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The unbearable ‘complexity’ of being: Taking China’s weaknesses seriously

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In May 2020, as the EU-China tensions rise, Margareth Vestager, EU Commissioner for Competition, voiced concerns over Europe’s lack of “strong knowledge on contemporary China.” Vestager’s concerns are important because knowledge, perception and policymaking are closely tied in international politics. Nevertheless, how does a mere deficiency in China scholarship affects one of the world’s largest economic powers? Simply put, this dearth of knowledge yields at least two critical consequences for the EU. First, Brussels’ limited understanding of China may negatively impact the soundness of the many EU policies involving China, from trade to competition. Second, misperceptions of what China is and wants could push the EU towards an excessive alignment with Washington’s strong China stance to the detriment of its own interests, which could be better served by a more autonomous European approach. Hence, given the stakes, some reflection upon the representation of China on which the EU conducts its policymaking is long-overdue.

Representations are important in social life, including politics, for they constitute a cognitive basis on which individuals and groups engage with outsiders and themselves. Thus, back in the early Enlightenment, Jesuits’ accounts of China fed into the European philosophers’ meditations on ethics and non-arbitrary government as a powerful case study, which suggested that sustainable enlightened governance and areligious morals were possible. In a way, the Europeans’ representations of China played a key role in the rise of European Modernism. Nowadays, the EU bureaucrats’ meditations on ‘The End of Naïvety’ and China as a ‘systemic rival’ led to the toughening of many EU ‘naïve’ policies, which have had the benefits of arming the EU cruise ship to better navigate increasingly geopolitical waters – e.g. the upcoming anti-foreign subsidies instrument. In both cases, the Europeans’ representations of China were key in engaging with themselves and the world.

However, unlike in the Enlightenment, the late European thoughts on systemic rivalry, which draw from an American ‘all-powerful’ representation of China, seem to inform many though policy moves that directly affect Brussels’ relations with Beijing. But, is this understanding of ‘all-powerful’ China accurate? While it is true that China is an authoritarian great power that may pose certain political and economic challenges to Western states, Beijing is also riddled with systemic weaknesses, which cast uncertainty over its future – e.g. aging population, shrinking workforce, or massive economic inefficiencies. Hence, any excessive focus on China’s dazzling strengths to the detriment of a proper appreciation of its deep-rooted deficiencies could alter the EU’s perception in potentially dangerous ways. In short, sound policymaking should address ‘China-the-powerful’ without losing sight of ‘China-the-weak’.

Take Beijing’s foreign policy. Very often, foreign states view Chinese policies as parts of a grand strategy aimed to render the world more sinocentric. While such views rightly consider the strategic elements underpinning certain Chinese policies, they often overlook Beijing’s complex policy implementation processes. That is, despite Chinese President Xi’s efforts towards centralization, strategic policies formulated in Beijing are implemented by substate actors according to their interests, which sometimes diverge significantly from those of the central government. Thus, while the Belt and Road Initiative does involve strategic considerations, its strategic effectiveness is often undermined by its implementation along the interests of local politicians and Chinese substate actors. Many significant issues and international misperceptions emerge from these ‘implementation politics’, such as China’s massive overlending to certain countries, which is often mistaken for a ‘debt trap’ strategy. In this context, developing more fined-grain approaches to China is critical for they help make sense of the usual confusion around Chinese projects and policies. In other words, they generate the kind of ‘strong knowledge on contemporary China’ that should inform sound policymaking.

Now, take the popular ‘China economic powerhouse’ narrative, which focuses on the links between Beijing’s GDP and international power, and informed a lot of Western policymaking towards China. Political economist Sean Starrs found that while Chinese privately-owned enterprises accounted for about 45% of China’s total exports in 2017, they only accounted for 10% of tech-intensive exports, which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) deems central to the country’s future development path. By contrast, foreign-owned firms accounted for about 65% of these tech-intensive exports, while joint ventures mostly accounted for the rest. Nowadays, as China became the world’s first foreign direct investment recipient in 2020 and foreign companies seem unwilling to leave the country, Starrs’ findings on the role of foreign firms in the Chinese economy are likely to remain relevant.

Therefore, when hearing about ‘all-mighty China’ taking over the world, one should remember that the CCP’s enduring leadership – Chinese leaders’ fundamental objective – rests on an economy that is significantly fueled by firms tied to the US. In other words, Chinese GDP should not be equated to Chinese power for it merely reflects Beijing’s complex embedment in globalization, which, depending on various factors, may or may not support its international power. Huawei was reminded of this fact the hard way when the Trump administration weaponized global value chains to shut the firm from its US and foreign semiconductor suppliers.

However, some might say that China could replicate its successful catch-up in solar panels across the board and solve its external dependency problems. China certainly steers in this direction, nevertheless, after over 60 years of industrial policy, Beijing’s semiconductor industry still lags two generations behind the global leaders. This failure sheds light on another popular representation of China – Beijing as a ‘tech power’ –, which is also potentially misleading. While it is true that China has ranked 14th in the Global Innovation Index and is home to staggering technological change – e.g. ubiquitous digital payment systems –, partly supported by the Chinese society’s ‘natural’ leaning towards tech absorption, Beijing’s weaknesses in terms of basic research make it hard to foster the kind of scientific breakthroughs that allow countries to move beyond the realm of incremental innovation. In other words, China’s tech power comes with serious caveats, which happen to explain a great deal of the Chinese economy’s decreasing productivity and related declining GDP growth rate. In short, this alternative understanding of China’s ‘tech power’ is yet another indication that, for all its might, China must constantly deal with deep-rooted weaknesses.

These weaknesses are all the more concerning for Beijing, as they occur when the CCP must take the country towards a new tech/consumption-driven development path to escape the middle-income trap. Any failure would shake the Party to its core. Therefore, to get a clear picture of China, one must move beyond the glamourous foreign investment announcements and the flamboyant warships, and look at the less glittering stuff. That is, for instance, Beijing’s ability to build a social safety net to free up savings and boost its weak consumption, as a part of its ‘Dual Circulation’ strategy aiming to rebalance China’s growth engine from the global markets to its domestic market.

One way to get this clearer picture of the Chinese system is to enrich our traditional understanding of China, as a developmental and repressive state, with some thoughts on the emerging Chinese regulatory state. That is the CCP’s policy action is not only political but also functionalist for it must solve concrete economic issues while exerting significant yet limited control over national actors. Thus, yes, the CCP’s current crackdown on Big Tech is about reaffirming its authority. But, it is also about technical considerations, such as streamlining digital markets by addressing the consumers’ demands regarding the digital platforms’ abusive practices and data privacy. These pragmatic concerns led the CCP to draft a GDPR-inspired law, which combines state access to private data and a high level of privacy protection, notably including the data of deceased persons. However, Chinese Big Tech, which already refused to hand personal loan data to the authorities, are likely to attempt to circumvent the new regulations, thus fueling a complex bargaining process among actors with various degrees of connection to the CCP, which will contribute to shaping the Chinese tech landscape. Such important and ambiguous developments are hard to grasp when considering China a mere totalitarian state and further emphasize the need for more refined approaches to China in policymaking.

This kind of more refined representation of China may help make the EU policymakers aware that China’s growing regulatory needs could constitute an avenue for renewed European engagement, given the EU’s broad regulatory experience. However, EU policymakers should keep in mind that, beyond ideological considerations, the ‘Plan’ or the market, the regulatory or the repressive state, are nothing but tools to ensure China’s stability under the leadership of the CCP. Thus, further engaging with China to foster trust between politically diverse regimes rather than liberalization may be wise for the time being. After all, trust will be key in persuading the CCP that a balanced rules-based world, which suits the EU the most, is the best environment for China’s stability. Of course, such an approach should be coupled with a degree of smart market protection and a strong attachment to EU core values. That will be a fine line to walk, but hey, that is what diplomacy is for.

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East Asia

Taiwan’s International Status: “A Country Within a Country”

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Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen met with US House Speaker Kevin McCarthy in California. (Photo: Taiwan's Presidential Office)

In California, a recent meeting was held between the President of Taiwan, Tsai Ing-wen, and the U.S. House Speaker, Mr. Kevin McCarthy, which holds political significance. This aforementioned meeting facilitated a negative shift in the bilateral relations between China and Taiwan.  The latent hostilities between China and Taiwan possess the potential to escalate into full-scale armed conflict at any given juncture.

The proposal

The incongruent dynamic existing between China and Taiwan has persisted since 1949, when Taiwan made the conscious decision to separate from mainland China.

From 1949 onwards, China and Taiwan have been embroiled in a geopolitical imbroglio pertaining to their respective territorial integrity and claims of sovereignty. The Chinese government asserts that Taiwan is an integral component of its sovereign geography. On the contrary, Taiwan is assertive of its autonomy as a distinct, self-governing entity that operates independently and is no longer subject to Chinese jurisdiction.

The discordant relationship between the two sides which has escalated over the preceding biennium, potentially heightening the likelihood of military confrontation.

Over the course of the past two years, there have been several instances in which China has deployed the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to conduct military maneuvers in close proximity to Taiwan. The aforementioned initiative was aimed at preventing any activities fueled by Taiwan that could have been construed as provocative and potentially encroach on China’s claims of rightful control over Taiwan’s sovereignty and territorial boundaries

The persistent geopolitical tensions between China and Taiwan since 1949 can be attributed to diverging opinions regarding the formal recognition of Taiwan, in particular, the contentious matter of Taiwan’s sovereignty. Tensions will continue Between China and Taiwan until Taiwan becomes independent or recognizes its self-identification as a constituent part of China.

Since 1949, the China has exerted persistent pressure upon Taiwan to acquiesce to the notion of reunification or the incorporation of Taiwan into the mainland territory of China. Nevertheless, it appears that Taiwan’s internal political circumstance and dynamics persist in maintaining its political choices and ideology as a democratic and self-governing entity.

The prolonged inability of both parties to develop a more extensive and adaptable resolution or methodology to address the matter implies that the aspiration to “normalize” relations between China and Taiwan continues to exist solely within the realm of rhetoric.

In order to achieve the objective of unification under the the idea of the “One China Principle” or One China Policy and to surmount the political divergence concerning Taiwan’s official position, has engendered several propositions by China aimed at resolving this issue. A proposed approach adopt the implementation of a “one country, two systems” protocol akin to that employed in Hong Kong and Macau.

The Chinese government has expressed that the policy is exceedingly permissive and capable of surmounting the distinct system variances that exist between the mainland region of China and Taiwan.

The proposal of “special administrative region” attributed to Taiwan enables the continued preservation of its economic, social, and security system that they have built so far, while attenuating or obviating any undue influence or interference by China. Nonetheless, the aforementioned proposal appears to be insufficient in instigating political transformation in Taiwan, given the persistent refusal of Taiwanese individuals and governmental officials to endorse unification and uphold their desire for independence.

In view of China, safeguarding Taiwan and accomplishing the complete unification of the country is not solely a matter of fulfilling its constitutional obligations, but also serves the purpose of preserving its stature as a dominant and revered nation on the global stage.

In contrast, Taiwan persistently endeavors to establish diplomatic and cross-strait relations through a range of diverse strategies and approaches with multiple nations across the globe. The clear objective is to secure the hearts and compassion of the global populace. Taiwan undertook this action with the aim of restoring its position in the global arena and paving the way for its eventual recognition as a self-governing entity with full political autonomy.

“Country within a country”

Again, the China-Taiwan issue is rooted in a territorial and sovereignty perspectives. In the global arena, China maintains a comparatively advantageous position. China, is a prominent participant in the United Nations, the most extensive intergovernmental organization encompassing numerous states worldwide, Positioning itself as a powerful participant in the direction and reflection of global politics. Furthermore, China belongs to “the distinguished” member of UN Security Council’s five permanent members, which has so far strong and great influence on world politics.

On the other hand, the international position held by Taiwan is considerably intricate. The question regarding the statehood of Taiwan remains a matter of unsettled dispute, given the absence of any universally recognized body empowered to render definitive judgments regarding the status of a nation-state.

Since the adoption of Resolution A/RES/2758 by the UN General Assembly on October 25, 1971, Taiwan has lost its international “stage”. This is because the resolution affirms China as the sole legitimate representative of China to the United Nations and consequentially nullifies Taiwan’s membership from the organization.

It is a well-documented reality that numerous nations have forged informal diplomatic ties with Taiwan, particularly in the realm of trade and investment. The United States, for instance, has solidified such relations through the Taiwan Relations Act. To the present day, a limited number of 22 nations have formally acknowledged and established official diplomatic intercourse with Taiwan. A notable aspect is that the majority of these nations lack any substantial sway or significant leverage on the international political sphere. Specifically, countries of comparatively small size in the African and Latin American regions, namely Haiti, Belize, and Tuvalu.

Taiwan has indeed met the three constitutive elements or absolute requisites deemed necessary for a country as exemplified by the 1933 Montevideo Convention. These components include the presence of a defined territorial boundary, a functioning populace, and a duly constituted government. However, Taiwan lacks a crucial element in its diplomatic status, namely the recognition from the international community through a declarative act.

The restricted global acknowledgement of Taiwan undoubtedly carries considerable political and legal ramifications. Recognition is widely regarded as the key component in modern international politics that has the potential to enhance the legitimacy and sovereignty of a given state.

Taiwan faces formidable challenges in achieving recognition. In order to attain successful governance, Taiwan must display adeptness in efficiently managing both internal and external political dynamics. Otherwise, the current state of affairs will persist, leading to Taiwan’s classification as a “subnational entity” Or “A country within a country”.

Ultimately, the resolution of the China and Taiwan conflict proves to be a formidable challenge. In order to mitigate potential future crises and uphold regional and international stability, it is necessary for China and Taiwan to refrain from engaging in provocative actions. It is imperative to adopt a cooperative approach through negotiations and concessions that are all-encompassing and pertinent, in order to attain a sustainable resolution that caters to the interests of both China and Taiwan’s populace of 23 million, while acknowledging and adapting to their respective challenges and circumstances.

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The Sino-Russian-led World Order: A Better Choice for the Globe?

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Photo: Grigoriy Sisoev, RIA Novosti

International forums, which were once established to promote cooperation and dialogue among the world’s states, are now increasingly being used as platforms for confrontation and accusation. The recent example of G20 and G7 summits, where China and Russia faced criticism and isolation from Western countries over the Indo-pacific and their actions in Ukraine, plus India’s accusation of Pakistan as a terrorist sponsor state in the SCO summit, illustrate these trends. Instead of working towards finding a solution to pressing global problems, these meetings have devolved into platforms for airing grievances and pointing fingers – this shift in focus has undermined the effectiveness of these forums in addressing the very issues they were created to solve.

At their recent summit in Hiroshima, Japan, the G7 leaders issued their strongest-ever condemnation of Russia and China. They accused them of using economic coercion and militarizing the South China Sea and urged them to push Russia to withdraw its troops from Ukraine. Furthermore, at the G7 summit, leaders of the significant democracies pledged additional measures targeting Russia and spoke with a united voice on their growing concern over China.

Similarly, in Feb 2023, at the G20 finance minister’s summit held in Bengaluru, Russia and China declined to sign a joint statement condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and of course, as a sovereign state, Russia has the right to defend its territory and combat threats that pose a danger to its survival. These are just a few instances that illustrate how the Western world reacts to the actions and policies of China and Russia on the global stage.

Consequently, this recent condemnation and blaming at the Hiroshima summit demonstrate that international forums can no longer address serious global issues; instead, they have become arenas for blaming and accusing one another. This shift in the nature of international forums has significant implications for global governance and cooperation – It highlights the need for the failure of the current global system dominated by the Western bloc.

Besides, accusing states such as China and Russia at international forums is not a solution to global problems; instead, it can exacerbate regional tension and promote anti-sentiment against influential states. Furthermore, instead of promoting cooperation and dialogue, such accusations can foster an environment of mistrust and hostility, making it more challenging to find common ground and work towards resolving global issues.

In one of my previous papers, I argued that “the contemporary geopolitical landscape is characterized by escalating tension between the United States and its allies and China and Russia. This can be attributed to the absence of transparent and inclusive unipolar world order that effectively addresses the interests and concerns of all nations.

I further elaborated that the US and its allies are not inclined to recognize the emergence of a Sino-Russian-led world order, as evidenced by the recent summit development. The West has frequently chastised China and Russia for their autocratic governments, breaches of human rights, and expansionist ambitions. Such claims, however, are based on a skewed and obsolete understanding of the global system that ignores the two countries’ legitimate interests and aspirations. Instead of making allegations, the Western world should be grateful for the Sino-Russian-led international system, which provides a more democratic, multipolar, and peaceful alternative to the US-dominated regional hegemony.

To begin with, the Sino-Russian-led international order is more democratic than the Western one since it recognizes the globe’s diversity of political systems and cultures. China and Russia do not push their ideals or ideologies on other countries but instead encourage them to exercise their sovereignty and self-determination. They also reject any influence or intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries, particularly by the United States and its allies. In contrast, the Western world has frequently employed economic and military force to compel or remove governments that do not share its interests or tastes. Iraq, Libya, Syria, Venezuela, and Iran are a few examples. Such operations have breached international law and generated insecurity and misery in several places.

Second, the Sino-Russian-led international order is more multipolar than the Western one because it balances the strength and influence of many global players. With expanding economic, military, and diplomatic capacities, China and Russia have emerged as crucial powers in the twenty-first century. They have also formed strategic alliances with other growing nations, including India, Brazil, South Africa, Turkey, and Iran. They have joined forces to oppose the US-led unipolar system and call for more egalitarian and inclusive global governance. On the other hand, the Western world has attempted to preserve its domination and hegemony over other countries, particularly in regions such as Europe, Asia-Pacific, the Middle East, and Africa. Many countries seeking greater autonomy have expressed displeasure and hostility to such a system.

Third, the Sino-Russian world order is more peaceful than the Western one because it values discussion and collaboration above confrontation and war. China and Russia have settled their historical differences and formed a comprehensive strategic alliance based on mutual trust and respect. They have also collaborated on several regional and global concerns, including counter-terrorism, non-proliferation, climate change, energy security, and pandemic response. They have also backed international institutions and procedures such as the United Nations (UN), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), BRICS (Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa), Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and others. In contrast, the Western world has frequently instigated or intensified tensions and disagreements with other countries, particularly China and Russia. A few examples are NATO expansion, missile defense deployment, sanctions system, and commerce.

Finally, international forums have the potential to promote cooperation and dialogue among nations; however, their effectiveness is hindered when they become platforms for confrontation and accusation. In contrast, the Sino-Russian-led world order is a superior choice for the globe to the Western one. It is more democratic because it values diversity; multipolar because it balances power; and more peaceful because it promotes dialogue – thus, rather than criticizing, the Western world should commend the international order led by Sino-Russian cooperation.

In conclusion, while international forums have the potential to promote cooperation among nations, they are increasingly being used for confrontation. In this context, the Sino-Russian-led world order offers a more democratic and peaceful alternative to the US-dominated hegemony and may be a better choice for promoting global cooperation.

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Beijing’s Continued Repression of Religious Minorities

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On May 24, a new U.S. congressional committee on China approved reports pushing back on Beijing over its treatment of Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities. The committee has highlighted what Washington says is an ongoing genocide against Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in China’s Xinjiang region. In March this year, a U.S. official told Newsweek she was “especially alarmed” by China’s placement of 1 million Tibetan children in a residential school system, which Beijing said was part of a broader poverty alleviation program.

The treatment of both Muslim Uyghur population in Xinjiang, and the Buddhist population in Tibet, by the  People’s Republic of China (PRC), created by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1949, officially an atheist state has been coming under increased scrutiny in the past few years. China’s policies towards religious minorities as a whole have developed from the CCP’s sense of concern about the threat to its authority posed by organised religion.

Anti Religious campaigns were launched in 1949, under the direction of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Chairman Mao Zedong but these became particularly active during the Cultural Revolution (1966–76). The possession of religious texts was also criminalised. Carte blanche to attack and take action against religious institutions that were seen as representatives of the old ‘feudal’ order was given, and repression and atrocities were committed throughout all of the regions of China, the non-Han areas, including Tibet and Xinjiang, were affected particularly badly. Thousands of Tibetans escaped to India with sacred texts and compiled teachings in exile communities.

The 1982 Constitution made a clear distinction between what it described as normal religious activities and those that threatened the stability of the state,  “The state protects normal religious activities. No one may use religion to make an attack on the order of society, harm the physical health of citizens, or impede the activities of the state’s education system.” ‘Normal religious activities’ is interpreted to mean religious activities carried out by religious bodies that have official government approval.

The Chinese government, led by Jiang Zemin from 1989 to 2002, commenced the persecution of Falun Gong and the Tibetan Buddhists.  The persecution of Tibetan Buddhists escalated under Hu Jintao. The announcement by China’s foreign ministry in 2011 that only Beijing could appoint the 15th Dalai Lama, led to the self immolation of a monk Tsewang Norbu, at Nyitso monastery, whilst chanting “Long live the Dalai Lama” and “Tibetan people want freedom.” After Xi Jinping adjured Party members in 2016 to act as “unyielding Marxist atheists,” China intensified anti-religious campaigns in the country. Since then the persecution and targeting of Tibetans and of Tibetan Buddhist monasteries, has intensified.

Chinese military surveillance units have been installed at Kirti Monastery, Yarchen Gar, Shak Rongpo Gaden Dargyeling Monastery, and at other monasteries. In a report dated November 1993 The Christian Science Monitor had reported that, “an influx of Chinese into the region, along with Beijing’s expanding infiltration of monasteries, threatens to bury Tibetan culture.” one Tibetan Buddhist monk says, “In the past, the party attacked Tibet’s monasteries with guns and tanks,”… “But today the government uses undercover police and management committees to attack us from within.This is a much more sophisticated method of causing the slow death of Tibetan Buddhism.” Tibetan Buddhism has a deep relationship with the Tibetan identity and this is precisely why China’s approach is to impose its own Chinese brand of Buddhism onto the Tibetans. If the Chinese authorities can control Tibetan Buddhism, then they can control the Tibetan identity. Today thousands of Tibetans are languishing in prisons and detention centres strewn across the region’s mountainous terrain. In 2022, the U.S. imposed sanctions on two officials, namely Wu Yingjie, Communist Party Secretary of Tibet from 2016 to 2021, and Zhang Hongbo, the region’s police chief since 2018, for the arbitrary detention and physical abuse of members of religious minority groups in the Tibetan Autonomous Region.

China is persecuting all minorities and it has different rationales for doing it. In 2018 the Associated Press reported that that “Xi is waging the most severe systematic suppression of Christianity in the country since religious freedom was written into the Chinese constitution in 1982.” This has involved “destroying crosses, burning bibles, shutting churches and ordering followers to sign papers renouncing their faith,” actions taken against “so-called underground or house churches that defy government restrictions. Pastors have received instructions in 2023 to“teach parishioners  to “always follow the Party,” and ‘study Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era.”

The treatment of Uyghur Muslims makes many of the headlines from China, as does the rejection of these reports by Beijing. Uighur Muslims are subject to heavy surveillance as part of the Chinese Communist Party’s efforts to eliminate cultural, linguistic and religious differences from the country’s majority Han culture. Evidence suggests that the CCP is engaged in a campaign to eradicate culturally, if not physically, the Uyghur Muslims. While releasing the US Department of State’s Annual report on religious freedom around the world for 2022,  Rashad Hussain, the US ambassador-at-large for international religious freedom said, “The PRC government continue[s] to commit genocide and crimes against humanity against Uighurs, who are predominantly Muslim, and members of other ethnic and religious minority groups.” It is difficult to precisely estimate the total number of Muslims in China and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (Eastern Turkestan). Muslims of the Xinjiang region speak Turkic languages, mainly Uyghur and Kazakh. Party policy towards Uyghur though always discriminatory, further tightened after 2014 when Xi Jingping visited the region and called for a “period of painful interventionary treatment” and the installation of Chen Quangao as CCP secretary for the region in August 2016. Thereafter the  suppression of Uyghur religious practices, political indoctrination intensified through arbitrary detention of Uyghurs in state-sponsored internment camps, forced labour, severe ill-treatment,forced sterilisation, forced contraception,and forced abortion.

China frames its activities in the region as countering extremism. According to Maya Wang, acting China director at  Human Rights Watch (HRW), “The Chinese government outrageously yet dangerously conflates Islam with violent extremism to justify its abhorrent abuses against Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang.”It has now been widely reported that the Chinese government has arbitrarily detained more than a million Muslims in reeducation camps since 2017. Initially China denied the existence of any detention camps in Xinjiang, but in 2018, said it had set up “vocational training centres” necessary to curb what it said was terrorism, separatism and religious radicalism in the region.

Diverse ethnic and religious groups are considered threats to China’s regime legitimacy, and a challenge to Han centric ethnocentrism. China’s repressive policies in Xinjiang were the subject of a landmark report by the United Nations Human Rights Office in November 2022. However it was a diplomatic victory for China as the proposal from Britain, Turkey, the United States and other mostly Western countries to hold a debate on alleged rights abuses against Muslim Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in China’s western Xinjiang region was voted down. The US is not alone in finding China’s activities in gingeng crimes against humanity; Belgium, Canada, UK have concurred that ‘genocide’ is underway in Xinjiang, but other countries in the Asia Pacific region Japan, Australian, New Zealand have demurred from holding China accountable. China’s centrality to the global economy, large and powerful military, and permanent membership of the United Nations’ Security Council complicate the use of conventional diplomatic and economic policy levers to help ameliorate the plight of the minorities.

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