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Eastern Europe

EU Commissioner Mr. Oliver Varhelyi: Eastern Europe needs a Cooperation not Antagonization



On March 8th, the second leg of the Vienna Process International Conference on the Future of Europe, titled Europe Future Neighbourhood at 75: Disruptions, Recalibration Continuity, was organised by the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna and the implementing partners –the European news platformModern Diplomacy, IFIMES think-tank, the international scientific journal European Perspectives and Vienna-based Culture for Peace. Among some 20 contributors to the conference’s three panel discussions were two serving European Presidents, an EU Commissioner, the former OSCE Secretary General, and several other high-level officials of European as well as international FORAs. In addition, a variety of thinkers and practitioners from the UK, Germany, Italy, Spain France, Poland, Ukraine and Norway provided their contribution to the debate about the European neighbourhood.

The keynote speaker of this unique international conference linking the Continent’s leading professionals with expertise the EU’s Neighbourhood policy, was the EU Commissioner for European Neighbourhood and Enlargement, Mr. Oliver Várhelyi. In his highly absorbing speech, he focused on the EU’s Eastern Partnership, which represents the since-2009-ongoing partner project between the Union with its member states, and six countries of its Eastern neighbourhood –Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Mr. Várhelyi commenced his speech by stressing that “during the times of the Covd crisis, the EU has been showing solidarity with its Eastern partners from the very beginning. We have notably supplied medical equipment across the region, saving thousands of lives.”

Indeed, the C-19 has posed significant challenges for all present and future work on the EU’s Eastern Partnership policy, which over 10 years has been crucial for bringing the European Union and the partner countries closer together. Therefore, the European Commission issued a proposal on the future of the Eastern Partnership, which focuses on five main priorities under the overarching theme of building resilience.

First of the priorities Mr. Várhelyi addressed in his speech is investing in the cross-Europe dialogue and understanding, economy and connectivity. “It is essential that we further enhance support to small- and medium-sized enterprises in these countries, and also that we accelerate the investment on the extended core trans-European network.”

Second priority is the investment into the post-C-19 pan-European space in the spirit of “build back better”. This entails projects and policies that will allow for a greener recovery of the Europe’s East. Indeed, these two attributes of the post-C-19 efforts to rebuild resilient societies based on acceptance and inclusion as well as objectives of the EU’s strategy for the future. This is further confirmed by the priority number three, in the words of Commissioner Várhélyi: “Investing in transformation, which is necessary to make the most for the world.”

The European Union represents a community of member states based on shared democratic values and practices, and therefore the fourth priority of the EU’s strategy for the future of its Eastern Partnership is invest in promoting the rule of law, credible justice reforms, and efficient public administration institutions. Only well-functioning democratic institutions can allow for making the countries of this region more prosperous and thereby contribute to the well-being of their populations. Not least, the fifth priority is represented by investing in fair and inclusive societies. Together, these priorities that are identified within the EU’s future strategy are aimed at strengthening the relationship between the Union and the countries, and thereby allow for further development of the countries located in the EU’s direct neighbourhood.

“The next summit of the EU with Eastern Partnership countries is expected to take place in autumn, and will be focused on the following three pillars: recovery, resilience, and reform. We are now preparing a more detailed plan for concrete targets to shape this future together thanks to the Eastern Partnership. The targets will be supported by an economic investment plan, focused to support socio-economic recovery, which is the absolute priority in the midst of the C-19, while ensuring that the citizens stay at the heart of our policies.”

Following from the mentioned pillars for recovery, what people need most is to have stable jobs, and therefore Mr. Várhelyi mentioned the need to boost the economies and make them more competitive. The EU therefore aims at supporting small- and middle-sized businesses in the region with its budget support, which is more needed than ever. Moreover, societies that are rebuilding need resilience, for which reforms in less-effective parts of the system play a key role.

At the end of his speech, the Commissioner for European Neighbourhood and Enlargement Mr. Várhelyi remarked that the Eastern Partnership currently faces a number of challenges, whether that is the ongoing political instability in Belarus and Georgia, or the conflicts in Armenia, Azerbaijan or Moldova. This would of course necessitate sobriety, de-escalation and listening to all.

“These challenges reinforce the message of working together in order to build an area of shared democracy, prosperity, stability and peace. The C-19 is just the latest of the ever-increasing list of global challenges we all face. But the EU’s responses to these challenges only further confirm my conviction that we are always stronger together.”

The final message corresponded well with the main tone of the “Europe Future Neighbourhood at 75: Disruptions, Recalibration Continuity” conference – no future for Europe without its neighbourhood f we are any series and sincere about it.

Tereza Neuwirthova, of Leiden University, International Studies program is the EU and IOs affairs specialist that monitors the EU Commission affairs from Brussels.

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Eastern Europe

Unhappy Iran Battles for Lost Influence in South Caucasus



Events that might not matter elsewhere in the world matter quite a lot in the South Caucasus. Given a recent history of conflict, with all the bad feelings that generates, plus outside powers playing geostrategic games, and its growing importance as an energy corridor between Europe and Central Asia, the region is vulnerable. 

This has been worsened by the two-year-long Western absence of engagement. In 2020, Europe and the U.S. were barely involved as the second Nagorno-Karabakh war broke out between Armenia and Azerbaijan, leaving about 7,000 dead. With tensions now on the rise between Azerbaijan and Iran, Western uninterest is again evident, even though this might have wider ramifications for future re-alignment in the South Caucasus. 

The drumbeat of Iranian activity against Azerbaijan has been consistent in recent months. Iran is getting increasingly edgy about Israel’s presence in the South Caucasus — hardly surprising given Israel’s painfully well-targeted assassination and computer hacking campaigns against nuclear staff and facilities — and especially its growing security and military ties with Azerbaijan, with whom Iran shares a 765km (430 mile) border. Iran has also voiced concern about the presence in the region of Turkish-backed Syrian mercenaries, who were used as Azeri assault troops last year.  

Much of the anger has been played out in military exercises. The Azeri military has been busy since its victory, exercising near the strategic Lachin corridor which connects the separatist region to Armenia, and in the Caspian Sea, where it has jointly exercised with Turkish personnel. Iran, in turn, sent units to the border region this month for drills of an unstated scale. 

This week, the Azeri and Iranian foreign ministers agreed to dial down the rhetoric amid much talk of mutual understanding. Whether that involved promises regarding the Israeli presence or a pledge by Iran to abandon a newly promised road to Armenia was not stated. 

Iran’s behavior is a recognition of the long-term strategic changes caused by the Armenian defeat last year. Iran has been sidelined. Its diplomatic initiatives have failed, and it has been unwelcome in post-conflict discussions. 

It is true that Iran was never a dominant power in the South Caucasus. Unlike Russia or Turkey, the traditional power brokers, it has not had a true ally. Iran was certainly part of the calculus for states in the region, but it was not feared, like Russia or Turkey. And yet, the South Caucasus represents an area of key influence, based on millennia of close political and cultural contacts. 

Seen in this light, it is unsurprising that Iran ratcheted up tensions with Azerbaijan. Firstly, this reasserted the involvement of the Islamic Republic in the geopolitics of the South Caucasus. It was also a thinly-veiled warning to Turkey that its growing ambitions and presence in the region are seen as a threat. In Iran’s view, Turkey’s key role as an enabler of Azeri irridentism is unmistakable. 

Turkish involvement has disrupted the foundations of the South Caucasian status quo established in the 1990s. To expect Turkey to become a major power there is an overstretch, but it nevertheless worries Iran. For example, the recent Caspian Sea exercises between Azerbaijan and Turkey appear to run counter to a 2018 agreement among the sea’s littoral states stipulating no external military involvement. 

The Caspian Sea has always been regarded by Iranians as an exclusive zone shared first with the Russian Empire, later the Soviets, and presently the Russian Federation. Other littoral states play a minor role. This makes Turkish moves in the basin and the recent improvement of ties between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan an unpleasant development for Iran — fewer barriers to the Trans-Caspian Pipeline threatens the Islamic Republic’s ability to block the project.  

This is where Iranian views align almost squarely with the Kremlin’s. Both fear Turkish progress and new energy routes. The new Iranian leadership might now lean strongly toward Russia. With Russia’s backing, opposition to Turkey would become more serious; Iran’s foreign minister said this month that his country was seeking a “big jump” in relations with Russia. 

The fact is that the region is increasingly fractured and is being pulled in different directions by the greater powers around it. This state of affairs essentially dooms the prospects of pan-regional peace and cooperation initiatives. Take the latest effort by Russia and Turkey to introduce a 3+3 platform with Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, as well as Iran. Beyond excluding the West, disagreements will eventually preclude any meaningful progress. There is no unity of purpose between the six states and there are profound disagreements. 

Thus, trouble will at some point recur between Iran and Azerbaijan, and by extension Turkey. Given the current situation, and Iran’s visible discontent, it is likely it will take some kind of initiative lest it loses completely its position to Turkey and Russia. 

Author’s note: first published in cepa

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Eastern Europe

Right-wing extremist soldiers pose threat to Lithuania



It is no secret that Lithuania has become a victim of German army’s radicalization. Could this country count on its partners further or foreign military criminals threaten locals?

It is well known that Germany is one of the largest provider of troops in NATO. There are about 600 German troops in Lithuania, leading a Nato battlegroup. According to Lithuanian authorities, Lithuania needs their support to train national military and to protect NATO’s Central and Northern European member states on NATO’s eastern flank.

Two sides of the same coin should be mentioned when we look at foreign troops in Lithuania.

Though Russian threat fortunately remains hypothetical, foreign soldiers deployed in the country cause serious trouble. Thus, the German defence minister admitted that reported this year cases of racist and sexual abuse in a German platoon based in Lithuania was unacceptable.

Members of the platoon allegedly filmed an incident of sexual assault against another soldier and sang anti-Semitic songs. Later more allegations emerged of sexual and racial abuse in the platoon, including soldiers singing a song to mark Adolf Hitler’s birthday on 20 April this year.

It turned out that German media report that far-right abuses among the Lithuania-based troops had already surfaced last year. In one case, a soldier allegedly racially abused a non-white fellow soldier. In another case, four German soldiers smoking outside a Lithuanian barracks made animal noises when a black soldier walked past.

Lithuania’s Defence Minister Arvydas Anušauskas said later that the investigation was carried out by Germany and that Lithuania was not privy to its details. The more so, Lithuania is not privy to its details even now. “We are not being informed about the details of the investigation. […] The Lithuanian military is not involved in the investigation, nor can it be,” Anušauskas told reporters, stressing that Germany was in charge of the matter.

Ms Kramp-Karrenbauer, German defence minister, said that these misdeeds would be severely prosecuted and punished. Time has passed, and the details are not still known.

It should be said Germany has for years struggled to modernize its military as it becomes more involved in Nato operations. Nevertheless problems existed and have not been solved yet. According to the annual report on the state of the Bundeswehr made in 2020 by Hans-Peter Bartel, then armed forces commissioner for the German Bundestag, Germany’s army “has too little materiel, too few personnel and too much bureaucracy despite a big budget increase.” Mr Bartels’ report made clear that the Bundeswehr continues to be plagued by deep-seated problems. Recruitment remains a key problem. Mr Bartels said 20,000 army posts remained unfilled, and last year the number of newly recruited soldiers stood at just over 20,000, 3,000 fewer than in 2017. The other problem is radicalization of the armed forces.

Apparently, moral requirements for those wishing to serve in the German army have been reduced. Federal Volunteer Military Service Candidate must be subjected to a thorough medical examination. Desirable to play sports, have a driver’s license and be able to eliminate minor malfunctions in the motor, to speak at least one foreign language, have experience of communicating with representatives of other nationalities, be initiative and independent. After the general the interview follows the establishment of the candidate’s suitability for service in certain types of armed forces, taking into account his wishes. Further candidate passes a test on a computer. He will be asked if he wants study a foreign language and attend courses, then serve in German French, German-Dutch formations or institutions NATO.

So, any strong and healthy person could be admitted, even though he or she could adhere to far-right views or even belong to neo-Nazi groups. Such persons served in Lithuania and, probably, serve now and pose a real threat to Lithuanian military, local population. Neo-Nazism leads to cultivating racial inequalities. The main goal of the neo-Nazis is to cause disorder and chaos in the country, as well as to take over the army and security organs. Lithuanian authorities should fully realize this threat and do not turn a blind eye to the criminal behaviour of foreign military in Lithuania. There is no room to excessive loyalty in this case.

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Eastern Europe

Lithuanian foreign policy: Image is everything



It seems as if Lithuanian government takes care of its image in the eyes of EU and NATO partners much more than of its population. Over the past year Lithuania managed to quarrel with such important for its economy states like China and Belarus, condemned Hungary for the ban on the distribution of images of LGBT relationships among minors, Latvia and Estonia for refusing to completely cut energy from Belarus. Judging by the actions of the authorities, Lithuania has few tools to achieve its political goals. So, it failed to find a compromise and to maintain mutually beneficial relations with economic partners and neighbours. The authorities decided to achieve the desired results by demanding from EU and NATO member states various sanctions for those countries that, in their opinion, are misbehaving.

Calling for sanctions and demonstrating its “enduring political will”, Lithuania exposed the welfare of its own population. Thus, district heating prices will surge by around 30 percent on average across Lithuania.

The more so, prices for biofuels, which make up 70 percent of heat production on average, are now about 40 higher than last year, Taparauskas, a member of the National Energy Regulatory Council (VERT) said.

“Such a huge jump in prices at such a tense time could threaten a social crisis and an even greater increase in tensions in society. We believe that the state must take responsibility for managing rising prices, especially given the situation of the most vulnerable members of society and the potential consequences for them. All the more so as companies such as Ignitis or Vilnius heating networks “has not only financial resources, but also a certain duty again,” sums up Lukas Tamulynas, the chairman of the LSDP Momentum Vilnius movement.

It should be said, that according to the Lithuanian Department of Statistics, prices for consumer goods and services have been rising for the eighth month in a row. According to the latest figures, the annual inflation rate is five percent.

Earlier it became known that in 2020 every fifth inhabitant of Lithuania was below the poverty risk line.

Pensioners are considered one of the most vulnerable groups in Lithuania. In 2019, Lithuania was included in the top five EU anti-leaders in terms of poverty risk for pensioners. The share of people over 65 at risk of poverty was 18.7 percent.

In such situation sanctions imposed on neighbouring countries which tightly connected to Lithuanian economy and directly influence the welfare of people in Lithuania are at least damaging. The more so, according Vladimir Andreichenko, the speaker of the House of Representatives of the Belarus parliament, “the unification of the economic potentials of Minsk and Moscow would be a good response to sanctions.” It turned out that Lithuania itself makes its opponents stronger. Such counter-productiveness is obvious to everyone in Lithuania except for its authorities.

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