The Indian Ocean, a significant geopolitical region, is acting as a regional stage for great power competition between India, China, and the U.S. The geo-strategic and geo-economic importance of the region not only asks India to manage the two leading powers of the world, with varying interests in the region but provides India with a chance to hold the regional banner while understanding the realpolitik of the situation. The U.S. interest in “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy” China’s concern for the “Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)” and that of India for “Security and Growth of the All-Region (SAGAR)” are the varying strategies of these major powers, which unwrap different outcomes.
Regional imbalance which is already very fragile has been narrowed down to conflicting interests of the U.S. and China which is apparent as per U.S. policy orientation in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). The U.S. regional strategy is an extension of its Asia-Pacific perspective which highlights that the U.S. aims to prevent regional dominance of China this allowing Washington to envisage India as a strategic partner in both strategic and economic spheres to uncap the potential of allying against China. Therefore, the emergence of Indo-Pacific as a political and strategic reality represents a scenario in which the U.S. not only needs to expand its partnership with all members of Quad, U.S. Japan, Australia, particularly India but also to ensure that its regional strategic alliance act as a dominant rebalancing act which will allow the U.S. to counter China through Malacca trap.
The Indian government is keen to gradually actualize choices to extend Indo-US strategic partnership, which is dictated by a plethora of strategic, economic, and political convergence. The contrasts between the two accomplices’ dreams of the locale boil down to accentuation on security versus trade factors. India is centered on developing its monetary presence in the Indian Ocean while the U.S. keeps on surveying the Indo-Pacific through a military focal point and freedom of navigation. The Indo-Pacific Strategy of the U.S. is at risk of getting jeopardized as China misuses the topographical creases, grows its coalition with Pakistan, and uses its abundance to acquire political impact. To counter China, the U.S. should essentially expand its non-military speculations and conciliatory commitment and actualize a coordinated system that thinks about the entire area.
IOR is essential for the geo-strategic as well as the geo-economic interest of China as it serves as a link with other Asian markets, but at the same time, it serves China’s desire to extend its Maritime Silk Road. Beijing also shares a common approach with New Delhi about the dominant role of commercial and trade factors in their regional strategies. However, for China, Pakistan is the core constituent of its approach as it links the continental and maritime components of BRI, while for India and the U.S, disfavor.
India’s grumbles towards China are not just linked to the Indian Ocean, but the growing cooperation between China and Pakistan over China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is acting as a Chinese counter in the regional chessboard. Currently, the increasing cooperative efforts of Pakistan and China to uplift BRI as a regional economic enabler allow India to view this as a countermeasure against its economic dominance. Furthermore, the diversification of economic activities to expand Chinese interest not only conflates with India’s regional desires but allows her to increase its bend towards U.S. regional ambitions to diversify its economic and strategic pool.
To keep Indian interest at a notch, Delhi must maneuver with its regional position by managing Sino-US rivalry in the region, while maintaining the status-quo to secure its end. The changing focus from the early 1990s by the emphasis of the Indian Navy to counter the aggregating Chinese military to the most recent Quad cooperation highlights India’s increasing role in the region, which is evident from Indian doctrine – SAGAR – which allows India to be more vocal towards regional affairs. But the growing hostility with China creates hurdles for which India needs to use its strategic partnership with Quad members supporting India’s interests while providing strategic depth for counter steps.
Understanding and viably dealing, this developing security dynamic might turn out to be crucial to safeguard territorial solidness and U.S. national interests for India. The essence of the U.S. as an adjusting force can likewise add to regional strength – this is where Biden’s approach will be at surge; eager to leave his distinct imprint on the Quad by focusing on ‘softer capabilities’ will balance out its counter China orientation, different from Trump. This is why India must expand its role in Quad, which is evident from India’s decision to invite Australia in the Malabar exercises amid the Ladakh standoff; a significant step to keep the regional allies on a single page against the common threat posed by an intransigent China. Along with this, India must ensure that if not a counteracting approach by Biden, then a centrality of Indo-Pacific in the U.S. national security must be highlighted, which is essential for India to play openly in the region.
Conclusively, the best opportunity for India in this situation is to triangulate the two contending hegemons and exploit these contesting perspectives to expand its essential self-sufficiency. The future of the region will evolve around how Biden will play in the region. His statement that “Alliances are our greatest asset” raised the question for the future of the region. Modi-Trump bromance provided India with an unrestricted chance to counter China in the Indian Ocean, but the change in administration could result otherwise.
