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Russia-Europe: Nothing New on the Western Economic Front?

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Since the autumn of 2020, the “Navalny Factor” has dominated the public and political discourse on Russia-EU relations. This factor fitted snugly into Brussels’ system of values that defines Europe’s principal approaches to its largest partner in the post-Soviet space. The nadir in the political dialogue was reached in October 2020, with the European Union adopting anti-Russian chemical cyber sanctions; November–December saw a period of somewhat smoothing out the particularly sharp angles. Yet, this was followed by Alexey Navalny’s return to Moscow from Berlin in January 2021, his subsequent arrest and several court sentences passed on him, as well as what Brussels deems a largely failed Moscow visit of Josep Borrell, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. All this doomed Russia–EU relations to an even deeper low. In early March 2021, the “insulted and injured” EU Ministers of Foreign Affairs spearheaded the adoption of new restrictive measures in the Council of the European Union as part of the Framework of Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime instituted on December 7, 2020. In addition, Charles Michel, President of the European Council, announced an upcoming revision of the EU’s strategic approach to Russia.

Frozen dialogues

The pressing political crisis backgrounded economic relations that had traditionally formed one of the key foundations of Europe–Russia relations. Nord Stream 2 was an exception, as many in the European establishment are attempting to turn this commercial project into an instrument for putting political pressure on the Kremlin.

Seven years ago, in the spring of 2014, Brussels one-sidedly froze the principal mechanisms of its economic and political collaboration with Russia, including bilateral summits, a number of sectoral/industrial dialogues, and inter-governmental consultations between EU member states and Russia. Additionally, stiff sectoral sanctions were imposed on several leading Russian financial and industrial entities. The well-known Mogherini guiding principles adopted in March 2016 became, in Andrey Kortunov’s opinion, something of the lowest common denominator for the diverse standings of EU members, as these principles enshrined a compromise between hard- and soft-liners in managing relations with Russia. The main economic issues were hidden behind the concepts of “selective engagement” and “bolstering internal stability”. In the summer of the same year, Sergey Lavrov proposed auditing the relations with a view to finding which connections would allow to restore constructive cooperation. Five years later, this proposal still elicits no response from his European colleagues. Ultimately, Russia’s Ministry for Foreign Affairs began to describe the European Union as an “unreliable partner” that bases its approaches to Russia on its short-term interests. Apparently, this applies to the economic area as well, including the Eurasian Economic Union track.

Bilateral cooperation

Over recent years, economic cooperation has mostly shifted to Russia working with individual EU states, primarily those forming the backbone of its economic potential: Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and France. These four countries [1] account for over half the mutual foreign trade that, together with investments, constitute the foreign economic framework of Russia–EU relations. Despite exports and imports significantly dropping from USD 262 bn in 2019 to USD 192 bn in 2020, the EU remains Russia’s leading partner, ahead of China. Its 27 states (without the UK) now account for 37% of Russia’s trade turnover (42.5% in 2019, over 50% in 2013), while China accounts for 20% (18% in 2019, about 11% in 2013). The commodity composition has not changed much since 2014: in exchange for primary and secondary energy sources, Russia receives machinery and equipment. The restrictive measures did have a negative impact on mutual trade but it was rather limited. Actors from other states, particularly from Southeast Asia, are successfully moving into the sanctions-affected segments. Russia’s sluggish economic and political reforms remain a traditionally negative factor. Russia never accumulated a critical mass of competitive small- and medium-sized businesses. In addition to red tape and corruption, European business complains of protectionism and of the Russian authorities demanding product localization and import substitution. 2020 saw added complaints that anti-COVID lockdown restrictions hindered cross-border travel for highly skilled professionals.

Transport and logistics offer good prospects for joint activities. In 2020, despite the pandemic and despite disruptions in global supply chains in the spring, European and Russian companies managed to expand their co-operation‒primarily in providing rail and truck container shipping. Russia’s objective advantages as an overland transit space between China and Europe lay the foundations for a long-term cooperation within China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Cooperation in using transport routes via the Arctic Ocean shows promise as well.

As the number of European economic entities in Russia’s economy shrinks [2] during the 2020 pandemic in particular, EU companies have continued to invest directly in Russia. The number of Russian investors in EU states is also gradually rising. Unfortunately, there is no reliable data broken down by their quantitative, cost, sectoral and regional structure. Recent high-profile deals include founding the Wintershall Dea energy concern in Germany, 33% of which is owned by a Russian partner. Total accumulated FDI of EU companies in Russia is about three times Russia’s investment in Europe.

Being a commercial project, Nord Stream 2 remains the most significant stumbling block in Euro-Atlantic and intra-EU relations alike. Even though most EU politicians and experts recognize the project’s importance for European energy security and sovereignty, hardliners support the American extra-territorial sanctions and continue to insist that the project be shut down [3].The key context is grounded in the need to continue transit shipping of the bulk of Russian gas via Ukraine as a guarantee of the latter’s treasury continuing to receive foreign currency payments from Gazprom and of its gas pipeline system’s modernization. The arguments used here focus on the need to maintain European solidarity and counter “the Kremlin’s gas aggression and uncontrolled expansion.”

The energy track shows a particular need for resuming full-fledged Russia–EU relations. As of today, the Gas Advisory Council (GAC) is represented by expert Work Stream 2, “Internal markets”, co-chaired by Andrey Konoplyanik for Russia and Wim Groenendijk for the EU (established in 2011 to reduce infrastructural and regulatory risks in bilateral gas relations). Two other GAC work streams (“Long-Term Gas Scenarios” and “Outlooks and Developing Gas Transportation Infrastructure”) have virtually stopped working. At the same time, trilateral Russia–EU–Ukraine talks on Russian gas deliveries and transit via the Ukrainian gas pipeline system were launched in May 2014. In 2019, the participants reached a new five-year transit agreement.

“Green” challenges and economic cooperation opportunities

In December 2019, the EU adopted the European Green Deal, a strategy determining the parameters for transitioning to a new energy paradigm by 2050. This paradigm will largely inform the way the EU will interact with Russia in the coming decades. In 2020, the European Commission adopted additional documents setting forth specific directions of the new course in industrial policies and digital transformation, in hydrogen energy, critically important raw materials, energy-efficient construction and building modernization, the closed-cycle economy, agriculture and forestry, and biodiversity. The particulars are still being actively discussed in the European political and expert communities. In 2021–2022, a new legal framework will be adopted and requisite mechanisms launched on the basis of these discussions.

All the areas announced in the New Green Deal open new avenues for European and Russian economic entities in implementing various cooperation projects. Hydrogen energy in all its aspects appears to be the most intelligible area in terms of possible co-operation. These aspects include manufacturing, storing, transporting and using environmentally-friendly hydrogen, which, in Russia’s view, includes not only green but also blue, turquoise and yellow Н2. Last summer, the Eastern Committee of the German Economy (ECGE) and the Russian-German Foreign Trade Chamber (RGFTC) protested against Russia not having been mentioned in the German and European hydrogen strategies. These actions triggered movement and, by the autumn of 2020, a discussion had been launched on a series of bilateral entrepreneurial projects. Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy and Russia’s Ministries of Energy and of Industry and Trade launched informal contacts in the area. Despite operational difficulties in using Н2 and hydrogen technologies, the Russian-German initiative has good prospects for promoting joint projects on the EU market, including the European Clean Hydrogen Alliance [4] In addition to big reserves of methane and fresh water, besides major surplus capacities of low-carbon hydropower plants and nuclear power plants generating cheap energy, coupled with the significant potential of renewable energy sources and unique Russian know-how (such as research conducted by the Technological Hydrogen Valley consortium established in November 2020), European stakeholders are interested in using Gazprom’s existing pipeline and storage infrastructure as well as in deliveries of various equipment, including that for hydrogen electrolysis and pyrolysis. In mid-February 2021, Denis Manturov, Russia’s Minister for Industry and Trade, speaking at a conference on Russia-Germany strategic cooperation, announced the intention to put hydrogen technologies on the list of priorities for second-generation special investment contracts.

Russia is extremely wary (adopts a de-facto negative stance) of the “carbon border adjustment mechanism” that entails imposing a tax on the “carbon footprint” of imported goods as part of the energy transition, which could result in multi-billion losses for Russian exporters of oil, gas, coal, steel and several other “carbon-intensive goods.” Moscow still has a chance to stand up for its interests, though the window for action is very small. It might be expedient to establish specialized expert groups on the issue, both in Russia and at the level of international multilateral dialogue, including by submitting the results of the discussion to the relevant UN agencies, including UNIDO and UNCTAD.

Let us note as an aside that the European Union is continuing to collaborate with Russia on a series of initiatives as part of long-term partnerships in climate and the environment: these are cross-border cooperation, the Northern Dimension programs, and partnerships for implementing the Paris Accords. Specific projects, including those in waste disposal and processing, wastewater treatment, increasing energy efficiency, entail equipment deliveries from the EU, which creates the prerequisites for cooperation in these areas. Bilateral initiatives implemented by Germany’s Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety and Russia’s Ministry for Natural Resources and the Environment also hold a special place in this process. These projects are, for instance, “Climate-neutral economic activities: introducing best available technologies (BAT) in the Russian Federation”, “Climate-neutral waste management” and “Peat bog restoration in Russia with a view to preventing fires and mitigating climate change”. In 2019, the parties agreed to resume the activities of the Russian-German Coordination Council on Environmental Protection. The German-Russian Agricultural and Political Dialogue has never ceased its activities; among other things, it works on forestry-related interactions.

Prospects

Another positive note is that Russian academic bodies can continue their collaboration with their EU partners under the 9th EU research and innovation framework program Horizon Europe, which runs until 2027. Some of the results obtained (such as in medicine, IT, digital, hydrogen and other technologies) might ultimately be put to commercial use. This applies fully to bilateral cooperation as well, for instance, cooperation with Germany: in late 2018, implementation was launched of a ten-year roadmap for academic and educational partnership.

Despite the evidently crying need to resume sectoral dialogues between Russia and the EU, this is unlikely to happen in the near future. The principal reason for this is a deep value-based conflict and a lack of progress in implementing the Minsk Agreements, which makes it impossible to put on the agenda the issue of lifting or at least mitigating the many restrictive measures introduced by the EU. In the near future, economic interaction will still be based on market entrepreneurial cooperation that partly relies on government and regional support instruments as well as on bilateral inter-agency mechanisms (such as the Russian-French Council for Economic, Financial, Industrial, and Trade Matters (CCIFR) and the Russian-German High-Level Working Group on Strategic Cooperation in Economy and Finance (JWG)).

An important role is played by interest groups; the above-mentioned Germany ECGE and RGFTC are traditionally seen as the most advanced of these. In addition to their own existing lobbying mechanisms, which have acquitted themselves well, in December 2020 these groups spearheaded the establishment of a German-Russian Economic Council. The French-Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Economic Council of French and Russian Enterprises, and the Russia-France Business Cooperation Council represent the interests of French companies, while Italian businesses are represented by the Italian-Russian Chamber of Commerce, with the European Business Association [5] standing for European businesses.

Russian business operating in the EU is essentially disorganized and can only count on the Russian state for support. We are mostly talking about Trade Missions, which were transferred in 2018 from the purview of the Ministry for Economic Development to that of the Ministry of Industry and Trade. Currently, the difficult process of reforming them is under way, and it will show whether they will be able to fit into the system that supports market interests of Russian businesses‒small- and medium-sized in particular‒on international markets, including those of Europe. We believe the activities of the Trade Mission in Berlin deserve special attention. On 6 May, it will celebrate its centennial. It has been active in introducing new instruments for co-operation with Russian economic actors. Internationally-based bodies of the Russian Export Centre are only now finding their way around European countries and seeking their niche in this area.

The current level of Russia’s bilateral interaction with EU states could advance preservation of their present potential and help achieve progress in some cooperation niches, including the European Green Deal. Russia’s negative image in the European media remains a powerful hindrance. This image is being formed, among other things, by the decisions of the European Council, including prolongation of existing sanctions and imposition of new ones. This picture makes small- and medium-sized businesses more wary of possible business ties with Russia and indefinitely postpones their willingness to establish contacts. Joint state formats, such as the Russian-French Cross Year of Regional Cooperation (2021), the Year of Germany in Russia (2020–2021) and the Russian-German Cross Year of Economy and Sustainable Development (2020–2022) are intended for countering these negative trends.

No breakthrough in Russia’s economic and political cooperation with EU states should be expected in 2021–2022. Co-operation dynamics will be informed by the EU’s successes in combating the coronavirus pandemic and by possible positive signals from the Russian regions to European and Russian business concerning planned steps for improving the framework state of the economy. As of the early spring of 2021, European entrepreneurs were mostly pessimistic. For instance, while the German business community positively assessed the prospects for their economic cooperation with China, the US and the Eurozone (a poll conducted by the German Chamber of Commerce and Industry (DIHT)) (with figures of +15, +11 and +6 points for bottom line expectations), the prospects for cooperation with Russia were mostly viewed negatively (-19 points). Unlike their parent companies, the top management of their Russian subsidiaries were more optimistic in late 2020 about the prospects for working in Russia (a poll conducted by the ECGE and the RGFTC). They particularly noted the importance of and the need for the EU to co-operate more closely with Russia on such matters on the bilateral agenda as industrial modernization and increased efficiency, waste processing and management, energy and climate, alignment of rules and standards. It is noteworthy that the respondents did not view such areas as space, mobility, and production of natural resources in 2021 as particularly significant.

In conclusion, I would like to refer to the opinion of Oliver Hermes, Head of the Eastern Committee of the German Economy, expressed at the 24th Potsdam Meetings in mid-November 2020 to the effect that only a powerful joint economic space stretching from Lisbon to Vladivostok would allow German and, consequently, European industry to pool the technological know-how and market potential of Western and Eastern Europe and Central Asia and become the leader in digital and green technologies in the future. He believes that specialized institutions need to be established right now to launch EU-EAEU talks on a single market. Yet, the signal sent to Brussels during Germany’s presidency of the Council of the European Union has so far fallen on deaf ears of the European Commission. Apparently, the time for a constructive response has not yet come.

From our partner RIAC

1. Germany is the backbone partner in Russia-EU relations who largely defines their qualitative and quantitative contents.

2 For instance, there were 4,274 legal entities with German capital in 2019, with 3,971 in 2020.

3 It appears that the EU failed in its attempts to introduce an effective mechanism for counteracting third countries’ extra-territorial sanctions by late 2020. See also Ivan Timofeev’s opinion.

4 Russian companies’ experience of interacting with the European Clean Hydrogen Alliance is interesting in terms of the participation by Russian actors in other similar alliances with the status of an “Important Project of Common European interest” (IPCEI)

5 The EU–Russia Industrialists Roundtable Association was established in 1997 and was active until 2014. It held its last events in 2015. Apparently, its participants are not interested in restoring this once-effective mechanism for discussing existing problems and possible solutions to them.

Ph.D in Economics, Deputy Director of the RAS Institute for Europe, Head of the Country and Regional Researches Department, Head of the German Research Center

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Accelerating COVID-19 Vaccine Uptake to Boost Malawi’s Economic Recovery

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Lunzu market in southern Malawi. WFP/Greg Barrow

Since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, many countries including Malawi have struggled to mitigate its impact amid limited fiscal support and fragile health systems. The pandemic has plunged the continent into its first recession in over 25 years, and vulnerable groups such as the poor, informal sector workers, women, and youth, suffer disproportionately from reduced opportunities and unequal access to social safety nets.

Fast-tracking COVID-19 vaccine acquisition—alongside widespread testing, improved treatment, and strong health systems—are critical to protecting lives and stimulating economic recovery. In support of the African Union’s (AU) target to vaccinate 60 percent of the continent’s population by 2022, the World Bank and the AU announced a partnership to assist the Africa Vaccine Acquisition Task Team (AVATT) initiative with resources, allowing countries to purchase and deploy vaccines for up to 400 million Africans. This extraordinary effort complements COVAX and comes at a time of rising cases in the region.

I am convinced that unless every country in the world has fair, broad, and fast access to effective and safe COVID-19 vaccines, we will not stem the spread of the pandemic and set the global economy on track for a steady and inclusive recovery. The World Bank has taken unprecedented steps to ramp up financing for Malawi, and every country in Africa, to empower them with the resources to implement successful vaccination campaigns and compensate for income losses, food price increases, and service delivery disruptions.

In line with Malawi’s COVID-19 National Response and Preparedness Plan which aims to vaccinate 60 percent of the population, the World Bank approved $30 million in additional financing for the acquisition and deployment of safe and effective COVID-19 vaccines. This financing comes as a boost to Malawi’s COVID-19 Emergency Response and Health Systems Preparedness project, bringing World Bank contributions in this sector up to $37 million.

Malawi’s decision to purchase 1.8 million doses of Johnson and Johnson vaccines through the AU/African Vaccine Acquisition Trust (AVAT) with World Bank financing is a welcome development and will enable Malawi to secure additional vaccines to meet its vaccination target.

However, Malawi’s vaccination campaign has encountered challenges driven by concerns regarding safety, efficacy, religious and cultural beliefs. These concerns, combined with abundant misinformation, are fueling widespread vaccine hesitancy despite the pandemic’s impact on the health and welfare of billions of people.  The low uptake of COVID-19 vaccines is of great concern, and it remains an uphill battle to reach the target of 60 percent by the end of 2023 from the current 2.2 percent.

Government leadership remains fundamental as the country continues to address vaccine hesitancy by consistently communicating the benefits of the vaccine, releasing COVID data, and engaging communities to help them understand how this impacts them.

As we deploy targeted resources to address COVID-19, we are also working to ensure that these investments support a robust, sustainable and resilient recovery. Our support emphasizes transparency, social protection, poverty alleviation, and policy-based financing to make sure that COVID assistance gets to the people who have been hit the hardest.

For example, the Financial Inclusion and Entrepreneurship Scaling Project (FInES) in Malawi is supporting micro, small, and medium enterprises by providing them with $47 million in affordable credit through commercial banks and microfinance institutions. Eight months into implementation, approximately $8.4 million (MK6.9 billion) has been made available through three commercial banks on better terms and interest rates. Additionally, nearly 200,000 urban households have received cash transfers and urban poor now have more affordable access to water to promote COVID-19 prevention.

Furthermore, domestic mobilization of resources for the COVID-19 response are vital to ensuring the security of supply of health sector commodities needed to administer vaccinations and sustain ongoing measures. Likewise, regional approaches fostering cross-border collaboration are just as imperative as in-country efforts to prevent the spread of the virus. United Nations (UN) partners in Malawi have been instrumental in convening regional stakeholders and supporting vaccine deployment.

Taking broad, fast action to help countries like Malawi during this unprecedented crisis will save lives and prevent more people falling into poverty. We thank Malawi for their decisive action and will continue to support the country and its people to build a resilient and inclusive recovery.

This op-ed first appeared in The Nation, via World Bank

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An Airplane Dilemma: Convenience Versus Environment

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Mr. President:  There are many consequences of COVID-19 that have changed the existing landscape due to the cumulative effects of personal behavior.  For example, the decline in the use of automobiles has been to the benefit of the environment.  A landmark study published by Nature in May 2020 confirmed a 17 percent drop in daily CO2 emissions but with the expectation that the number will bounce back as human activity returns to normal.

Yet there is hope.  We are all creatures of habit and having tried teleconferences, we are less likely to take the trouble to hop on a plane for a personal meeting, wasting time and effort.  Such is also the belief of aircraft operators.  Add to this the convenience of shopping from home and having the stuff delivered to your door and one can guess what is happening.

In short, the need for passenger planes has diminished while cargo operators face increased demand.  Fewer passenger planes also means a reduction in belly cargo capacity worsening the situation.  All of which has led to a new business with new jobs — converting passenger aircraft for cargo use.  It is not as simple as it might seem, and not just a matter of removing seats, for all unnecessary items must be removed for cargo use. They take up cargo weight and if not removed waste fuel.

After the seats and interior fittings have been removed, the cabin floor has to be strengthened.  The side windows are plugged and smoothed out.  A cargo door is cut out and the existing emergency doors are deactivated and sealed.  Also a new crew entry door has to be cut-out and installed. 

A new in-cabin cargo barrier with a sliding access door is put in, allowing best use of cargo and cockpit space and a merged carrier and crew space.  A new crew lavatory together with replacement water and waste systems replace the old, which supplied the original passenger area and are no longer needed.

The cockpit gets upgrades which include a simplified air distribution system and revised hydraulics.  At the end of it all, we have a cargo jet.  If the airlines are converting their planes, then they must believe not all the travelers will be returning after the covid crisis recedes.

Airline losses have been extraordinary.  Figures sourced from the World Bank and the International Civil Aviation Organization reveal air carriers lost $370 billion in revenues.  This includes $120 billion in the Asia-Pacific region, $100 billion in Europe and $88 billion in North America.

For many of the airlines, it is now a new business model transforming its fleet for cargo demand and launching new cargo routes.  The latter also requires obtaining regulatory approvals.

A promising development for the future is sustainable aviation fuel (SAP).  Developed by the Air France KLM Martinair consortium it reduces CO2 emissions, and cleaner air transport contributes to lessening global warming.

It is a good start since airplanes are major transportation culprits increasing air pollution and radiative forcing.  The latter being the heat reflected back to earth when it is greater than the heat radiated from the earth.  All of which should incline the environmentally conscious to avoid airplane travel — buses and trains pollute less and might be a preferred alternative for domestic travel.

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There Is No Business, Like Small Business: New Strategy

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Marc Chagall, Circus Horse, 1964

Once upon a time, all big businesses of the world were only small businesses. However, occasionally, when big businesses classified as too big to fail, it is the special status when they start failing their own nations, damaging common good, hurting humankind at large. This is when big business allowed to morph into a Godzilla to trample all over the governments and institutions and line them up as hostages. Study the rise and fall of the world’s largest business empires of last century. 

Now Showtime: There is no business, like small business, because the small business sector is not only a giant business, but also the biggest layer of the economy, largest contributor in kind to its nation, adding jobs, paying taxes and creating real value creation, while taking all the abuse and bureaucratic nonsense.  Hence, post pandemic recovery will take no prisoners and harshly unleash economic challenges as mirror on the economic development competency and question national priorities. Here, no worries, as usual the big business will always take care of itself. Small business will be the only game left in town, something for the political leadership to cling on to and something for local trade groups to try to claim as success. The definitions on what is big and what is small are both on the table for honest evaluation and equally juxtaposed need a declaration on what business serves the economy of the nation and what business destroys the economies of nation.

New math of the post pandemic world clearly shakes down old mindsets. Unless national economic development leaders, trade groups and trade associations acquire proven entrepreneurial experiences, expertise and tactical battlefield capability at the very top and display a warrior mindset to upskill for global competitive excellence, they are just a dance party with water pistols.  Entrepreneurialism is the real value creation driving force behind the economy and not a value manipulation exercise with some certificates. Any misunderstanding on such issues only creates shiny cities, surrounded by tent-cities. Study the global economic chaos and worklessness is creeping across the world.

The illusion of super big technology driving super global growth is another myth of crypto-tyrannies. The worshiping super magnanimous technologies, including Facebook engaged in stealing the future from the next generations, now manipulating data to divide and conquer elections and serving special agenda groups causing tribalism and global socio-economic damage. Study how the future routinely stolen in broad daylight by Social Media. 

Mutation of economic thought:  Why is creation of fake economies much easier; this is where zeros bought, sold and traded as real assets, everything multiplied, subtracted, divided but nothing adds up, there are no bottom-line totals, ever. When columns do not fit anywhere, like an abstract art on canvas, for the eye of the beholder they glow in the dark. Hence, cubism-finances  and impressionist-economies, while on the other hand, real value creation economy is one of the hardest journeys,it isrealentrepreneurialism wrapped in integrity and solid hard day’s work creating common good. The reason is that small medium businesses have lost trust in their government and major institutions, while they paint the economy as abstract art and print invisible unlimited money but SME only thrown in jail if they only photocopy a dollar bill.  Covidians demand a new narrative on economic affairs and overall totals of budgets.

Unless trade groups of nations assembled and thanked profusely for their work done over the last century. Invited to join as new players, as this is now a new page for a new age and a new direction for a new digital future. Let meritocracy chart out the future of trade-groups; let vertical sectors build their own independent global age narratives to ride on entrepreneurial mindsets. When methodical agenda on simultaneous synchronization bring all key components under master plan tabled critical thinking and hardcore business experiences should lead. When vertical groups and all upskilling and reskilling features interact on digital platforms combined, eventually they will all see the light and most importantly learn the future of the global-age of digital commerce. Upskilling of all layers is critical so all grow together. Reskilling to create real value production is essential so it becomes a sustainable model. 

With no room to spend another decade on some academic feasibility studies, organize a warrior team to undertake such mobilization developments. Such national mandates are often not new funding dependent rather execution starved and deployment hungry. Why shut down the electricity of the building and climb the skyscraper via the staircase.  With the majority of nations locked up in an old mindset on digitization, today, they simply cannot zip up to the top floor, exhausted and breathless as they are climbing stairs and badly stuck on lower floors.  Pandemic recovery is harsh. Fire the first person who says they need heavy new funding, fire the second person who says they are too busy to change. Change is a gift for free but for the right mindset.

The New Trends: National mobilization of entrepreneurialism will advance; small and medium businesses will grow, as they have no choice but to upskill innovative excellence and reskill for quality manufacturing of goods and services. Learn from Asia, study Africa, stop reading newspapers but the world maps, acquire new math from ‘population-rich-nations’, and expand collaborative alliances with the knowledge-rich-nations to reach global markets.

New Trends on Small Medium Business Economy:

The new math:  why all over the world it is now attracting new entrepreneurs at rapid speed? Why are Covidians all over the world refusing high-rise, low pay, cubical-slavery and transforming to creative freedom, global-age access and hammocks. Today a USD $1000 investment in technology buys digital solutions, which were million dollars, a decade ago. Today, any micro-small-medium-enterprise capable of remote working models can save 90% of office and bureaucratic costs and suddenly operate like a mini-multi-national with little or no additional costs.

The new uplifts: How struggling economies are now exploring the “National Mobilization of Entrepreneurialism on Digital Platforms of Exportability Protocols” as alternate revolutionary thinking. Study how Africa model under Dr. Ameenah Gurib-Fakim is expanding and why the groups of western developed economies are so fearful of such a mega shift in thinking. Study Expothon on Google.

The new speed: If Agrarian age to industrial age took a millennia, while industrial age to computer age took a century, now from cyber-age to paperless, cash-less, office-less and work-less age it is almost knocking the door, just open and see. Is this the revenge of The Julian Calendar, time like a tsunami drowning us in our own depths of performance, challenging our lifelong learning and exposing our critical thinking forcing us to fathom the pace of change, swim or drown?

Time to study deeply, why forest fires always put out by creating more selected fires;  therefore let government and bureaucracy stay where they are, while creating a far superior brand new meritocracy centric digital firefighting unit to act at the top and bring required results. The cost is a fraction of what routinely wasted 1000 times in lost and missed opportunities.

Time to appreciate, why is the fear of exposure of limited talent the number one fear of adapting digitizationas digital-divide is just a mental-divide.Why without digitization there is no economy and why it has taken decades?

Time to apply entrepreneurial mindset, why incentivizing all frontline management of all midsize business economic development and foreign investment attraction and export promotion bodies is a requirement of time? Observe the power of entrepreneurial mindset in the driver seat, deploy national mobilization of midsize economies, accept upskilling as a national mandate, and digitization as national pride.

Is there any authoritative leadership on entrepreneurialism present in the boardroom?  No need to have chills, as mainly from Asia, there are some 500 million new entrepreneurs already on the march, therefore, no need to ask where are they headed but rather ask where your national entrepreneurialism is going? Study why entrepreneurialism is neither academic-born nor academic centric, why all most successful legendary founders that created earth shattering organizations were only the dropouts?

Is there a new realization or back to water pistol games? Not to be confused with academic courses on fixing Paper-Mache economies and already broken paperwork trails, chambers primarily focused on conflict resolutions, compliance regulations, and trade groups on taxation policy matters.  Mobilization of small medium business economy is a tactical battlefield of advancements of an enterprise, as meritocracy is the nightmarish challenges for over 100 plus nations where majority high potential sectors are at standstill on such affairs. Surprisingly, such advancements are mostly not new funding hungry but mobilization starved. Observe the trail of silence. The empty shelves are not supply chain issues but symptoms of broken down economies. Economies are not cryptopia; they are about real value creation by the local small medium business forces to create local grassroots prosperity. The failure is not having the right mindsets.

Five things to watch for the year 2022: US election will surprise the world as it has the last two times. World economies tested, financially along with leadership competency levels. Big business will remain big and undisturbed.  The Covidian will march for truth. Small medium business mobilization will further grow as a reliable answer to the economy and jobs.This is how humankind will crawl towards critical thinking.

The rest is easy

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