Connect with us

Defense

New START and the Prospects for Weapons Limitation in Russian-American Relations

Published

on

Now that the New START Treaty is extended, the parties need to make efforts to work out a realistic new agreement that takes into account as many of the parties’ concerns as possible, but it should not set impossible tasks as a precondition, writes Valdai Club expert Evgeny Buzhinsky.

Following the US withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the difficulties with the extension of the Prague Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (New START), which arose during the Trump administration, it seemed that nearly fifty years of nuclear arms control history had come to an end.

If New START had ceased to exist on February 5 this year, the nuclear arms control system would have been completely dismantled, after which the question of the viability of the NPT and CTBT would obviously arise.

In addition, the destruction of this system would most likely lead to an uncontrolled multilateral arms race, including strategic land-based and submarine-based missiles, medium-range missiles, non-strategic nuclear weapons, as well as space strike systems, cyber and laser weapons, and many other innovative weapons systems.

As a consequence, the concept of strategic stability based on transparency and predictability would disappear and the threat of armed conflicts would increase, which could well develop into a global nuclear catastrophe.

Fortunately, the above-described scenario for the development of events in the field of nuclear arms control has not been implemented.

US President Joe Biden, almost immediately after taking office, made a decision to extend the New START Treaty for five years practically on Russian terms, i.e. in the form in which it was signed in 2010. The only reason the Americans conditioned the extension of the Treaty was the start of negotiations on the next agreement in the field of nuclear weapons, during which, obviously, all the questions that the previous administration put as preconditions for the extension of New START will be raised, namely, the involvement of China, limitation of new types of nuclear weapons that have appeared in the arsenal of the Russian Federation and, most importantly, limitation of non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW). In turn, Russia also has its own concerns, namely the US global missile defence system and American plans to militarise space. In early February, the parties exchanged diplomatic notes on the completion of domestic procedures and the New START Treaty entered into force for the next five years, until February 5, 2026.

Yes, the existing system of nuclear arms control is bilateral, but only for one reason: the nuclear potential of the United States and Russia are incomparable with those of other countries that possess nuclear weapons. At the same time, the idea of translating this system into a multilateral format is becoming more and more popular.

Moreover, some very authoritative experts argue that in modern conditions it has become impossible to control new types of weapons and military technologies using old treaties and agreements, which should be replaced by multilateral forums, where the preconditions for nuclear disarmament should be developed and the foundations of nuclear deterrence should be strengthened, based on transparency and predictability. In their opinion, the current arms control crisis was inevitable and does not pose a great danger; it is possible to exist without formal agreements on the arms limitation and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Do these ideas have a chance of being implemented in the foreseeable future? I am certain that they don’t.

First, multilateral nuclear arms control, as well as multilateral nuclear deterrence, is extremely unlikely, due to the clear superiority in nuclear weapons of the United States and Russia, which account for 92 percent of the global nuclear potential (there are 14,500 nuclear warheads in the world, including those in reserve and pending disposal).

Second, there is virtually no such thing as multilateral nuclear deterrence. For example, India and Israel are not concerned with the size and condition of the nuclear capabilities of Russia, the United States, Britain and France. India is concerned about the nuclear capabilities of China and Pakistan, and Israel is concerned about the nuclear capabilities of Pakistan and Iran’s military nuclear programme. Russia is pursuing a policy of nuclear deterrence of NATO forces led by the United States and possibly Pakistan, but not China or India. China, in turn, is aiming at nuclear deterrence for the United States and India, but not Pakistan and Russia.

Third, it is practically impossible to create a multilateral system of control over the respective arsenals of the countries possessing nuclear weapons, due to their obvious imbalances.

And finally, the beginning of multilateral negotiations of the actual possessors of nuclear weapons should be preceded by the recognition of at least India and Pakistan (and possibly Israel and the DPRK) as nuclear powers in the context of the NPT.

I think that the existing model of nuclear arms control has not completely outlived its usefulness.

It should be noted that for decades the strategic offensive arms reduction treaties between the United States and the USSR/Russia ensured strategic stability by maintaining a balance of nuclear potentials and by providing for the exchange of comprehensive information on the status of strategic offensive nuclear forces and plans for their modernisation. This stability was achieved via hundreds of on-site inspections, transmitted notifications on the status and transportation of nuclear weapons, and the exchange of telemetry information on the launches of ICBMs and SLBMs.

The accumulated experience indicates that the absence of this information would inevitably lead to an overestimation of the capabilities of the opposite side and, consequently, to a quantitative and qualitative increase in their own arsenals. It is believed that in the absence of the Treaty, Russia and the United States can compensate the lack of information at the expense of their national capability. The possibilities for space exploration are rather limited. For example, satellites are unable to determine the number of warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs.

After the extension of the existing Treaty, the parties have already agreed to begin consultations on the conclusion of a new agreement which would possibly cover of additional types of weapons.

There are a number of weapons of concern to each of the parties to be included into a possible further agreement.

First of all, these are air, land and sea-based cruise missiles with a range of more than 600 km, space-based strike systems, hypersonic gliding units, unmanned aerial attack vehicles, as well as uninhabited underwater strike systems such as Russia, Poseidon. Some of them, for example, Russia’s Avangard hypersonic gliding block, can be relatively easily incorporated into the warhead counting rules, since they are slated to be equipped with heavy Sarmat ICBMs. The inclusion into common ceilings for air-launched cruise missiles, which was already provided for by the provisions of START I and START II, should not be problematic either. Technically mutually acceptable solutions can also be found for land-based and sea-based cruise missiles.

The situation is more complicated with space strike systems and attack UAVs, which have never been the subject of the restrictive provisions of any arms control agreements. At the same time, with regard to offensive and defensive space-based systems, the greatest concern for both Russia and the United States is caused by anti-satellite systems, which include non-nuclear interceptor missiles, laser components and electronic warfare components. This type of weapon poses the main threat to missile attack warning systems.

The issue of unmanned underwater systems is even more difficult, since any agreements in the field of arms control are based on the principles of parity and reciprocity. If one of the parties has such a system and the other does not, reaching a mutually acceptable agreement seems problematic.

And, of course, a completely special type of armed struggle is cyber weapons; the achievement of any restrictive agreements regarding them is hardly possible due to a whole range of organisational (inability to identify a state or non-state source of threat) and technical difficulties.

In conclusion, it is better to mention two more types of weapons that Russia and the United States insist on limiting. For Russia, these are anti-missile systems and the deployment of combat systems in space, for the United States — non-strategic nuclear weapons. It is hardly possible to restrict one of these types without affecting others in the foreseeable future. At the same time, the most difficult issue is the limitation of NSNW. The fact is that all the Russian NSNW are in storage, while the American arsenal is warehoused, in a partly deployed state at air force bases in five Western European countries. Neither Russia nor the United States have any experience in controlling nuclear warheads in storage. Moreover, even technically, neither Russian nor American experts clearly understand how this can be done. There are various theoretical options for implementing such control, but they are either technically very difficult or extremely expensive. In addition, if the problem of controlling warheads in storage is resolved, the Americans would either have to withdraw their NSNW to US soil and store it there, or allow Russian inspectors to visit their air bases in Europe.

Some experts propose, in parallel with the negotiations on a new agreement on strategic offensive arms control, resuming bilateral consultations on strategic stability issues, during which doctrinal issues would be discussed, including the sides’ views on the use of nuclear weapons, including non-strategic ones, the issue of missile defence, strategic high-precision weapons systems in conventional equipment, hypersonic weapons, the possible militarisation of outer space and cyber security.

In the context of the ongoing US accusations of Russian and Chinese hacking of one or another system of state and party administration, the parties simply need to agree on a ban on cyber-attacks against critical infrastructure related to nuclear weapons: communications satellites, missile warning systems, attack, control and communication systems.

Now that the New START Treaty is extended, the parties need to make efforts to work out a realistic new agreement that takes into account as many of the parties’ concerns as possible, but it should not set impossible tasks as a precondition.

From our partner RIAC

Continue Reading
Comments

Defense

SCO: Potential and Challenges to Regional Integration

Published

on

The modern system of the world is facing the state of imbalance as it passes through the phase of change and evolutionary development. Globalization has emerged as a main trend in international relations and deepens the interdependency between countries of the world. The rapid increasing interdependency contributes for countries to get close one another and to protect their interests. The desire of extending economic and trade activities, access to capital market and the contracts for investment are encouraging countries to work together and to cooperate. The cooperation for economic activities, trade, transportation, information, communication and transmission are making the countries and regions unite.

Regionalization has emerged as a new form and process of interaction among the countries of the world. Many countries are striving to establish a system of cooperation with their neighbors to enhance their potential and also to facilitate each other for solution regional issues. Thereby, the regionalization has taken diverse form of regional integration including the establishment of multinational regulatory system and flexible model of cooperation and partnership in different areas and at different levels. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)is an outstanding example of regionalization and hybrid and new mixed model of interstate multifaceted cooperation.

SCO established in 2001 to meet the objectives of regional security and stability. Since the establishment the organization continued evolutionary path of multifaceted and multilateral cooperation. It does not desire to achieve a specific target level of collaboration, but it move systematically along the path of finding the common attribute in resolving the regional issues. The SCO also has potential of unique perimeters, new opportunities and directions of further development in the areas of security, economics and other mutual interests. The organization comprises of 43 percent of world population and 25 percent of global GDP. Similarly, it covers 80 percent area of Eurasia. Although the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is a young organization than the other international associations but it has the ability to achieve mutually beneficial solution of political, economic and security issues and it also leads to accumulation of unresolved issues of the region. However, the size never conflates with influence and effectiveness. In fact, the SCO is also facing hamstring by major regional economies and powers with their own interests in the region and mistrust between member states.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is often stated as a club of autocrat powers. The members follow the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other states. However, China and Russia adhere this principle rhetorical basis but not in reality. Both the countries have history of interference and violence of neighboring countries. The member states rely on the principle to push back at Western and local civil society effort to promote responsible governance, human rights and democratic norms in the region. Since the formation, the organization holds a broad goal of fighting against terrorism, extremism and separation. Furthermore, the convention of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization invokes the principle of United Nation charter to help clock the organization’s founding document with international legitimacy identifying all three equal threats to state security, public order and the safety of citizen. The member states also have commitment to share information about terrorist activities and threats and to make request to act against individuals or organization. Subsequent declaration of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and agreements of the member states have simply added to the list of principles and their responsibilities. Since the surveillance of new technology the member states moved beyond the simple method of information exchange to best practice of monitoring and tackling.

On the other hand, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has had very little achievements to strength domestic security despite the convergence of member states. The RATS (Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure) based in Tashkent Uzbekistan has been coordinating to combat these three evils Terrorism, Extremism, Separation). The RATS provides a platform and services to member states particularly Central Asian States of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan for sharing intelligence but it made very little progress. Furthermore the RATS shares intelligence with member states but the terrorist threats are increasing.

Since the SCO framed, the high hopes of diplomatic relations, effective economic and security cooperation were made by the founding members. It was also expected that the organization may bring regional cohesion to Central Asia and it would create great opportunities for the regional states of mutual trade and economic activities, and it will lead towards security promotion of the region. The founding partners of the SCO had ambitious plan for the transforming the organization in to a cohesive bloc with political and economic integration. There was also a hope that the organization may counter influence of EAEU and CSTO and will maintain its own influence in the region. But Russia wanted to dilute Chinese influence within the organization by advocating its expansion in to south Asia and other neighboring states.The SCO has organized many joint military exercises and efforts but could get any significant level of achievements because they were symbolic and political moves. To encounter any kind of security crisis and military operation in the region, there is a need of political logistical and operational system. For example during the unrest in Kyrgyzstan in 2010, the organization delivered an anodyne statement for peace; security and stability, additionally, China and Russia were hesitating to get involved. While, the other states and powers tried to play their role to tackle the crisis.

China and Russia are the primary drivers of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization but have different visions for this organization. Although they share common interest of regional stability within the organization but at the same time their geopolitical interests pull them in different directions. These differences are a big question mark, how the organization would achieve their objective and would evolve?  Russia thinks of SCO as a security to prevent encroachment by outside powers NATO, UE and United States, and also a tool to maintain its geopolitical domination on the region and less than a partnership in Central Asia.

 Since the post-cold war, the economic imbalance has increased between China and Russia. China is increasing its economic influence in Central Asia while Russia is worrying about its security issues. Moscow hopes that the Pakistan and Indian including in Shanghai Cooperation Organization may bind Beijing to more work for the security and stability of the region than to enhance its own economic influence in the region. As the issues of uncertainty in Afghanistan, Pakistan-India confrontation and instability on China-India border are a clear threat to the interests of all member states. China is also suspected about the Russian ability to act as the security manager in an area where china has invested and is investing billions of dollars. On the other hand, Beijing may not be able rely on extra regional powers to secure and prevent Central Asia from the security deteriorated environment. However, SCO has not made any mechanism or approach to play a decisive security role in Afghanistan post withdrawal United States and NATO force.

China thinks that economic activities and investment can mitigate instability. Shanghai Cooperation Organization also a tool to promote Chinese soft power and economic influence in Central Asia. Therefore, Beijing has been continued its investment in the region and through OBOR and SCO. Although the Central Asian States are receptive to these Chinese overture but they are also keen to prevent SCO to become an anti-western bloc because the states feel the need of Western powers to counterbalance their powerful neighbors. Moscow already has upended its relationship with West over the Ukraine issue, thus, in these circumstances; Russia has no other choice to acquiesce Chinese increasing economic influence in the region. Moscow may pull itself from the Chinese efforts to multiply its security role in the region. The current clash on border between China-India put Russia in to awkward position. Russia does not like tension between China and India but it suggests dialogues and appears to have little interest mediating. Russia never wanted that China convert SCO in to an economic and trade bloc while China never wanted that Russia transform the organization into a military alliance. It is hard to imagine that Shanghai Cooperation Organization may be able to deliver its original goals eradicate extremism, terrorism and separation through mutual cooperation because it appears with the major focus on economic integration across the Eurasian region.

Now the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is coexisting with other regional initiatives like OBOR, AIIB, CSTO and EAEU. Both China and Russia have expressed their intentions to work within these institutions.     Since the formation, the SCO is facing many structural and organizational challenges. All members have their own interests and values of independence and sovereignty, which are difficult to reconcile with collective security particular Pakistan and India, China and India have mutual mistrust and all Central States also have territorial issues with one another.  

Continue Reading

Defense

Possibility of an alliance in Sino-Russian Relations

Published

on

The defense ministers’ meeting of NATO member states was held in video format a few days ago (17/2/2021). During the period, the discussion focused on the topic of “China-Russia threat” and believed that a “global approach” should be adopted to curb China-Russia expansion.” At the same time, this meeting also attracted widespread attention from outsiders.

Senior Russian researcher, Vasily Kashin published an article in which he emphasized that when there is a risk of military conflict with the United States, China and Russia should immediately form a military alliance. And share the missile early warning data collected by themselves.

According to the article, Sino-Russian military technology cooperation has always been quite secretive, and because Russian companies have participated in the development of China’s ballistic missile early warning system, China and Russia are fully able to establish data sharing on this basis and establish their own global Missile defense network. Russian media subsequently reported on it and said that Russia has repeatedly proposed the formation of a Sino-Russian military alliance, and even President Putin himself has conveyed the idea of ​​an alliance with China.

It should be noted that the containment and suppression of China and Russia by Western countries do not stop there. To provoke the territorial sovereignty of China and Russia, US aircraft and warships have already on the doorstep of China and Russia, carrying out under the banner of freedom of navigation (FON).

Intensive reconnaissance activities, this behavior has seriously threatened the national security of China and Russia but also undermined global peace and stability. To build a global encirclement of China, the United States is also actively wooing other countries to join its anti-China front in an attempt to reorganize the eight-nation coalition forces to contain China.

It can be said that Western countries are pressing on with China and Russia step by step. As the US continues to escalate its suppression, the security situation around China and Russia will deteriorate again in the future, and the two sides may even break out head-on conflict.

Faced with the complex situation in the Indo-Pacific, China and Russia also need to strengthen cooperation in the field of national defense. After all, the two countries are originally a comprehensive strategic partnership of cooperation in the new era. In recent years, the strategic mutual trust between the two sides has been deepening and several rounds of military exercises have been jointly conducted.

Therefore, the opinions of Russian experts are in line with the future development trend of Sino-Russian relations. As a friendly country, Sino-Russian relations will only continue to develop for the better, and the possibility of China and Russia forming a military alliance in the future is not ruled out. The Chinese people also have extremely high expectations for the future direction of Sino-Russian relations. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi once stated that Sino-Russian cooperation “has no end, no restricted zone, and no upper limit” (2/1/2020).

Foreign media believe that this means China’s non-aligned position or non-alignment Applying the Sino-Russian relationship again means that Wang Yi recognized the possibility of China and Russia forming a military alliance. Both China and Russia are peace-loving world powers and have always been committed to maintaining the peace and stability of the regional situation.

Therefore, even if a military alliance is concluded in the future, they will never follow a hegemonic line. In the final analysis, how China and Russia cooperate depends on changes in the international situation. Instead of worrying about the “threat” brought by the rise of China and Russia, Western countries should stop deteriorating the regional situation and work with China and Russia to maintain world peace and stability. Otherwise, this “heart disease” will never be eliminated.

It is worth noting that the Western countries, led by the United States, have a very playful attitude towards Sino-Russian cooperation. They have been using various means to sow discord between China and Russia in an attempt to prevent the establishment of a Sino-Russian military alliance.

However, the continuous deepening of cooperation between China and Russia is a historical development. The inevitable result of this is that no matter how obstructed by Western countries, Sino-Russian relations will continue to develop for the better, without any interference from external forces.

Continue Reading

Defense

The world arms sales market

Published

on

New data from SIPRI’s Arms Industry Database, released last December, show that arms sales by the world’s twenty-five largest defence equipment and military services companies totalled 361 billion dollars in 2019. This is an 8.5% increase in real terms in arms sales compared to 2018. All this emerged from the studies by the Stockholm-based International Peace Research Institute founded in 1966.

In 2019 the top five arms companies were all based in the United States: Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon and General Dynamics. These five companies together recorded 166 billion dollars in annual sales. In total, twelve U.S. companies rank among the top 25 for 2019, accounting for 61% of total sales.

For the first time, a Middle East company appears in the top twenty-five. Edge, based in the United Arab Emirates, was established in 2019 from the merger of over twenty-five smaller companies. It ranks twenty-second and accounts for 1.3% of the total arms sales of the top twenty-five companies. This demonstrates that oil revenues in the Near and Middle East are also invested in businesses that produce jobs and money, and are not just accumulated for the personal expenses of the ruling elite. Edge is an example of how high domestic demand for military products and services, combined with the desire to become less dependent on foreign suppliers, is driving the growth of arms companies in the Near and Middle East.

Another newcomer to the top twenty-five list in 2019 was L3Harris Technologies (ranking tenth). It was created by the merger of two U.S. companies that were both in the top twenty-five in 2018, namely Harris Corporation and L3 Technologies.

The top twenty-five list also includes four Chinese companies. Three of them are in the top ten: Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC, ranking sixth), China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC, ranking eighth) and China North Industries Group Corporation (Norinco, ranking ninth).

The combined revenue of the four Chinese companies in the top 25 list, which also includes China South Industries Group Corporation (CSGC, ranking twenty-fourth), grew by 4.8% between 2018 and 2019. Chinese arms companies are benefiting from the People’s Liberation Army’s military modernisation programmes.

Conversely, the revenues of the two Russian companies in the top twenty-five, namely Almaz-Antey and United Shipbuilding, declined between 2018 and 2019, for a combined total amount of 634 million dollars. A third Russian company, United Aircraft, lost 1.3 billion dollars in sales and dropped off the top 25 list in 2019. Domestic competition and reduced government spending on modernising the Russian Navy were two of the main challenges for United Shipbuilding in 2019.

After the United States, the People’s Republic of China recorded the second largest share of 2019 arms sales by the top twenty-five companies, accounting for 16%.

The six Western European companies together account for 18%. The two Russian companies in the ranking account for 3.9%. Nineteen of the top twenty-five arms companies increased arms sales in 2019 compared to 2018. The largest absolute increase in arms sales revenue was recorded by Lockheed Martin: 5.1 billion dollars (11% in real terms). The largest percentage increase in annual arms sales (105%) was reported by French manufacturer Dassault Aviation Group. A strong increase in export deliveries of Rafale fighter aircraft pushed Dassault Aviation into the top 25 arms companies for the first time.

The Sipri report also examines the international presence of the 15 largest arms companies in 2019. These companies are present in a total of 49 countries, through majority-owned subsidiaries, joint ventures and research facilities. With a global presence in 24 countries each, Thales and Airbus are the two most internationalised companies, followed closely by Boeing (21 countries), Leonardo (21 countries) and Lockheed Martin (19 countries).

The United Kingdom, Australia, the United States, Canada and Germany host the largest number of these companies.

Outside the North American and Western European arms industries, the largest number of foreign corporate entities is hosted by Australia (38), Saudi Arabia (24), India (13), Singapore (11), United Arab Emirates (11) and Brazil (10).

There are many reasons why arms companies might want to establish themselves abroad, including better access to growing markets, collaborative arms programmes or policies in host countries that link arms purchases to technology transfers.

Of the 49 countries hosting foreign industries in the top 15 arms companies, seventeen countries are low- and middle-income ones. Southern countries seeking to restart their arms production programmes have welcomed foreign arms companies as a means for benefiting from technology transfers.

Chinese and Russian arms companies in the top 15 list have only a limited international presence. Sanctions against Russian companies and government limits on takeovers by Chinese companies seem to have played a role in limiting their global presence.

All these data were collected by the Sipri Arms Industry Database founded in 1989. At that time, it excluded data for companies in Eastern European socialist countries, including the Soviet Union. The updated version contains 2015 data, including data for companies in the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation. An archive of the first one hundred data sets for the period 2002-2018 is available on the Sipri website (www.sipri.org), while for the first twenty-five ones it has been updated with the latest available information.

Arms sales are defined as sales of military goods and services to military customers at national and international levels. Unless otherwise stated, all changes are expressed in real terms. Comparisons (e.g. between 2018 and 2019 or between 2015 and 2019) are based on the groups of companies listed in the respective year (i.e. the comparison is between different groups of companies).

For 2020-2021, Sipri is releasing its dataset on arms sales of the world’s largest companies along with the results of a mapping on the internationalisation of this industry. For this reason, a new dataset was created, including 400 subsidiaries, joint ventures and research facilities linked to the top fifteen arms companies in 2019. Data sources included corporate investment documents, information on company websites, public records and newspaper and magazine articles.

To be included in the mapping, an arms industry must have been active for the majority of its fiscal year, as well as be located in a country other than that in which its parent company is headquartered and also (i) produce military goods or provide military services to military customers; (ii) produce or provide services for dual-use goods to military customers.

This is the first of the key data handovers in view of the publication of the next Sipri Yearbook in mid-2021. Before that, Sipri will release its data on international arms transfers (details of all major international arms transfers in 2020), as well as its data on global military expenditure (comprehensive information on global, regional and national trends in military expenditure). We will inform readers of all this in due course.

Continue Reading

Publications

Latest

Middle East59 mins ago

Will the New Interim Government Lead Libya Out Of A Long-Standing Crisis?

Last week, February 17, Libyans celebrated the 10th anniversary of the revolution that ousted the long time leader Colonel Muammar...

Economy3 hours ago

Kickstarting the U.S. Economy: A Rebound or Further Inequity?

The global economy has seen its fair share of peculiarity in recent years; much attributed to the developing economies rather...

Health & Wellness5 hours ago

Over 500,000 people have been inoculated against COVID-19 in Moscow

The number of people who wish to receive a COVID-19 vaccination in Moscow has reached half a million, and over...

Middle East9 hours ago

Gender in the GCC — The Reform Agenda Continues

In my previous Op-Ed about the road map for reforms in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), I talked about the...

Human Rights13 hours ago

Belarus human rights situation deteriorating further

A “systematic crackdown” against dissent in Belarus is continuing, months since the country’s disputed presidential election last year, UN rights...

Health & Wellness15 hours ago

Natalia Vodianova joins UNFPA to tackle stigma and advance women’s health

The UN’s sexual and reproductive health agency, UNFPA, on Wednesday appointed supermodel, philanthropist, and impact investor Natalia Vodianova as its...

Defense17 hours ago

SCO: Potential and Challenges to Regional Integration

The modern system of the world is facing the state of imbalance as it passes through the phase of change...

Trending