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China’s military modernization is a threat to global security

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China’s defence budget is said to have grown only in single-digit figures since 2016, with the PLA enjoying double-digit increases for nearly thirty years before that. Over the years, Western analysis of China’s defence budget has claimed that the People’s Republic of China does not officially reveal its actual expenditure on defence and that available figures are way below the expenses actually incurred by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The challenge is that it is difficult to make real estimates of China’s defence expenditure in the absence of clearly defined heads of expenditure. In this context, we have a welcome addition to the literature on the subject in the form of the analysis by Nan Tian and FeiSu of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

SIPRI, which had originally estimated China’s defence expenditure for 2019 as being US$ 261 billion, has reduced its estimates for expenditure in 2019 to US$ 240 billion (Chinese Yuan 1,660 billion). SIPRI states that it had reduced its estimates of Chinese defence expenditure, as some of the expenses earlier considered extra-budgetary in the 1990s and 2000s were probably included in the main defence budget in 2019. The assessments of inclusions and exclusions is a useful academic exercise into the constituents of China’s defence budget. However, this fails to take into account the rapid pace of military modernization undertaken by China in the last decade or so. This includes specific attention given to the rocket and missile forces, the PLA Navy and Air Force.

Military expenditure figures published by China are usually only the total figure for ‘national defence’ expenditure, with no disaggregated information. Occasionally, China provides a breakdown of expenditure, normally across the three categories of personnel, training &maintenance, and equipment. The Defence White Paper (July 2019), for instance, offers a breakdown for spending across 2010-2017, which significantly reveals that the share of total spending allocated to equipment had risen from 33.2 percent to 41.1 percent over this period. Additionally, official figures do not account for spending on China’s space (military) programme, extra-budgetary revenues from military-owned commercial enterprises, defence mobilization funds, authorized sales of land or excess food produced by some units, and provincial military base operating costs.

The SIPRI study revises, by both adding or excluding some heads under which China could be spending its money on defence and then calculates the overall expenditure. For instance, expenditure on the Chinese Coast Guard is included in the new estimate, while appropriations for arms imports and commercial earnings from military-owned businesses are not. The new SIPRI estimates also excludes the idea that arms imports expenses came from outside the national budget. As three-quarters of Chinese imports come from Russia, the SIPRI study uses figures from Russian sources to calculate these figures. The logic used is that since there is no conclusive evidence to show that there exist extra-budgetary sources of expenditure for arms imports, it is safer to assume that this forms a part of the national budget. Profits from military-owned businesses have been excluded from SIPRI’s estimates. It was thought that the PLA offered “paid services” such as accommodation, healthcare and agricultural services to earn additional income. In 2015, President Xi Jinping ordered the closure of these activities within a period of three years. Assuming that some degree of closure was achieved, it can be presumed that income from commercial enterprises still in operation could not be calculated, therefore SIPRI deleted these from the official national budget.

What SIPRI has retained in its estimates of official defence expenditure is money spent on military research & development and testing. While China asserts that R&D is covered in the official estimate of expenditure, SIPRI basing its calculations on the annual changes in the general R&D budget assumes that 90 per cent of this funding goes to military programmes. Capital construction spending i.e., civil and military, is not differentiated in the budget. Historically, 5 per cent of this allocation was supposed to go to military expenditure, but SIPRI asserts that the actual spending amounted to only 0.07 on the military side. This then accounts for the sharp drop in the overall figure for military expenditure in 2019. In the past, Chinese State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) involved in arms manufacturing and exports made profits, with State subsidies. In the current scenario, SIPRI assumes that the level of subsidy granted to most SOEs, including loss-making ones, would be higher than before. Companies like the China Electronics Technology Group Corporation still receives subsidy. However, the absence of accurate data on this has made SIPRI drop this item from its estimates.

The authors of the SIPRI report have chosen to add five new elements to China’s official budget. These include the Coast Guard, the People’s Armed Police, payments to demobilised and retired personnel, additional military R&D, testing and evaluation expenditure, and finally, additional military construction expenditure. These five areas totalled Chinese Yuan 448 billion in 2019, amounting to 27 per cent of the total estimate of Chinese Yuan of 1,660 billion. 

Official figures released by China for 2021 indicate that the defence budget is around of Chinese Yuan 1.355 trillion (US$209 billion) which represents a 6.8 per cent nominal increase over the core 2020 budget of Chinese Yuan 1.268 trillion (US$188billion). The UK’s IISS estimates that the nominal growth for 2021 is indicative of the sturdier footing that China’s economy is on, compared to last year. In real terms, the 2021 defence budget growth is slightly lower than in 2020, owing to the 3 per cent annual inflation rate in China. But in value terms, the increase amounts to a whooping US$ 13 billon, a figure comparable with the entire defence budget of Taiwan! Similarly, in 2020, despite slower real growth in the defence budget, the nominal US$ 12 billion increase was greater than the combined defence budget increases of all other Asian states. The IISS thus concludes that the 2020 China defence budget, including funding for local militias, came to US$193billon, although total expenditure is estimated to be much higher if foreign weapons purchases, military R&D funding, and the People’s Armed Police central budget are included.

Evaluating defence spending in relation to the overall government budget also gives one for interesting insights. While China’s central government budget is slated to fall by 0.2 percent, total national government spending will probably increase by 1.8 percent. Spending on the military as a share of overall national government spending according to the IISS rises from 5.1 percent in 2020 to 5.4 percent in 2021, the highest in several years. Similarly, spending as a percent of the central government budget will rise from 36.2 percent to 38.7 percent, well above the average of 34.7 percent seen in the last five years. The new SIPRI estimate of Chinese military expenditure in 2019 is Chinese Yuan 1,660 billion (US$240 billion). This is Yuan 142 billion less than the old SIPRI estimate, but still Chinese Yuan 448 billion more than the official national defence budget. With the new estimate of US$240 billion in 2019, China remains the second largest military spender in the world (behind the USA) and its spending is still almost three-and-a-half times higher than India. China’s military burden—that is, military spending as a share of GDP—is now 1.7 per cent, down from 1.9 per cent under the old estimate.

Whichever way one looks at it, the conclusion can safely be drawn that China continues its military modernization across the spectrum and aims for advances in high technology that will give it an edge over its adversaries. This is the key lesson to be derived from any analysis of its defence expenditure. While statistics can vary from time to time, according to the figures used to calculate the total budget, analysts still don’t have a full picture of the money that is going to building the Chinese war machine and this is worrisome. Just one instance of this will suffice to illustrate the issue. For over eight months last year, China mobilised 60,000 troops ostensibly for military exercises, but were in fact used to occupy contentious positions in Eastern Ladakh against India and was very much a part of the offensive strategy adopted by the PLA across its periphery, displaying new weapons and equipment. Strangely though this deployment did not find a mention in the 35-page Work Report submitted by Premier Li Keqiang to the National People’s Congress recently.

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Test of Agni Prime Missile and India’s Counterforce Temptations

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South Asia is widely regarded as one of the most hostile regions of the world primarily because of the troubled relations between the two nuclear arch-rivals India and Pakistan. The complex security dynamics have compelled both the countries to maintain nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis each other. India is pursuing an extensive and all-encompassing military modernization at the strategic and operational level. In this regard, India has been involved in the development of advanced missiles as delivery systems and improvement in the existing delivery systems as well. Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent and delivery systems are solely aimed at India; however, India aspires to fight a ‘two-front war’ against Pakistan and China. Therefore, the size and capability of its nuclear deterrent and delivery systems are aimed at countering both threats. However, most of the recent missile delivery systems made by India appear to be more Pakistan-centric. One recent example in this regard is the recently tested nuclear-capable cannisterized ballistic missile Agni Prime, which is insinuated as Pakistan-centric. These developments would likely further provoke an action-reaction spiral and would increase the pace of conflict in South Asia, which ultimately could result in the intensification of the missile arms race.

Just quite recently, on 28th June 2021, India has successfully tested an advanced variant of its Agni missile series, namely Agni Prime or Agni (P). The missile has a range between 1000-2000 kilometers. Agni Prime is a new missile in the Agni missiles series, with improved accuracy and less weight than Agni 1, 2, and 3 missiles. It has been said that the Agni-P weighs 50 % less than the Agni-3 missile. As per the various media reports, this missile would take the place of Agni 1 and 2 and Prithvi missiles, however officially no such information is available. This new missile and whole Agni series is developed as part of the missile modernization program under the Defence Research and Development Organization’s (DRDO) integrated guided missile development program. 

Agni-P is a short missile with less weight and ballistic trajectory, the missile has a rocket-propelled, self-guided strategic weapons system capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear warheads. Moreover, the missile is cannisterized with the ability to be launched from road and rail. The DRDO claimed that the test flight of the missile was monitored by the telemetry radar stations and its trajectory met all the objectives of the mission successfully with high level of accuracy. Agni-P missile because of its range of 1000 to 2000 km is considered a weapon against Pakistan because within this range it cannot target China. Although, India already has different missiles in its inventory with the same range as the newly developed and tested Agni-P missile, so the question arises what this missile would achieve. 

Since the last few years, it has been deliberated within the international security discourse that India’s force posture is actually more geared towards counterforce options rather than counter-value options. Although, India’s nuclear doctrine after its operationalization in 2003, claims  “massive retaliation” and “nfu” but in reality with developing cannisterized weapons like Agni-P, Agni 5, and testing of hypersonic demonstrative vehicles, India actually is building its capability of “counterforce targeting” or “splendid first strike”. This reflects that India’s nuclear doctrine is just a façade and has no real implication on India’s force modernization.

These developments by India where it is rapidly developing offensive technologies put the regional deterrence equation under stress by increasing ambiguity. In a region like South Asia, where both nuclear rivals are neighbors and distance between both capitals are few thousand kilometers and missile launch from one side would take only a few minutes in reaching its target, ambiguity would increase the fog of war and put other actors, in this case, Pakistan in “use it or lose it” situation, as its nuclear deterrent would be under threat.

In such a situation, where Pakistan maintains that nuclear weapons are its weapons of last resort and to counter threats emerging from India, its nuclear deterrence has to hold the burden of covering all spectrums of threat. It might be left with no choice but to go for the development of a new kind of missile delivery system, probably the cannisterized missile systems as an appropriate response option. However, as Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence is based on principle of “CMD” which allow Pakistan to seek deterrence in a cost-effective manner and also by not indulging in an arms race. Therefore, other than the threat of action-reaction dynamic developments like Agni P by India, would make weapons more accurate and lethal, subsequently conflict would be faster, ambiguous, and with less time to think. In such a scenario, as chances of miscalculation increase, the escalation dynamics would become more complex; thus, further undermining the deterrence stability in South Asia.

India’s counter-force temptations and development of offensive weapons are affecting the deterrence equilibrium in South Asia. The deterrence equation is not getting affected just because India is going ahead with the development of offensive technologies but because of its continuous attempts of negating the presence of mutual vulnerability between both countries. Acknowledgement of existence of mutual vulnerability would strengthen the deterrence equation in the region and help both countries to move forward from the action-reaction spiral and arms race. The notions such as the development of offensive or counterforce technology or exploiting the levels below the nuclear threshold to fight a war would not be fruitful in presence of nuclear weapons. As nuclear weapons are weapons to avert the war and not to fight the war.

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Unmanned Aircraft Systems & The Annihilistic Future

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The unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), commonly known as drones were introduced as a useful means to military, commercial, civilian and humanitarian activities but yet it ends up in news for none of its original purposes. Drones have rather resulted as a means of mass destruction.

The recent attacks on the technical area of the Jammu Air Force Station highlights the same. This was a first-of-its-kind terror attack on IAF station rather the Indian defence forces that shook the National Investigation Agency to National Security Guard. The initial probe into the attacks directs to involvement of Lashkar-e-Taiba, a terrorist group based out of Pakistan, in the drone attacks as the aerial distance from the point of attack was just 14 kilometers. The attacks took place via an Electric multi-rotor type drone between 11:30 P.M to 1:30 A.M on 27th June, 2021.

The above incident clearly points out the security issues that lie ahead of India in face to the asymmetrical warfare as a result of drones. The Indian Government after looking at the misuse of drones during the first wave of the pandemic realised that its drone regulations were nowhere sufficient and accountable and hence passed the Unmmaned Aircraft Rules, 2021. These rules imposed stricter requirement for obtaining license and authorisations by remote pilots, operators, manufacturers or importers, training organisations and R&D organisations, thereby placing a significantly high burden on the applicants but at the same time they also permit UAS operations beyond visual sight of line and allowing student remote pilots to operate UAS.

But these rules still don’t have any control on the deadly use of drones because multi-rotor drones are very cheap and readily available and what makes them lethal is their ability to be easily detected, additionally the night time makes it even worse. Their small size grants them weak radar, thermal, and aural signatures, albeit varying based on the materials used in their construction.

The pertinent issue to be understood here is that these rules can never ensure safety and security as they cannot control the purpose for which these drones maybe used. There are certain factors that are to be accounted to actually be receptive to such imminent and dangerous threats. Firstly, significantly increasing urban encroachments  in areas around defence establishments, particularly air bases, has proved to be fatal. If frontline bases like Jammu or be it any other base when surrounded by unbuffered civilization poses two pronged problems, first it acts as high chances of being a vantage point for possible attackers and second, it also hampering the defence mechanism to come to an action. It is not limited to drone concerns but there have been cases of increased bird activity that has once resulted in engine failure of an IAF Jaguar and has caused similar problems all along.

Another important factor is that of intelligence. The Anti-drone systems will take their time to be in place and it is still a distant call to ascertain how effective will these systems be, so in the time being it is pertinent to focus on intelligence which may include sales and transfers of commercial drone, or the hardware that is required to build a basic multi-rotor drone. These are not something extraordinary because it is even in news when Pakistani drones were being used to supply weapons and ammunition to terror networks on Indian soil. Also, the past experience in handling ISIS have shown the weightage of intelligence over defensive nets.

Intelligence is no doubt a crucial factor in anticipation of drone attacks but what cannot be done away with is the defense mechanism. Efficient counter-drone technology is the need of the hour. DRDO has developed such technology that could provide the armed forces with the capability to swiftly detect, intercept and destroy small drones that pose a security threat. It is claimed that solution consists of a radar system that offers 360-degree coverage with detection of micro drones when they are 4km away, electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) sensors for detection of micro drones up to 2 km and a radio frequency (RF) detector to detect RF communication up to 3 km and is equipped for both soft kills as well as hard kills.

Hence, the above analysis brings out the need of the application of an international instrument because the technology used in such drone attacks is at an evolving stage and the natural barriers still have an upper hand over be it either flying a pre-programmed path aided by satellite navigation and inertial measurement units (IMUs), or hand controlled to the point of release or impact, both methods have significant limitations as satellite and IMU navigation is prone to errors even when it comes to moderate flight ranges while manual control is subject to the human limitations such as line of sight, visibility as well as technical limitations such as distance estimation of the target, and weak radio links. An example of this could be the Turkish-made Kargu-2 model of killer drone can allegedly autonomously track and kill specific targets on the basis of facial recognition and Artificial Intelligence (AI). As the AI becomes better and better, these drone attacks become more and more terminal.

The recent COVID-19 pandemic is an eye opener for India as well as the world as none of the countries considered the possibility of bio-defenses or made a heavy investment in it even when there was awareness about lethal effects of genetic engineering. Hence, it should be the priority of the government to invest heavily in research and make the development of defensive technologies a national priority else the result of artificially intelligent killer drones would be much more catastrophic.

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Russia’s National Security Strategy: A Manifesto for a New Era

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The central feature of the new strategy is its focus on Russia itself. The Russian leadership has every reason right now to turn homeward to address the glaring weaknesses, imbalances, and inequalities of the country’s internal situation.

Russia’s new, forty-four-page National Security Strategy signed by President Vladimir Putin on July 2 is a remarkable document. It is much more than an update of the previous paper, adopted in 2015. Back then, relations with the West had already sharply deteriorated as a result of the Ukraine crisis, but were still considered salvageable; much of the liberal phraseology inherited from the 1990s was still in use; and the world still looked more or less unified. The current version of arguably the most important Kremlin strategy statement—covering not only national security issues, but a whole range of others, from the economy to the environment, and values to defense—is a manifesto for a different era: one defined by the increasingly intense confrontation with the United States and its allies; a return to traditional Russian values; and the critical importance for Russia’s future of such issues as technology and climate.

The strategy lays out a view of a world undergoing transformation and turmoil. The hegemony of the West, it concludes, is on the way out, but that is leading to more conflicts, and more serious ones at that. This combination of historical optimism (the imminent end of Western hegemony) and deep concern (as it is losing, the West will fight back with even more ferocity) is vaguely reminiscent of Stalin’s famous dictum of the sharpening of the class struggle along the road to socialism. Economically, Russia faces unfair competition in the form of various restrictions designed to damage it and hold it back; in terms of security, the use of force is a growing threat; in the realm of ethics, Russia’s traditional values and historical legacy are under attack; in domestic politics, Russia has to deal with foreign machinations aimed at provoking long-term instability in the country. This external environment fraught with mounting threats and insecurities is regarded as an epoch, rather than an episode.

Against this sobering background, the central feature of the strategy is its focus on Russia itself: its demographics, its political stability and sovereignty, national accord and harmony, economic development on the basis of new technologies, protection of the environment and adaptation to climate change, and—last but not least—the nation’s spiritual and moral climate. This inward focus is informed by history. Exactly thirty years ago, the Soviet Union collapsed just as its military power was at its peak, and not as a result of a foreign invasion. Having recently regained the country’s great power status and successfully reformed and rearmed its military, the Russian leadership has every reason now to turn homeward to address the glaring weaknesses, imbalances, and inequalities of the country’s internal situation.

The paper outlines a lengthy series of measures for dealing with a host of domestic issues, from rising poverty and continued critical dependence on imported technology to the advent of green energy and the loss of the Soviet-era technological and educational edge. This certainly makes sense. Indeed, the recent Kremlin discovery of climate change as a top-tier issue is a hopeful sign that Russia is overcoming its former denial of the problem, along with inordinately exuberant expectations of the promise of global warming for a predominantly cold country. After all, the Kremlin’s earlier embrace of digitalization has given a major push to the spread of digital services across Russia.

The strategy does not ignore the moral and ethical aspects of national security. It provides a list of traditional Russian values and discusses them at length. It sees these values as being under attack through Westernization, which threatens to rob the Russians of their cultural sovereignty, and through attempts to vilify Russia by rewriting history. In sum, the paper marks an important milestone in Russia’s official abandonment of the liberal phraseology of the 1990s and its replacement with a moral code rooted in the country’s own traditions. Yet here, the strategy misses a key point at the root of Russia’s many economic and social problems: the widespread absence of any values, other than purely materialistic ones, among much of the country’s ruling elite. The paper mentions in passing the need to root out corruption, but the real issue is bigger by an order of magnitude. As each of President Putin’s annual phone-in sessions with the Russian people demonstrates—including the most recent one on June 30—Russia is governed by a class of people who are, for the most part, self-serving, and do not care at all for ordinary people or the country, instead focusing single-mindedly on making themselves rich on the job. Money—or rather Big Money—has become that group’s top value, and the most corrosive element in today’s Russia. Therein lies perhaps the biggest vulnerability of modern Russia.

On foreign policy, the strategy is fairly elliptic, but it gives a hint of what the upcoming Foreign Policy Concept might include. The United States and some of its NATO allies are now officially branded unfriendly states. Relations with the West are de-prioritized and those countries ranked last in terms of closeness, behind former Soviet countries; the strategic partners China and India; non-Western institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, BRICS, and the Russia-India-China trio; and other Asian, Latin American, and African countries. In addition to U.S. military deployments and its system of alliances, U.S.-based internet giants with their virtual monopoly in the information sphere, and the U.S. dollar that dominates global finances are also seen as instruments of containing Russia.

Overall, the 2021 Russian National Security Strategy seeks to adapt the country to a still interconnected world of fragmentation and sharpening divisions, in which the main battle lines are drawn not only—and not even mostly—between countries, but within them. Victories will be won and defeats suffered largely on domestic turf. Accordingly, it is the Home Front that presents the greatest challenges, and it is there that the main thrust of government policies must be directed.

From our partner RIAC

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