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The Chessboard for the Great Power Competition in the Indo Pacific

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As structural change is happening with China’s ascending growth and Russia’s re-emergence, the scholarly community is worried about the result of such changes. US pre-eminence is now being increasingly challenged in the wider geopolitical structure, as countries like China, Russia and India are busy acquiring advanced military weapons, thus thickening their military might. This has led to power diffusion across the globe. Subsequently, as the relative power of China vis-à-vis the US is expanding, security analysts are predicting an intense security competition between the rising power and the falling giant. People are concerned about what steps the US should take to either contain or accommodate China? Since belligerency is the characteristic of Chinese behavior, US must sort to contain China by maintaining existing power gaps and technological advantages.

But, by and large, US failed to thwart the Chinese rise. The recent Indo-Pacific Deterrence Initiative highlights the worry caused by Chinese growth and its impact on the overall balance of power within the Western Pacific. The usage of words like “regaining” US advantages in the region reflects a broader opinion that the US has lost its prior superiority, and must focus on “balancing” China’s gains. This is broadly a result of recent changes in US foreign policy where decision-makers think that mere acquiring military “mass” won’t do any good unless some significant edge is not achieved in the “intelligence” domain. The thinking points to the fact that since intelligence is a requirement to achieve target destruction through means of weapons, budgetary investments must prioritize the acquisition of information technology alongside advanced weapons.

Why just gaining military mass is not enough?

Realistically speaking, if the military balance between the two powers is calculated then it seems that the US is much powerful than the Chinese. Since this reckoning is mostly based on absolute numbers of weapons a country possesses, a mere number-to-number analysis might mislead us. A more intelligent approach would be to observe how these weapons (acquired by both countries) behave in supposed battlefield operations. For instance, if we assume the South China Sea (SCS) to be the next battlefield, then it’s imperative for the US to project power and neutralize any Chinese threat. Considering this context, I believe this may not be that easy for Americans, given the Chinese A2/AD capabilities. Fielding these weapons may inflict heavy damage on US assets at a considerably lower cost. For example, a DF-21 or DF-26 ASBM of China could threaten the whole Carrier Strike Group or theoretically might aspire to sink an aircraft carrier, hence making it “prohibitively” costly for Americans to engage with the Chinese.

In fact, as depicted by Andrew Krepinevich, a foremost scholar on A2/AD capabilities, China could utilize such capabilities to prevent US forces from entering contested waters and may also hinder freedom of actions in the grey zones. This might lead to the creation of “bastions”, if not “sphere of influence”, leading to the demarcation of areas into zones and probably resulting in the “balkanization” of Indo Pacific oceans. Such assessment if actualizes in the future, could then threaten US primacy in the world at a significant low cost.

Conceptually, Anti Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities threaten to destroy access points in the region so as to make US operations quite costly and even technologically unfeasible. For instance, US airbases in Gaum or Japan, if destroyed, would make US operations strategically infeasible hence making it easier for China to flex its muscles against the regional actors. If airbases are destroyed, then long-range bombers are required to complete the mission. Tactically, no. of sorties delivered by these bombers will be significantly lower if the mission is launched from the US mainland. Adding to this, the burden of air refueling will make it difficult for the US to achieve operational objectives at a sustainable cost. Moreover, the recent US acquisition of small ranger fighters including F/A 18 or F-35’s will become redundant, if not useless, in the above combat scenario. Thus, the US must plan its acquisition program in a way to offset any contingency that may arise, as the security competition with China is exacerbating.

Similarly, area-denial capabilities are those, which may not prevent entry into the combat theatre, but would severely challenge the US potential for “freedom of actions” in these contested zones. Loosely speaking these capabilities are submarines, mine warfare, ballistic and cruise missiles, G-RAMM.

The merits of such capabilities are not only restricted to cheap weapons causing damage to expensive weaponry, but also to other aspects, which might be even more critical. US aspiration to get an information edge over its non-peer competitors might go down the drain, as these capabilities, in addition to weapons damage, could also inflict heavy destruction to the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)enterprise, leading to the suppression of intelligence, which the US considers, a key element for nabbing the adversary.

ISR is the system that makes it easier to sense, detect, and precisely destroy the targets within a limited theatre of operations. In a naval unit, the Carrier Strike Groups (CSG) along with their weapon delivery capacity simultaneously engage in ISR functioning, churning out abundant data from the combat theatre thereby increasing the battlefield awareness.

Now, any leakages within the missile defenses of the CSG would mean heavy destruction to the platform whereby even the ISR technology is compromised. Apparently, US attempt to gain an information advantage over its competitors at the expense of military “thickness” may suffer, unless significant investments are not done in missile defense systems to preserve platforms, thus ensuring free flow of information.

In short, the US focus on prioritizing intelligence technology over gathering military weapons is welcoming. Although care has to be taken to invest significantly in those technologies which will provide the secure flow of data and intelligence without any disruption. Defense systems have to be strengthened if the information edge has to be preserved. Until then, security anxiety will persist.

Will the Dragon able to withstand the Eagle’s Strike or Power Projection?

Although, pictorial imagination might reckon the Eagle victorious in real life, but in world politics, this may not be true. In real life, eagles are known to be surreptitious which kills with a pinpoint accuracy rendering the prey helpless in most conditions. Unfortunately, great power politics is not a biological kingdom, where predator always dominates the prey. Superiority changes based on the performance of the countries and today’s prey can be tomorrow’s predator.

Comparatively, the US is superior to every nation in the sense that it had the capability to project and demonstrate its power over long distances. In my opinion, the most important service which could provide such superiority is the US Navy and US Marine corps. As allied overseas bases are becoming increasingly vulnerable to China’s attack, over-reliance on them to access the combat theatre will be much riskier. This vulnerability of fixed basing is ultimately solved by sea basing option which the navy provides through the means of the aircraft carrier and its combatants. Operationally, the naval unit overcomes the anti-access problems, simply because the access points are not fixed, but mobile, and targeting a fleeting giant would be much bigger a challenge than destroying a fixed base. Though the vulnerabilities of the US Air Force and US Army are mitigated by Naval command, without joint operations and coordinated efforts gaining an early edge over Beijing may not be possible.

The most probable combat theatre in my opinion would be the SCS, besides Taiwan Strait and the East China Sea. Given strategic advantages in the SCS, in lieu of sovereignty disputes over the Spratly and Paracel islands with added complexity due to the overlapping of maritime entitlements , such an ambiguous environment presents enough opportunities for China to hone its “salami-slicing” tactics whereby China is making small strides to take control over the SCS without provoking an adversarial response from the contestants. Since China never officially clarified the meaning of the 9dashline, its actions in the SCS are interpreted by neighboring countries as coercive. Moreover, Chinese actions also feed its image as a big-time bully in the region, intended to make SCS its own “lake”.

China’s resurgence in SCS began after 2013 when it started the land reclamation program. And as of 2020, Beijing constructed more than 3200 acres of land around these tiny islets. Such magnitude of reclamation stands quite meagre to other’s construction which stands at 200 acres. Moreover, the 13 largest islands in Spratly are only half the size of Central Park in Manhattan New York, according to the geological survey conducted in 2000. Thus, extending artificial space beyond the natural geography point to the fact that such construction cannot be intended to assert sovereignty similar to other contestants. Instead, quite interestingly, China has built airstrips, installed radars, fielded artillery, and mobile platforms in these man-made islands. In the future, the area might become an overseas strategic base to launch attacks on adversaries, similar to what Japan did in WWII. Such actions clearly show Beijing’s interest to challenge the status quo and Eagle’s pre-eminence in the global commons.

US achieves its power projection through the means of Aircraft Carrier and those escorting the giant including destroyers, surface combatants, replenishment ship together with helicopters, UAV’s, submarines scattered over a distance. Surveillance and Reconnaissance functions are done by most of the platforms, as diversification prevents over-reliance on the single platform. In a combat theatre, locating the target is the first task, which in this case can be achieved by radars either mounted on a destroyer, or those loitering in the space. Target’s precise coordinates are then fed into the weapons system, which ultimately delivers the munitions to destroy the adversary. Moving objects are difficult to track, but weapon system fitted with laser-guided or precision strike munition could easily inflict heavy damage with pinpoint accuracy, largely because of seekers, fitted into the warhead which provides real time location of the target.

As military analysts have observed, China’s fielding of such weapons mainly anti-aircraft, anti-ship missiles, mortars from mobile launchers, artillery, mines could prevent the US force projection. Installing these on the SCS islands will extend the area over which US forces can be denied freedom of action. According to Robert Works, an aircraft carrier must be within 25-100 miles of the adversary’s coastline to deliver a powerful punch. Although it remains unrealistic to achieve such a blow unless counter-measures to offset the effects of AD capabilities are not taken. Such closeness to the enemy’s shore would mean additional armored and munitions directed towards the US. China’s short-range cruise missiles could be used to engage the missile defense system of the allied powers like PAC 3. Moreover, such deflection of missile defense systems towards countering cheap missiles might be used to launch more lethal weapons like ballistic missiles, so as to exploit any leakages and penetrate to cause heavy damage to an aircraft carrier. More importantly, near to the enemy coastline, US vessels could be successfully interrupted through mine warfare capabilities, given the poor track record of US platforms to counter such weapons.

Given China’s policy of active defense, which purports to achieve a defensive objective with an offensive posture. In simple words, China can initiate war with any country solely with the purpose to deter them. In light of this, China could in the future rely on offensive cyber warfare and information warfare mechanisms. The goal would be to cripple the “network-centric architecture” on which the whole US operations depend. Loosely speaking, network-centric architecture means the integration of the ISR system with the common center on the ground so as to perform C3 functions (Command, Control, and Communication). In a cyber offense, China could get considerable leverage if this “central nervous system” is hacked. In operational terms, the offense could distort the information received by the commanders on the ground. GPS coordinates for precision strikes can be manipulated. The goal in this warfare would be to either kill data or tweak it in a way to create false intelligence among the commanders.

By analyzing this crisis situation, it remains imperative to counter China’s A2/AD capabilities. Moreover, intelligence that is provided by platforms has to be protected. Further, concrete defensive steps have to be taken to mitigate any possibility of cyber offense from China.

Conclusion

US must focus on acquiring weapons system and must integrate these with advanced ISR system, so as to “see first and attack first”. Any trade-off between the two would mean immense ripple effects. Prioritizing defense acquisition will mean less investment directed towards building the ISR capabilities while focusing solely on ISR capabilities would mean less military weight to deter the Chinese. More importantly, the integration between the two systems would work effectively counter China’s A2/AD capabilities, hence keeping the world power balance intact.

Master’s student in Politics and International Studies at School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Areas of interest includes the Realist theories, Great Power Competition(USA-China), Politics in Southeast Asia, Emerging technologies and its impact on military strategy. Twitter @rahuljaybhay1

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Why shouldn’t Israel Undermine Iran’s Conventional Deterrence

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When Naftali Bennett took over as the prime minister of Israel, it was expected that he would take a different approach compared to Netanyahu. This could be a probable expectation, save for the issue of Iran, since Iran is considered a consistent strategic and existential threat in the eyes of Israeli political and military officials same way that Israel has always been considered an enemy in the strategic culture of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Therefore, with the resumption of the Iran nuclear talks in Vienna, Israel has intensified its campaign for an imminent military strike on Iran. On the other hand, Iran has tried to create a balance of missile threat against Israel based on valid deterrence during the past years.

However, the level and the nature of performance and deterrence of these two influential actors of the Middle East are fundamentally different. While Iran has defined its deterrence based on hybrid missile deterrence concepts—including direct and extended deterrence—, Israel’s deterrence is based on preemptive warfare, a.k.a. “immediate deterrence,” irrespective of its nuclear capabilities, policies of “strategic ambiguity” and “defensible borders strategy.”

From a direct deterrence perspective (i.e., the strength of a large missile fire from within Iranian territory) and given the extended and asymmetric dimensions (i.e., strengthening missile capabilities of the axis of resistance), the Islamic Republic of Iran believes that Israel will gradually become weaker and more fragile defensively, considering the importance of objective components in the area of ​​deterrence—such as geographical depth and population, and this will derive Israeli leaders to consider their fragile security and survival before any attempt to take on a direct military confrontation with Iran. For instance, when the tensions over Iran’s nuclear program escalated between 2010 and 2013 during the Obama administration, none of Iran’s nuclear facilities was attacked, despite Israel’s repeated expression of its willingness to do so. Former defense minister Ehud Barak justified this inaction with the pretext of Barack Obama’s opposition and lack of support.  In fact, the Netanyahu administration sought to instill this idea to the world that Israel has both the “determination” and the “ability” to attack Iran should this preemptive action not have been faced with Washington objection. The fact that Netanyahu still failed to implement the idea even during Trump administration—as John Bolton points out in the first chapter of his book—despite his overwhelming support for Israel, indicated the fact that Israel does not have independent military capabilities and determination to take such hostile action at no cost without the support of the US.

Therefore, despite the constant claims of Israeli officials, this country’s general strategy so far has been to avoid direct military confrontation with Iran and to focus on less intense and covert warfare. This has changed since 2017 due to Israel’s objection to pro-Iranian forces regaining the control over Al-Bukamal Qa’im border crossing on the Iraqi-Syrian border, and the consequent lack of a proportionate and retaliatory response from Iran to Israel’s ongoing operations in Syria. In fact, inaction of Iran has allowed Israeli army to expand its campaign from northern borders and the Golan Heights (as the first ring) to the province of Deir ez-Zor in eastern Syria, then to the depths of Iraq in cooperation with the US (as the second ring), and eventually, inside the Iranian territory (as the third ring). The expansion of Israel’s subversive actions deep inside Iran is an effort to discredit Iran’s deterrence as well as undermining Iran’s strategic stability, while also dismantling Iran’s military and nuclear capabilities.

In the meantime, Israel’s embark on the strategy of Third-Circle Directorate based on intensifying low-level but effective military actions on Iranian soil has played a greater role in undermining Iran’s conventional deterrent advantages. Israel’s repeated operation and its recklessness in accepting responsibility for such actions has taken Israel’s belief and determination that it can target Iran’s assets and strategic resources inside and outside of Iran with numerous intermittent actions to a new level. Therefore, it can be said that while the previous positions of Israeli officials regarding the bombing and cessation of Iran’s nuclear capabilities were mostly focused on the assassination of Iranian scientists, targeted cyberattacks, sabotages, and bombings of industrial, security, and military facilities, there is no guarantee that the Third-Circle Directorate would not extent to explicit and direct entry of Israeli fighters, bombers or ballistic missiles to bomb Iran’s nuclear and military facilities in cooperation with the United States or independently.

If Israel mistakes Iran’s inaction with inability to respond and decides to extend Mabam Campaign to air or missile strikes inside the Iranian borders, it should not be sure of the unpredictable consequences. Iran has not yet responded decisively to cyber-attacks, the assassination of its scientists, and the Israeli sabotages due to the fact that these actions have been designed and carried out in such a way that Iran has assessed the damage as compensable. That is, a long set of low-level attacks were conducted to change the state of the field without taking actions that justifies an extensive reaction. Iran’s failure to respond to the recent Israeli attack on the port of Latakia is a clear example of the success and effectiveness of Salami Slicing strategy. Such strategies are designed to engage Iran in a polygonal dilemma: that it cannot respond to every individual military actions and small-scale sabotage, while inaction against these multiple small and non-intensive attacks will gradually result in losing its strategic position and deterrent credibility.

This very, unique Israeli strategy in military confrontation with Iran has reinforced the assessment of the Bennett administration about the serious weakness of Iran’s conventional deterrence. As a clear case Foreign Minister Yair Lapid claimed that “Israel could attack Iran if necessary without informing the Biden administration, which is looking to rejoin the nuclear deal”. This problem became more apparent after the assassination of the commander of the Quds Force of the IRGC, especially in the last months of Donald Trump’s presidency. In other words, if Tehran decided to respond directly to various Israeli actions, such as the assassination of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh and attacks on its military and industrial centers, the risk of a war with Israel with the support of the US would increase. By the same token, this has in fact given Tehran an opportunity not to retaliate based on the concept of conventional strategic stability. That is, at this level of conflict, Iran’s confidence in its ability to retaliate makes it easier for this country to limit and delay the response. From Iranian perspective, therefore, conventional strategic stability means preventing armed conflict in the Middle East, especially a level of conflict that directly threatens its security and territory.

However, if Israel tries to discredit Iran’s conventional deterrence and strategic stability by launching a direct air strike into Iranian territory, Iran’s retaliatory response will not be as limited and symbolic as the attack on the US base of Ain al-Assad in Iraq, because Tehran would face the so-called “Sputnik moment” dilemma, which forces it to test its missile credibility. In such a situation, Iran will be forced to first, launch a decisive comprehensive missile response against Israel and then change its deterrent structure from conventional to nuclear by leaving the NPT in order to contain pressure of domestic public opinion, maintain its credibility with regional rivals such as Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and even the Republic of Azerbaijan, and to reassure its proxy forces in the axis of resistance.

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Indo-Pacific strategy and the new China-IDF relationship

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The signing of the United States of America (the new Aukus defense agreement and the Quad Quartet agreement with Japan, India and Australia), had significant future repercussions on the Middle East region and the balances of power and influence within it, given its great geopolitical importance, according to these new American agreements in the “Indo-Pacific region”, China will have to (face a new strong defense alliance in the Indo-Pacific region, then transfer this entire Chinese conflict to the Middle East and the Iranian nuclear file and increase Chinese influence in the sea straits and waterways in the Middle East), an alliance welcomed by regional partners such as  Japan. The three countries in the new US regional alliances and polarizations of “Japan, India, and Australia” also make it clear that such agreements with the United States of America are a (historic opportunity for them and their allies to protect common values ​​and enhance security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region). On the other hand, we find that those American agreements and alliances in the “Indo-Pacific” region surrounding China will be reflected in one way or another and may increase in the Middle East, for China will have to transfer conflict and competition with Washington to the region, Israel and Iran, and this will have future consequences and repercussions.  The countries of the region in the Middle East and the Arabian Gulf, as follows:

The equation of competition between the United States and China in the Middle East has increased since the Biden administration took office, and here (placing the neutral countries in the middle became more difficult). One of the areas that may witness an escalation in the intensity of competition between the two sides is the Middle East.

To understand the vision of regional countries for their interests with the two powers, it is necessary to look at the initial indicators issued by the Biden’s administration towards the region. It has become clear that the US administration has a desire to reformulate its approach towards the region, but (it is not yet clear how deep this American step and its impact on the regional security structure sponsored by the United States, especially in the Arab Gulf region).

The US Defense Secretary “Lloyd Austin” announced a comprehensive strategic review of the status of US forces around the world, including the Middle East. It seems that officials in the US Department of Defense “Pentagon” are tending to reconsider the status of US forces in the Middle East, which may be understood (not a condition of reducing them), in favor of increasing the size of the forces in the “Indo-Pacific” region.

At the present time, the Biden administration’s focus was on (ending the war in Yemen, reviving the negotiation track over the Iranian nuclear file), and it did not show much interest in other pivotal files.

In parallel with the previous US approach, the US National Security Adviser “Jake Sullivan”, reduced the number of Middle East experts in the US National Security Council, and significantly increased the number and hierarchy of Indo-Pacific experts.

Defense Minister “Lloyd Austin” also appointed three advisers to him, all of them are Asian experts, and none of them specialize in Middle Eastern issues, in contrast to the approach of all previous US administrations, due to the danger of China, according to the current US security strategy.

These American steps toward China reflect the Biden administration’s vision of the world from the perspective of “the theory of the great power conflict”, which prevailed during the Cold War, and the decline of the Middle East on its list of priorities.

On the Israeli-Chinese side, Beijing will try to play an increasing role inside Israel in order to bring about rapprochement with Tel Aviv at the expense of Washington.  Here, we note the (extent and seriousness of Chinese companies sought to obtain contracts to operate the main Israeli ports, as Washington was particularly concerned about a Chinese company winning a tender to manage a port in Haifa, where the US Navy’s Sixth Fleet is anchored).

Perhaps the future analysis will come in (China’s attempt to play a challenge to American interests inside Israel, and China’s future planning in order to manage all Israeli ports, and thus control the shipping lanes in the Mediterranean and the Red Sea). Which is what Washington fears the most.

In addition to China’s desire to invest and be present in vital infrastructure projects in Israel, (China is trying to obtain this advanced Israeli technology, and trying to obtain any monopoly information that can be harvested in China by Israeli companies to benefit from it in the aspects of Chinese progress and innovation), thus, he challenged American technological progress from the Israeli gate.

The most important and most dangerous for me, analytically, is the attempts of the People’s Republic of China to obtain all Israeli trade secrets related to the United States of America, and even more dangerous in the future is (the rapprochement of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army with the Israel Defense Forces, which relies heavily on advanced American equipment such as  Fighter “F-35”).

From my analytical point of view, the expectation remains that (if China succeeds in increasing its ability to exist, monitor and infiltrate the Israeli army), this may allow Beijing to obtain all American military technological secrets from Israel directly, and here is the danger for the United States of America being  Israel is a conduit through which the (People’s Liberation Army of China) “PLA” achieves greater parity with the US armed forces. This is what Washington is trying to confront from Tel Aviv to counter Chinese influence there, as the United States of America cannot in any way allow its military technology to fall into the hands of its main opponent, China.

   Perhaps the final analysis here, is explaining that (the absence of American thinking of a clear strategy until now to confront the growing Chinese influence in the region and the world), and perhaps it is a continuation of the same approach of the “Trump’s administration”, as the United States shows interest in what it does not want, without presenting a clear vision of the results that you want access to this conflict.

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China, Vietnam, Philippines and United States Sustainability in the South China Sea

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The guided-missile cruiser USS Chancellorsville during a replenishment-at-sea with the aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan. Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class John Harris/U.S. Navy/Flickr

Authors : Nabel Akram, Imran Altaf, Komal Tariq

Supremacy of any world power depends upon its control over the important Geo-strategic places. A hegemon must have influence over the Geo-strategic places. This rule is generally applied for every world super power. Other factors like the will to lead, economic, political and military factors are also important but these factors are restricted in a specific sphere of influence. Influence over Geo-strategic important places enhances the influence over other countries related to that place. Britain remained the superpower due to occupation of such important places. The US as a super power and hegemon, is enjoying influence over the Geo-strategic places in the world. The US has influence over Malacca Strait, Suez Canal, and Panama Canal etc. (Oral, 2012). On strategic places, the US is facing challenges from China and Russia. Russia has occupied Crimea the strategically important place in East Europe which covers black sea and offered a way towards Mediterranean Sea. On the other hand, China is struggling hard to get control over South China Sea (SCS). The SCS is an important Geo-strategic, Geo-economic and geopolitical place for world. It contains plenty of natural resources and the hub of fishing. It covers half of the world trade passage. The US has enjoyed strong influence in this place after WWII, but, now the US is facing great resistance from China. The US does not want to lose its influence in East Asia and the SCS. The US is struggling hard with the coordination of the ASEAN states, Japan, Australia and India. China is gradually strengthening its control over the SCS. Due to economic growth, China has got influence over regional countries. Most critical area of South China Sea dispute contains two groups of islands such as Paracel Islands and Spratly Islands. Paracel archipelago comes under the rule of China (The People’s Republic of China, 2014). China has occupied this group of islands in 1974. Spratly islands are most disputed among China, Philippines and Vietnam (Ngo, 2017). This group of islands are under the different countries like China, Vietnam, Philippine, Malaysia and Taiwan. China has constructed seven artificial islands on this place (Southerland, 2016). The US has initiated Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) in the SCS region with objective to contain China from establishing its hegemony in this region. It has increased the sensitivity of this issue in region (Harress, 2015).   

Vietnam and Philippines both are the potential rival of China in South China Sea dispute. These countries have deep economic and diplomatic ties with China. Both countries are engaging China to set up alliances with the US and other important states for restraining and hedging China. Vietnam and Philippines are making efforts to strengthen their military setup against China. The US is providing its assistance to the rival states of China and opposing Chinese irredentist claim with the help of maritime law and the right of freedom of navigation in the SCS as an international sea. In this way, China has to face potential rivalry from the US, Vietnam and Philippines in SCS.

Philippines and Vietnam have huge trade and diplomatic relations with China for hedging China. Both countries even have strong economic and strategic relations with Chinese competitors like the US, Russia, Japan and India. In this way, both countries are reducing the risk. Vietnam is consistently building its military capabilities through strong economy and making alliances with the strong countries and international and regional institutions. There are following way which cause to hedging China.

  • For hedging China, Philippines and Vietnam are engaging China through a huge trade volume and interdependence. Vietnam has become the biggest trading partner of China. Mutual interdependence will cause to stop China from taking any aggressive action against Vietnam.
  • Philippines and Vietnam are developing diplomatic, political, party to party and people to people relations with China. This will help to know about the behavior of China towards Philippines and Vietnam over South China Sea dispute.
  • Philippines and Vietnam are focusing to increase its military strength. For this purpose, Vietnam has bought large military equipment from Russia and developed its military equipment complex in Vietnam for modernizing its military equipment with the help of Russia. Philippines has increased its military alliance with the US.
  • Vietnam has made alliances with world powers like the US, Russia, India, Japan etc. to secure itself against any aggression from China. For this purpose, it has engaged itself in many exercises and joint ventures with the US and many other countries.
  • Philippines and Vietnam has improved its relations with neighboring countries who can provide help in time of difficulty. This is the reason that Philippines and Vietnam are active in ASEAN forum.

China would play its role as a hegemon after the US. The US should contain China through its neighboring countries like Japan, India, South Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, Singapore and Russia. To gain hegemonic status, it is necessary to become regional hegemon. John Mearsheimer supports regional hegemon. He gives example of the US that it first became regional hegemon in 1898 after Monroe doctrine and gained world hegemonic status after the WWII (Mearsheimer, 2004).

China has acquired economic and military power and about to become a regional hegemon. John Mearsheimer (2006) suggests China to gain hegemonic status; China must need to become regional hegemon and to get more power than its neighbors like Japan, Russia and India. China should increase its military strength and power. China has to regain Taiwan for establishing the status of regional hegemon (Mearsheimer, China’s Unpeaceful Rise, 2006).

Rising security demands of China has unsecured the neighboring countries. Arm race has been started in East Asia region. Although, China has maintained good relations with its neighbors but they have strong concerns over Chinese security measures. China’s largest economy and advanced military stimulate China to control its surroundings (Roy, 2013).

After open up policies, China has rapidly grown and become world imminent actor. To become a great power, China has to respond all challenges positively and set its priorities to overcome its drawbacks. In future, China should not claim its hegemony. China should need to advocate new world system with some reforms in economy and politics without claiming its hegemony (Bijian, 2005).

China is the largest trading partner of Vietnam. Vietnam’s second largest export partner is China with 13.2 percent of its export. The US secure biggest trading partner with 21 percent of Vietnamese export and Japan secured third with 8.4 percent of Vietnam export. Vietnam’s first largest import partner is China with 34 percent of its import and Japan secured fourth largest import partner with 6.4 percent of Vietnamese import (CIA, 2017). A huge numbers of Chinese foreign direct investment companies are working in Vietnam. It is estimated that about 833 companies are running their business in Vietnam in 2011. The quantity of these companies are increasing day by day and their total registered capital is 4.3 billion. There are following benefits of Vietnam for economic partnership with China;

Spratly Islands (Kalyan Islands Group) are the part of Philippines territory. KIG is the part of Philippines Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) under UNCLOS 1982 (Palma, 2009). Philippines has filed a case against China and its historical claim of nine dash lines in International court of Tribunal in Hague in 2013. Court has given decision in favor of Philippines on 12 July 2016 but China has rejected the decision and remained adamant in its claim (France-Presse, Agence, July 8th, 2016). Philippines and Chinese relations worsen due to Philippines case and the ongoing problem in Scarborough Shoal and Chinese construction of new islands. This was the scenario when Philippines new president Rodrigo Roe Duterte took charge on 30 July 2016 (Philippine History, 2017) and initiated new strategy that is called strategic hedging. Although Philippines previous governments have close economic and political relations but current government is leading in this respect.  Philippines started to engage China with a huge trade volume. Politically, Philippines has come closer to China (Shead, 2017).

The Geo-strategic position and bundle of resources are the main reason that China is very conscious to control this region whereas other regional actors like Vietnam, Philippine, Malaysia and Brunei are also active for sovereignty over these islands due to Geo-proximity and resources. The US as the global hegemon has become the part of this game and wants to get its part from these resources. This is the reason that it has established strong alliances with other stack holders against China and also provoking Japan, Australia and India against China due to this regional dispute. The SCS is important for the US for three purposes; first it secures the US trade and military, second, it is check to restrain and contain the Chinese hegemony in the East Asia region (Mustajib, 2016), third, it is necessary for the protection of the US allies like Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan and ASEAN member countries. On the trade basis, the SCS is the passage of the 5 trillion annual ships (Robinson, 2018) and ships related to the US trade and military activities are worth 1.2 trillion dollar trade with East Asian countries (Mustajib, 2016).

Peace lies in continuous diplomatic engagement of claimant countries of the SCS dispute. Any change in existing status quo might put the peace of whole region at risk. Philippines and Vietnam consider China as an assertive state. Both States want to establish close relations with China in order to stop China from assertive actions. The US has strong political, economic and military bilateral alliances with Philippine, Vietnam and other ASEAN countries.  The US has launched the FONE operations in the SCS to contain China. These operations show that the US wants to sustain its hegemony in East Asia.

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Reports10 hours ago

Green Infrastructure Development Key to Boost Recovery Along the BRI

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) presents a significant opportunity to build out low-carbon infrastructure in emerging and developing economies...

Crypto Insights12 hours ago

The Crypto Regulation: Obscure Classification Flusters Regulators as Crypto Expands into Derivatives Markets

Crypto regulation has long been a topic of debate in policymaking circles. As the white-hot market continues to soar in...

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