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How Academics and Educational Institutions help the realisation of BRI in the Gulf

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The roles of academics and educational institutions in the implementation of China’s Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI) should not be neglected. From the time the initiative was introduced, academic intellectuals and institutions have indeed played a crucial role in promoting and socialising the BRI.

When drawing up the plan for the BRI and the AIIB, Xi and his teams seemed to acknowledge the importance of intellectuals and academic establishments in the implementation of the project. Vision and Action of the BRI states that the initiative will involve academic efforts, such as sending “more students to each other’s countries”, granting “government scholarships”, and establishing “cooperation in jointly running schools”. Such objectives have manifested in the implementation of the BRI in the Gulf as a means to create legitimacy for the initiative.

One important institution is the Qatar-PKU Chair in Middle Eastern Studies, which was established during the Emir of Qatar’s visit to Beijing in mid-2014, between the Qatar government and Peking University (PKU). The most noticeable initiative by the centre was a public lecture entitled: “China’s Foreign Policy and the GCC” at Qatar University. The main topic of the discussion was the BRI; one of the speakers, Professor Wu, talked about the BRI, and how the initiative would benefit Qatar and the Gulf.

Shanghai University also played a role in inciting public debate about the initiative in the Gulf. In March 2016, the university cooperated with the Centre for Turkish Studies, the Maltepe University, and Sociology of Islam Journal to organised a conference titled: “Neoliberalism with Chinese Characteristics in the Middle East” at Qatar University  where topics related to the BRI, the AIIB, and the Chinese Dream were discussed, including the Chinese model of development and the implications of the BRI in the Gulf.

Academic institutions are also crucial in forming moral and intellectual legitimacy for the financial aspect of the BRI. For example, the China-UAE Conference on Islamic Banking has been held in China since 2015. The conference, which is organised by various Chinese and Gulf institutions, such as China Islamic Finance Club as well as the Dubai Centre for Islamic Banking and Finance, discusses issues such as ways to enhance the Islamic finance aspect of the BRI’s implementation in the Gulf.

Confucius Institutes

The Confucius Institute is another academic institution that plays an important role in the consensus-building efforts behind the initiative. At a conference in summer 2015, the Confucius Institutes’ Chief Executive proclaimed that the Institutes, which are the Chinese Ministry of Education-affiliated institutions founded to teach Chinese language and other China-related courses globally, involve themselves in the implementation of the BRI and the AIIB.

Internationally, the Confucius Institutes have organised several training programs for the construction of infrastructures related to the BRI. Additionally, the institutes have held public

conferences and seminars on the initiative as an effort to socialise the project.

In the Gulf, such efforts have also been increasingly apparent. It is vital to note that several

branches of the Confucius Institute have been established in the Gulf since the beginning of China’s internationalisation in the region. The first branch was established at Zayed University in 2010 and was followed by the second at the University of Dubai in 2011. The third branch of the Confucius Institute in the region is located at the University of Bahrain, and was founded in 2014.

One notable BRI-related activity of Confucius Institutes in the Gulf was a conference held at the Abu Dhabi branch in March 2017, in cooperation with the Emirates Policy Centre. It was entitled “Prospects of Partnership between China and the UAE under the One Belt, One Road Initiative”. In May of the same year, the Confucius Institute in Bahrain held the first “Belt and Road” International Seminar, attended by over 500 scholars from seven countries. At such events, topics related to how the BRI and the AIIB are being implemented in the region were presented, such as the importance of energy in the initiative and the various projects that are currently being pursued in the Gulf.

Another role of the Confucius Institutes in the implementation of the BRI in the Gulf is through promoting the Chinese language across the region. Such language efforts have taken the

form of offering Chinese language classes to the Gulf’s peoples, who in recent years have experienced an increase in the number of students. Other institutes have also become involved in this effort. For instance, in 2015 the Chinese Embassy in Qatar signed a MoU with the Translation and Interpreting Studies Faculty at Qatar’s Education City to collaborate in language teaching and cultural activities. The deal has manifested in Chinese language classes being offered to the Qatari public.

The increasing interest in the Chinese language among the Gulf society not only helps the implementation of the BRI and the AIIB in the Gulf by raising people’s awareness of China. It has also improved communications among relevant stakeholders in the implementation of the initiative.

Intellectuals

In addition to academic institutions, the role of academics should also be noted. In most cases, these intellectuals contribute to the promotion of the BRI through their publications. For example, Wang Jinglie published an article for Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia), in which he asserts that the Chinese “wish that when we realise the ‘Chinese Dream,’ the Arab countries will not only be happy for us, but will also achieve their own ‘Arab Dream’”. Sun Degang of the Shanghai International Studies University and Yahia Zoubir of Kedge Business School in France also wrote an article in the same journal, where they stated that “Chinese and Arabs share similar dreams of achieving their respective national rejuvenation in the 21st century. As two great civilizations, the ‘Chinese Dream’ and the ‘Arab Dream’ share similarities”.

Impacts

The growing efforts by educational institutions and academics have not been without

consequence. In the recent years, there has been a rise of individuals from within the region, who, directly or indirectly, are involved in the promotion of the BRI.

Academic institutions in the Gulf have increasingly published studies and held seminars on the BRI, the AIIB, and the Chinese Dream. In May 2016, for example, the Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies in Qatar held a conference: “The Arab World and China: Future Prospects of Relations with a Rising Power”. 

Aside from publishing studies and organising conferences about the BRI and the AIIB, these regional institutions have also become interested in bolstering partnerships with Chinese institutions. In September 2017, the UAE University concluded an agreement with Zhejiang University to cooperate in student exchanges and collaborative research, and in academic activities such as courses and seminars. 

Academics and public intellectuals in the Gulf have also increasingly engaged in promoting public debates on the BRI and the AIIB. For example, the GCC’s Assistant General Secretary, Abdel Aziz Aluwaisheg, wrote an article on the BRI for Saudi-based newspaper Arab News, whereby he stated that: “the initiatives could usher in a new economic and political alliance between China and the rest of Asia, including the Middle East” .

The rise of the pro-China intellectuals from within Gulf society is also rooted in the offering of scholarships to regional intellectuals.

Since the beginning of China’s entry to the Gulf, many intellectuals from the Gulf have been given scholarships to study in China. These scholarships are offered mainly by the China Scholarship Council (CSC), which is the Chinese Ministry of Education’s non-profit organisation that offers financial aid and scholarship to both Chinese and non-Chinese to study overseas or in China. The CSC has worked with different Gulf universities and ministries, and funded students from the region to study in China since the early years of China’s presence in the Gulf.

Such efforts have been complemented by Chinese academic institutions which participate annually in educational exhibitions across the region. These include the International Education

and Conference on Higher Education in Riyadh and the Dubai International Education Exhibition, which have led to Gulf students becoming interested in studying in China.

When the BRI and the AIIB were introduced, Xi also pledged to increase the number of scholarships to students from the countries along the routes. Gulf students are included as recipients of this scholarship. As Xi announced in his speech at the Arab League headquarters, his government intended to provide 10,000 scholarships and 10,000 training opportunities to Middle Eastern students.

The China-Oman Industrial Park at Duqm has also cooperated with the Omani government

to offer scholarships to Omani students to study in China with funding from the park. In the last few years, many of the scholarship recipients have returned to the Gulf. As an example, in June 2018, the first batch of 39 Omani students returned, following completing vocational training at Ningxia Polytechnic, to work at the Duqm park.

This has resulted in the emergence of intellectuals from within the Gulf who are acquainted with Chinese politics, economics, and cultures, and are well-versed in the Chinese language. Even though not all of them are pursuing careers as academics, the experiences of living and studying in China have made these scholarship recipients not only very interested in imitating the Chinese way of life, but also in educating the public about China and what they have learnt there.

Due to the increasing interest in China among politicians, intellectuals, and the general public, numerous universities in the Gulf have begun to offer China-related courses. Qatar University, for example, now teaches classes on Chinese politics and philosophy in Arabic. China-related courses are also offered by several regional universities, such as at Kuwait University, the American University of Sharjah, and the University of Sharjah.

Similarly, since mid-2016, Sultan Qaboos University (SQU) in Oman has been teaching Chinese language courses. It was also reported in mid-2014 that SQU planned to establish a Confucius Institute. In July 2018, the UAE Ministry of Education announced that it began offering Chinese classes in 100 schools.

Overall, in the realisation of the BRI in the Gulf, the roles of the academics and educational institutions has not only contributed to the growing creation of consent for the initiative, but has also resulted in the rise of pro-China intellectuals and institutions who have been directly or indirectly involved in not only socialising the initiative but also in gathering support from the people.

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Lessons Learned: US Seek to Salvage their Relations with the Syrian Kurds

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The hasty retreat of the US troops from Afghanistan has left a sizeable dent in the reputation of the White House among the American public, in the Middle East and the world in general. Washington was criticised heavily for the betrayal of the Afghan government, which paved the way for Taliban to storm to power.

It’s only natural that such events created a breeding ground for uncertainty among US allies in the region. Some of them started to reevaluate their relationship with the White House after the Afghan fiasco; others were having doubts about the US’ commitment beforehand. Current situation forces Washington to take firm actions to validate their status as a powerhouse in the region. There are indicators that US leadership has found a way to regain trust from its allies starting with Kurdish armed units in Syria.

The Kurds became a key ally to the US in their quest to defeat ISIS in Syria. Washington helped to create the predominantly Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), who consequently established control over oil-rich regions in the north-eastern Syria. However the rapid rise of Kurdish influence triggered discontent from other parties of the Syrian conflict: the Assad government and Turkey, who considers SDF an offshoot of the PKK, designated as a terror group by the Turkish authorities. Under this pretext Ankara conducted three full-scale military operations against the Kurds in spite of its membership in the US led coalition.

Turkey remains a major headache for the US in northern Syria as it obstructs the development of a Kurdish autonomy. US failure to act during the Turkish offensive on Al-Bab and then Afrin is still considered one of the most agonizing experiences in the recent history of American-Kurdish partnership. On the flip side, this relationship had its bright moments. US forces were persistent in their cooperation with the Kurds despite Donald Trump’s efforts to withdraw US military presence from Syria. Furthermore, former Pentagon’s chief James Mattis increased funding of SDF in 2019 to a record high of $300 million.

Although the US cut back its support for the Kurds after proclaiming victory over ISIS, it’s still sufficient for SDF to stay among the most combat-capable forces in Syria. US provide machinery, equipment and ammunition, but most importantly teach the Kurds the skills to profit from their resources. Besides training SDF rank soldiers, the American troops prepare their special forces HAT (Hêzên Antî Teror, Anti-Terror Forces) primarily tasked with establishing security on oil facilities as well as detection and elimination of terrorists. In terms of their equipment they practically hold their own even against US troops. During their operations HAT fighters use standardized weaponry, night goggles and other modern resources.

Regardless of all the US aid military capabilities of SDF have one critical vulnerability, namely the lack of air defense. This weakness is successfully exploited by Turkey who uses their drones to bomb Kurdish positions. For the last couple of months the number of air strikes has significantly increased, which brought SDF to find new methods of deflecting air attacks.

There are good grounds to believe that Washington accommodated their partner’s troubles. Thus a source from an US air-base in Middle-East who asked to keep his name and position anonymous told us that on the 18th of September three combat-capable trainer aircraft T-6 Texan have been deployed to Tell Beydar air-base in Hasakah province, Syria. According to the source American instructors have begun a crash course in air pilotage with the candidates picked form the SDF ranks long before the airplanes arrived to their destination. This is implicitly confirmed by the large shipment of US weaponry, machinery and ammunition to Tell Beydar delivered on the 17th of September that included missiles compatible with Texan aircraft.

The sole presence of airplanes, even trainer aircraft, prompts a change in the already existing power balance. T-6 Texan can be used not only for air cover but also as a counter tool to Turkish “Bayraktar” UAVs especially if US grant Kurds access to intel from the radars situated on US air bases. Ultimately, from Turkey’s standpoint it must look like an attempt from the US military to create PKK’s own air force.

This being said the US are better off using political means rather than military if the goal is to handicap Turkish interests in Syria. The groundwork for this has been laid thanks to a reshuffle in the White House under Biden administration. First came the resignation of former US Special Representative for Syria Engagement James F. Jeffrey infamous for his soft spot for Turkey, who has been openly promoting pro-Turkish views in the White House during his tenure. In addition to the loss of their man in Washington, Turkey has gained a powerful adversary represented by the new National Security Council coordinator for the Middle-East and North Africa Brett McGurk. McGurk is a polar opposite to Jeffrey and has sided with the Kurds on numerous occasions. He is well respected among the leaders of SDF because of his work as Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to counter ISIS.

The only yet the most important question that is yet to be answered is the position of US president Joe Biden. So far Biden’s administration has been avoiding radical shifts regarding its Syria policy. Development of cooperation with the Kurds considering they have proven their reliability might come as a logical solution that will also allow the White House to show their teeth. Washington cannot endure another Afghanistan-like fiasco that will destroy their reputation figuratively and their allies literally. Even with all possible negative outcomes taken into account the enhancement of cooperation with the Kurds outweighs the drawbacks and remains the optimal route for the US.

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Turkish Geopolitics and the Kabul Airport Saga

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Image credit: Hurriyet daily news

The Taliban’s ultimate agreement to a prominent Turkish security presence at Afghanistan’s only airport completes an important power-play for the latter. Ankara wishes to establish itself as a dominant player in the post-U.S. withdrawal Afghan affairs, ensuring that the U.S. looks to it as an ideal partner for its future policies in Afghanistan. It is in this context that Turkey having overcome the formerly heated rejections by the Taliban of its proposed role at the airport is highly significant as it portends the closer integration of Afghanistan into familiar Turkish geopolitical agendas.

Turkey’s Afghan power-play and the U.S.

Turkey’s announcement in June of plans to militarily manage the security at Kabul’s Hamid Karzai International Airport with U.S. financial support incensed the Taliban.

By not consulting or informing the powerful Islamist group on such a major issue in a post-withdrawal Afghanistan, Turkey signaled its view of the Taliban as inimical non-state actors lacking the stature to act upon the pretext of Afghan sovereignty. Indeed, President Tayyip Erdogan accused the Taliban of the ‘occupation’ of the Afghan territory in response to their warnings that Turkey’s airport plan violated the Doha Accords in terms of the exit of all foreign forces from Afghanistan and that they would harshly react to it.

The Taliban’s near-effortless takeover of Kabul in mid-August seemed to close the chapter on the airport saga, but deadly ISIS bombings near the airport two weeks later forced the new regime to consider external help in filling the Afghan security vacuum.

Consequently, Turkey gained not only an acquiescence from Afghanistan’s strongest faction to its desired role at the airport but also an affirmation of its capacity to face down and override local actors as a foreign power seeking to guide its Afghan initiatives to fruition.

This may appeal strongly to the U.S., which has increased its geoeconomic interests in Afghanistan in parallel with the process of its military disengagement from the country. These interests take the form of large infrastructure trade projects of a regional scale and would benefit if shielded from the whims of domestic Afghan factions that tend to cripple governance and policy implementation. Ankara’s assertive posture during the airport tussle with the Taliban helps it pitch itself to Washington as capable of doing precisely this.

The Central Asia factor

These trade infrastructure projects in Afghanistan aim to develop it as a transit hub for Central Asian trade to extra-regional markets as outlined in the U.S. ‘Strategy for Central Asia 2019-25’. The U.S. affords considerable importance to this strategy both as a means of rebuilding Afghanistan and providing the Central Asian states with new trade routes that do not need to transit the territory of Russia, their former Soviet patron and America’s great-power rival.

Turkey shares the goal of increasing Central Asia’s global connectivity, whilst envisioning itself the natural leader and conduit for the Turkic Central Asian states’ growing socio-economic bonds with the outside world. By acting as a lead-from-the-front partner for the U.S. in the post-withdrawal Afghanistan, Turkey can persuade the U.S. to entrust it with the Afghan leg of the Strategy for Central Asia.

Turkey could then inculcate the progress of its own connectivity projects for Central Asia into the U.S. priorities as a premium of sorts for its services tackling Afghanistan-based risks and hazards to the U.S. Strategy for Central Asia. These Turkish-led projects include the East West Trans-Caspian Middle Corridor (connecting Turkmenistan-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan to Europe via the Caspian Sea-South Caucasus-Turkey route) and its Eastern spur for Afghanistan, the Lapis Lazuli Corridor (connecting northwest Afghanistan via Turkmenistan to the same Caspian Sea-South Caucasus-Turkey route to Europe).

The text of the US Strategy for Central Asia does mention and pledge favourable visa and customs policies for the Lapis Lazuli Corridor, but does not mention the Middle Corridor or Turkey at all. The absence of the latter two key names indicates that U.S. backing for the Lapis Lazuli Corridor likely owed to the simple fact that it directly includes Afghanistan and has already been functional since December 2018. Thus, the U.S. does not formally endorse the East-West connectivity for Central Asia—which Turkey specializes at—under the rubric of its Strategy for Central Asia.

“Senior [Trump] administration officials have expressed support for specific infrastructure projects—such as, notably, Georgia’s deep-water port project in Anaklia—but without having cast them as part of a broader regional agenda,” commented Middle East Institute scholar Dr John Calabrese on the erstwhile Donald Trump administration’s position on the Middle Corridor months before the Strategy on Central Asia’s release.

All this greatly limits the pool of U.S. financial and political support that Turkey could tap into for developing and expanding the Middle Corridor, which is the lynchpin for its push for pan-Turkic leadership. Ankara’s remedy for this problem, however, may lie in gaining the mentioned lead-from-the-front ally status vis-a-vis the U.S. in Afghanistan.

As observed by the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute’s Chairman and Director Frederick Starr and Svante Cornell, the present U.S. approach represents important shifts in the American conceptualization of Afghanistan and Central Asia relative to each other. These are a departure from the long-standing tendency to ‘view Central Asia as an appendix to Afghanistan policy’ and an embrace of Central Asia as a bloc. Both these shifts laid the basis for the U.S. Afghan policy to take its cue from Central Asia’s development. Officially mandating the development of an East-West transport corridor from Central Asia to Europe—in short, Turkey’s Middle Corridor—is the next logical step in this paradigm.

Starr and Cornell, leading proponents in the U.S. policy advocacy community for treating Afghanistan as part of Central Asia, identify the East-West transport corridor as crucial to the Strategy for Central Asia and criticize the document for not mentioning it.

Thus, from its position in Afghanistan, Turkey can orient the inputs it feeds back to its diplomatic and military partners in Washington around the case for the merger of the U.S. Afghanistan and Central Asia policies that Starr and Cornel advocate. The U.S. will expect actionable suggestions from its top consultative partner for Afghanistan to actualize this merger, paving the way for Turkey to impactfully pitch the Middle Corridor as the solution.

This could well become an elusive opening that Turkey has long needed to bridge the chasm between the Middle Corridor’s innate appeal to the U.S. great-power sensitivities underpinning its Central Asia posture and the U.S. seeming disinterest in the corridor. After all, the Middle Corridor bypasses Russia, challenging its monopoly over Central Asia’s trade routes. It also acts as what Starr describes as a ‘Land Suez’ for China to connect to Europe—reducing China’s reliance on transiting Russia for this purpose and offsetting, from Washington’s perspective, the prospect of its two great-power rivals’ geoeconomic priorities aligning too closely.

Subsequent U.S. endorsement of the Middle Corridor would stimulate greater U.S. investment in the mega-project, hitherto limited by the Strategy for Central Asia’s non-mention of East-West connectivity as explored prior.

In addition to this, the Middle Corridor could become an agenda item in multilateral platforms for Central Asia, such as the C5+1, set up by the U.S. with a focus on the Afghan-Central Asian connectivity. This would prop up advocates in Turkic Central Asia for a formal embrace of an Ankara-led Turkic bloc by enabling them to present this as part of the institutionalization of Central Asian affairs as opposed to a pro-Turkish tilt which might alarm Russia, who has a past record of reacting forcefully to external powers engaging in bloc-building in its former Soviet backyard in Eurasia. This will greatly benefit Turkey.

Restoring balance with the West

Afghanistan can arguably bring Turkey’s ideologically-driven desire to carve a Turkic bloc from Central Asia and its more general desire to mitigate the strains in bilateral ties with the U.S. closer together than any other foreign policy file in Ankara.

Linked to Central Asia or not, Afghanistan stands out as a vacuum left by American strategic miscalculations at the regional doorstep of several U.S. rivals. Turkish initiatives, such as the Kabul airport project, clearly designed to preserve U.S. stakes in Afghanistan—at a time when Russia, Iran and China appear poised to capitalize on the U.S. shrinking presence there—can inject fresh credibility into Turkey’s historical image as the West’s Eurasian vanguard.

This will help President Erdogan as he tries to stabilize relations with the U.S. against their list of disputes, from Turkey’s purchase of Russian air defense systems to the U.S. support for Kurdish groups near the Turkish-Syrian border and beyond. Additionally, President Joe Biden faces mounting public and political pressure at home over the rapid collapse of the former U.S.-backed Kabul government in the Taliban’s wake; in this context, Turkey volunteering itself as a new and coherent vehicle for U.S. interests in Afghanistan may prove the very ice-breaker Erdogan needs for his notably bleak relationship with Biden.

However much progress Ankara makes in these endeavours, its headstrong approach and eventual success in securing a role at Kabul’s airport points to strategic clarity and an expectation of Afghanistan’s seamless integration into Turkish geopolitics.

From our partner RIAC

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The Battle for the Soul of Islam: Will the real reformer of the faith stand up?

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Saudi and Emirati efforts to define ‘moderate’ Islam as socially more liberal while being subservient to an autocratic ruler is as much an endeavour to ensure regime survival and bolster aspirations to lead the Muslim world as it is an attempt to fend off challenges rooted in diverse strands of religious ultra-conservatism.

The Saudi and Emirati efforts to garner religious soft power have much in common even though the kingdom and the United Arab Emirates build their respective campaigns on historically different forms of Islam. The two Gulf states are, moreover, rivals in the battle for the soul of Islam, a struggle to define what strand or strands will dominate the faith in the 21st century.

The battle takes on added significance at a time that Middle Eastern rivals are attempting to dial down regional tensions by managing their disputes and conflicts rather than resolving them. The efforts put a greater emphasis on soft power rivalry rather than hard power confrontation often involving proxies.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE propagate a ‘moderate’ Islam on the back of significant social reforms in recent years that preaches absolute obedience to the ruler and relegates the clergy to the status of the ruler’s clerics.

The reforms include Saudi Arabia’s lifting of a ban on women’s driving, enhancing of women’s professional and personal opportunities, curbing the powers of the religious police and introducing Western-style entertainment.

The UAE last November allowed unmarried couples to cohabitate, loosened alcohol restrictions and criminalised “honour killings,” a widely criticised religiously packaged tribal custom that allows a male relative to kill a woman accused of dishonouring her family.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE compete in the Muslim world with Turkish and Iranian Islamist strands of the faith that are laced with nationalism.

The Gulf states’ state-led moderation of religious practices rather than of theology and Muslim jurisprudence is also challenged by some strands of Wahhabism, the ultra-conservative interpretation of Islam on the basis of which Saudi Arabia was founded.

“Wahhabism has refracted into three broad groups since the early 1990s: a left that has developed a discourse of civic rights, a centre occupying official posts of state (dubbed ‘ulama al-sultan’ or the ruler’s clerics) that has put up some resistance to the loosening of their powers in the social, juridical and media spheres, and a Wahhabi right sympathetic to the jihadist discourse of al-Qaeda and its focus on questions of foreign policy,” said scholar Andrew Hammond.

While Turkey and Iran pose a geopolitical danger, autocratic monarchical rule is more fundamentally threatened by the religious challenge posed by what Mr. Hammond dubs the Wahhabi left and the Wahhabi right as well as Indonesia’s Nahdlatul Ulama, the only non-state player in the battle for the soul of Islam, that advocates and practices reform of Islamic jurisprudence and unconditionally endorses the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The arrests in recent years of Saudi scholars and preachers such as Safar al-HawaliSalman al-Awda, Sulayman al-Duwaish, Ibrahim al-Sakran, and Hasan al-Maliki suggests as much.

Implicitly drawing a distinction with Nahdlatul Ulama, Mr. Hammond argues that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s reforms amount to “defanging Wahhabism not dethroning it.”

The crown prince, since coming to office, has radically cut back on the investment of tens of billions of dollars in the propagation of religious ultra-conservatism across the globe, most effectively in Pakistan and Afghanistan. He has also sought to balance Wahhabism with Saudi ultra-nationalism and shave off the rough social edges of the kingdom’s austere interpretation of the faith. His subjugation of the clergy, and incarceration of adherents of the Wahhabi left and far-right, put an end to a 73-year long power-sharing agreement between the ruling Al-Saud family and the clergy.

The left has entertained concepts of a constitutional rather than an absolute monarchy, called for political liberalisation and civil rights and in some cases endorsed the 2011 popular Arab revolts that toppled four Arab autocrats.

The Wahhabi left could be joined in challenging the conservative Gulf monarchies and, simultaneously, be challenged by Nahdlatul Ulama once the group expands its activities to target the Muslim world’s grassroots beyond Indonesia, the world’s most populous Muslim-majority country as well as its foremost democracy. In its first outreach to grassroots elsewhere, Nahdlatul Ulama is expected to launch an Arabic-language website before the end of the year that would target the Arab world.

Nahdlatul Ulama’s concept of a humanitarian Islam that embraces principles of tolerance, pluralism, gender equality, secularism and human rights as defined in the Universal Declaration goes considerably further than proposals put forward by Mr. Hammond’s Wahhabi left, perhaps better described as more liberal rather than an ideological left-wing of a fundamentally ultra-conservative movement.

The Indonesian group’s concept of Islam also contrasts starkly with the Saudi and Emirati notion of autocratic religious moderation that involves no theological or jurisprudential reform but uses ‘the ruler’s clergy’ to religiously legitimise repressive rule under which protests, political parties and petitioning of the government are banned and thought is policed.

“The state has strengthened the Wahhabi centre through neutralising the Wahhabi left and right, which have each represented a threat to state authority and legitimacy … As for the civic rights innovations of the Wahhabi left exemplified by al-Awda, it is precisely this discourse that the state wants to shut down,” Mr. Hammond said, referring to the imprisoned cleric.

The track record of proponents of autocratic religious moderation is checkered at best. While the UAE has created a society that is by and large religiously tolerant, neither Saudi Arabia nor Egypt, which doesn’t have the wherewithal to fight a soft power battle in the Muslim world but seeks to project itself as a champion of religious tolerance, can make a similar claim.

Prince Mohammed has met Jewish and Evangelical leaders. Mohammed al-Issa, the head of the Muslim World League, long a major vehicle to promote Saudi religious ultra-conservatism, doesn’t miss an opportunity these days to express his solidarity with other faith groups. Yet, non-Muslims remain barred in the kingdom from worshipping publicly or building their own houses of worship.

In Egypt, Patrick George Zaki, a 27-year-old student, lingers in prison since February 2020 on charges of spreading false news and rumours for publishing an article documenting incidents of discrimination against Egypt’s Coptic Christian minority.

Mr. Zaki was arrested a year after Ahmed el-Tayeb, the Grand Imam of Al Azhar, Egypt’s citadel of Islamic learning, signed a Declaration of Human Fraternity for World Peace and Living Together with Pope Francis during the two men’s visit to the UAE. The declaration advocates religious freedom and pluralism.

By contrast, Nahdlatul Ulama secretary general Yahya Staquf recently told the story of Riyanto in a September 11 speech at Regent University, a bulwark of American Evangelical anti-Muslim sentiment founded by televangelist Pat Robertson. A member of Nahdlatul Ulama’s militia, Riyanto died guarding a church in Java on Christmas Eve when a bomb exploded in his arms as he removed it from a pew.

“To us in Nahdlatul Ulama, Riyanto is a martyr, and we honour his memory every Christmas Eve alongside millions of our Indonesian Christian brothers and sisters,” Mr. Staquf said.

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