Followers and fans of Balkan politics were startled by the news that Slovenian PM Janez Janša has delivered a non-paper to the European Council, advocating the repartition of Bosnian-Herzegovinian territories between Serbia and Croatia, and the union of Albania with Kosovo. Janša denied any link with the matter and journalists from the Balkans and abroad expressed opposing views on the authorship and the place of origin of the document. On April 15, the Slovenian website necenzurirano.si, published the full version of the document titled “Western Balkans – A Way Forward”.
After some initial comments following the publication of the non-paper, the whole affair is now fading in the depths of the cyberspace from where it came without causing much regret for the unsolved mysteries that it is leaving behind. Western European media pay attention to the Balkans as long as they are a source of sensational facts such as a secret border exchange between former “enemy” countries. In the Balkan media, border exchange is usual business and the news did not create much turmoil. In this article I will take a closer look at the details of the document in order to understand the logic of the policies that it prescribes. The analysis of the non-paper enables a reflection on the popularity of the EU in the Western Balkans (WB) and allows to explore current political tendencies in the region.
A Way Forward?
Unless it turns out to be an internet meme, the content of non-paper clearly shows that it was addressed to the highest ranks of EU diplomacy. The authors of the document outline a strategy for the EU to reinforce its influence in the WB. In the first part, titled “Situation”, the document claims that the main political setbacks in the region are linked to the national issues of Serbs, Albanians, and Croatians. The Dayton Agreements of 1995 and the tense situation between Serbia and Kosovo are considered the main obstacles for the EU integration process. Turkey is designated as EU’s main competitor because of its extended influence in the region, particularly in Bosnia-Herzegovina and North Macedonia.
The second part of the document titled “Solutions”, is divided in six paragraphs (from a. to f.) and provides a series of objectives aimed at accelerating access to EU and NATO memberships (f.). According to the program, the first and seemingly easier objective would be to unify Kosovo and Albania (a.). The authors claim that 95% of Kosovo wants to unite with its “Albanian nation of origin” and that the situation is similar in Albania. The data is certainly not extrapolated from statistical evidence, but by the transposition of the accepted figure of the Albanian population in Kosovo which is above 90%. The passage “want to unite with their nation of origin” is quite bizarre because it seems as if Kosovo Albanians were not from Kosovo but migrated from present day Albanian territories.
The non-paper (b.) promotes the annexation of the territory of Republika Srpska to Serbia. This process will hypothetically sort out the “Serbian national issue” and will lead Belgrade to accept the union of Kosovo and Albania. The solution of the “Croatian national issue” is open to different options (c.). The authors recommend either to unite predominantly Croatian cantons of Bosnia-Herzegovina with Croatia; or to grant a special status to the Croatian part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, similar to the one that South Tyrol enjoys in Italy. South Tyrol, which is also indicated as a model for the status of the “Serbian part” of Kosovo (a.), is probably mentioned to provide the readers with a familiar example. Bosniaks should accept the dismemberment of their state for the sake of EU interests. They would thereby “gain” (d.) an independent state and would have to organize a referendum in order choose “between EU and non-EU (Turkey)”. The authors believe that this solution will prevent the spread of further Turkish influence and radical Islam.
State-building based on national or religious grounds is against the sense of the EU integration process and is probably conceived to put an end to it. The formation of a Bosniak independent state based on a “national” principle would (legitimately)lead Bosniaks to claim the Sanjak territories in Montenegro and in Serbia. National and religious tensions will increase Turkey’s influence in the region. The union of Serbia and Republika Srpska would bring eurosceptics living on both sides of the border to join ranks, thus hindering the region’s integration in the EU. Similar outcomes would be generated by the union of Albania and Kosovo where eurosceptics have become more numerous in the last years.
With and Against the EU
The document is anonymous, but its content allows us to make a hypothesis on its commissioner. In the penultimate paragraph of the “Solutions” section, the authors lay down the areas of intervention on which the EU should focus in order to increase its influence in the Balkans. In their view, the EU should launch a “comprehensive economic programme for the stabilisation, better infrastructure and energy connectivity of the region, and environmental rehabilitation.” The authors believe that the EU should not act alone, but with the support of regional actors such as the Three Seas Initiative (3SI). The 3SI was founded in 2015 in view of enhancing collaboration between EU member states of Central and Eastern Europe. One of their official papers argues that the organisation aims at reducing the “civilisation gap” that separates Eastern from Western European countries. In order to fulfil this objective, the 3SI has devised a series of projects for improving the mobility, energy and digitalisation infrastructure of the region on a vertical axis that runs from North to South.
The policies recommended by the non-paper for the WB seem at least in part inspired by the objectives of the 3SI. For instance, the endeavour to achieve a “better infrastructure and energy connectivity of the region, and environmental rehabilitation”, falls in the organisation’s commitment to improve energy security (objective number 3) and reach climate goals (objective number 6). The 3SI and the non-paper share some conceptual analogies. The 3SI documents use the historically controversial term “nation” to refer to European states. A nation-centric perspective informs the authors of the non-paper who believe that regional problems will be solved by supporting nationalist drives instead of opposing them. WB countries which are not members of the 3SI are cited as partners in a series of projects for the development of the transport, digitalisation and energy infrastructure that were discussed during the organisation summit in Slovenia in 2019.
The non-paper and the 3SI pay attention to political stability and economic growth, but they do not seem very concerned by issues related to the rule of law, human rights and corruption, which are at least formally at the core of the EU action in the area. In the third and last section of the document, titled “Steps”, the authors draw out the strategies through which the “Solutions” can be reached. In their view, the plan should be checked and carried out with international and regional decision-makers in a “silent procedure”. According to the document, it seems that the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the union of Kosovo and Albania could be achieved without popular vote. The non-paper expects the EU to endorse a project that will radically alter the borders of the region without taking into consideration the will of the communities that will be affected by the changes.
Return to the Old Path
The non-paper was perhaps never received by the office of the European Council. However, the mere fact that it was addressed to the EU shows that the latter is exposed to the lobbying of groups operating in contradiction with the EU agenda in the Balkans. Rather than consolidating EU interests, the non-paper exploits EU diplomacy to the benefit of its commissioners. The3SI – like the non-paper- promotes a top-to-bottom governance approach that aims at attaining political stability and economic growth at the detriment of democracy and justice. This old political strategy is the outcome of a widespread feeling of distrust in the future of the EU.
The constitution of the 3SI is a sign of this feeling. Another manifestation of this political course is the mini-Schengen initiative that was started by Serbia, Albania and North Macedonia in 2019. Both 3SI and mini-Schengen are presented as complementary to the EU. But they might also become alternatives or competitors to the EU, especially for non-member states that do not want to have too close links with Russia or/and the Atlantic Alliance. The EU is one of the main investors in the connectivity sectors in the WB, but it is not the only partner available to regional politicians who are constantly on the lookout for financial assets. Many citizens of the WB believe that their countries have no chance to access the EU in the next decade. Their opinion toward the EU has been negatively conditioned by the euroscepticism in Eastern and Western European neighbouring states. The inability of the EU to conduct a common vaccination program has also damaged its image of in the eyes of regional actors.
The EU is facing a credibility crisis that is turning former EU-enthusiast countries such as Albania into eurosceptics. Local politicians have promptly exploited this mood. In a recent interview on Vizion Plus, Albanian PM Edi Rama spoke about the EU membership of the country with realistic tones. Rama affirmed that the matter does not depend on Albanians, but on the attitudes of the European politicians who are conditioned by the public opinion of their countries. He cited the case of Bulgaria’s veto on the accession talks of North Macedonia in order to claim that Sofia’s decision was determined by internal pressures. Rama affirmed that Albania can enter “Europe” by either improving its infrastructure, economy, and digitalisation or by doing its “homework”. However, according to the Albania Premier, doing “homework” is not a guarantee of success because Albania will be subject to the incoherent judgment of EU politicians. Rama, who hopes to win the imminent general elections and obtain the third mandate in a row, praised the works undertaken by his government to improve mobility infrastructure such as airports and touristic and commercial harbours.
The policies advocated by the non-paper and by the 3SI circles that might have commissioned it reflect the overall course of WB politics. Regional actors aim at changing the configuration of the area either by redrawing the state territories or easing border regimes. However, they still want to preserve and even reinforce the idea of “nation” and the cultural boundaries that it entails. Balkan politicians are less and less concerned with inequalities, corruption and human right protection, which are the cause of some of the biggest issues in the region. The top-down strategies adopted for improving the connectivity sectors do not always take into account the ecological impact, notwithstanding the formal declarations about the protection of the environment. The way in which investments will affect the economy is uncertain because foreign and regional speculators are likely to profit from them at the detriment of small and medium local businesses and communities. The conceptual frame that is guiding WB politics and connectivity projects, suggests that the EU might be destined to a more marginal role in the area if it’s not able to regain its lost charisma.
Belgrade and Pristina: Will a territorial exchange really happen?
The European Union is dialing up pressure on Serbia and Kosovo in an effort to convince Belgrade and Pristina to sign an agreement on normalizing bilateral relations. This would allow Brussels to seize the initiative in the Balkans from the United States, which has previously managed to get the two sides clinch a similar deal on trade and other economic issues. Moreover, the EU is even ready to break from its previous policy and give a nod to a territorial exchange between Serbs and Albanians, which was categorically rejected, above all by Germany. However, while the Serbian leadership largely welcomes the idea, the Kosovo Albanians’ radically-minded leaders rule out any territorial concessions to Belgrade, thus deepening the Kosovo impasse.
Albin Kurti, the leader of the radical Vetëvendosje (“Self-Determination”) movement, who has regained the Kosovo premiership, categorically rejected the idea of any territorial exchange with Serbia, proposed by the EU’s High Representative for International Affairs Josep Borrell.
“I do not think that we should give anything away.” … “This is pressure from Serbia. They want us to give in,” Kurti said.
That being said, the former Kosovo president, Hashim Thaci, actively lobbied the idea of a territorial exchange, even more than others. Back in August 2018, he and his Serbian counterpart Aleksandar Vucic reached a preliminary agreement on this when meeting on the sidelines of the European Forum in Alpbach, Austria. Thaci and Vucic voiced their intention to double down on signing a comprehensive deal, and invited the EU to act as its mediator and guarantor.
“We have a small window of opportunity,” Hashim Thaci said at the time. The planned agreement was supposed to be inked in Brussels already in September 2018, with the participation of the EU leadership. However, the whole process immediately hit a snag due to disagreements over border delimitation and opposition protests in both Belgrade and Pristina.
According to the plan, devised by Hashim Thaci, the delimitation issues should be discussed as a “package” and provide for a complex exchange of territories, including both the Serbian-populated North Kosovo communities of Leposavic, Zvecan and Zubin Potok (roughly one-fifth of the territory of Kosovo), and the southern Serbian communities of Buyanovac, Presevo and, preferably, Medvedja, adjacent to Kosovo, populated mainly by ethnic Albanians. The Kosovar leader argued that a territorial exchange whereby regions with a majority Albanian population would end up in Kosovo, and those with a predominantly Serbian population – in Serbia, would help ease tensions between Belgrade and Pristina.
According to the latest census in Serbia, about 90,000 people live on the territory of the three southern Serbian communities: in Presevo, 89 percent are Albanians and 9 percent are Serbs; in Bujanovac, 55 percent are Albanians and 34 percent are Serbs; in Medvedja, 26 percent are Albanians and 67 percent are Serbs. Thus, Albanians already make up the majority of the population of Presevo and Bujanovac. In Medvedja, their share has also been steadily rising.
While President Aleksandar Vucic generally agrees to the partition of Kosovo with the return of control over the province’s northern regions to Belgrade, he is still against the idea of extending the “package” exchange to include the southern Serbian communities of the Presevo Valley.
There is no unity on this issue outside the Balkans too, with Germany and France initially rejecting the idea of territorial exchanges as such, arguing that this could fire up tensions in North Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
“The territorial integrity of the Western Balkan states is already a hard fact and cannot be changed,” German Chancellor Angela Merkel said.
Austria has been foursquare behind the partition of Kosovo as a means of normalizing relations between Belgrade and Pristina.
“If Serbia and Kosovo agree on a border correction, the agreement will have our support,” Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz said.
The EU’s Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy Johannes Hahn equally favored the upcoming agreement. He urged his EU colleagues not to obstruct the deal between Pristina and Belgrade, even if it involves changing borders. Such an agreement, if it is reached, will be a one-off affair though and “should not be used as an example for solving other problems,” Hahn said at the end of August 2018.
The US administration backed the upcoming deal, with President Trump’s national security advisor John Bolton going on record saying that “Our policy, the US policy, is that if the two parties can work it out between themselves and reach agreement, we don’t exclude territorial adjustments.”
The agreement on the exchange of territories, drawn up in 2018 never came to fruition though. Responsibility for this failure lies with radical nationalist forces in both Belgrade and Pristina, not interested in any compromise solutions that won’t sit well with their own political intentions. While Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic is still in power and has not changed his position, Vjos Osmani, who replaced Hashim Thaci as President of Kosovo, is less inclined to accept any compromises with Belgrade.
This situation adds to EU and US headaches with Barack Obama’s de facto foreign policy team, now back in power in Washington, being eager to strengthen the position of the United States in the Balkans through more active military and political activity and pressure (not trade and economic scenarios and proposals, as was the case under Donald Trump). The EU and the US now have two options to choose from – either to ramp up pressure on Serbia in order to force it to recognize Kosovo without any territorial exchanges (which is more to the Joe Biden administration’s liking), or to convince the Kosovar leaders to accept territorial compromises (more preferred by the EU).
And here we should not forget about the Bosnian factor, since any changes to the status and borders of Kosovo will inevitably reflect on the domestic political situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and, in particular, on the position of the Bosnian Serbs. When briefing reporters a few days ago, the chairman of the Presidium of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Milorad Dodik, said that in any case he would insist on the implementation of the concept of “peaceful divergence,” that is, the disintegration of the country, which, according to him, is already happening. He stated that the integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot be maintained, and this is something that has increasingly been discussed by the international community.
“We are waiting for the moment when a peaceful gap becomes real,” Milorad Dodik noted, adding that he was not a warmonger and was only offering a way out of the current situation, which he described as unstable.
The EU too appears ready to “reformat” Bosnia and Herzegovina. When, during a visit to Sarajevo in early March of this year, Slovenian President Borut Pahor informally asked members of that country’s collective leadership whether a “peaceful divergence” was a possibility. Bosnian Muslim Shefik Jaferovic and Croat Zeljko Komšić responded that this was impossible, while Milorad Dodik, for his part, said that it was a likely scenario.
The current situation of “unstable equilibrium” around Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina is serious enough to prod all the disputing parties to more actively seek Russia’s mediation. Serbia and Republika Srpska maintain partner relations with Moscow. Meanwhile, the disagreements between the EU and the United States could make the other participants in the discussions more accommodating, including the Kosovar Albanians, who are interested in normalizing relations with Belgrade and implementing large-scale regional projects.
From our partner International Affairs
A leaderless ship: The Bulgaria’s political crisis and the storm to come
Internal and international tensions
Politics tends to develop in a complex conundrum in all Balkan countries. Thus, never can observers take their eyes off the ball, investors feel completely safe or international partners express enduring satisfaction. In effect, this is the case also for bits of the region that have joined the European Union in the last decade. Recently, Bulgaria has been the most interesting hearth of, popular outrage, institutional instability and international tensions amongst the latter countries.
Actually, the atmosphere began simmering back in Summer 2020, when thousands of people took to the streets for several weeks. Arguably, the combination of the umpteenth high-echelon corruption scandal involving andthe pandemic-induced recession was only the most immediate cause. Swiftly, dissatisfaction led to vigorous calls for the Prime Minister’s and the Attorney General’s resignation and early election. Even the President of the Republic, Rumen Radev, broke with his supposed non-partisanship and joined the protestors gathering vast support. However, the winter suppressed street protests and Boyko Borisov, the Prime Minister, exploited the pandemic to justify his indifference.
In the meantime, the cabinet embroiled Bulgaria in a dispute which the country had refrained from ever since 1991. The so-called ‘Macedonian question’predates the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’s independence, but only then turned into a crisis. Indeed, the hardest-fought issue was that surrounding the use of the name ‘Macedonia’, which Greece opposed until the Prespa Agreement. But the newly named Republic of North Macedonia has failed to acknowledge the deep historical and cultural connection with Bulgaria. Eventually, the former’s lack of real cooperation led Sofia to veto the opening of negotiations on EU membership. Thence, scholars have criticised the country’s government while foreign politicians tried to persuade Borisov to lift his veto.
Against the background of such a delicate, multifaceted domestic and international circumstances Bulgaria celebrated regular election on April 4. The country needed everything but being left leaderless, but this is exactly what happened.
Election results: Who to form a cabinet?
The most recent elections speak volume about the difficulty in understanding Bulgarian politics and understanding what the popular sentiment is. For a start, GERB, Borisov’s party, lost about 300,000 votes falling from 33.65%in 2017, to 26.18% this year. Moreover, the nationalist collation United Patriots, GERB’s reliable allies, split up and failed to clear the 4% threshold. Thus, with his 75 MPs in the 240-seat Parliament Borisov had no more a majority and desperately needed a partner.
At the same time, the elections produced an unusually hostile environment for GERB. In fact, a number of new leaders and formations emerged — all of which declared GERB a “most toxic party”. Still, opposing Borisov’s “model”, as they use to say, was not enough to form a government. Neither the protest party There is such a people (ITN) nor the establishment Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) even tried. Therefore, the two smaller protest parties – Democratic Bulgaria (DB) and Stand Up! Bastards Out (ISMV) – and the Muslim Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS) had to accept new elections in July.
In effect, once the elections results became clear, no one nurtured many hopes for a stable government. The BSP had offered it external, conditional support to an ITN cabinet as the DPS and even GERB did. Perhaps, members of DB and ISMV could have joined the project to ensure wider representation. But all attempts failed in front of ITN’s leader, the showman-turned-politician SlaviTrifonov, display of “political fearfulness”. The ultimate result of these developments was the shortest parliamentin Bulgaria’s two-century history.
What the parliament produced
Without a fully-functioning political government and with a lame-duck Parliament, Bulgaria is traversing a difficult period. The legislature has yet to approve the Recovery and sustainability plan towards which the EU has granted €6bln ($7.3bln). Without these funds, it will be harder for the country’s economy to rebound after the last recession. At the same time, no one is in charge of managing the ongoing feud with the Republic of North Macedonia. Hence, Sofia can neither substantiate its claims and pretences vis-à-vis Skopje nor backtrack and let membership negotiations start. Finally, in the last weeks tensions between Bulgaria and Russia have risen with mutual expulsion of several high-ranking diplomats. In fact, Czech authorities have found out about a “Bulgarian connection” in the incidents allegedly blamed on Russian security services.
On the offense: ITN, DB and ISMV against GERB
Yet, the parliament has found not time to address any of these really pressing issues. As it often happens after the elections, foreign policy has disappearedfrom the order of the day. There was no discussion of either the bilateral relations with Russia nor the North Macedonian issue.
Representative from ITN, DB and ISMV wrapped up the Recovery plan into their wider attempt to publicly discredit GERB. Thus, they refused to let the competent executive official introducing the bill and pretended Borisov himself did it.
Meanwhile, the three parties and the BSP also forced a vote on the cabinet’s resignation. Hence, the government is officially in charge only of managing current affairs: it cannot update the budget or adopt new economic measures. The opposition also blocked the automatic renewal of key concession for Sofia’s airport and some highways to Borisov’s closest allies.
So-called ‘Protest parties’ also formed a parliamentary commission to investigate Borisov governments’ misdeed. However, the legislature will soon dissolve, so nothing will come out of it besides some gossipy kompromat. The only real change is a new electoral law,remedying to some of the previous legal framework’s most evident fallacies. The hope is that it will curb the purchase of votes and other instances of fraud.
Wait-and-see: Borisov’s unkind defence
Borisov’s loyalists in the government, in the Parliament and, more importantly, in the media are repelling this frontal assault vehemently.
Figure 1 Acting Prime Minister Boyko Borissov called the Parliament “a show” in a video on his Facebook page.
Acting foreign minister Ekaterina Zakharieva has spoken out against the supposed attempt to make 850,000 GERB voters ‘disappear’. The chair of GERB’s parliamentary group, Desislava Atanasova, accused other parties of having “failed to fulfil society’s interests”. Borisov himself went out for the biggest prey: President Radev.On Facebook he declared
I hope that Radev is not proud [of the result of last year’s protests …]: This parliamentary show costs 19 million [leva, €9.5mln] a day. It is better that they closed it because we would have gone bankrupt.
The opposition motto offers no way forward behind the idea that “What GERB did must be cancelled”. Yet, GERB is not less destructive in its agenda. Currently, Borisov’s clique is challenging both the moratorium of concessionsand the electoral reformin front of the constitutional court. According to many experts, the justices could strike down or rescale at least one of these two measures. Hence, all hopes for a real democratic change will likely evaporate as long as GERB holds the levers of power.
Forecast: A leaderless ship in a stormy sea
Some have been talking about the rebirth of parliamentarism. But partisanship, anger and personal hatred currently dominate Bulgaria’s politics. Thus, a disenchanted observer could only see the dismaying polarisationand personalisation of the mainstream political discourse. At this time, Bulgaria is like a ship whose crew has mutinied, but whose captain refuses to jump off. Fortunately, the peaks of the economic and sanitary crisis seem over — for now. But the international setting conspires against the vessel. A storm is mounting from the East and the West. Winds of reprisal spire from Russia, whereas the EU is increasingly discontent with Bulgaria’s management of the North Macedonian issue. Assuming that the next elections will produce a working government, either the mutineers or the old captain will be just in time to manage the gale. But should this not happen, the country may soon regret the current lull.
Geopolitics of Europe and the Third Wave
With hospitals filling up across the continent, new variants of the virus proliferating and vaccine shortages biting back, Europe can be seen to be under the third wave of the COVID crisis. This wave has been a confused sea across Europe in which some national epidemics are worsening, some are reaching their peak and some are declining. Although lockdowns have eased as vaccine drives make headway, the end of state emergency does not undermine the inevitable long-term consequences of the crisis. COVID has brought to the forefront new geopolitical dynamics and created risks for the foreign policy of the European Union on several fronts. Beyond the epidemiological challenge of the impending health calamity, economic, political and geopolitical challenges are also plenty.
The crisis has held up a mirror to the Western countries as their effectiveness in managing the pandemic has been distorted and has brought about de-Westernisation of the world. As globalisation is under strain, the crisis is bound to redraw the borders between the state and the markets in democracies such as the Member States of the EU. Such an environment is likely to emphasise on national initiatives to the detriment of international cooperation. In a post-COVID world, the EU may have to deal with its geopolitical problems with less external credibility as well as internal solidarity among its member states.
The potential geopolitical consequences of the virus can be identified by extrapolating those trends that were taking place before the onset of the virus. Amidst evolving global scenarios, there has been a constant push from the EU to establish itself as a relevant geopolitical actor to realise its global power aspirations. In this context, it becomes important to note the two areas of concern raised by the crisis consist of questions on the internal cohesion of the EU and Europe’s ability to adapt to the increasing rivalry and competition among other global powers.
The EU as a player derives its identity from its supranationalism. However, with COVID wreaking havoc on the already unequal economy of the Northern and Southern Europe, the downslides of globalisation are being highlighted. This is likely to further embolden nationalist narratives, rather than European solutions. This will lead to the fragmentation of the region into its component member-states part, threatening the very identity if the Union. This has been a challenge to the EU as the Union recognizes solidarity as a fundamental principle as per Article 2 of the Treaty of the European Union. With the EU is facing the increasingly centrifugal ‘member states first’ approach put forward by the European capitals, the European integration project is under threat.
Further, with the pre-existing tensions between US and China, the European Union has been facing heat from both the sides of the Pacific. While the EU has put forward its own Indo-Pacific Strategy in order to constructively engage with the region, it continues to be challenged by America’s confrontational foreign policies and also being apprehensive of China’s refusal to open up their markets at a time of dwindling global economies, China’s assault on Hong Kong’s independence as well as China’s growing support towards the populist parties of Europe. The EU has come to perceive China as a systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance with this perception largely being shaped by China’s revisionist challenge and its alarming nationalist narrative.
It is important to understand that coronavirus is not here to kill geopolitics. However, the European Union will have to strengthen their efforts towards ensuring that the pandemic does not kill the EU as a geopolitical force. The European Commission must step up its efforts to broker the Multilateral Financial Framework (MFF) among member states which was long pending even before the pandemic struck the continent. It would enable the Union to act collectively in funding recovery efforts in a post-COVID reconstruction of the economies. Further, the EU should focus on shortening their supply chains pursuing a policy of strategic autonomy such that EU’s external dependencies are diversified. The need of the hour is to rebuild an economically sound healthcare Europe while at the same time working towards a more geopolitical Europe. This will require EU to continue investment as a full-spectrum power in military as well as other security capabilities along with assistance and aid to the neighboring countries to rebuild their resilience in a geopolitically volatile environment.
The EU needs to defend and promote the European model which is struggling to stand amidst the global battle of narratives along with maintaining its strategic autonomy in health, economic and other sectors. At the same time, the Union needs to bolster existing and forge new alliances in order to fill the gap on multilateralism. It needs to locate a strategic edge to resist the external pressures and protect its presence in the global scene and continue being relevant in the changing global order with its extraordinary transcontinental presence of soft power.
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