The Karabakh issue has always been an issue shaping Armenian politics. In September 2020, Azerbaijan initiated large-scale hostilities against the unrecognized Nagorno Karabakh Republic, and Armenia attempted to defend its compatriots in the region. I believe that Armenia  suffered a systemic defeat during the 2020 Artsakh  War, since it is not prudent to separate the authorities from the army or any other institution from the nation’s remaining institutions.
The structure in which Armenia has been living since its independence (1991) both influences and constrains its foreign and security policies. Various stakeholders—domestic opposition parties, diaspora, the media, regional and extra-regional powers—and realities of a landlocked nation with closed borders with its two neighbors as well as the unresolved Karabakh conflict: all these factors impact and place limitations on the foreign policy decision-making process. Still, even under such circumstances, leaders in Armenia’s decision-making process matter, with researchers identifying several conditions of this: leaders’ diplomatic training, regime type, leaders’ personal interest in foreign policy, etc. Two other variables also stand out in Armenia’s case: political culture and constitutional toolkit. Although Armenia has undergone a transition from a semi-presidential to a parliamentary system, it is de-facto a single-party parliamentary regime rather than a long-established parliamentary democracy, where the leader of the (ruling) party (usually the chief executive of the country) has many formal and informal authorities. If a leader wields power that matters, leaders matter, their personal characteristics matter as well too.
Research shows that a leader’s behavior and actions as well as the situational context (others’ presence, time constraints, stakes, roles, and norms) are affected by their mental model and cognitions; the latter, in turn, are influenced and shaped by personality traits, perceptions (which is filtered through biases, stereotypes and heuristics), motivation/emotion.
Nikol Pashinyan’s diplomacy?
Nikol Pashinyan, with no prior diplomatic training and interest in foreign policy, is known for his emotional and fiery speeches, which often contain insults, outbursts of anger, threats. Emotions are capable of altering humans’ normal cognitive function. Often Pashinyan acts out of anger, such as making emotional expressions. There are many instances when he cannot restrain himself; there are examples of his outbursts, anger, and threats. For all that, there are instances where he acts very calmly. Pashinyan’s speeches are often accompanied by instant changes in facial expressions and abrupt transitions from an angry to a happy state. It seems Pashinyan lacks emotional stability. He is even suspected of having some mental health problems, and his mother is rumored to have psychological issues (schizophrenia), which could pass to Pashinyan.
The status of Artsakh and its surrounding seven territories are perhaps the most critical issues. Armenia has advocated for Artsakh’s right to self-determination, meaning independence from Azerbaijan—something unacceptable for Baku. Armenia was ready to hand the seven regions (on a “5+2” basis) over to Azerbaijan on condition of independence or at least a path to independence (through a future referendum once refugees return). In 2011, Baku refused to sign a document implying such a scenario, insisting that any status of Nagorno-Karabakh outside Azerbaijan is not acceptable. This, in turn, was unacceptable for Yerevan.
Then the so-called Lavrov plan, a set of Russian proposals, was circulated (in 2015), which, according to Pashinyan, implied the return of the seven regions (5+2) and refugees and deployment of Russian peacekeepers bypassing the issue of status. Russian Co-Chair in the OSCE Minsk Group Igor Popov openly denied Pashinyan’s arguments, saying that the phased proposal implied the return of the five regions to Azerbaijan in the first stage, while the return of the remaining two regions was in conjunction with affirming the status of Nagorno-Karabakh. This, at least, points out Pashinyan’s misperception, if we leave out that politicians often lie. But the other part is Russia, with whom you cannot have such a game, especially in these challenging times of security. In Pashinyan’s cognition, Russian proposals bypassed the very status of Karabakh, which, as he explained in his article, was rejected both by his predecessor and himself. However, his predecessor in a recent interview claims that he had agreed to the Lavrov plan.
Upon coming to power, Pashinyan acquainted himself with what he believed to be a stalled negotiation process, and, according to him, there was a simple choice: to give the territories back to Azerbaijan or try to change the negotiation logic. He argues that he had chosen the second path, which was doomed to fail since it was impossible to stop the train. Meanwhile, he knew very well of Azerbaijan’s intention to solve the Karabakh issue by military means. Therefore, every uncalculated and heedless action could ignite a military conflict. In such a situation, Armenia’s leadership had to be very careful in its statements and activities so as not to aggravate the already tense situation. Instead, Pashinyan’s government made several hawkish statements. Where did such overconfidence come from? A likely answer is the perceived military balance. The last war proved it was a misperception.
Importantly, misperception and overconfidence were not common only to Pashinyan. Artsakh president Arayik Harutyunyan in June 2020 stated that “the air of Artsakh is entirely protected”. Samvel Babayan, then Secretary of Artsakh Security Council, said in August 2020 that even if Turkey joins Azerbaijan in a possible war, Artsakh will definitely win. As the war showed, both statements were miscalculations.
Research shows that emotion plays an essential role in psychology and decision-making. McDermott posits that “emotions can facilitate motivation and arousal”. From the very beginning, Armenia’s political opposition accused Pashinyan of at least two things—anti-Russian views and being soft on the Karabakh conflict (handing over some territories to Azerbaijan). In response, Pashinyan attempted to prove that the opposite is true. Like all humans, leaders also have their motivations. In Pashinyan’s case, the motivation for achievement of showing that he is a hardliner is observable. His motivation could be showing that he is not less of a hardliner than his predecessors (except Levon Ter-Petrosyan) or, at least, not a dove. To this end, he and his government made emotional, tough, and shortsighted statements: “Karabakh is Armenia, and that’s it”; “new war for new territories”, etc.
Pashinyan also insisted on the return of Karabakh to the negotiating table. True, this was rather noble and crucially important for Armenian diplomacy. However, given that Artsakh’s more representative place had been lost because of Armenia’s shortsighted policy previously—and more importantly, Azerbaijan would by no means agree to that claim—it was naive to expect any success in this regard. The OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs’ stance was also predictable: for such an outcome, all parties must agree. Azerbaijan disagreed. In the end, by September 2020, Pashinyan proved to be even more hardliner on the Artsakh issue than any Armenian chief executive.
Although Pashinyan’s government did not completely overlook the Vienna and S. Petersburg statements reached immediately after the 2016 April War, these advantageous (for Armenia) agreements were somewhat sidelined in the context of the aspiration of bringing Artsakh back to the negotiating table. Instead of consistently highlighting the implementation of the agreements on creating OSCE investigative mechanisms for ceasefire violations and increasing the number of international observers, Pashinyan’s administration prioritized the agenda of Artsakh’s participation in the talks.
Was the new formula necessary?
Armenia’s reformist ex-defense minister David Tonoyan in March 2019 publicly redefined the “land for peace” formula with a “new war for new territories”, meaning that if Azerbaijan undertakes a new offensive, Armenia may take more territories. Besides, he pointed out that Armenia will get rid of the constant trench defense strategy and increase the number of military units that can transfer the hostilities to the enemy’s territory. The defense minister spoke confidently about the future. While he was voicing what he would do, why would his antagonist have waited to modernize his army and increase its combating capabilities? Knowing that its army has just started reforms, Armenia’s government hurried to declare overconfident and ambitious plans and readiness.
This still begs the question of “Why”. Given Armenia’s inadequate capabilities vis-a-vis Azerbaijan, instead of irritating statements, it should have been prudent to choose a restrained phrase, which would not nurture the already existing overconfident moods within the society. Had Tonoyan’s formula been stated by the foreign minister, things could have been different, as a same statement made by the Defense ministry and the Foreign ministry conveys different messages.
After the war, Russian foreign minister Lavrov stated that the “new war for new territories” statement was emotional, and these words materialized with very negative strength. Tonoyan recently clarified that his statement was a response to Azerbaijan’s statements to solve the Karabakh conflict through war. Leaving aside whose cause is right, it is significant to understand whose capabilities were real to win a war.
Though in hindsight, Azerbaijan was capable of winning a war against Armenia. Even if Azerbaijan was not ready for war and made provocative and belligerent statements, Baku was confident that Armenia would not start a war over such kinds of statements. Armenia did not need a war. One can infer that Azerbaijan’s leadership voiced such statements from time to time to provoke the Armenian side, and they succeeded in Pashinyan’s tenure when—apparently—they were ready for war much more than ever.
In his August 2019 speech at Artsakh capital city, Stepanakert, Pashinyan presented Armenia’s strategic goals and announced, “I feel that many of you may wonder that I said nothing about Artsakh. The answer is very simple: Artsakh is Armenia, and that’s it”. He also chanted “Miatcum” (unification), hinting at the unification of Armenia and Artsakh. Miatcum was a popular nationalistic slogan of the Karabakh movement in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Later explaining his proclamation, Pashinyan mentioned that his claim that Artsakh is Armenia was a response to Azerbaijan’s maximalist approach that Artsakh has to be part of Azerbaijan. Instead of a ‘tit for tat’ approach, Pashinyan should have expressed in a much more restrained way, claiming, for instance, that Artsakh’s right to self-determination was exercised in accordance with both Soviet and international law, hence, this did not conflict with Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. Doing so, he could also blame Aliyev for not being constructive at the negotiating table.
Nikol Pashinyan’s statement soon raised criticism. Former American Co-Chair of the OSCE Minsk Group Matthew Bryza claimed that the “Artsakh is Armenia” proclamation stops the entire negotiation process, making it impossible. Russia’s foreign minister Lavrov noted that the statement “doesn’t help create an atmosphere for renewing the political process.” Certainly, the nuances between the concept of the “Armenian world” and the “Republic of Armenia” were lost in translation. Still, the statement was shortsighted in terms of anticipating the reaction from the external audience.
In a sense, Pashinyan’s statement that “Karabakh is Armenia, period”, was also a response to Aliyev’s assertions that the Armenians are alien people or Yerevan is an Azerbaijani city. Aliyev’s motive, inter alia, for such kind of statements was provocation and propaganda. Should Armenia somehow react? The answer is positive, since there was no need to appease the opponents. But Armenia’s leaders shouldn’t have expressed emotional and dangerous (for negotiations) statements, as Pashinyan did, unlike his predecessors. Many times Azerbaijan’s presidents made such kinds of statements, but Armenia’s top leadership did not respond emotionally.
After the war, Nikol Pashinyan stated that as of 2018, the Karabakh issue was in deadlock, from which there was only one way out—an unconditional handover of territories, since Aliyev demanded so. “The alternative was the following: either we have to hand over the seven regions without the status of Karabakh, or it is a war”, he continued. Pashinyan rejected Aliyev’s demands. Hence, he clearly knew that a war could break out any day. Surprisingly, in one of his interviews after the war, he said that the war had always been anticipated, based on the last ten years’ [military and intelligence] reports hinting that that anticipation was general and there had not been any specific date for the start of the war. Moreover, he said that Armenia’s military-political leadership by September 25, 2020 assessed that the war would not begin.
Coming to grips with Pashinyan’s behavior
What is the rationale for such an assessment when Nikol Pashinyan stated after the war that the alternative of Aliyev’s demands of the unconditional return of the seven surrounding regions of the NKAO was the war, with Pashinyan refusing to act on that demand? Once again, the war could start any day, and Armenia’s leadership did not know about this.
In June 2020, Armenia’s Chief of General Staff reported that “Our opponent is not only Azerbaijan but also Turkey. Therefore, Armenia cannot effectively resist the military potential of those states. It is necessary to direct all the political and diplomatic potential to avoid or at least postpone a war.” This is a clear and open warning that Turkey is in the game more seriously than ever before.
After this, the July clashes of 2020 happened when Azerbaijan suffered a mini-military loss. Commenting on the events of 2020 July, Pashinyan said, “The Azerbaijani myth that its army can defeat the Armenian army, and thus Armenia and Artsakh should no longer have to make concessions. For a long time, we have been urging Azerbaijan not to talk with us from the positions of force, war-mongering and threat of use of force. We can now confidently say that Armenia has both rejected the threat of use of force on the diplomatic table and showed in the battlefield that those claims are unfounded and do not reflect the real balance of power”.
Then PM Pashinyan delivered a speech in quite a symbolic place and manner dedicated to the 2020 July fighting, where he presented several outcomes of that clash. He notably declared, “The victorious July battles proved the credibility of our political statements; they showed that our assessment of the military-political situation in the region and the balance of power was well-calculated and accurate”. He continues, “The victorious July battles demonstrated Armenia’s ability to meet its own security challenges on its own”; that Armenia has “an efficient and intelligent army with a decisive influence in the region.”
What was the rationale for organizing a big event and ceremony celebrating a very local victory? The small success was presented as a significant achievement. How is it possible to draw several ambitious and strategic outcomes based on low-scale and positional fighting, even though you won those battles? How can local and positional fighting judge the real balance of power? Pashinyan could say that “the Armenian army fulfilled the challenge it faced in July with success, thus increasing its combat effectiveness”. One can even claim that there was no need to publicize the event at all.
Arguably, this speech was not an attempt to delay the war as the Chief of General Staff had advised. If someone asks Pashinyan about his claim that Azerbaijan’s army cannot win the Armenian army, he will probably argue that Turkey supported Azerbaijan’s army in the recent war. Fair enough, but equally reasonable is the counterargument that he had the Chief of the General Staff report well before the 2020 July escalation, which proves that the balance of power was broken at least by June 2020. Importantly, several months after the war, the same Chief of the General Staff and 40 other high-level officers of the armed forces demanded the Pashinyan administration’s resignation, criticizing its foreign and domestic policies.
Beliefs are important constructs of an individual’s mental model. Pashinyan believed that the balance of power between Armenia and Azerbaijan by 2020 July was in place. This belief was affected and shaped by the July battles and its result, which in Pashinyan’s cognitions was a viable indicator of the conflicting parties’ real capacities. Pashinyan’s memory probably lacked Turkey’s years-long assistance to Azerbaijan.
But what about the report of the Chief of General Staff? Did he forget about this report? Still, this raises some suspicions about his sense of reality. The 2020 Artsakh War showed that the belief about power balance was misleading. As one commentator observed, the Karabakh “conflict continues to illustrate the gap between political leaders’ perceptions and military reality.” Furthermore, Armenia’s second president Robert Kocharyan insisted that Armenia had provoked the border incident in 2020 July. Pashinyan did not deny that Armenia had taken the path of aggravating the situation.
Although people are considered rational actors, their rationality is always limited. People, including politicians, live in bounded rationality—“behavior that is adaptive within the constraints imposed both by the external situation and by the capacities of the decision maker”. In other words, people cannot know everything, think about everything and understand everything, including themselves. Bounded rationality tells that Pashinyan could not know the true aims of Azerbaijan. Misperceptions and heuristics led to Pashinyan’s overconfidence during the post-2020 July speeches, which, in a sense, could be regarded as a provocation in Baku or at least irritate it.
Another problem with the official analysis and assessments regarding the 2020 July escalation is that Armenia was able to confront Azerbaijan on the battlefield and will in the future also be able to do so if they fight one on one. I speculate it was misconceiving in a sense that Azerbaijan did not concentrate all its efforts in those clashes, letting it be a very local clash so as (a) to give a bait to the enemy and (a) not to instigate an all-out war with a possible interference of Russia/CSTO. Probably, Azerbaijan, calculating the realities on and around the conflict, chose not to respond heavily for a chance of starting an all-out war with Armenia per se. It is highly possible that Aliyev did so later to blame Pashinyan for provocation.
Pashinyan on a par with Aliyev?
All this happened after the September 2018 meeting in Dushanbe between Pashinyan and Aliyev (this was their first talk), where they agreed to establish a direct communication line and reduce borderline tensions. Reaching such an agreement usually takes some trust and compromise. (Theoretically, the deal could have been achieved without compromise: one party asked to observe the ceasefire regime, the other one agreed either for the sake of gaining trust or for other unknown reasons, e.g., negotiation gambit). According to Pashinyan, Aliyev asked him to stop talking about the lack of democracy in Azerbaijan in return for the ceasefire regime to be respected. Libaridian supported this, basing on his sources from Azerbaijan and adding that Pashinyan asked Aliyev to observe the ceasefire, while the latter agreed. Libaridian continues, “Probably, Aliyev said something like “Ok, we will do it, but the essence of the [Karabakh] issue must be discussed”, and Pashinyan said something in the spirit, “Ok, but give me time.” And after this, to state that “Artsakh is Armenia”, “new war for new territories” is not a constructive move. Instead, it was provocative and damaged not only the personal trust of Aliyev towards Pashinyan but also the negotiation process. Put it very simply, “If Artsakh is Armenia, then what to negotiate.”
Understandably, this statement was also directed to the internal audience, given the accusations mentioned above by political opposition to the address of Pashinyan that he is not a hardliner. The essence of short-sightedness is that by paying tribute to those accusations and trying to prove the opposite, Pashinyan made dangerous and uncalculated statements and steps.
Look at Armenia’s statements from the eyes of Aliyev. He has never hidden his readiness to use force, while Armenia’s new authorities at some point started to use aggressive and arrogant statements. Aliyev could simply think, “Well, Armenia, you think that if a new war starts, you will seize new territories; you announce that Artsakh is Armenia; you think that your little success in the July 2020 clashes means you are ready to wage a large-scale war with us; fine, you will see what we can do.”
All the actions and moves by Armenia’s government cannot be considered steps to avoid the war. Instead, one can opine that they aggravated the situation and brought the war closer. In the very least, for Azerbaijan those statements served as a legitimizing ground to start the war, which is Armenia’s diplomatic failure. Later Aliyev would blame Pashinyan for provoking Azerbaijan—both military and diplomatically—as he implicitly legitimized launching the latest war against Karabakh. The international context was also conducive to Azerbaijan to start the war—this meaning competition between Turkey and Russia, Western sanctions against Russia, post-election political crisis in Belarus, the pre-election United States, disagreements and management crisis in the European Union and NATO as well as the COVID-19 pandemic.
Nikol Pashinyan and his team are often accused of unwise and shortsighted diplomacy, which triggered the war. An important counterargument is that Azerbaijan had calculated that if Armenia continues its intensive armament strategy and makes its army stronger, it can bring the balance of power back, although it had been broken during recent years. Moreover, Armenia has officially adopted several plans to modernize and develop its army, procure large-scale arms and military equipment for the period of 2018-2024. Therefore, using the conducive geopolitical atmosphere, Azerbaijan initiated the war in 2020, not leaving it to another year, when chances to win might be less realistic. No doubt, Baku had been preparing for this war for quite a long time.
Two factors stand out: (a) Aliyev’s readiness to solve the conflict by force and (b) and his extensive military procurement. Aliyev assured himself that he could solve the conflict by force, of which he had started to talk long ago, such as immediately after the failed Kazan talks. Given his extensive military procurement and Turkey’s explicit support, including militarily, the possible war shouldn’t have been excluded in the minds of Armenia’s military-political leadership. In February 2019, Aliyev said that “the might is right” principle currently prevails in world politics, and Azerbaijan must be ready for this reality. Once again, Aliyev asserted that if negotiations break down, Azerbaijan will not hesitate to use force.
In the past, Aliyev lambasted the OSCE Minsk Group, particularly right before the 2016 “Four-Day War” and the 2020 “44-Day War”. Thus, Aliyev accused Minsk Group Co-Chairs of freezing the Karabakh conflict and using double standards in February 2016, charged the troika of “freezing the conflict instead of resolving it” just days before the Four-Day War. Notably, the Minsk Group’s mandate is to facilitate the peace process to find solutions for the conflict but not to resolve it, as incorrectly argued by Aliyev. On July 6, 2020, he also qualified the peace process under the aegis of Minsk Group as “meaningless”, while charging the Co-Chairs of that the conflict had been dragging for so long. Seemingly, by these statements, Azerbaijan informed Armenia that the war is looming large and it would be sooner rather than later.
What was the role of Nikol Pashinyan in this drama? Pashinyan’s policy was not the reason for the war, nor was it the result. Did he incite the war? I insist that he indirectly brought the war closer by his diplomacy. Why publicly adopt the “new war for new territories” formula when you are at the beginning of the mentioned plans? Why did the Armenian authorities assure the public that if a new war starts, new territories will be taken, when they knew the modernization of the army had just begun? It was utterly unnecessary and inefficient to enter into a dangerous war of words. Armenia’s authorities knew that Armenia was beginning the long road of reforming and strengthening its army. Why not wait for the year 2024 to have a more powerful and modernized army and then be more confident? Furthermore, despite the balance of power (including military) has been broken between Armenia and Azerbaijan during the recent years and in spite of the success of the July 2020 clashes, Armenia’s leadership had to be hyper-careful in its statements and actions so as not to incite a military conflict. In other words, Armenia’s military-political leadership had to have a realistic and unemotional evaluation of where the country stands in terms of power relations. However, as the above discussion shows, Pashinyan’s administration, wittingly or unwittingly, instigated the 2020 war.
Aiming to solve the conflict by force, Aliyev used the conducive international environment as well as the shortsighted diplomacy of Nikol Pashinyan to wage the war, not leaving it for the years to come, when the balance of power could be restored. Arguably, Pashinyan’s unwise and emotional policy coincided with Aliyev’s decisiveness to solve the conflict by military means. Touching upon the origins of the war, Pashinyan claimed that the point for any event to take place in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict had matured. This analysis argues that he wittingly or unwittingly facilitated that point to be matured.
- If otherwise not specified, whenever I use Armenia, it includes Artsakh as well
- Armenian name of the Karabakh.
- Hudson, V.M. Foreign policy analysis: classic and contemporary theory [2th edition]. Rowman & Littlefield. 2014. pp. 40-41.
- McDermott, R. Political psychology in international relations. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004. p. 167.
- Davit Tonoyan’s statement could not be made without Pashinyan’s knowledge and permission; otherwise, Tonoyan would have been fired.
- Simon, H. Human nature in politics: the dialogue of psychology with political science. American Political Science Review. 1985. No. 79, 293-304. p. 294.
From our partner RIAC
Ukraine’s Chance for Rational Behaviour
From the point of view of international politics, the most important thing in the recently-published article by the President of Russia on the Ukrainian issue is the indication that Russia continues to supports the sovereignty of this country if it reflects its genuine ability to maintain an independent foreign policy. It cannot be otherwise — Ukraine and Russia share a common geopolitical space, and Moscow is the strongest player.
Therefore, the logic of the Russian leader is quite simple and should be intelligible, since it addresses the ability of a neighbouring country to behave rationally. Russia is directly indicating (as it had not always done before) that a neighbouring country is expected to behave adequately in its position and understand that it is very dangerous to ignore Russian security interests. Notably, this is a serious departure from domestic foreign policy tradition, wherein Russia usually indicates its interests indirectly.
In this case, Moscow is trying to show how predictable its policy is and what the main motives are.
However, when trying to discuss reasons whether or not other states understand this, we cannot ignore the fact that rational behaviour is not always characteristic of nations during moments when they are deeply mired in internal crises. Moreover, historical experience can also be the basis for actions that are irrational or even suicidal from the point of view of formal logic and the laws of international relations. An example of irrational behaviour was the activity of the Soviet leadership in the late 1980s, when it dismantled all the power advantages it possessed in relations with Western countries. This was due to an exceptionally severe internal crisis, during which the Soviet system forced people to turn to myths, not reality.
Historical experience is no less important — Ukraine, like a number of other countries, has been part of a single political space with Russia. Moreover, in this case Russia did not play the role of a metropole in its pure form — Ukrainians have occupied leadership positions in the Russian elite since the middle of the 18th century. During the Soviet era, this republic was in a very special position — it was where most of the opportunities for economic development were concentrated; executives from Ukraine, along with Russians, occupied leading positions in other Soviet republics. Such historical experience significantly limits the ability of Ukrainian citizens to adequately assess their place on the map and in the balance of power next to Russia.
Now, 30 years after the disappearance of the USSR, all newly independent states, without exception, are at a stage when their behaviour towards Russia must become responsible, corresponding to real sovereignty. This, as we can see, is hindered by historical experience. In some cases, it manifests itself through the significant presence of national diasporas in Russia, in others — through rent-seeking behaviour, and most difficultly — through the perception of Russia as a metropole. At the same time, all three of these negative aspects of the region’s shared experience are supported by an objective balance of forces and presence in the common geopolitical space. However, Russia is no longer a metropole and policy towards it should be formed on the basis of the understanding that it is a different state from the Soviet Union, but at the same time the most powerful state to emerge from it.
How much can Russia itself contribute to such a change? First, this will really only happen as the political generations change in Russia, when more pragmatic politicians from the different nations of the region come to replace those who grew up together in the Soviet Union. Russia’s neighbours quite often turn to the question of how this change in generations affects their attitude. But at the same time, we cannot forget that the significance of a similar process in Russia itself is more important, given its power capabilities. Vladimir Putin’s article attaches such great importance to the common historical experience of Russia and Ukraine because it is important for him personally. But those who were just starting their lives at the time of the collapse of the USSR are hardly likely to see things the same way. To sum up, as long as the aggregate power capabilities of Russia are maintained, our neighbours can expect unpleasant news.
Second, Russian foreign policy towards Ukraine and other neighbours will gradually shed its ethical, fraternal component, derived from the perception of “our” neighbours as “our people.” As you know, “the Russians do not leave theirs behind”.
This means that Russia may begin to lose its motivation to fight to maintain order in the surrounding areas.
This could potentially contribute to Russia’s neighbours beginning to see it simply as the most powerful neighbour, whose capabilities have no alternative.
Third, Russian policy towards its neighbours should be more demanding precisely so that the situation does not go as far as it happened with Ukraine. So far, we see only signs of movement in this direction, however, if we look at a 10-15 year timeline, the disciplining effect may turn out to be more significant. This, of course, depends on how chaotic the international environment of our common space becomes. Now, most of the signs indicate that none of the significant world powers is ready to take on a large share of responsibility for the fate of the countries of Central Asia or the Caucasus.
In general, Vladimir Putin’s article on Russian-Ukrainian relations equally reflects both objective and subjective components of Russia’s interaction with practically all countries of the former Soviet Union. Even the Baltic states cannot be an exception in the full sense of the word — they are still connected with Russia in the power field, although soon after gaining independence they entered another institutional jurisdiction. Moreover, economically, these three countries are significantly connected with the huge Russian market in the east.
The subjective factor in relations is the historical experience; most of the article of the Russian head of state concerns this aspect. In the case of Ukraine, it is the lengthiest, and therefore very difficult to overcome.
The argument in the concluding part of the President’s article deals with objectivity and geopolitical conditions. The presence of the former can interfere with the perception of the latter — the logic of the usual interaction of powers in accordance with their power potential is hardly linked with the recognition of the special nature of relations that has been formed over several centuries.
We cannot say now how fatal the inability to overcome this contradiction may prove to be in the coming years — it is possible that the result will indeed be the disappearance of the Ukrainian state, even in the form we have become accustomed to seeing.
Given that Russia would be interested in its preservation, the matter may be about a problem so fundamental that it is necessary to recognise the inevitability of its consequences. Also, taking into account the general context, it is necessary to understand the potential impact of the unresolved Ukrainian issue on European security as a whole. In the spring of 2021, we saw how high international tension could become.
In any case, the Ukrainian issue, in its modern, post-independence incarnation, provides a very good lesson to learn from, both for Russia and for all the surrounding states.
From our partner RIAC
Latvia developed new tasks for NATO soldiers
Member of the Latvian Saemas’ national association “Everything for Latvia!” and Freedom”/LNNK Jānis Dombrava stated the need to attract NATO troops to resolve the migration crisis. This is reported by la.lv. In his opinion, illegal migration from the Middle East to Europe may acquire the feature of an invasion. He believes that under the guise of refugees, foreign military and intelligence officers can enter the country. To his mind, in this case, the involvement of the alliance forces is more reasonable and effective than the actions of the European border agencies. Dombrava also noted that in the face of an increase in the flow of refugees, the government may even neglect the observance of human rights.
The Canadian-led battlegroup in Latvia at Camp Ādaži consists of approximately 1512 soldiers, as well as military equipment, including tanks and armoured fighting vehicles.
Though the main task of the battlegroup in Latvia is country’s defence in case of military aggression, Latvian officials unilaterally invented new tasks for NATO soldiers So, it is absolutely clear, that Latvian politicians are ready to allow NATO troops to resolve any problem even without legal basis. Such deification and complete trust could lead to the full substitution of NATO’s real tasks in Latvia.
It should be noted that NATO troops are very far from being ideal soldiers. Their inappropriate behaviour is very often in a centre of scandals. The recent incidents prove the existing problems within NATO contingents in the Baltic States.
They are not always ready to fulfill their tasks during military exercises and training. And in this situation Latvian politicians call to use them as border guards! It is nonsense! It seems as if it is time to narrow their tasks rather than to widen them. They are just guests for some time in the territory of the Baltic States. It could happen that they would decide who will enter Latvia and who will be forbidden to cross the border!
Changes are Possible: Which Reforms does Ukraine Need Now?
The past 16 months have tested our resilience to sudden, unexpected, and prolonged shocks. As for an individual, resilience for a country or economy is reflected in how well it has prepared for an uncertain future.
A look around the globe reveals how resilient countries have been to the COVID-19 pandemic. Some have done well, others less so. The costs of having done less well are almost always borne by the poor. It is for this reason the World Bank and the international community more broadly urge—and provide support to—countries to undertake economic and structural reforms, not just for today’s challenges but tomorrow’s.
One country where the dialogue on reform has been longstanding and intense is Ukraine. This is particularly true since the economic crisis of 2014-2015 in the wake of the Maidan Revolution, when the economy collapsed, and poverty skyrocketed. Many feared the COVID pandemic would have similar effects on the country.
The good news is that thanks to a sustained, even if often difficult, movement on reforms, Ukraine is better positioned to emerge from the pandemic than many expected. Our initial projection in the World Bank, for example, was that the economy would contract by nearly 8 percent in 2020; the actual decline was half that. Gross international reserves at end-2020 were US$10 billion higher than projected. Most important, there are far fewer poor than anticipated.
Let’s consider three reform areas which have contributed to these outcomes.
First, no area of the economy contributed more to the economic crisis of 2014-2015 than the banking sector. Powerful interests captured the largest banks, distorted the flow of capital, and strangled economic activity. Fortunately, Ukraine developed a framework to resolve and recapitalize banks and strengthen supervision. Privatbank was nationalized and is now earning profits. It is now being prepared for privatization.
Second, COVID halted and threatened to reverse a five-year trend in poverty reduction. Thanks to reforms of the social safety net, Ukraine is avoiding this reversal. A few years back, the government was spending some 4.7 percent of GDP on social programs with limited poverty impact. Nearly half these resources went to an energy subsidy that expanded to cover one-in-two of the country’s households.
Since 2018, the Government has been restructuring the system by reducing broad subsidies and targeting resources to the poor. This is working. Transfers going to the poorest one-fifth of the population are rising significantly—from just 37 percent in 2019 to 50 percent this year and are projected to reach 55 percent in 2023.
Third, the health system itself. Ukrainians live a decade less than their EU neighbors. Basic epidemiological vulnerabilities are exacerbated by a health delivery system centered around outdated hospitals and an excessive reliance on out-of-pocket spending. In 2017, Ukraine passed a landmark health financing law defining a package of primary care for all Ukrainians, free-of-charge. The law is transforming Ukraine’s constitutional commitment to free health care from an aspiration into specific critical services that are actually being delivered.
The performance of these sectors, which were on the “front line” during COVID, demonstrate the payoff of reforms. The job now is to tackle the outstanding challenges.
The first is to reduce the reach of the public sector in the economy. Ukraine has some 3,500 companies owned by the state—most of them loss-making—in sectors from machine building to hotels. Ukraine needs far fewer SOEs. Those that remain must be better managed.
Ukraine has demonstrated that progress can be made in this area. The first round of corporate governance reforms has been successfully implemented at state-owned banks. Naftogaz was unbundled in 2020. The electricity sector too is being gradually liberalized. Tariffs have increased and reforms are expected to support investment in aging electricity-producing and transmitting infrastructure. Investments in renewable energy are also surging.
But there are developments of concern, including a recent removal of the CEO of an SOE which raised concerns among Ukraine’s friends eager to see management independence of these enterprises. Management functions of SOE supervisory boards and their members need to remain free of interference.
The second challenge is to strengthen the rule of law. Over recent years, the country has established—and has committed to protect—new institutions to combat corruption. These need to be allowed to function professionally and independently. And they need to be supported by a judicial system defined by integrity and transparency. The move to re-establish an independent High Qualification Council is a welcome step in this direction.
Finally, we know change is possible because after nearly twenty years, Ukraine on July first opened its agricultural land market. Farmers are now free to sell their land which will help unleash the country’s greatest potential source of economic growth and employment.
Ukraine has demonstrated its ability to undertake tough reforms and, thanks to the COVID-19 pandemic, has seen the real-life benefits of these reforms. The World Bank looks forward to providing continued assistance as the country takes on new challenges on the way to closer European integration.
This article was first published in European Pravda via World Bank
Syria: Rules-Based International Order Creates Humanitarian Rule, Not Law?
The world community survived the UN vote on the mechanism for delivering cross-border aid to Syria. On the agenda was...
Deloitte Acquires Industrial Cybersecurity Business aeCyberSolutions from aeSolutions
Deloitte Risk & Financial Advisory announced today its acquisition of the industrial cybersecurity business (aeCyberSolutions) from Greenville, S.C.-based Applied Engineering...
Violence in schools leads to $11 trillion in lost lifetime earnings
A new report from the World Bank and the End Violence Partnership / Safe to Learn Global Initiative shows that...
Case Study on Data Markets in India and Japan Show What Is Possible
The World Economic Forum’s Data for Common Purpose Initiative (DCPI) completed the first stage of two case studies demonstrating how...
Turkey’s role in Afghanistan
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on Thursday launched a training program in Turkey for Afghan military personnel. This is the...
Ukraine’s Chance for Rational Behaviour
From the point of view of international politics, the most important thing in the recently-published article by the President of...
North-East India Towards Peace and Prosperity: Bangladesh Paves the Way
Bangladesh has always been one of the brightest examples of religious harmony and peace. “secularism” is not only a word...
Terrorism2 days ago
Drones in the Hands of Terrorists: What Happens Then?
East Asia3 days ago
The Allure Of Winning
Green Planet3 days ago
The problems of climate change, part 2
Economy2 days ago
Half a Decade On – Reflecting on Russia’s Unsung Successes
Finance3 days ago
Hungary: Reforms to raise productivity would strengthen recovery from COVID-19
Environment3 days ago
Why climate science is key to protecting people and planet
Americas2 days ago
The hegemony of knowledge and the new world order: U.S. and the rest of the world
Energy News2 days ago
IRENA and the ESA Agree to Advance Energy Transition in Space Activities