to the United States and supportive of its regional presence.
While Secretary Sherman discussed ways to set terms for a responsible management of US-China relations by welcoming competition and avoiding conflict, Secretary Austin focused on reassuring the enduring US security commitment to Southeast Asia, underscoring the centrality of ASEAN-led regional architecture.
US influence in Asia meets the Chinese challenge
As China keep militarizing the South China Sea and bolster its naval fleet, the littoral states will be naturally driven closer to the United States, which remain strongly committed to the idea of freedom of the seas.
Even though the US continues to top the latest Asia Power Index rankings and remains the most powerful country in the region in terms of comprehensive relative power, it had been on the downward path when compared to previous years as China moves ahead in key measures such as economic relationships, economic capability and diplomatic influence.
The US pre-dominance in Asia owes a lot to its military capabilities and vast alliance networks. But recently, regional countries are brought closer to China in the realm of trade and economics through initiatives such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) free trade agreement signed in November 2020, the trillion-dollar Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) initiated in 2013, the Digital Silk Road and mounting Chinese investments in Southeast Asia.
In fact, regional players have been trying to dodge the bullet of choosing between China and the US. As the vaccine diplomacy of the US and Quad is underway in Southeast Asia, China too is also in the scene offering its own alternative means of support. The visit of Vice President Harris covers a broad spectrum of issues ranging from defence cooperation and cyber-security to climate change and supply chain risks.
Policy steps from Obama to Trump
Barack Obama’s ascension to the White House in 2009 heralded a new era of US engagement with Asia, moving away from his predecessor George Bush’s costly decade of military interventions in the Middle East and Afghanistan, an approach later evolved as the US Pivot to Asia in 2011. It had security and economic dimensions to rebuild ties with regional allies, partners and countries and to re-posture its presence in the region. It also came in the backdrop of dealing with a new rising economic and technological giant and an aspiring superpower – China.
The Trump era that followed Obama saw the re-emergence of the Indo-Pacific and the Quad from the shadows in 2017, as the strategic challenge from China became more and more evident in multiple spheres of engagement. The Biden presidency is hopeful of managing the continuing competitive relationship with China in a responsible manner as articulated by Secretary Sherman in her recent visit to China last month.
As the Indo-Pacific construct dominates US foreign policy discourse on Asia and the Pacific today, Southeast Asia remains at the centre of it. The trajectory of Chinese belligerence in the South China Sea, along with the Taiwan Strait crisis, will remain as the two most important factors that could potentially determine the future of US involvement in Asia’s regional security architecture.
South China Sea – a potential conflict zone
Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan continue to claim parts of South China Sea and its islands, despite China’s opposition, particularly the Spratly and the Paracel archipelagos. Chinese patrolling in the seas are also affecting the livelihoods of fisher-folk, particularly the Filipinos, who are the most vocal in their protests. Beijing continues to exert it’s so called “historical” claim on almost the entirety of the strategic waterway and has been reclaiming land and building artificial islands from the submerged reefs and atolls. Many of them are subsequently placed with military installations.
China’s claims are based on the vague notion of ‘Nine-Dash Line’ that dates back to 1947 and it overlaps with the legitimate 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zones of many of the Southeast Asian states. It has been ruled invalid and baseless in the eyes of internaltional law by an arbitration tribunal ruling in 2016. During the latest China-ASEAN virtual summit held this year, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi warned against “external interference” in the South China Sea and described the United States as the “biggest trouble-maker” in the region.
Moreover, China perceives US military presence and regular passage of its warships through the South and East China Seas as an unwarranted provocation and meddling in its backyard. All these factors make the region ripe for a potential conflict in the near future. Having Southeast Asia again as a conflict zone is in no one’s interest and such a scenario can only be avoided by giving diplomacy a chance and building trust with each other.
Change of focus and new possibilities
America’s old military preoccupations are giving way to a renewed focus towards Asia’s east, which happens to be in the neighbourhood of China. The Biden administration considers its rivalry with China as “the single biggest geopolitical test” of this century. At the same time, the US withdrawal from Afghanistan opens up new possibilities to divert its attention and resources to East Asia and the Pacific which can be utilised for ensuring peace, security, and a rules-based order, rather than plunging into an unwanted conflict. ASEAN’s inability to effectively compel China towards a mutually-agreeable dispute resolution and a lack of shared interests among its individual member-states may also provide more chances for a pro-active US diplomatic outreach to the region, and I hope the visit of V-P Kamala Harris could pave the way for it.
Making sense of a rugged political terrain in the Land of Golden Pagodas
Eight months have passed since Myanmar’s coup d’état. What are the domestic factors that contribute to the country’s grim political scenario? What are the odds that work against Burmese democracy? Here, I look back at the chequered political past of Myanmar to find answers.
After a decade of relative calm, the Tatmadaw, as the Burmese armed forces are referred to, smuggled power from the civilian leadership by staging a repugnant coup in February this year, led by its 65-year old-leader, General Min Aung Hlaing. This was executed just a few days before the convening of Myanmar’s newly-elected Parliament and three months after the National League for Democracy’s (NLD) landslide victory in the election held in November 2020 in the country’s second freely-contested polls since 2015.
As the junta came back to haunt the newest democratic experiment in Myanmar again, history repeats itself. Even before the coup, the Tatmadaw’s dominant posture in the administration was strongly evident, as twenty-five per cent of seats in the Parliament and key portfolios in the Cabinet were reserved for the military, according to the Constitution promulgated by the military itself in 2008.
Déjà vu 1988
Apparently, the Tatmadaw and its aging leader were outraged by the continuing and overwhelming popularity that democratic icon Aung San Suu Kyi still enjoyed in the weeks following the 2020 elections, despite all the allegations of her playing second-fiddle to the Tatmadaw. The coup d’état and the subsequent crackdown on democracy set the clock back to 1988.
It was in that year, a large wave of protests erupted against the military that began as a student-led movement in the city of Rangoon (now, Yangon), which soon spread across the country. It came to be known as the ‘8-8-88 Uprising’ or the ‘People Power Movement’ because the protests peaked on 8 August 1988. Suu Kyi’s NLD party emerged from this movement.
Burma was separated from British India as a separately-administered colony eleven years before the country gained independence. The Buddhist-majority state was free of British rule in 1948 under the leadership of people like U Nu and Aung San with the hopes of ushering in a parliamentary democracy. Unfortunately, in the next fourteen years, the country would witness the very first military coup in its history since independence, in 1962, led by General U Ne Win, who would go on to rule the country with an iron fist for the next twenty-six years.
Absence of a political consensus
Right from its independence in 1948, the Land of Golden Pagodas has been a deeply divided nation along the lines of ethnicity, religion, and political loyalty, with the majority Burmans dominating the upper echelons of power. Myanmar comprises of 135 ethnic groups in total. It includes the majority Burmans, who constitute two-thirds of the population, minority groups such as the Shan, the Karen, the Rohingya, the Kachin, the Mon and other smaller groups. A grave absence of political consensus among diverse ethno-religious groups and their respective parties had always been a bane for Myanmar’s overall stability.
Myanmar’s decades-long inter-ethnic tensions and sectarian violence have been a historical factor behind the rise of popularity of the Tatmadaw among the people, who consider themselves as the only force that could bring-in stability to the country, an idea that resonates with a substantial proportion of the majority Burmans even today. But, a pro-democracy resistance movement is underway on the other side, with the military’s recent excesses leading to many of its supporters switching sides.
When the Tatmadaw was seen a beacon of stability
The Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) coalition dominated Myanmar’s political scene from 1948 to 1958. Contrary to popular beliefs today, the military was seen as a beacon of stability in the country’s immediate post-independence period as numerous sectarian groups battled each other. In the 1950s, the country had to deal with scattered left-wing insurgencies too, along with the widely prevalent ethnic conflicts.
Even as early as 1958, when the affairs of the state were slipping away, the Tatmadaw was asked by the civilian government to step in as a temporary caretaker government. The military remained loyal to the elected government for fourteen years since independence and had even facilitated the general elections of 1960.
At a moment when the military’s public support rose considerably among the people, catalysed by a corrupt civilian government led by the AFPFL, the Tatmadaw decided to take matters into their own hands by staging a coup in 1962. The junta adopted a new Constitution in 1974, suspending the one previously promulgated in 1947.
Soon, the military emerged as a repressive force and their socialist state policy known as the Burmese Way to Socialism isolated Myanmar from the rest of the world from 1962 to 1988 and devastated the economy. Around the same time, Buddhist ultra-nationalism perpetrated by fear-mongering monks also thrived under the regime at the cost of intimidation of the minority groups.
The dawn of a new epoch and the return to history
With the people realising their folly in trusting the Tatmadaw, the uprising of 1988 happened. Around the same time, young Suu Kyi returned to her home country after completing her studies abroad. Witnessing the scathing power abuse of the ruling junta hands-on, she rallied her fellow Burmese citizens for the cause of Myanmar’s democratic transition. The uprising can also be viewed as a direct consequence of the emergence of the NLD, which contested and won the elections of 1990. But, the military refused to accept the results and prevented a civilian government from exercising power.
Suu Kyi was placed under house arrest by the junta in the following year. She continued her struggle and was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1991. She was detained for fifteen years in total between 1990 and 2010. Elections were held in 2010 and the junta was ‘supposedly’ dissolved the following year, only to re-emerge in 2021.
As per estimates by the United Nations, around 230,000 people were displaced as of June this year, because of the military action and retaliatory attacks either by civilian rebels or by one armed resistance group or the other. As of July this year, more than a thousand people were allegedly killed by the junta, with thousands of protesters arrested, detained, or charged, and many even just disappeared beyond trace. Recently, the shadow resistance movement that calls itself the ‘National Unity Government’ of Myanmar had gone underground since the February coup and has called for a nation-wide ‘people’s defensive war’ against the Tatmadaw.
Regional voices and the road to peace
Myanmar is a member of the ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) since 1997. But, the organisation, despite its diplomatic efforts, was unable to prevent the coup and the subsequent civilian unrest in the country. In fact, the ASEAN’s negotiations in its capital Jakarta, in April, and the Five-Point Consensus that emerged from it have been seemingly side-lined by the junta. ASEAN envoys met with the army leaders in June and the organisation’s latest proposal for a ceasefire until the end of 2021, put forward in August-end, has been reportedly denied by the military.
Due to geo-economic and border security considerations, neighbouring China and India happen to have good ties with the Tatmadaw. However, a broad-based civilian support is the only way to ensure the army’s sustained legitimacy. And, the best solution to bring back real stability in Myanmar is to agree on a mutually-accepted power-sharing agreement between the shadow civilian leadership and the military that would secure unequivocal internal peace within the country.
Social cohesion continues to be a distant dream for Myanmar and the Burmese people, the absence of which continues to be the root cause of all political wrongs in the country. The ongoing Covid-19 pandemic is making the crisis worse. In the end, the military cannot afford to antagonize the United Nations and the democracies of the world for long, especially of the West, with their economic sanctions in place, and the dire curbs placed on the Burmese people’s genuine democratic aspirations will go out of the reckoning again in just a matter of time.
Australia’s churn in the Indo-Pacific with India and Indonesia
The shared vision for a free, open, rules-based, and inclusive Indo-Pacific brings Australia, India, and Indonesia together. Being democracies and maritime powers with overwhelmingly large coastlines, the three countries are natural partners. Australia and India have just inaugurated a ‘2+2’ Dialogue of foreign and defence ministers on September 11. Meanwhile, Indonesia and Australia have conducted seven ‘2+2’ ministerials so far since 2012.
The mutual interaction between these countries has improved over the years. Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne and Defence Minister Peter Dutton are on a visit to New Delhi, the Indian capital, from 10-12 September 2021, with the main point of agenda being the commencement of the annual ministerial-level consultations, taking the India-Australia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership to the next level. They are on a four-country Indo-Pacific tour, spread over two weeks that began on September 9, with their first leg being Jakarta, the Indonesian capital where the headquarters of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is also located. The Australian minister-duo will be heading to South Korea and the United States after concluding their India visit.
Looking back on Australia-India ties
2021 has been the fourth year since India and Australia recalibrated their ties in the second avatar of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or the Quad 2.0 that came into being in 2017. Last year witnessed several landmark moments in India-Australia relations. Australian PM Scott Morrison and his Indian counterpart Narendra Modi held a virtual summit in June, followed by the elevation of bilateral ties to a ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’ and the signing of a naval interoperability pact called the ‘Mutual Logistics Support Agreement’ (MLSA) to access each other’s bases and reciprocal use of each other’s military facilities, including refuelling and repair. Both leaders also agreed on a ‘Shared Vision for Maritime Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific’ in 2020. The year also saw Australia returning to Exercise Malabar after 13 years, accepting India’s invitation, and both countries participated in the drills for two consecutive years – 2020 and 2021 – along with Japan and the United States. Shared concerns on the disruptive rise of China in the past few years have also brought Australia closer to India.
Australia and India have joined hands with Japan for a Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI) last year for the diversification of supply chain risks across a group of supplying nations instead of being dependent on just one or a few and for ensuring the free flow of goods, apparently with China in mind, with which both countries have deep-rooted economic and trade links. Both India and Australia are victims of Beijing’s bullying in different arenas. If territorial disputes with China form a major part of Indian security concerns, for Australia it is the trade and tariffs-related tensions. Both countries are also apprehensive of Chinese telecom companies and their technological edge, particularly regarding 5G trials and rollout.
Australia was the first country in the world to ban Chinese firms of next-generation technology Huawei and ZTE from 5G trials due to the alleged links of these companies with the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which if allowed could’ve been used against Australia’s national security interests one day, capitalising on increased tensions between the two countries. Under Chinese law, companies that operate in Chinese territory are obligated to co-operate with the country’s intelligence services. With China upping the ante in the Himalayan frontiers with India that resulted in a bloody skirmish in eastern Ladakh in June last year, New Delhi has also taken similar steps like the banning of Chinese mobile applications and not permitting Chinese firms from participating in the 5G trials in India.
In a subtle reference to China while addressing an event organised by an Indian think-tank during the recently-concluded visit to India, Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne said that Canberra seeks a region in which the rights of all states, large and small, are respected with a strategic balance, in which ‘no single dominant power dictates outcomes for others’. Today, India-Australia ties cover a wide range of areas that goes beyond maritime security and defence cooperation such as science and technology research, economic and multilateral cooperation, innovation and entrepreneurship, agriculture and water resources management, education, culture, tourism and people-to-people ties.
Looking back on Australia-Indonesia ties
The Indonesian archipelago lies to the north and northwest of Australia. Both countries are immediate maritime neighbours and touch upon both the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The governments of Indonesia and Australia have held seven ‘2+2’ Ministerial Dialogues so far. In the recently concluded such dialogue, issues that were discussed include defence cooperation, the pandemic, the situation in Myanmar, an ASEAN member-nation, and also the regime change in Afghanistan.
Notably, both countries have enhanced their military-level cooperation in the recent ‘2+2’ meet with the joint decision to renew the defence cooperation arrangement (DCA) that was agreed in 2012. With a new framework, Indonesian defence personnel will be trained in Australian military academies, along with their Australian counterparts, for the very first time. Soon, it is expected that both militaries would conduct joint military exercises in Australian soil, along with maritime drills.
Indonesia and Australia have crossed the milestone of 70 years of diplomatic ties just last year and their cooperation in counter-terrorism operations have improved considerably from the early 2000s, particularly in the aftermath of the 2002 Bali bombings that also included Australian victims, but it followed a brief period of strained ties owing to Indonesia’s intervention in East Timor and its alleged military excesses and spying.
In 2006, both countries signed the landmark Lombok Treaty, named after an Indonesian island lying east of Bali, which set out a ‘Framework for Security Cooperation’ that covered both traditional and non-traditional challenges to security. This commitment was reiterated in 2014 with the signing of a Joint Understanding on a code of conduct on the same between the two countries. Even though there have been ups and downs on their ties, both countries have been conducting ‘2+2’ ministerial-level consultations annually since 2012. Indonesia and Australia have signed a Joint Declaration on Maritime Cooperation in 2017 that took their ties to the next level, and in the following year it was elevated to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.
While Indonesia represents the ‘ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific’ that distances itself from great power rivalries, Australia is one of the four partners in the Quad, which accepts the centrality of ASEAN as essential for their conceptualisation of the Indo-Pacific. Even though balancing Chinese assertion is one of the non-explicit objectives of the Quad in which Australia is part of, as evident from Exercise Malabar, Indonesia seems least concerned with antagonizing China. In fact, Jakarta is a key participant of China-sponsored Maritime Silk Road, a key component of Beijing’s trillion-dollar project of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
However, these differences have not prevented the both countries from cooperating in the realms of military, diplomatic, economic and maritime cooperation. Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne has said in the latest ‘2+2’ Dialogue with her Indonesian counterpart that Canberra welcomes a ‘healthy competition’ based on rules and norms, on a ‘level-playing field’, rather than the one that risks sliding into a conflict. However, she played down the need for direct ASEAN-Quad consultations.
An emerging trilateral and the way ahead
The emerging Australia-India-Indonesia trilateral sheds light on the Asia-Pacific’s evolving mini-lateralism and a multipolar order that has its beginnings in 2017 with the Senior Officials’ Strategic Dialogue held in Bogor, Indonesia, with the three countries participating. Further such meetings were followed in Canberra in 2018 and New Delhi in 2019. As the US-China great power rivalry continues to take a new shape, this trilateral of the three maritime middle-powers would further enrich multilateralism and the overall regional architecture in the Indo-Pacific.
Common interests that bind Australia, India, and Indonesia include a rules-based, free, and inclusive maritime order in the region, and the respect for international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS). The Australia-India-Indonesia trilateral could also complement the Quad and other trilaterals and minilaterals in the region such as the Australia-India-Japan and the Australia-France-India groupings. India’s ‘Act East’ policy, Australia’s ‘Pacific Step-Up’ policy, and Indonesia’s ‘Global Maritime Fulcrum’ policy are well-capable of effectively finding strategic convergence with each other.
The G7 Ministerial Meeting: The Three “Firsts” for the Indo-Pacific
In the run-up to the upcoming G7 Summit in June, foreign ministers of the seven wealthiest nations, met in London to discuss on a wide variety of issues for collective deliberation at the top leadership level next month. But unlike the past, the recent G7 foreign ministerial meeting placed Indo-Pacific as a new strategic focus this year ⸺ a move that showcased the grouping’s increasingly unequivocal position in dealing with the issues related to China today. As stipulated in the G7 Foreign and Development Ministers’ Communique (or the Comminique), there are three “firsts” when comes to the group’s position on the Indo-Pacific region.
First and foremost, all the G7 foreign ministers pledged to support ASEAN’s centrality with an eye toward building concrete cooperation with the Southeast Asian bloc in the coming years. For the first time in G7’s history, ASEAN’s participants are invited to the May ministerial meeting in London. Apart from the ASEAN Chair which is represented by Brunei in the G7’s ministerial meeting, the Southeast Asian bloc’s Secretary-General also attended the event as another participant alongside foreign ministers of Australia, India, South Korea and South Africa. With such importance attached to ASEAN by the G7 foreign ministers, all eyes are looking to see if there will be any Southeast Asian representative invited to the G7 Summit slated to be held in Cornwall (UK) next month.
That said, such importance attached to ASEAN, does not describe the whole picture of the G7 foreign ministerial meeting. The core remained to be G7’s support for ASEAN’s centrality in the Indo-Pacific region. To be specific, it entailed harmonizing G7’s Indo-Pacific normative position (norms, rules and values) with that of ASEAN’s Indo-Pacific Outlook through concrete cooperation between the two. Aside from pandemic recovery and climate change that are outlined in the Communique, improvisation of regional connectivity is another area of which it is particularly relevant to ASEAN member countries. As the Southeast Asian bloc is set along the course of economic integration, quality infrastructure development and projects ⸺ as highlighted by the Communique ⸺ are undoubtedly important for ASEAN countries to achieve sustainable development in the long-term.
Second, the G7 foreign ministers also included Taiwan in their overall position toward China. Just like the inclusion of ASEAN’s centrality into the Communique, the inclusion of Taiwan within the official document, is a departure from the cautious position adopted in the previous communiques. While the G7 foreign ministers failed to meet in 2020 and only issued a statement on the imposition of national security law in Hong Kong, the 2019 communique also conveniently avoided the Taiwan issue in their collective position toward China. From the May meeting, however, the G7 foreign ministers made it absolutely clear that they are supporting Taiwan’s meaningful participation in World Health Organization (WHO) forums and World Health Assembly (WHA) in line with the spirit of inclusiveness within all international organizations. Furthermore, the G7 foreign ministers also highlighted Taiwan’s success in containing the COVID-19 pandemic as another rationale that should be given strong consideration as countries around the world can learn from the Taiwanese experiences on this particular area.
Finally, the G7 foreign ministers also layered the Taiwan Strait issue within their collective position on both the East and South China Seas. Deviating from the 2019 communique that sidestepped the Taiwan Strait issue, the latest Communique emphasized the G7’s call for maintaining peace and security in the Taiwan Strait, the first ever such articulation is made in the ministerial meeting. Without singling China in their follow-up statement, the G7 foreign ministers urged both Beijing and Taipei to resolve the cross-Strait disputes peacefully and not to resort to unilateral actions that would destabilize the region and the international rules-based order.
The interesting part, however, is the layering of the Taiwan Strait issue within the G7’s statement on the East and South China Seas. For certain, such maneuver brought Taiwan into the same page with the other two territorial disputes, namely, Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands’ dispute (East China Sea) and Spratly Islands’ dispute (South China Sea). This effectively elevated the Taiwan Strait into an international issue on par with the two territorial disputes and with that, sought to neutralize China’s long-standing discourse of insulating Taiwan from the world through its “one-China” principle.
Notwithstanding the three “firsts” from the recent G7 foreign ministerial meeting, the overarching question will be on how these collective positions can be translated into tangible actions on the ground. For instance, on G7’s support for ASEAN’s centrality, the major challenges stem from the two aspects: Can the G7 nations operationalize its cooperation with the Southeast Asian bloc as a collective institution? How significant these wealthy countries can contribute to ASEAN’s integration in a way that they become the indispensable partners for the Southeast Asian bloc as a whole?
Similarly, the G7’s increasingly unequivocal position on the two Taiwan-related issues reverberate another follow-up question: Will China play with the G7’s playbook or at least, adjust its “one-China” principle to reduce any external pressure on its non-negotiable position toward Taiwan? From the recent statement issued by the Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson, Wang Wenbin, it seemed Beijing has no interest to alter the status quo as far as its position on Taiwan is concerned. Besides reiterating China’s position to handle Taiwan’s international participation based on the “one-China” principle, Wang also criticized G7 for what he sees as an interference to the Chinese internal affairs in an array of issues that included the contentious East and South China Seas. As such, it will be hard to imagine China adjusting its long-held position on Taiwan despite the increasingly unequivocal position adopted by the G7 foreign ministers on issues related to the island.
20 years after 9/11: American decline in the Islamic world and China- Russian emergence
The main headlines and axes The first axis: American strategy in the Islamic world, to draw a new political and...
COVID crises highlight strengths of democratic systems
The UN Secretary-General, on Wednesday, urged the world to “learn from the lessons of the past 18 months, to strengthen democratic resilience in the face of future...
The Economic Conundrum of Pakistan
The State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) is due to convene on 20th September 2021. The Monetary policy Committee (MPC) will...
China And U.S. Are On the Brink of War
Right now, the neocons that Biden has surrounded himself with are threatening to accuse him of having ‘lost Taiwan’ if...
Gender equality ‘champion’ Sima Sami Bahous to lead UN Women
Secretary-General António Guterres described Sima Sami Bahous of Jordan, as “a champion for women and girls”, announcing on Monday her appointment to lead the UN’s gender equality and empowerment entity, UN Women. The UN...
Most agricultural funding distorts prices, harms environment
Around 87% of the $540 billion in total annual government support given worldwide to agricultural producers includes measures that are price distorting and that can be harmful to...
Spain’s PM Speaks with Global CEOs on Strategic Priorities in Post-Pandemic Era
The World Economic Forum today hosted a “Country Strategy Dialogue on Spain with Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez” for its partners,...
Middle East4 days ago
Elections represent an opportunity for stability and unity in Libya
East Asia3 days ago
Politicizing the COVID-19 pandemic and Xi Jinping’s vision to reshape the new world order
Economy3 days ago
CPEC: Challenges & Future Prospects
Southeast Asia4 days ago
Australia’s churn in the Indo-Pacific with India and Indonesia
Defense3 days ago
To include or not include? China-led SCO weighs Iranian membership
South Asia4 days ago
The Junagadh conundrum
Intelligence2 days ago
Russia, Turkey and UAE: The intelligence services organize and investigate
South Asia2 days ago
The Taliban Dilemma and Thucydides Trap