The US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin became the first high-ranking official to visit Southeast Asia during Biden’s presidency. His last month’s visit to Vietnam, Singapore, and the Philippines sent a message that the US is willing to renew its ties with Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states. The visit that followed by the US attendance in ASEAN Regional Forum seems to allay the long-held suspicion over the US’s commitment to the region. When President Biden took the office, among the most pertinent question from ASEAN leaders was whether the United States will reengage the region, given lack of trust caused by the previous administration.
A Renewed the US-ASEAN Relations?
ASEAN’s apprehension is understandable; during four years of Trump administration, the US was virtually absent in the region. Its approach to ASEAN was characterized by lack of engagement and tough anti-China rhetoric that put ASEAN into a quagmire. One of the most jarring snubs was during the 35th ASEAN Summit in 2019, when the US only sent low-level delegations in the event that was attended by head of state from ASEAN dialogue partners, including Japanese PM Shinzo Abe, Indian PM Narendra Modi, and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang. The summit ultimately casted doubt over reliability of the US from its partners in Southeast Asia; the question that lingers for many observers, at least until recently.
Austin’s three-nation tour was preceded by another dialogue from the US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken when he attended the Special ASEAN-US Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on July 14th. Murray Hiebert, a senior associate of Center for Strategic and International Studies observed that this move constitutes an effort to “let the region know that the US still sees it as very important.” This action is welcomed by many ASEAN leaders. During the meetings, both Austin and Blinken voiced concern over China’s aggressive behavior in the South China Sea and COVID-19 pandemic mitigation in the region. At a glance, their visits show the continuity of China containment policy from the previous administration. However, major differences are worth noting.
Same Goal, Different Approach
While there’s a continuity in though China policy, Biden’s administration took a more constructive approach by going beyond a mere containment. The current strategy fills the gaps that were left by Trump policy: partners and multilateralism. During the previous administration, the US policy was strongly navigated by anti-China rhetoric that forced ASEAN countries to choose between siding with the US or China. Moreover, the US limited engagement was also driven only by the focus to counter China, while sidelining other constructive dialogues. Such an approach is self-defeating in the end, for ASEAN countries has long been steadfast to not getting mired into great power competition in the region. The more the US incites its great powers politics, the less ASEAN appeals to it.
The new administration seemingly, and finally, realizes that siding with the US or China is never an option for ASEAN. Under Biden, the US acknowledges the indispensability of ASEAN in regional affairs, including the Indo-Pacific that gained prominence under Trump’s policy. In many official speeches, the US now supports the notion of “ASEAN centrality,” alluding to the indispensability of Southeast Asian countries. As such, the US’s China policy is now focused on building strong relationship with ASEAN countries, rather than viewing it merely as a “pawn” on geopolitical chessboard to defeat China. The US needs to “quickly and clearly abandon Manichean language of ‘us-versus-them’ and instead engage Southeast Asia on its own term,” wrote Sebastian Strangio in The Diplomat, reflecting the same concern since Trump’s administration.
This renewed approach seemingly gained favorable outcomes. During Austin’s visit to Manila in July 30th, the US was able to restore the Visiting Forces Agreement (FMA) that allows the mobilization of the US forces in and out of the Philippines. China’s incursion at Whitsun Reef, the Philippines’ maritime territory on South China Sea, may push the country to such take move, after President Duterte previously threatened to terminate the agreement. However, Biden’s approach also merits the praise. The new administration also expected to garner positive image after other visits by Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman to Indonesia, Cambodia, and Thailand earlier in May.
Biden administration also took similar approach in multilateral fora. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), for instance, the security cooperation between the US, Japan, India, and Australia. The Quad was initially viewed as the US’s “anti-China coalition” and will replace the prominence of ASEAN in the region. The Quad during Biden now took a more constructive approach; not only by focusing on more pressing issues such as vaccine distribution and alternative source for supply chains, but also reiterating support for ASEAN in many of its official statement.
Even the Quad Summit in March, which previously predicted to be the culmination of the US’s China containment, was unexpectedly ended up with a rather cooperative tone: the China name is not mentioned and the grouping also reiterated their support for the ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific (AOIP), Southeast Asian own conception of Indo-Pacific that put ASEAN at the center. The US’s acknowledgement gives a message that it will recommit itself in the region. In short, the objective to offset China’s influence remains a bipartisan issue among the US policy makers. However, the new administration is able to undertake a more constructive approach to attain the objective.
Lots of Work to be done
With the Vice President Kamala Harris scheduled to visit Vietnam and Singapore next month, the US’s recommitment is seemingly forthcoming for ASEAN. However, several criticism arises, directed against Biden’s rather belated action. Quoting The Diplomat columnist Derek Grossman from Twitter, he said that it took Biden “nearly six months to do anything substantive.” Moreover, Biden until now has not yet called any leader from Southeast Asia after a half year of his presidency. One editorial from Jakarta Post also voiced Biden’s snub, arguing that the new administration only focused on countries that can join its “anti-China coalition,” after Indonesia was singled out from Austin’s visit. If dissuading ASEAN from China is concerned, the US’s diplomatic moves still fall short compared to that of China.
Foreign Minister of China Wang Yi has visited nine of ten ASEAN countries since October last year, whereas it took six months after Biden took office to only visit three. On another comparison, China also directly hosted the Special China-ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Chonqing last June, while the US “only ” attended the meeting virtually. Irrespective of the COVID-19 pandemic, this juxtaposition clearly shows the US’s commitment is still far-fetched compared to that of China, if the competition between two countries is the sole concern.
Despite the late administration’s faulty strategy, and belated fixing by its successor, ASEAN countries still reserve a remarkable degree of trust to the US. The 2021 survey by Singapore-based think-tank ISEAS Yushof-Ishak Institute revealed that 64.5% respondents of ASEAN countries’ elites still prefer the US as their partner, compared to 38.5% that opted for China, given a binary option between two countries. This means that the declining trust towards the US is not irreversible. There are lots of avenue where the US can amend for ASEAN and simultaneously offset China’s influence on the processes, such as vaccine distribution, high-quality investment, and at minimum, more engagement in ASEAN fora.
The most of Biden’s recommitment is anticipated in the upcoming ASEAN Summit, the event that Trump had skipped for three consecutive years during his administration. As Kurt Campbell, the US National Security Council’s Indo-Pacific Coordinator, said, “For an effective Asia strategy, for an effective Indo-Pacific approach, you must do more in Southeast Asia.” The US still have lots of work to achieve its best strategy in Southeast Asia and, no less important, to achieve regional order that also anchors ASEAN.
