A Failed Invasion vs A Failed Exit

The much-awaited exit of the US forces from Afghanistan has stretched a bit further than the set deadline. While President Joe Biden has always purported a safe withdrawal of the US troops, lack of adherence and reverence to the pact, by the Afghan Taliban, has been one of the core facets that has fueled this unconditional deadline extension. Now the US forces, along with the NATO troops, are expected to initiate redeployment back to the United States starting 1st May and completely pulling out by 11th September: the 20th anniversary of the ghastly Twin Tower attacks. No matter how graceful the plan sounds, however, it lacks bilateral coherence. 

The ambitious invasion of Afghanistan was well-planned but rather poorly executed. While the US, as a by-product, managed to alleviate the living standard of the Afghan citizens, the plan had no barricade against the Taliban. The war lasted indefinitely because while the NATO managed to eke victory over al-Qaeda, the forces had no plan to eradicate the regional fanatics of Jihad. This led to a clustering of insurgents well after the decimation of al-Qaeda. Even the killing of Osama bin Laden couldn’t hinder the exponentiating influence of Jihadists within Afghanistan. With no clear goal in sight, the war turned against the guest forces despite having sophisticated artillery. The conflict thus far has claimed the lives of over 38000 civilians, over 65000 Afghan security forces personnel, 3500+ coalition troops, 4000 Western mercenaries, and between 67000 and 72000 Taliban fighters. The war has also injured over 60,000 Afghans and displaced many civilians. The war ranging 2 decades has cost over $2 trillion to the US alone: not even on the brink of the spending on the war in Syria despite fighting a multi-nation extremist group. 

Despite of the agreement of withdrawal, the Afghan Taliban have continuously shown hostility to the Afghan security forces ever since the agreement was forged with former US President Donald Trump in February 2020. The Doha Agreementhad bound the Taliban to refrain from attacking the US and NATO forces in exchange for a systematic withdrawal of the Troops by May 2021. However, the agreement never expanded its jurisdiction over the protection of the Afghan security forces and the citizenry of Afghanistan. The resultant was the misery of the government forces and Afghan civilians; a brunt faced in the aftermath of a poorly leveraged deal. Clearly, the Taliban enjoy the edge over the US coalition and negotiations were never equitable to begin with: the US being in a dilemma of exiting while the Taliban gaining influence and subsequently, an upper hand.

The concerning absence of the Taliban’s council from the recent Istanbul summit, arranged to discuss and negotiate the withdrawal systems and measures, created a vortex of doubt: would the Taliban agree to the delayed withdrawal plan? Their position could be gauged by the untimely refusal to be part of any negotiations prior to the US withdrawal. Before the revised withdrawal plan was even announced, the Taliban Spokesperson Mohammad Naeem made the group’s position very clear, stating: “Until all foreign forces completely withdraw from our homeland, the Islamic Emirate will not participate in any conference that shall make decisions about Afghanistan”

The Ghani regime welcomed the series of events in his tweets, stating: “Afghanistan’s proud security and defense forces are fully capable of defending its people and country, which they have been doing all along, and for which the Afghan nation will forever remain grateful”. However, the Taliban representation spared no time to cast their dejection. The Taliban representation projected its dismay: “As the withdrawal of [foreign] forces is being delayed by several months and will be completed before September…This decision is a clear violation of the Doha Agreement and non-compliance with its commitments. The Islamic Emirate [Taliban] urges America and all occupying countries to stop making excuses for prolonging the war and to withdraw all their forces from Afghanistan immediately”. The clear position laced with threats shows that although the withdrawal is unconditionally on cards, the foreign forces would not be safe for a very long time. The Taliban have eyed the extension as an excuse rather than a gateway to further negotiations: a prospect that President Biden vied even before ascending to the office.

The US aims to focus on brewing issues in the world that have been stagnated by the longest war in the history of the US and NATO. With a withdrawal, the US could focus on rivaling the prevalence of China in the Asia Pacific, and combat the raging violations of Russia in the Black sea. The signs of a prospective strategy post-withdrawal could be gauged by the recent diplomatic strokes in Taiwan to counter China whilst slapping sanctions on Russia over interference in the US and intimidation on the borders of Ukraine. It’s clear that the US, under the flag of President Biden, wants to fight its own wars after facing the consequences of entering an alien conflict.

Now, with 9592 troops from 36 countries still serving in Afghanistan, the grim reality looms over the military as it seeks a peaceful exit. With 573 killed and 1210 injured, a 29% increase compared with the same period last year, in just the first quarter of 2021, an establishment of a stable government along with a processing democracy seems fanatically optimistic at best. A fragile government, retreating foreign forces, and a surging bout of the Islamist groups being unrooted in the Middle East, the rule of Taliban, taking over swatches of Afghanistan like in the 90s, seems like a real possibility again. Analytically gauging the ground reality, the prospect of a revived Shariah rule post the US withdrawal could be extracted from the words of finality by the Afghan government: “The Taliban have committed this ‘miscalculation’ in the past…It would be wrong if the group thinks that they will reach their demands through force with the withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan”.

Syed Zain Abbas Rizvi
Syed Zain Abbas Rizvi
The author is a political and economic analyst. He focuses on geopolitical policymaking and international affairs. Syed has written extensively on fintech economy, foreign policy, and economic decision making of the Indo-Pacific and Asian region.