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Will 2021 be the year of thaw in international relations for Turkey?

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In recent years, after the clumsy and misguided coup that attempted to overthrow him in 2016, Turkey’s President Erdogan has adopted increasingly extremist attitudes and internal and international policies that have practically isolated Turkey not only from its traditional NATO allies (of which it has been a partner since NATO’s foundation), but also from almost all of its geopolitical counterparts in the Middle East.

In his attempt to play a leading role in the games underway in the Mediterranean and Near East region, from Syria to Libya, passing through Nagorno-Karabakh, President Erdogan has given his country’s diplomacy an Islamist drift – based, in particular, on support for the fundamentalist movement of the Muslim Brotherhood -which if, on the one hand, has strengthened him internally, on the other has led him to make more enemies than he could reasonably bear.

The peak of Turkey’s international isolation was blatantly shown in October last year when, after the brutal murder in France of Professor Samuel Paty, beheaded in the street by a Muslim extremist of Azeri origin because he was “guilty” of having exposed the infamous Charlie Hebdo cartoons on Mohammed in the classroom, President Macron lashed out at those who, “in the shadow of Mohammed”, were fanning the flames of radical Islamism in France with the aim of stirring up young Muslims and encouraging them to convert their anger at social and economic marginalisation into religious strife.

On the orders of the French President, the security forces began investigating and conducting carpet searches in the French Salafist circles controlled by some three hundred Turkish Imams who had settled in France.

Macron’s words and the initiatives of the French security forces against Islamic fundamentalism in France unleashed the wrath of the Turkish President who did not hesitate to call his French colleague “a brain-dead” who treated Muslims in France “like Jews were treated in Hitler’s Germany”.

President Erdogan’s words have added fuel to the fire of the already difficult relations between France and the minority of Salafists active in the country: a few days after Erdogan’s public statements, a young Tunisian in Nice killed three people shouting “Allaakhbar” in the cathedral of Nice.

At that juncture, France recalled its Ambassador from Ankara, freezing its relations with a country that for decades had been considered a solid commercial, political and military partner.

At the end of 2020, Turkey’s international relations hit the lowest ebb in recent history.

Even justified claims such as the request to redefine the sea borders with Greece have ceased to be supported by European diplomats, while activism in Libya to support the President of the “Government of National Accord” (GNA), imposed by the United Nations but supported by Islamist militias, has put Ankara on a collision course with Russia and Egypt which, in turn, have sided with the “secular” warlord of Cyrenaica, Khalifa Haftar.

At the end of last year, a country like Turkey which, owing to its pragmatism in foreign policy, had not only been considered worthy of belonging to NATO, but also considered a reliable and credible partner for decades by Europe and the United States, found itself in total isolation at international level and in great difficulties at national level, due to the effects of the pandemic and a creeping economic crisis.

It is probably against this background that, since the beginning of this year, President Erdogan has changed strategy and launched what international observers have called the “charm offensive”, in an attempt to reopen the channels of dialogue between Turkey and Western countries and the regional powers in the Middle East (from Israel to Egypt, from Saudi Arabia to the Emirates) – a dialogue that had been frozen due to the reckless and ill-considered decision to support, always and in any case, the Muslim Brotherhood.

After starting a secret channel of cooperation with Israel in an attempt to find a solution to the small-scale civil war over Nagorno-Karabakh, in which Turkey, with Israel’s “clandestine” support, successfully supported the reasons of the Azerbaijani Muslim Turkmen, to the detriment of the Christian Armenian majority, President Erdogan decided to reopen relations with Egypt.

After eight years of strained or absent relations, Turkey has reopened the door to dialogue with Egypt under the banner of a “Realpolitik” which President Erdogan seemed to have forgotten.

Since 2013, when General Al Sisi overthrew the government of President Morsi – the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the winner of the 2012 elections -President Erdogan had repeatedly called him “a murderer” and “a tyrant”. Relations between the two countries had cooled definitively when the Turkish President had blatantly given refuge and political asylum to all Morsi’s aides and collaborators and to all members of the Muslim Brotherhood who had fled to Turkey to escape repression.

On March 12, 2021, in a surprise statement, President Erdogan admitted at a press conference that he had “taken diplomatic steps” to achieve “reconciliation with Egypt”.

Foreign Minister Melvut Cavusoglu confirmed that change of policy line saying that “after years of hostility and mutual distrust…time had come to gradually restart contacts with Egypt”.

According to diplomatic sources, there are two main reasons that have convinced the Turkish President to change his attitude towards his (probably former) rival Al Sisi.

The first one can be traced back to Turkey’s total and by now suffocating isolation in the entire Mediterranean and Middle East region.

The second one is much more practical and pragmatic: the possibility of discussing with Egypt a new definition of Turkey’s maritime borders in the Mediterranean could enable Turkey to negotiate – from a more solid position – the “12 miles” problem and enable it to extend, within acceptable limits, the borders of territorial waters, currently “strangled” and chocked by the Greek islands’ proximity to the Turkish coast.

According to the Turkish government, a Turkey-Egypt agreement on maritime borders could lead to a further agreement on the same subject with Israel, useful for the joint exploitation of the underwater gas fields off Cyprus, Egypt and Israel.

According to very reliable and qualified sources, the Head of the Turkish Secret Service (MIT), General Hakan Fidan, has received direct orders from President Erdogan to re-establish contacts and relations (interrupted since 2013) with the Egyptian Secret Service, the Mukhabarat Al Amma.

Thanks to the personal commitment of the Emir of Qatar, Tamin Ben Hamad al Thani, who is President Erdogan’s last ally remaining in the region, the MIT has established contacts with Egyptian colleagues in early March this year and, as a gesture of cooperation towards Egypt, Turkish security authorities have placed thirty Egyptian “Muslim Brothers”, who had taken refugees in Turkey, under strict security control in view of their possible extradition.

Meanwhile, Turkish authorities have asked the three Egyptian TV channels “hosted” in Turkey, namely the Al Shaq, Mekamleen and Watan networks – to tone down their criticism against the Egyptian government and stop insulting Egyptian President Al Sisi. The three channels have abruptly been asked to “revise their editorial policies” if they want to Keep on enjoying Turkish hospitality.

According to Saudi press sources, many members of the Muslim Brotherhood who have taken refuge in Turkey have allegedly been placed under house arrest.

The back bench diplomacy put in place by President Erdogan through the MIT is beginning to bear fruit: the contacts between Fidan and his Egyptian counterpart, General Abbas Kamel, have led to an agreement in Libya that has favoured the appointment of Abdelhamid Dabaiba as President of the “Government of National Accord” to replace the now discredited Fayez Al Sarraj.

Also thanks to the behind-the-scenes commitment of the Turkish and Egyptian secret services, under the vigilant supervision of the Israeli Mossad, President Erdogan’s “charm offensive” is beginning to bear fruit and, after years of ill-considered, reckless and adventurist moves, it will probably bring Turkey back to the negotiating table, after relinquishing Muslim fundamentalism, thus contributing to the search for the “thaw” in international relations that the world needs to repair the huge damage caused by the pandemic.

Advisory Board Co-chair Honoris Causa Professor Giancarlo Elia Valori is an eminent Italian economist and businessman. He holds prestigious academic distinctions and national orders. Mr. Valori has lectured on international affairs and economics at the world’s leading universities such as Peking University, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Yeshiva University in New York. He currently chairs “International World Group”, he is also the honorary president of Huawei Italy, economic adviser to the Chinese giant HNA Group. In 1992 he was appointed Officier de la Légion d’Honneur de la République Francaise, with this motivation: “A man who can see across borders to understand the world” and in 2002 he received the title “Honorable” of the Académie des Sciences de l’Institut de France. “

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Middle East

Saudi Arabia and Iran cold war

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After almost seven decades, the cold war has reached the middle east, turning into a religious war of words and diplomacy. As Winston Churchill says that “diplomacy is an art of telling someone to go to hell in such a way that they ask for the direction”. So, both the regional powers are trying to pursue a policy of subduing the adversary in a diplomatic manner. The root of the conflict lies in the 1979, Iranian revolution, which saw the toppling of the pro-western monarch shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi and replaced by the so-called supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei. From a Yemini missile attack to the assassination of the supreme commander QassimSoleimani, the political, ideological and religious differences between Iran and Saudi Arabia are taking the path of confrontation. The perennial rivalry between the two dominant Shiite and Sunni power house ins an ideological and religious one rather than being geo strategic or geo political. Back to the time when Saudi Arabia supported Saddam Hussain against the united states of Americathe decline of Saddam and his authoritarian regime was made inevitable and with this, Iran and Saudi Arabia rosed as the powerful, strategic and dominant political forces in the middle east.it was from here that the quest for supremacy to be the prepotent and commanding political powercommenced. The tensions escalated or in other words almost tended to turn into scuffles when in 2016, the Iranians stormed the Saudi embassy as a demonstration of the killing of a Shia cleric. The diplomatic ties were broken and chaos and uncertainty prevailed.

This cold war also resembles the original one., because it is also fueled by a blend of ideological conviction and brute power politics but at the same time unlike the original cold war, the middle eastern cold war is multi-dimensional and is more likely to escalate .it is more volatile and thus more prone to transformation. This followed by several incidents with each trying to isolate the other in international relations. The Saudis and Iranians have been waging proxy wars for regional dominance for decades. Yemen and Syria are the two battlegrounds, fueling the Iran-Saudi tensions. Iran has been accused of providing military assistance to the rebel Houthis, which targets the Saudi territory. It is also accused of attacking the world naval ships in the strait of Hormoz, something Iran strongly denies.  This rivalry has dragged the region into chaos and ignited Shia-Sunni conflict across the middle east. The violence in the middle east due to this perennial hostility has also dire consequences for the economy of the war-torn nations. In the midst of the global pandemic, when all the economic activities are at halt, the tensions between the two arch rivals will prove hazardous and will yield catastrophic results. The blockade of the shipping and navigation in the Gulf, attacks on international ships, and the rising concerns of the western powers regarding this issue has left Iran as an isolated country with only Russia supporting her.

A direct military conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran will have dire consequences for the neighboringcountries. A direct military confrontation might not be a planned one, but it will be fueled due to the intervention of the other key partners, who seek to sought and serve their personal and national intrigues. Most importantly middle east cannot afford a conflict as it is a commercial hub for the world. The recent skirmishes in Iraq sparked fears of wider war when Iraq retaliated for killings of QassimSoleimani. If the US president had not extended an olive branch, the situation might have worsened. The OIC, which is a coalition of 57 Muslim countries has also failed in bringing measures to deescalate the growing tensions. The OIC, where the Saudi Arabia enjoys an authoritarian style of dominance has always tried to empower her own ideology while rising the catch cry of being a sacred country to all the Muslims. Taking in account, the high tensions and ideological and the quest for religious dominance, the international communities such as UN and neighboring countries should play a positiveand vital role in deescalating these tensions. Bilateral trade, communications between the two adversaries with a regional power playing the role of mediator and extending an olive branch to each other will yield better results and will prove fruitful in mitigating the conflict if not totally subverting it.

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First Aid: How Russia and the West Can Help Syrians in Idlib

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Authors: Andrey Kortunov and Julien Barnes-Dacey*

The next international showdown on Syria is quickly coming into view. After ten years of conflict, Bashar al-Assad may have won the war, but much is left to be done to win the peace. This is nowhere more so than in the province of Idlib, which is home to nearly 3 million people who now live under the control of extremist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) with external Turkish protection and humanitarian assistance from the United Nations.

The question of humanitarian access into Idlib is now emerging as a central focus of new international politicking. In so doing, this small province could be pivotal to the future of the larger stalemate that has left the United States, Europe, and Russia locked in an unwinnable status quo.

Russia has said that it plans to veto an extension of cross-border UN aid delivered from Turkey, authorised under UN Security Council resolution 2533, which is up for renewal in July, potentially depriving the population of a vital lifeline amid desperate conditions. Moscow says that all aid should be channelled from Damascus via three new government-controlled crossing points to the northern province. Western governments, to say nothing of the local population, are sceptical, given the Syrian government’s hostility towards the province’s inhabitants. For its part, the UN says that cross-lines aid cannot compensate for a closure of cross-border access.

As ever, the two dominant players—the US and Russia—are talking past each other and are focused on countering each other’s moves—to their mutual failure. It is evident that US condemnation and pressure on Russia will not deliver the necessary aid, and also evident that Russia will not get its wish for the international recognition of the legitimacy of the Syrian government by vetoing cross-border access. While these will only be diplomatic failures for the US and Russia, it is the Syrian people who will, as ever, pay the highest price.

But a mutually beneficial solution to Idlib is still possible. Russia and the US, backed by European states, should agree to a new formula whereby Moscow greenlights a final one-year extension of cross-border aid in exchange for a Western agreement to increase aid flows via Damascus, including through Russia’s proposed cross-lines channels into Idlib. This would meet the interests of both sides, allowing immediate humanitarian needs to be met on the ground as desired by the West, while also paving the way for a transition towards the Damascus-centred international aid operation sought by Moscow.

This imperfect but practical compromise would mean more than a positive change in the humanitarian situation in Idlib. It would demonstrate the ability of Russian and Western actors to work together to reach specific agreements in Syria even if their respective approaches to the wider conflict differ significantly. This could serve to reactivate the UN Security Council mechanism, which has been paralysed and absent from the Syrian track for too long.

To be sure the Syrian government will also need to be incentivised to comply. Western governments will need to be willing to increase humanitarian and early recovery support to other parts of government-controlled Syria even as they channel aid to Idlib. With the country now experiencing a dramatic economic implosion, this could serve as a welcome reprieve to Damascus. It would also meet Western interests in not seeing a full state collapse and worsening humanitarian tragedy.

The underlying condition for this increased aid will need to be transparency and access to ensure that assistance is actually delivered to those in need. The West and Russia will need to work on implementing a viable monitoring mechanism for aid flows channelled via Damascus. This will give Moscow an opportunity to push the Syrian regime harder on matters of corruption and mismanagement.

For its part, the West will need to work with Moscow to exercise pressure on Ankara to use its military presence in Idlib to more comprehensively confront radical Islamists and ensure that aid flows do not empower HTS. A ‘deradicalisation’ of Idlib will need to take the form of a detailed roadmap, including that HTS comply with specific behaviour related to humanitarian deliveries.

Ultimately this proposal will not be wholly satisfactory to either Moscow or the West. The West will not like that it is only a one-year extension and will not like the shift towards Damascus. Russia will not like that it is an extension at all. But for all sides the benefits should outweigh the downsides.

Russia will know that Western actors will respond to failure by unilaterally channelling non-UN legitimised aid into the country via Turkey. Russia will lose the opportunity to slowly move Idlib back into Damascus’s orbit and the country’s de facto partition will be entrenched. This outcome is also likely to lead to increased instability as aid flows decrease, with subsequent tensions between Moscow’s allies, Damascus and Ankara.

The West will need to acknowledge that this approach offers the best way of delivering ongoing aid into Idlib and securing greater transparency on wider support across Syria. The alternative—bilateral cross-border support—will not sufficiently meet needs on the ground, will place even greater responsibility on Turkey, and will increase the prospect of Western confrontation with Russia and the Syrian regime.

Importantly, this proposal could also create space for wider political talks on Idlib’s fate. It could lead to a renewed track between Russia, the US, Turkey and Europeans to address the province’s fate in a way that accounts for Syria’s territorial integrity and state sovereignty on the one hand and the needs and security of the local population on the other hand. After ten years of devastating conflict, a humanitarian compromise in Idlib will not represent a huge victory. But a limited agreement could still go a long way to positively changing the momentum in Syria and opening up a pathway for much-needed international cooperation.

* Julien Barnes-Dacey, Middle East and North Africa Programme Director, European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)

From our partner RIAC

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Iran’s Impunity Will Grow if Evidence of Past Crimes is Fully Destroyed

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No reasonable person would deny the importance of preventing a nuclear-armed Iran. But that issue must not be allowed to continue overshadowing Iran’s responsibility for terrorism and systematic human rights violations. These matters represent a much more imminent threat to human life, as well as longstanding denials of justice for those who have suffered from the Iranian regime’s actions in the past.

The Iranian people have risen multiple times in recent years to call for democratic change. In 2017, major uprisings broke out against the regime’s disastrous policies. Although the ruling clerics suppressed those protests, public unrest soon resumed in November 2019. That uprising was even broader in scope and intensity. The regime responded by opening fire on crowds, murdering at least 1,500. Amnesty International has reported on the torture that is still being meted out to participants in the uprising.

Meanwhile, the United Nations and human rights organizations have continued to repeat longstanding calls for increased attention to some of the worst crimes perpetrated by the regime in previous years.

Last year, Amnesty International praised a “momentous breakthrough” when seven UN human rights experts demanded an end to the ongoing cover-up of a massacre of political prisoners in the summer of 1988.

The killings were ordered by the regime’s previous supreme leader Khomeini, who declared that opponents of the theocracy were “enemies of God” and thus subject to summary executions. In response, prisons throughout Iran convened “death commissions” that were tasked with interrogating political prisoners over their views. Those who rejected the regime’s fundamentalist interpretation of Islam were hanged, often in groups, and their bodies were dumped mostly in mass graves, the locations of which were held secret.

In the end, at least 30,000 political prisoners were massacred. The regime has been trying hard to erase the record of its crimes, including the mass graves. Its cover-up has unfortunately been enabled to some degree by the persistent lack of a coordinated international response to the situation – a failure that was acknowledged in the UN experts’ letter.

The letter noted that although the systematic executions had been referenced in a 1988 UN resolution on Iran’s human rights record, none of the relevant entities within that international body followed up on the case, and the massacre went unpunished and underreported.

For nearly three decades, the regime enforced silence regarding any public discussion of the killings, before this was challenged in 2016 by the leak of an audio recording that featured contemporary officials discussing the 1988 massacre. Regime officials, like then-Minister of Justice Mostafa Pourmohammadi, told state media that they were proud of committing the killings.

Today, the main victims of that massacre, the principal opposition Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), are still targets of terrorist plots on Western soil, instigated by the Iranian regime. The most significant of these in recent years was the plot to bomb a gathering organized near Paris in 2018 by the MEK’s parent coalition, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI). The Free Iran rally was attended by tens of thousands of Iranian expatriates from throughout the world, as well as hundreds of political dignitaries, and if the attack had not been prevented by law enforcement, it would have no doubt been among the worst terrorist attacks in recent European history.

The mastermind of that attack was a high-ranking Iranian diplomat named Assadollah Assadi. He was convicted in a Belgian court alongside three co-conspirators in February. But serious critics of the Iranian regime have insisted that accountability must not stop here.

If Tehran believes it has gotten away with the 1988 massacre, one of the worst crimes against humanity from the late 20th century, it can also get away with threatening the West and killing protesters by the hundreds. The ongoing destruction of mass graves demonstrates the regime’s understanding that it has not truly gotten away with the massacre as long as evidence remains to be exposed.

The evidence of mass graves has been tentatively identified in at least 36 different cities, but a number of those sites have since been covered by pavement and large structures. There are also signs that this development has accelerated in recent years as awareness of the massacre has gradually expanded. Unfortunately, the destruction currently threatens to outpace the campaign for accountability, and it is up to the United Nations and its leading member states to accelerate that campaign and halt the regime’s destruction of evidence.

If this does not happen and the 1988 massacre is consigned to history before anyone has been brought to justice, it will be difficult to compel Tehran into taking its critics seriously about anything, be it more recent human rights violations, ongoing terrorist threats, or even the nuclear program that authorities have been advancing in spite of the Western conciliation that underlay 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

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