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Egypt’s Return to Authoritarianism

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The existing political scenario of Egypt shows how the government has established absolute authority over every affair in the state, curbing any independent work. The government has successfully centralized the power imposing new constitutional reforms that limit any political opposition and increased the role of the military in domestic affairs. The armed forces are used to terrorize the citizens into subjugation, strict control over media, censorship of news, arresting activists, journalists, lawyers over falsified cases, passing new laws making working of NGOs impossible and legalizing massive state violence in the nation by securitization the ‘terrorist’ narrative characterizes the authoritarian rule in Egypt.

The recent power grab by Abdel Fattah el-Sisi is authoritarian in nature yet on paper is a semi-presidential system as he previously served as a general in the army and led a military coup in 2012 against President Mohammad Morsi. He has recently made constitutional amendments that have extended his term until 2030. In order to maintain power and control, he has tightened his grip over branches of power in several ways: creating an office of vice president, changed the political structure of the parliament by creating an Upper House (Senate) in which one-third of members will be directly appointed by the president, overseeing of judicial selections and increased the role of the military in state affairs.

Along with the constitutional changes, the military role has expanded in the political and domestic sphere. Recently, a military force has started terrorizing the citizens in North Sinai as the government conflicts with the extremist groups of ISIS in Sinai province. The armed forces have conducted several human rights violations such as demolishing houses, arresting, torturing, and executing the residents. In response, the ISIS militants also committed gross abuses including kidnapping, torturing, and killings of residents and armed forces. It is observed that the crackdown is focused and directed towards the citizens of the state to spread terror from both sides.

Human rights watch declared the actions of the Egyptian army in Sinai province as unlawful air and ground attacks that targeted innocent civilians. Human rights watch reported at least 20 judicial killings of residents by the government. Moreover, the armed forces have forcibly abducted children and tried them in military courts. The Egyptians have yet to release any reports on the causalities and death of the citizens in the province. HRW has declared that armed forces have arrested 12,000 citizens and have detained them in concentration camps where they are interrogated. Around 100,000 civilians were forced to leave their homes as well.

To legalize the brutal crackdown in Sinai Province, the government declared a nationwide state of emergency which gives the armed forces unchecked power. They disregard the law and conduct enforced disappearance, systematic torture, and so on. Since the actions of armed forces are unchecked, they exercise their power unjustly and have thrown children in jail and awarded them with the death penalty through military courts. A 4-year-old was awarded the death penalty as he was accused of being a part of riots in 2014. Later, an army spokesman acknowledged some child detentions and justified them as a part of the counterterrorism operations conducted by the army.

These crackdowns have been conducted under the ‘disinformation campaign’ propagated by President Sisi. Regarding the spike in the death penalties in Egypt, European leaders’ criticized the Egyptian at the Arab-EU summit in Sharm el-Sheikh to which he replied that executing detainees is part of “our humanity”, which is different from “your [European] humanity”. As a part of his disinformation campaign, Sisi is trying to propagate human rights value as something ‘Western’ and ‘foreign’ to Egypt. Even though many Egyptian lawyers, such as Nasser Amin were advocating against the death penalties.

To further control the human rights situation in the country, he has passed a new law that has imposed restrictions on the workings of NGOs that have made it nearly impossible for these organizations to work in the country. These Draconian restrictions suppress the independently working groups and forbid the conduction of any opinion polls and the publication of results without the government approval and also ban any political work that might undermine national security. Consequently, NGOs are left crippled and 2,000 charity groups shunt down by the government and the rest pulling out. The most famous case of 2011, the ‘foreign funding case’ was filed against 31 Egyptian human rights activists. Even though the court acquitted them, the government didn’t remove the travel ban or unfreeze their assets. 

Likewise, the security forces of the state are guilty of conducting enforced disappearances of human rights activists and subjecting them to extreme torture and degradation practices. According to a report published by Amnesty International, activists Alaa Abdal Fattah and Israa Abdal Fattah were wrongly accused and abducted during the biggest crackdown on journalists, lawyers, and activists. Abdal Fattah was transferred to Tora extreme security prison and was stripped and beaten by the guards regularly and was locked in a room with hardly any air circulation. He was abused verbally as well and was forbidden to access fresh drinking water or food for days.

Similarly, President Al-Sisi has restricted any anti-government protests and has ordered the security forces to arrest and detain more than 4,400 people to suppress any voice. Prominent figures such as political science professor Hazem Hosni, a journalist and politician Khaled Dawood, and human rights lawyer Mohamed al-Baker was arrested in this massive crackdown. Furthermore, 160 activists were picked up for criticizing the current government. The homes of these activists were searched as they were accused of funding ‘terrorist groups’. A notable case ‘Hope Coalition’ made the headlines as it involved activists such as Ziad al-Elaimy and Hossam Mo’nis who were forming a political party to contest in the 2020 elections. They were illegally detained, banned from traveling abroad and all their assets were sealed.

The government has suppressed freedom of expression along with freedom of speech. In 2018, Anti-Cyber And Information Technology Crimes Law was passed to control and monitor media and the internet. Under the law, insulting or criticizing the government is forbidden. Any news channel or website that did not follow the laws would be subjected to penalties without judicial oversight and has strictly punished bloggers, journalists, and even social media users for criticizing the government. They were charged with spreading ‘false news’ and Egypt was termed as the top 3 worst jailers of journalists. Moreover, the government has censored newspaper, websites, and TV shows as well and blocked 600 newspapers.

Egypt does not support women’s rights and has avoided passing legislation on increasing cases of domestic violence in the country. UN Women reported that almost one-third of all Egyptian women face physical or sexual violence at the hands of intimate partners. Moreover, many women are killed in name of honor false allegations of being in a relationship with men outside marriage. The criminal practice of female genital mutilation is still practiced in Egypt, and 87% of women and girls have undergone FGM in Egypt. A survey conducted showed that 98% of foreign women and 83% of native women have been sexually harassed, and two-thirds of men admit that they have harassed women..

This demonstrates that Egypt only exists as a semi-presidential system on paper and is authoritarian in nature. The current government has exercised strict control and monopoly over legislation, judicial proceedings, and state enforcement agencies. The President tackled international criticism by creating a disinformation campaign that human rights are western and foreign ideas, not Egyptian values.

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Middle East

The Absence of Riyadh in the Turbulent Afghanistan

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As the situation in Afghanistan becoming increasingly turbulent, the NATO allies led by the United States are fully focused on military withdrawal. As this has to be done within tight deadline, there have been some disagreements between the United States and the European Union. Josep Borrell, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security, publicly accused the U.S. military in Afghanistan, which was responsible for the internal security of Kabul Airport, of deliberately obstructing the EU evacuation operations.

China and Russia on the other hand, are more cautious in expressing their positions while actively involving in the Afghanistan issue. This is especially true for Russia, which after both the Taliban and the anti-Taliban National Resistance Front of Afghanistan (NRF) led by Ahmad Massoud have pleaded Russia for mediation, Moscow has now become a major player in the issue.

Compared with these major powers, Saudi Arabia, another regional power in the Middle East, appears to be quite low-key. So far, only the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia has issued a diplomatic statement on the day after the Taliban settled in Kabul, stating that it hopes the Taliban can maintain the security, stability and prosperity of Afghanistan. Considering the role that Saudi Arabia has played in Afghanistan, such near silent treatment is quite intriguing.

As the Taliban were originally anti-Soviet Sunni Jihadists, they were deeply influenced by Wahhabism, and were naturally leaning towards Riyadh. During the period when the Taliban took over Afghanistan for the first time, Saudi Arabia became one of the few countries in the international community that publicly recognized the legitimacy of the Taliban regime.

Although the Taliban quickly lost its power under the impact of the anti-terror wars initiated by the George W. Bush administration, and the Saudis were pressured by Washington to criticize the Taliban on the surface, yet in reality they continuously provided financial aid to the Taliban and the Al-Qaeda organization which was in symbiotic relations with the Taliban.

However, after 2010, with the Syrian civil war and the rise of the Islamic State, the Riyadh authorities had decreased their funding for their “partners” in Afghanistan due to the increase in financial aid targets.

In June 2017, after Mohammed bin Salman became the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia and took power, Saudi Arabia’s overall foreign policy began to undergo major changes. It gradually abandoned the policy of exporting its religious ideology and switched to “religious diplomacy” that focuses on economic, trade and industrial cooperation with main economies. Under such approach, Saudi Arabia’s Afghanistan policy will inevitably undergo major adjustments.

With the reformation initiated by the Crown Prince, Saudi Arabia has drastically reduced its financial aid to the Taliban. In addition, Riyadh also further ordered the Taliban to minimize armed hostilities and put its main energy on the path of “peaceful nation-building”. This sudden reversal of the stance of Saudi Arabia means that Riyadh has greatly weakened the voices of the Taliban in the global scenes.

In recent years, the Taliban have disassociated with Saudi Arabia in rounds of Afghanistan peace talks. After Kabul was taken over by the Taliban on August 19, a senior Taliban official clearly stated that the Taliban does not accept Wahhabism, and Afghanistan has no place for Wahhabism. Although this statement means that Al-Qaeda’s religious claims will no longer be supported by the Taliban, it also indicates that the Taliban has reached the tipping point of breaking up with Riyadh.

Under such circumstance, for the Riyadh authorities under Mohammed bin Salman, the most appropriate action is probably wait-and-see as Afghanistan changes again.

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Middle East

Gulf security: It’s not all bad news

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Gulf states are in a pickle.

They fear that the emerging parameters of a reconfigured US commitment to security in the Middle East threaten to upend a more-than-a-century-old pillar of regional security and leave them with no good alternatives.

The shaky pillar is the Gulf monarchies’ reliance on a powerful external ally that, in the words of Middle East scholar Roby C. Barrett, “shares the strategic, if not dynastic, interests of the Arab States.” The ally was Britain and France in the first half of the 20th century and the United States since then.

Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al-Nahyan, the revered founder of the United Arab Emirates, implicitly recognised Gulf states’ need for external support when he noted in a 2001 contribution to a book that the six monarchies that form the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) “only support the GCC when it suited them.”

Going forward question marks about the reliability of the United States may be unsettling but the emerging contours of what a future US approach could look like they are not all bad news from the perspective of the region’s autocratic regimes.

The contours coupled with the uncertainty, the Gulf states’ unwillingness to integrate their defence strategies, a realisation that neither China nor Russia would step into the United States’ shoes, and a need to attract foreign investment to diversify their energy-dependent economies, is driving efforts to dial down regional tensions and strengthen regional alliances.

Israeli foreign minister Yair Lapid and Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan, his UAE counterpart, are headed to Washington this week for a tripartite meeting with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken. The three officials intend “to discuss accomplishments” since last year’s establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries “and other important issues,” Mr Blinken tweeted.

The Israeli foreign ministry suggested those other issues include “further opportunities to promote peace in the Middle East” as well as regional stability and security, in a guarded reference to Iran.

From the Gulf’s perspective, the good news is also that the Biden administration’s focus on China may mean that it is reconfiguring its military presence in the Middle East with the moving of some assets from the Gulf to Jordan and the withdrawal from the region of others, but is not about to pull out lock, stock and barrel.

Beyond having an interest in ensuring the free flow of trade and energy, the US’s strategic interest in a counterterrorism presence in the Gulf has increased following the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. The US now relies on an ’over the horizon’ approach for which the Middle East remains crucial.

Moreover, domestic US politics mitigate towards a continued, if perhaps reduced, military presence even if Americans are tired of foreign military adventures, despite the emergence of a Biden doctrine that de-emphasises military engagement. Moreover, the Washington foreign policy elite’s focus is now on Asia rather than the Middle East.

Various powerful lobbies and interest groups, including Jews, Israelis, Gulf states, Evangelists, and the oil and defence industries retain a stake in a continued US presence in the region. Their voices are likely to resonate louder in the run-up to crucial mid-term Congressional elections in 2022. A recent Pew Research survey concluded that the number of white Evangelicals had increased from 25 per cent of the US population in 2016 to 29 per cent in 2020.

Similarly, like Afghanistan, the fading hope for a revival of the 2015 international agreement to curb Iran’s nuclear programme, from which former President Donald J. Trump withdrew in 2018, and the risk of a major military conflagration makes a full-fledged US military withdrawal unlikely any time soon. It also increases the incentive to continue major arms sales to Gulf countries.

That’s further good news for Gulf regimes against the backdrop of an emerging US arms sales policy that the Biden administration would like to project as emphasising respect for human rights and rule of law. However, that de facto approach is unlikely to affect big-ticket prestige items like the F-35 fighter jets promised to the UAE.

Instead, the policy will probably apply to smaller weapons such as assault rifles and surveillance equipment, that police or paramilitary forces could use against protesters. Those are not the technological edge items where the United States has a definitive competitive advantage.

The big-ticket items with proper maintenance and training would allow Gulf states to support US regional operations as the UAE and Qatar did in 2011 in Libya, and, the UAE in Somalia and Afghanistan as part of peacekeeping missions.

In other words, the Gulf states can relax. The Biden administration is not embracing what some arms trade experts define as the meaning of ending endless wars such as Afghanistan.

“Ending endless war means more than troop withdrawal. It also means ending the militarized approach to foreign policy — including the transfer of deadly weapons around the world — that has undermined human rights and that few Americans believe makes the country any safer,” the experts said in a statement in April.

There is little indication that the views expressed in the statement that stroke with thinking in the progressive wing of Mr. Biden’s Democratic Party is taking root in the policymaking corridors of Washington. As long as that doesn’t happen, Gulf states have less to worry about.

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Reducing Middle East tensions potentially lessens sectarianism and opens doors for women

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Two separate developments involving improved relations between Sunni and Shiite Muslims and women’s sporting rights demonstrate major shifts in how rivalry for leadership of the Muslim world and competition to define Islam in the 21st century is playing out in a world in which Middle Eastern states can no longer depend on the United States coming to their defence.

The developments fit into a regional effort by conservative, status quo states, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt; and proponents of different forms of political Islam, Iran, Turkey, and Qatar; to manage rather than resolve their differences in a bid to ensure that they do not spin out of control. The efforts have had the greatest success with the lifting in January of a 3.5-year-long Saudi-UAE-Egyptian-led diplomatic and economic boycott of Qatar.

The reconciliation moves also signal the pressure on Middle Eastern players in what amounts to a battle for the soul of Islam to change perceptions of the region as being wracked by civil wars, sectarian tensions, extremism, jihadism, and autocracy. Altering that perception is key to the successful implementation of plans to diversify oil and gas export dependent economies in the Gulf, develop resource-poor countries in the region, tackle an economic crisis in Turkey, and enable Iran to cope with crippling US sanctions.

Finally, these developments are also the harbinger of the next phase in the competition for religious soft power and leadership of the Muslim world. In a break with the past decade, lofty declarations extolling Islam’s embrace of tolerance, pluralism and respect for others’ rights that are not followed up by deeds no longer cut ice. Similarly, proponents of socially conservative expressions of political Islam need to be seen as adopting degrees of moderation that so far have been the preserve of their rivals who prefer the geopolitical status quo ante.

That next phase of the battle is being shaped not only by doubts among US allies in the Middle East about the reliability of the United States as a security guarantor, reinforced by America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan. It is also being informed by a realisation that neither China nor Russia can (or will) attempt to replace the US defence umbrella in the Gulf.

The battles’ shifting playing field is further being determined by setbacks suffered by political Islam starting with the 2013 military coup that toppled Mohammed Morsi, a Muslim Brother and Egypt’s first and only democratically elected president and brutally decimated the Muslim Brotherhood. More recently, political Islamists suffered a stunning electoral defeat in Morocco and witnessed the autocratic takeover of power in Tunisia by President Kais Saied.

A just published survey of Tunisian public opinion showed 45 percent of those polled blaming Rachid Ghannouchi, the leader of the Islamist Ennahada party, for the country’s crisis and 66 percent saying they had no confidence in the party.

The Middle East’s rivalries and shifting sands lend added significance to a planned visit in the coming weeks to Najaf, an Iraqi citadel of Shiite Muslim learning and home of 91-year-old Shiite religious authority, Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, by Ahmed El-Tayeb, the grand imam of Al-Azhar, Sunni Islam’s foremost historic educational institution.

The visit takes place against the backdrop of Iraqi-mediated talks between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the two major centres of Islam’s two main strands, that are aimed at dialling down tensions between them that reverberate throughout the Muslim world. The talks are likely to help the two regional powers manage rather than resolve their differences.

The rivalry was long marked by Saudi-inspired, religiously-cloaked anti-Shiite rhetoric and violence in a limited number of cases and Iranian concerns about the country’s Sunni minority and its opting for a strategy centred on Shiite Muslim proxies in third countries and support for the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

Implicit in Saudi and Iranian sectarianism was the perception of Shiite minorities in Saudi Arabia and other Sunni majority countries, and Sunnis in Iran and Iraq after the 2003 toppling of Saddam Hussein, as fifth wheels of the other.

Imam El-Tayeb’s visit, a signal of improvement in long-strained Egyptian-Iraqi relations, as well as a possible later meeting between the Sunni cleric, a Shiite cleric other than Ayatollah Al-Sistani who is too old and fragile to travel, and Pope Francis, are intended to put sectarianism on the backburner. Ayatollah Al-Sistani met with the pope during his visit to Iraq in March.

The visit takes on added significance in the wake of this week’s suicide bombing of a Hazara Shiite mosque in the northern Afghan city of Kunduz that killed at least 50 people and wounded 100 others. The South Asian affiliate of the Islamic State, Islamic State-Khorasan, claimed responsibility for the attack, the worst since the Taliban came to power in August. It was likely designed to fuel tension between the Sunni Muslim group and the Hazara who account for 20 percent of the Afghan population.

Imam El-Tayeb’s travel to Najaf is likely to be followed by a visit by Mohamed al-Issa, secretary-general of the Saudi-dominated Muslim World League. The League was long a prime vehicle for the propagation of anti-Shiite Saudi ultra-conservatism. Since coming to office, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has recast the League as a tool to project his vaguely defined notion of a state-controlled ‘moderate’ Islam that is tolerant and pluralistic.

In a similar vein, hard-line Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi took many by surprise by allowing women into Tehran’s Azadi Stadium to attend this month’s World Cup qualifier between Iran and South Korea. Iran is the only country to ban women from attending men’s sporting events. It was unclear whether the move was a one-off measure or signalled a loosening or lifting of the ban.

Mr Raisi was believed to see it as a way to rally domestic support and improve the Islamic republic’s image as much in China and Russia as in the West. No doubt, Mr. Raisi will have noted that China and Russia have joined the United States, Europe, and others in pressuring the Taliban in Afghanistan to recognize women’s rights.

To be sure, women in Iran enjoy education rights and populate universities. They can occupy senior positions in business and government even if Iran remains a patriarchal society. However, the ban on women in stadia, coupled with the chador, the head to foot covering of women, has come to dominate the perception of Iran’s gender policies.

Allowing women to attend the World Cup qualifier suggests a degree of flexibility on Mr. Raisi’s part. During his presidential campaign Mr. Raisi argued that granting women access to stadiums would not solve their problems.

It also demonstrates that the government, with hardliners in control of all branches, can shave off sharp edges of its Islamic rule far easier than reformists like Mr. Raisi’s predecessor, Hassan Rouhani, were able to do.

The question is whether that is Mr. Raisi’s intention. Mr. Raisi may be testing the waters with this month’ soccer match, only time will tell.

It may be too big a leap in the immediate future but, like Imam El-Tayeb’s visit to Najaf, it indicates that the dialling down of regional tensions puts a greater premium on soft power which in turn builds up pressure for less harsh expressions of religion.

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