Negotiations on a full-scale free trade agreement between Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) are planned for the second half of 2021. The success of the current interim agreement with Iran suggests that initiating a proper FTA could indeed work. However, a number of obstacles—which have nothing to do with customs duties and trade tariffs—need to be eliminated if any possible agreement is to bear fruit. Being the parties most interested in reaching such an agreement, Iran and Russia remain the main drivers of Iran’s rapprochement with the EAEU.
A Full-Scale Agreement
Signing a full-scale free-trade agreement with Iran was hardly surprising, given the previous agreements between the EAEU and Tehran. On May 17, 2018, Iran put pen to paper on a three-year interim agreement on the establishment of a free trade area (FTA) that entered into force on October 27, 2019. Among other things, the parties agreed to launch talks on making the interim agreement permanent (with changes) no later than 18 months after it would come into effect, as well as to conclude such talks within three years of that same date.
Everything that the parties have said and done in this respect has been in accordance with the previous agreements. The decision to launch negotiations with Iran was made on December 11, 2020, and the first consultations took place on February 17, 2021, that is, somewhat less than 16 months after the FTA agreement entered into force.
Assuming everything goes to plan, the issue of a full-scale agreement should be settled before October 27, 2021. To this end, more comprehensive negotiations have been pencilled in for the second half of this year. In any case, the sides still have over a year to resolve any issues that may come up, as Minister of Energy of Iran Reza Ardakanian duly noted in early March when he said, “We’ve got some one and a half years to put things in place.” 
In other words, a full-scale free-trade agreement between Iran and the EAEU may not necessarily be concluded by the end of this year. Judging by what both Iran and the EAEU member states say, all the sides are interested in replacing the interim agreement with a permanent one. However, a new round of talks will surely focus on expanding the range of goods and reducing the duties even further. The parties will try to protect the interests of their domestic producers as much as possible, and it will hardly be surprising if they fail to reach a consensus straight away so that everything eventually drags out.
There is another factor that might prove a serious obstacle to cooperation between the EAEU and Iran, which is the EAEU’s ongoing FTA negotiations with Israel. The Israeli Ambassador to Russia has noted that such an agreement could be signed as early as this year. Iran has yet to comment on the matter. However, should Tel Aviv and the EAEU manage to reach agreement, there are forces within the Iranian political system that are capable of stirring up a wave of discontent, which could scupper all diplomatic efforts invested to achieve a full-scale FTA.
The rumour that Iran could be about to join the EAEU added a new dimension to this story. Tongues started wagging following the comments made by Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the Speaker of Iran’s Parliament, after his trip to Moscow on February 10, 2021, which many interpreted as Tehran announcing its intentions to become a full-fledged member of the Union. A number of Russian and English publications ran with the story, discussing the prospects of such a move.
However, the Ministry of Trade and Integration of the Republic of Kazakhstan would later deny these rumours. There are certain procedures that must be followed to become a member of the EAEU, including that of submitting an application to the Chairman of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council. “As of February 17, 2021,” the Ministry’s statement reads, “the relevant application has not been received from the Islamic Republic of Iran.”
A Pivot to the East
The very notion of rapprochement between Iran and the EAEU fits comfortably into Tehran’s strategy of pivoting to Asia and its markets. The move started to take shape back in the 2000s and was mainly motivated by economic trends, namely, the growing need in energy resources of the rapidly developing Asian economies, such as China and India. Then sanctions followed, and following the US withdrawal from the nuclear deal in May 2018 the pressure has considerably increased. All this made the Iranian elites to become disenchanted with the idea of fostering economic ties with Europe, as businesses in the EU turned out to be most sensitive to the restrictions imposed by Washington.
It would seem that cooperation with the EAEU avails Iran an opportunity to mitigate the effects of the U.S. sanctions policy. The fact that several EAEU countries are under Western sanctions certainly helps in this respect. On February 7, 2021, Roman Golovchenko, Prime Minister of Belarus, argued that the EAEU is looking to develop a mechanism for countering sanctions to give cause for optimism.
What is more, Iran is interested in abandoning the U.S. dollar in settlements and switching to national currencies. This remedy acquired even greater urgency once Iran was cut off from the SWIFT international settlement system as a result of U.S. pressure. The EAEU has repeatedly stated that it is consistently moving towards this goal. Similar comments and practices are evident in bilateral relations between individual EAEU member states and Iran.
Finally, Tehran is trying to break out of its political isolation. Rapprochement with the EAEU could thus help elevate its status on the international stage. On the whole, establishing the interim FTA with its subsequent transformation into a full-scale agreement should be viewed in the broader context of Iran’s striving to strengthen regionalism and bolster Eurasian cooperation.
As far as the EAEU interests are concerned, one should say that Iran represents serious potential for the Union’s expansion. Among the economies of the EAEU member states, observers and partners, the Iranian economy is second only to Russia’s. In terms of economic cooperation, Russia and Kazakhstan stand to benefit most from lowering tariff barriers. In addition, the project is of particular interest to Armenia, which is the only EAEU member that has a land border with Iran—currently under a partial blockade. Armenia could thus be used as a transit country for Iranian imports and exports. A free-trade agreement with Tehran would also do wonders for Moscow’s integration policy.
The interim agreement on establishing a free trade area between the EAEU and Iran entered into force on October 27, 2019 and provided for a reduction in customs duties on 862 categories of goods (502 for Iranian exports and 360 for EAEU exports). The list of goods covers approximately 50% of the total mutual trade between the partners. The agreement came into effect amid a difficult time in Iran, owing to the U.S. sanctions regime and the coronavirus lockdown. Despite this, however, trade turnover between the EAEU and Iran grew to $2.9 billion in 2020, an 18% increase from 2019.
At the same time, as far as EAEU exports are concerned, we rather stand witness to their recovery to the level prior to the restoration of U.S. sanctions. It was immediately after the nuclear deal became effective and the sanctions against Iran were lifted in 2016 that exports hit a recent-year record high at $2.6 billion. While EAEU 2020 exports rose by 2% as compared to 2019, they only amounted to $1.6 billion.
A somewhat different situation could be observed in the case of EAEU imports from Iran in 2020, which grew by 51.5% as compared to 2019, surpassing $1.2 billion. This is significant, as for the previous ten years imports had not exceeded $1 billion. In other words, the Iranian economy benefited significantly more from the establishment of the FTA than the EAEU, at least during the initial stages of the deal. What is more, this had to do with non-oil sectors of Iran’s economy, as EAEU imports are primarily based on agricultural products.
At the same time, Iran occupies a relatively insignificant place in the trade balance of the EAEU countries, accounting for just 0.5% of all trade operations in the Union. Meanwhile, the EAEU countries account for approximately 3% of Iran’s trade balance.
We should also note the uneven distribution of trade between the individual EAEU countries and Iran. For example, Russia accounts for approximately 75% of all trade between the EAEU and Iran, which is around 85% of exports and 65% of imports. Kazakhstan accumulates some 10% of the total trade turnover, with its trade volume shrinking by 37% in 2020, as opposed to the trade with the EAEU as a whole. Meanwhile, the share of Belarus and Kyrgyzstan is almost next to nothing.
Relations between Tehran and Yerevan are somewhat different. Armenia makes up approximately 15% of all trade with the EAEU. Additionally, more than 25% of all EAEU imports from Iran go to Armenia. Armenia is thus a valuable partner for Iran, purchasing food and industrial products, as well as oil and gas from the country. These special relations are reflected in the fact that Iran makes up almost 9% of Armenia’s trade turnover.
Definite changes were recorded in the dynamics of trade relations following the conclusion of the interim FTA agreement. In the case of Russia, both exports and imports increased (by 19% and 100%, respectively). Meanwhile, Iran’s trade with Belarus and Kyrgyzstan remained negligible. In the case of Armenia, slight changes have taken place, with exports increasing by 1% and imports falling by 3%. Exports from Kazakhstan have dropped by 54%, while imports have increased by 32%.
In other words, the FTA serves as an incentive for Russia to foster trade with Iran. Kazakhstan has also increased its imports from the country. However, there have been no serious positive shifts with regard to the remaining EAEU countries.
It would seem that trade cooperation between Iran and the EAEU will do little to alter the economic situation for its participants. For Tehran, however, the EAEU can serve as a reliable partner with stable trade ties, something that is of particular importance to a country suffering partial economic isolation. Meanwhile, Moscow—still the key driver for cultivating economic relations with Iran—sees Tehran as a potential buyer of its industrial goods. This is especially important given the fact that hydrocarbons remain at the heart of Russia’s exports around the world. Finally, as we mentioned earlier, Iran can play a special role in the development of the Armenian economy.
Expanding the FTA agreement to include additional product lines may serve as a basis for bringing the economic relations between the parties to a new level. However, a number of barriers that have nothing to with customs duties and trade tariffs still pose a major problem for the development of trade between Iran and the EAEU. On the one hand, there are objective limitations that will hardly be eliminated in the foreseeable future. For example, trade opportunities are limited by the fact that the oil sector remains the backbone of the economies of Iran, Russia and Kazakhstan. This is why the EAEU cannot offer Iran anything comparable to what China offers. Then, there is the special position that Russia occupies on the EAEU energy markets. Tehran can hardly expect to significantly increase its gas supplies to Armenia, as Russia continues to have a hold on this market. Finally, U.S. sanctions play a huge role in limiting development opportunities, and the EAEU and Iran can only partially neutralize their negative effects.
At the same time, the parties are in a position to work on removing other equally important obstacles, for example, developing a transport and logistics infrastructure and automating and digitalizing customs procedures in order to avoid delays and red tape at the borders. Receiving payment for goods remains a big problem after Iran was cut off from the SWIFT system. Much work has already been done to transition to settlements in national currencies, although it is far from complete. What is more, Iran is not a member of the WTO, and its business practices do not meet international standards in most cases.
We should also mention the specifics of doing business in Iran, which presents additional challenges when it comes to concluding and implementing agreements with foreign partners. Iran’s economic isolation and unpredictable foreign policy environment are the core reasons why it keeps such business practices. Increasing its foreign economic activity, including that with the EAEU countries, should help Iranian businesses get to grips with working under the rules that have been adopted in international trade.
In other words, a full-scale agreement between Iran and the EAEU has great development prospects. However, real prospects primarily depend on the ability of both governments and businesses to work to remove those barriers that are not connected with customs duties and trade tariffs.
From our partner RIAC
Carbon Market Could Drive Climate Action
Authors: Martin Raiser, Sebastian Eckardt, Giovanni Ruta*
Trading commenced on China’s national emissions trading system (ETS) on Friday. With a trading volume of about 4 billion tons of carbon dioxide or roughly 12 percent of the total global CO2 emissions, the ETS is now the world’s largest carbon market.
While the traded emission volume is large, the first trading day opened, as expected, with a relatively modest price of 48 yuan ($7.4) per ton of CO2. Though this is higher than the global average, which is about $2 per ton, it is much lower than carbon prices in the European Union market where the cost per ton of CO2 recently exceeded $50.
Large volume but low price
The ETS has the potential to play an important role in achieving, and accelerating China’s long-term climate goals — of peaking emissions before 2030 and achieving carbon neutrality before 2060. Under the plan, about 2,200 of China’s largest coal and gas-fired power plants have been allocated free emission rights based on their historical emissions, power output and carbon intensity.
Facilities that cut emissions quickly will be able to sell excess allowances for a profit, while those that exceed their initial allowance will have to pay to purchase additional emission rights or pay a fine. Putting a price tag on CO2 emissions will promote investment in low-carbon technologies and equipment, while carbon trading will ensure emissions are first cut where it is least costly, minimizing abatement costs. This sounds plain and simple, but it will take time for the market to develop and meaningfully contribute to emission reductions.
The initial phase of market development is focused on building credible emissions disclosure and verification systems — the basic infrastructure of any functioning carbon market — encouraging facilities to accurately monitor and report their emissions rather than constraining them. Consequently, allocations given to power companies have been relatively generous, and are tied to power output rather than being set at absolute levels.
Also, the requirements of each individual facility to obtain additional emission rights are capped at 20 percent above the initial allowance and fines for non-compliance are relatively low. This means carbon prices initially are likely to remain relatively low, mitigating the immediate financial impact on power producers and giving them time to adjust.
For carbon trading to develop into a significant policy tool, total emissions and individual allowances will need to tighten over time. Estimates by Tsinghua University suggest that carbon prices will need to be raised to $300-$350 per ton by 2060 to achieve carbon neutrality. And our research at the World Bank suggest a broadly applied carbon price of $50 could help reduce China’s CO2 emissions by almost 25 percent compared with business as usual over the coming decade, while also significantly contributing to reduced air pollution.
Communicating a predictable path for annual emission cap reductions will allow power producers to factor future carbon price increases into their investment decisions today. In addition, experience from the longest-established EU market shows that there are benefits to smoothing out cyclical fluctuations in demand.
For example, carbon emissions naturally decline during periods of lower economic activity. In order to prevent this from affecting carbon prices, the EU introduced a stability reserve mechanism in 2019 to reduce the surplus of allowances and stabilize prices in the market.
Besides, to facilitate the energy transition away from coal, allowances would eventually need to be set at an absolute, mass-based level, which is applied uniformly to all types of power plants — as is done in the EU and other carbon markets.
The current carbon-intensity based allocation mechanism encourages improving efficiency in existing coal power plants and is intended to safeguard reliable energy supply, but it creates few incentives for power producers to divest away from coal.
The effectiveness of the ETS in creating appropriate price incentives would be further enhanced if combined with deeper structural reforms in power markets to allow competitive renewable energy to gain market share.
As the market develops, carbon pricing should become an economy-wide instrument. The power sector accounts for about 30 percent of carbon emissions, but to meet China’s climate goals, mitigation actions are needed in all sectors of the economy. Indeed, the authorities plan to expand the ETS to petro-chemicals, steel and other heavy industries over time.
In other carbon intensive sectors, such as transport, agriculture and construction, emissions trading will be technically challenging because monitoring and verification of emissions is difficult. Faced with similar challenges, several EU member states have introduced complementary carbon taxes applied to sectors not covered by an ETS. Such carbon excise taxes are a relatively simple and efficient instrument, charged in proportion to the carbon content of fuel and a set carbon price.
Finally, while free allowances are still given to some sectors in the EU and other more mature national carbon markets, the majority of initial annual emission rights are auctioned off. This not only ensures consistent market-based price signals, but generates public revenue that can be recycled back into the economy to subsidize abatement costs, offset negative social impacts or rebalance the tax mix by cutting taxes on labor, general consumption or profits.
So far, China’s carbon reduction efforts have relied largely on regulations and administrative targets. Friday’s launch of the national ETS has laid the foundation for a more market-based policy approach. If deployed effectively, China’s carbon market will create powerful incentives to stimulate investment and innovation, accelerate the retirement of less-efficient coal-fired plants, drive down the cost of emission reduction, while generating resources to finance the transition to a low-carbon economy.
(Martin Raiser is the World Bank country director for China, Sebastian Eckardt is the World Bank’s lead economist for China, and Giovanni Ruta is a lead environmental economist of the World Bank.)
(first published on China Daily via World Bank)
The EU wants to cut emissions, Bulgaria and Eastern Europe will bear the price
In the last few years, the European Union has been going above and beyond in dealing with climate change. Clearly, this is far from being a case of disinterested endeavour to safeguard the planet and the environment. On the contrary, the EU’s efforts aim at reinforcing its “normative power”. In effect, the EU has gained some clout on the international stage, even vis-à-vis faraway countries like Vietnam and China. Yet, in doing so the Union embroiled in the apparent rush for more and more ambitious climate standards and targets. Therefore, Brussels needs to start acting and deliver on its promises to keep staying ahead of the pack. Even more so given US President Biden’s strengthened engagement with friends and foes alike on the climate and human rights.
Last week, the European Commission manifested its acknowledgment of this need by unveiling the Fit for 55 (FF55) growth strategy. Overall, this new, beefed-up Green Deal should reduce greenhouse gas emissions to 55% of their 1990 level by 2030. In some analysts’ view, the FF55 plan is a game changer in the long-term race towards climate neutrality alas. In fact, it could “both deepen and broaden the decarbonisation of Europe’s economy to achieve climate neutrality by 2050.” Moreover, they expect the FF55’s 13 measures to generate a number of positive ripple effects across EU economies.
True, wanting to reduce greenhouse gases significantly by 2030 and reaching net-zero-emission by 2050 goal is commendable under many regards. Still, the FF55 includes a number of measures that could impact ordinary people’s life massively across Europe. Nevertheless, the 27 Member States of the EU are responsible for as little as 8% of global emissions. As such, it is necessary to take a deeper look at how the FF55 will affect different countries and demographics.
The transition’s social cost
The realisation that reduction of capitalism’s dependence on fossil fuels will have serious socio-economic consequences is not at all new. Contrariwise, scholars and politicians have been outspoken about an indisputable “conflict between jobs and the environment”, since the early 1990s. Together, the pandemic-induced recession and the signing of the Paris Accord have brought the notion back on the centre stage.
Factually, pushing the energy transition entails facing mass lay-offs, generalised workforce retraining and taxes hikes on ordinary consumers. For instance, these hardships’ seriousness is evident in the progressive abandonment of coal mining for energy generation in the US. Moreover, the energy transition requires strong popular backing in order to be effective. Yet, measures pursued to achieve environmentally friendly growth tend to generate strong, grassroot opposition. Most recently, France’s gilets jaunes protests shows that environmental policies generate social discontent by disfavouring middle and lower classes disproportionately.
The poorest families and countries will bear the costs
One of the FF55’s main policy innovation regards the creation of a carbon trading market for previously exempt sectors. Namely, companies working int the transport and buildings sectors, be they public or private, will have to follow new rules. As it happened in the energy industry before, each company will have to respect a “carbon allowance”. Basically, it is an ‘authorisation to pollute’ which companies can buy from each other — but the total cannot increase. Despite all claims of just transition, this and other measures will have a gigantic, re-distributional effect within and between countries. And it will be of markedly regressive character, meaning that poorer families and countries will pay more.
Taxing transport emission is regressive
Historically, these sectors were trailing behind most others when it comes to decarbonisation for a variety of reasons. First of all, the previous emission trading system did not include them. Moreover, these are far from being well-functioning markets. As a result, even if the cost of emissions was to rise, enterprises and consumer will not react as expected.
Thus, even as they face higher costs, companies will keep utilising older, traditional vehicle and construction technologies. With taunting reverberations on those poorer consumers, who cannot afford to buy an electric car or stop using public transport. Hence, they “will face a higher carbon price while locked into fossil-fuel-based systems with limited alternatives.” Moreover, the EU could worsen these effects by trying to reduce the emission fees on truck-transported goods. Indeed, the commission is proposing a weight-based emission standard that would collaterally favour SUVs over smaller combustion-engine car and motorbikes.
In a nutshell, higher taxes and fee will strike lower-class consumers, who spend more of their incomes for transportation. Even assuming these households would like to switch to low-emission cars and buildings, current market prices will make it impossible. In fact, all these technologies ten to have low usage costs, but very high costs of acquisition. For instance, the cheapest Tesla sells at over €95,000, whereas a Dacia Sandero “starts at just under €7,000.”
Eastern Europe may not be willing to pay
At this point, it is clear that the FF55 plan will deal a blow to ongoing efforts to reduce inequalities. In addition, one should not forget that EU Member States are as different amongst them as they are within themselves. Yet, the EU is not simply going to tax carbon in sectors that inevitably expose poorer consumers the most. But in doing so it would impose a single price on 27 very diverse societies and economies. Thus, the paradox of having the poorest countries in the EU (i.e., Central- and South-Eastern Europe) pay the FF55’s bill.
To substantiate this claim, one needs to look no further than at a few publicly available data. First, as Figure 2 shows, there is an inverse relation between a country’s wealth and consumers’ expenditures on transport services. Thus, not only do poorer people across the EU spend more on transport, poorer countries do as well. Hence, under the FF55, Bulgarians, Croatians, Romanians and Poles will pay most of the fees and taxes on carbon emission.
Additionally, one should consider that there is also a strict inverse relation between carbon emissions and the minimum national wage. In fact, looking at Figure 3 one sees that countries with lower minimum wages tend to emit more carbon dioxide. On average, countries with a minimum salary of €1 lower emit almost 4.5mln tonnes of carbon dioxide more. But differences in statutory national wages explain almost 32% of the cross-country variation in emissions. So, 1.5 of those extra tonnes are somehow related to lower minimum salaries and, therefore, lower living standards.
The EU’s quest for a just transition: Redistribution or trickle down?
Hence, the pursual of a ‘just’ transitionhas come to mean ensuring quality jobs emerge from these economic changes. However, many of the FF55’s 13 initiatives may worsen disparities both within countries and, more importantly, between them. Thus, the EU has been trying to pre-empt the social losses that would inevitably come about.
From the Just Transition Fund to the Climate Social Fund
In this regard, the European Union went a step forward most countries by creating the Just Transition Fund in May. That is, the EU decided to finance a mix of grants and public-sector loans which aims to provide support to territories facing serious socio-economic challenges arising from the transition towards climate neutrality [… and] facilitate the implementation of the European Green Deal, which aims to make the EU climate-neutral by 2050.
Along these lines, the FF55 introduces a Climate Social Fund (CSF) that will provide “funding […] to support vulnerable European citizens.” The fund will provide over €70bln to support energy investments, and provide direct income support for vulnerable households. The revenues from the selling of carbon allowances to the transport and building sectors should fund most of the CSF. If necessary, the Member States will provide the missing portion.
The EU Commission may give the impression of having design the CSF to favour poorer households and countries. However, it may actually be a false impression. In fact, it is clear that the entire carbon pricing initiative will impact poorer household and countries more strongly. However, only a fourth of the carbon pricing system’s revenues will go to fund the CSF. The remaining portion will finance other FF55 programmes, most of which have a negative impact on poorer communities. Thus, despite the CSF, the final effect of the entire FF55 will be a net redistribution upwards.
Stopping a redistribution to the top
Nevertheless, there is a way to fix the FF55 so that it can work for poorer households and lower-income countries. Given that the CSF is too small for the challenge it should overcome, its total amount should be increased. In fact, the purpose of higher carbon pricing is in any event not to raise revenue but to direct market behaviour towards low-carbon technologies—there is thus a strong argument for redistributing fully the additional revenues.
Hence, the largest, politically sustainable share of carbon-pricing revenues from transportation and housing should ideally go to the CSF. In addition, the Commission should remove all the proposed provision that divert CSF money away from social compensation scheme. In fact, poorer families will not gain enough from subsidies to electric car, charging stations and the decarbonisation of housing. One contrary, “using the fund to support electric vehicles would disproportionally favour rich households.”
Finally, the allocation of CSF money to various member states should follow rather different criteria from the current ones. In fact, the Commission already intends to consider a number of important such as: total population and its non-urban share; per capita, gross, national income; share of vulnerable households; and emissions due to fuel combustion per household. But these efforts to look out for the weakest strata in each country could backfire. In fact, according to some calculations, a Member State with lower average wealth and lower “within-country inequality could end up benefiting less than a rich member state with high inequality.”
A number of well-known, respected economist have been arguing that environmental policies should account for social fallouts attentively. Goals such as emission reduction and net-zero economies require strong popular support in order for the transformation to succeed. Or at least, the acquiescence of a majority of the public. Otherwise, the plans of well-intentioned and opportunistic governments alike will derail. After all, this is the main lesson of the currently widespread protest against the mandating of ‘Covid passes’ and vaccines.
If the FF55 will deal poorer households a devastating blow, social unrest may worsen — fast. But as long as it will also hurt Eastern European countries as a whole, there is a chance. Hopefully, European parliamentarians from riotous Hungary or Poland will oppose the FF55 in its current shape. Perhaps, in a few years everyone will be thankful for these two countries strenuous resistance to EU bureaucracy. Or else, richer countries may force Central- and South-Eastern Europe to swallow a bitter medicine. Even though, whatever happens, Europe alone cannot and will not save the planet.
Entrepreneurialism & Digitalization: Recovery of Midsize Business Economies
Observe nations around the world, especially those with the largest numbers of IT professionals, rich and well-groomed government departments and their related agencies, with matured bureaucracies and unlimited numbers of computers but still no signs of thriving digital economies buzzing on global platforms. What is so mysterious about digitization of small medium businesses, smoothly leading to ‘virtualization of economies’ creating global bounce of trade? Well, it is surrendering to the realization that entrepreneurialism is the main driving engine of such challenges and not the herds of IT teams, deluxe bureaucracies and accountancy-mindsets.
What is a digital economy? It is definitely not when all businesses have websites and are all doing social media postings, at the outset understanding digitalization of a single enterprise is already a fine art, and to make it fly on global trade platforms is a science. Unless economic development teams can articulate, what is and how ‘virtualization of economies’ work, uplift and upskill vertical trade sectors and create an entrepreneurial bounce of trades’, the entire exercise of digitization might as well leave to early video game players or early grader IT personnel. Observe how The Silicon Valley and e-Commerce revolutions of the world never created by large IT teams, but categorically by “techie-entrepreneurs” of the day that in turn occupied millions of IT professionals and created hundreds of millions IT experts driving e-commerce of today. Of course, IT teams needed but in very reverse order.
Why is the digital economy an entrepreneurial economy? Digitization of the economy is simply not an IT exercise rather a strategic entrepreneurial maneuver of placing a midsize business economy on wheels using easily available digital platforms with abundance of software to choose from to make right entrepreneurial-based decisions to create creative bounce. The survival strategies for the post pandemic economies have less to do with accountancy-mindsets and bureaucratic attitudes, as it is all about entrepreneurial global age execution with superior digital performances.
Calling Entrepreneurial Business Mindsets: The new horizons beyond pandemic call for “simultaneous synchronization” a need to merge ‘mental-blocks’ the lingering ‘productivity-silos’ ‘digital-divides’ ‘mental-divides’ all such negative forces balanced with positive forces of ‘innovative excellence’ and ‘superior-performance’ thrown all in an entrepreneurial-blender to make a great progressive multi-flavored shakes. To mix and match with our realty checks of today and the blended calamites; Economy + SME + MFG + AI + VR + AR + Officeless + Remote + Occupationalism + Globalization + Exports + Upskilling, all in one single sandbox need progressive advancements with entrepreneurial guts and clarity of vision for any serious stable economic balance. If such were a monopoly game, printing of currency would be the norm.
National Mobilization of Entrepreneurialism: Needed are deep studies of the prolonged trajectory of entrepreneurial intellectualism spanning a millennia… the word ‘entrepreneurialism’ was only invented over a century ago… but our civilization was built on similar principles, driven and strong people. Declare an economic revolution as a critical cure to desolate periods and call the nation but will they listen? With credibility of institution and political promises tanked, audible to the populace now is the grind of mobilizations, thundering deployments of action packed strategies, but how do you fund them? National mobilization of entrepreneurialism is the hidden pulse of the nation, often not new funding dependent rather execution hungry and leadership starved, so what makes it spin? Entrepreneurial warriors
As if a silent revolution mobilized, the nouveau entrepreneurialism in post pandemic economy in action, where talents on wings of digitalization, flying on trading platforms, visible in smart data and shining amongst upskilled midsize economies. Lack of upskilling, lack of global-age expertise, and most importantly lack of entrepreneurialism is what keeps digitization of economies lost in the past. How naïve is it to believe post-pandemic economic issues some PR singsong election campaigns? Only deployment, execution, mobilization will be the message now acceptable by the billions displaced, replaced and misplaced workers, but what is stopping nations, their Ministries and trade groups to have all out discussions and table immediate action plans? Ouch, do not forget the entrepreneurial blood in the economic streams, exciting the bureaucracies and accountancy-mindsets. The next 100 elections over the coming 500 days will be full of surprises, but serious transformation for survival is inevitable, with or without upskilled ministries of commerce. Which nations and regions are ready to engage in this tactical battlefield of global-age skills? Study how Expothon Africa is in deployments with selected countries.
The deciding factors: Never ever before in the history of humankind,the economic behaviorism across the world suddenly surrendered to a single calamity, affecting the majority of the global populace suffering in prolonged continuity. The side effect of such complexity juxtaposed with technological access can bring sweeping changes to our assumed complacency. All traditional problem solving and conventional thinking styles now considered too dangerous to economic growth and social balances.
Recommendation and Survival Strategies: Discover and establish authoritative command on digitization and virtualization of economies, study more on Google.Allow micro-small-medium enterprises a tax-free window on the first USD$5-10 million revenues in exports, this will create local jobs and bring foreign exchange. Allow micro-small-medium enterprises free access to all dormant Intellectual Property, Patents rolled up due to lack of commercialization. Allow Academic Experts on innovative technologies and related skills on free voucher programs to the SME base to uplift ideas and special expertise. Optimization of telecommunication and internet structures worth trillions of dollars with global access at times completely ignored and wasted by wrong mindsets deprived of entrepreneurial undertakings. Allow micro-small-medium enterprises free full time MBA as 12 months interns so MBA graduates can acquire some entrepreneurialism while enterprises can uplift their ideas in practice.
“Allow Million qualified foreign entrepreneurs to park within your nation for 5-10 years under a special full tax-free visa and stay program. Which nations have qualified dialogue on such affairs? Bring in, land million entrepreneurs in your nation, and create 10 million plus jobs and new wealth in following years. Let your own institutions and frontline management learn how such economic developments created. Be bold, as the time to strategize passed now time to revolutionize has arrived”. “Excerpted from keynote lecture by Naseem Javed, Global Citizen Forum, Dubai, 2013.”
Allow National Mobilization of Entrepreneurialism Protocols mandated to engage trade and exports bodies. Allow National Scoring of entrepreneurialism to measure, identify and differentiate required talents. Digitize from top to bottom and sideways, futurism fully digitized and without real transformation, it is like a nation without any internet. Act wisely. Digitalization of economies without entrepreneurial minds is more like pre-pandemic archives of mostly failures. Needed are the economic revolutions, based on entrepreneurial meritocracy and national mobilization of midsize economy.
The rest is easy
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It is possible to prevent almost half of annual plastic ocean waste by reusing just 10% of our plastics products....
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