This article takes Australian, Russian and Chinese media as three examples to differentiate media systems and elucidate their political or economic context to understand media systems globally. Arguably, the concept of media systems “does not possess a normative or even generally accepted definition“, mainly because the notion is posited on existing publications and empirical research rather than normative theory. More precisely, “this is so for two reasons: firstly—because of the term’s content specificity; secondly—because it is dynamic and variable in time and therefore difficult to precisely define“.
Drawing on the current research of advanced capitalist democracies in Western Europe and North America, Hallin and Mancini propose “there are two main elements of the conceptual framework of Comparing Media Systems (setting aside political-social system variables): the set of four “dimensions” of comparison, and the typology of three models that summarizes what we see as the distinctive patterns of media system development among our 18 cases”. Furthermore, they clarify the four major dimensions that can be compared in different media systems: “first, the development of media markets, with particular emphasis on the strong or weak development of a mass circulation press; second political parallelism; that is, the degree and nature of the links between the media and political parties or, more broadly, the extent to which the media system reflects the major political divisions in society; third, the development of journalistic professionalism; and fourth, the degree and nature of state intervention in the media system”.
Drawing on the four dimensions, Hallin and Mancini summarize three modules from Western Europe and North America: “the Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist Model, the North/Central European or Democratic Corporatist Model,
and the North Atlantic or Liberal Model”, which will be elaborated on by the next tables.
Table 1 Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist Model
|Country Examples||France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain|
|Newspaper Industry||Low newspaper circulation; elite politically oriented press|
|Political Parallelism||High political parallelism; external pluralism, commentary-oriented journalism; parliamentary or government model of broadcast governance—politics-over-broadcasting systems|
|Professionalization||Weaker professionalization; instrumentalization|
|Role of the State in Media System||Strong state intervention; press subsidies in France and Italy; periods of censorship; “savage deregulation” (except France)|
Table 2 North/Central European or Democratic Corporatist Model
|Country Examples||Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland|
|Newspaper Industry||High newspaper circulation; early development of mass-circulation press|
|Political Parallelism||External pluralism, especially in the national press; historically strong party press; a shift toward neutral commercial <p>press; the politics-in-broadcasting system with substantial autonomy|
|Professionalization||Strong professionalization; institutionalized self-regulation|
|Role of the State in Media System||Strong state intervention but with protection for press freedom; press subsidies, robust in Scandinavia; strong public-service broadcasting|
Table 3 North Atlantic or Liberal Model
|Country Examples||Britain, the United States, Canada, Ireland|
|Newspaper Industry||Medium newspaper circulation; early development of mass circulation commercial press|
|Political Parallelism||Neutral commercial press; information-oriented journalism; internal pluralism (but external pluralism in Britain); professional model of broadcast governance—formally autonomous system|
|Professionalization||Strong professionalization; noninstitutionalized self-regulation|
|Role of the State in Media System||A market dominated (except strong public broadcasting in Britain, Ireland)|
Source: created by the author of this thesis and based on Hallin and Mancini.
Furthermore, it is unfeasible to simply apply the conceptual framework to other countries without appropriate modification. In fact, the “four dimensions” and “three models” are just perfect types, only loosely matched by the media systems of different countries. The ultimate purpose is not to classify individual media systems but to identify the “characteristic patterns of relationship between system characteristics“. Consequently, these inherent patterns of media systems offer “a theoretical synthesis and a framework for comparative research on the media and political systems“.
The Australian media system as an outlier in the Liberal Model
Hallin and Mancini illustrate that Australia should be another example of the Liberal Model. It is because firstly, the “Liberal Model is the broadest, attempting to bridge the trans-Atlantic gulf that regularly emerges in the comparative literature“. Secondly, Australia has historical connections with the UK and the US regarding “early democratization and highly professionalized information-based journalism“. This association has led to strong characteristics of Anglo-American conventions in the Australian media structure, with the quintessence of a dual media system. The binary design has combined the UK-style PSBs (public service broadcasters) such as ABC and SBS (Special Broadcasting Service) with the “US-style commercial networks“. Thirdly, Australia is famous for one of the highest commercial media ownership concentration rates globally, particularly in the newspaper area.
However, the Australian media system does not offer the quintessence of the Liberal Model. Jones and Pusey apply the Liberal Model to the Australian media system and identify four remarkable discrepancies. More precisely, compared to the Liberal Model, Australia has “historically late professionalization of journalism; comparatively low levels of education of journalists; low per capita investment in PSBs; poor regulation for accuracy and impartiality of commercial broadcast journalism; and slow development of relevant bourgeois liberal institutional conventions and rational-legal authority, e.g., formal recognition of freedom of the press”.
Furthermore, Jones and Pusey contend that Australia has several similar features with the Polarized Pluralist Model, especially in clientelism. Based on the definition of Hallin and Mancini, “clientelism tends to be associated with instrumentalization of both public and private media. In the case of public media, appointments tend to be made more based on political loyalty than purely professional criteria”. More concretely, Jones and Pusey outline the following examples to indicate the similarities of the Australian media system with the Polarized Pluralist Model: “the widely accepted recognition that appointments to the ABC Board have been more often than not party-political; the infamous ‘Murdoch amendments’ by the Fraser government to broadcasting legislation in the late 1970s to facilitate Murdoch’s concentration of television ownership; and the long history of proprietorial intervention in the political world”.
Thus, to this extent, there is a certain degree of political parallelism in the Australian media system. However, the Australian one does not match the Polarized Pluralist Model in some key areas. More precisely”, Australia does not have a highly polarized political culture and a strong tradition of mass-circulation party newspapers“. Therefore, it is arguable to perceive the Australian media system as an outlier of the Liberal Model, which can be shown in the following figure:
Figure 1 Relation of individual cases to the three models
Source: derived from Jones and Pusey.
Beyond the West: the unique Russian and Chinese media model
Although the Australian media system is an outlier in the Liberal Model, it still belongs to the typology and scope of the three models, posited on the empirical reality of Western Europe and North America. However, bringing the Russian and Chinese media models into this global comparative apparatus involves two distinct and peculiar systems into the Western-centric framework. Thus, the three models’ classification cannot apply to Russia and China’s two unique systems. Nevertheless, the four dimensions of comparison as a tool for analyzing systemic characteristics still work. However, they are not perfect and need to be modified in the application, as mentioned before.
The Russian media system as a statist commercialized model
After the disintegration of the USSR, Russia took a series of measures to adopt elements of the Western media apparatus, such as “abolition of censorship, freedom of press concepts and related legislation, privatization of media, a shift to more objective reporting, and increasing control by journalists and editorial boards over news production“. However, arguing that the Russian media have been westernized only shows “a poor understanding of” the legacy of the Soviet Union and the “complexity and dissimilarities of the post-Soviet society“, ignoring the most influential factor in the Russian media system: the state. Arguably, the interplay between the state and media has defined the essence and main features of the Russian media system. Historically and culturally, “in Russian public communications, relations between the state and a citizen have involved a clear subordination of the individual to a social power that has always been associated in the Russian context with the state“.
Thus, even though the Polarized Pluralist Model is the most similar of the three models to the Russian one, the Russian media system is still far from the Mediterranean apparatus. The Russian state’s role has exceedingly overshadowed that of the Mediterranean states, suggesting that they cannot be classified as the same type. Ivanitsky differs the Russian media system from the Polarized Pluralist Model in that “it is the state which defined the particular journalism modes such as Court journalism, Imperial journalism, Communist Party journalism in Russian history. Currently, while liberating the media’s economic activity, the state is not ready to relax the control over the content”.
This overwhelming influence of the state also reflects in Russian political parallelism. Although new political parties have appeared after the formation of the Russian Federation, Oates argues that “rather than encouraging the growth and the development of a range of political parties, media outlets in Russia have worked at supporting relatively narrow groups of elites”, part of which have been formed due to the privatization. These elites, combining old political and new emerging business elites, “became key players in the media scene“. More concretely, they created “a particularly Russian form of political parallelism” by using “political media as traditional instruments of political elite management“. Besides, due to the dominant role of the state in Russia, “media, particularly television, have been used to subvert the development of a pluralistic party system“.
Furthermore, in terms of the media industry, the influence of the state is also ubiquitous. Ivanitsky believes the state “has produced practically unsolvable tension for the media themselves trying to function both as commercial enterprises and as institutions of the society”, even though Russia has achieved rapid development in its advertising and media market. Hypothetically, these tensions between the media and the state are supposed to be the “decentralized market competition as a vital antidote to political despotism“. However, Vartanovaargues that “the aims of the state converged with those of the advertising industry, and commercially determined content became both a means of increasing depoliticization and instrumentalization of political communication, and of stimulating consumption”. From another angle, de Smaele believes that the Western influence on Russian media has only been limited to market demand, with the lack of Western notions such as “independent Fourth Estate”.
As for Russia’s professionalization, “journalism as a profession had a rather late start” with a strong censorship history, thus resulting in a self-censorship tradition until now. Another factor contributing to the self-censorship is that “formally declared freedom and autonomy of media professionals came into conflict with the efforts of the new owners”, deeply connected to the state and political elites, “to use these new professional values to further their own interests” rather than the public interests and social responsibility. Thus, to notch economic successes and avoid potential political risks, Russian journalists have become increasingly market-driven and apathetic to politics. Due to the different “professional identity“, Russian journalists have a dissimilar “literary style and attitude to facts and opinions“, which has restrained them from integration into Western journalism.
However, this statist media policy does not mean there is no freedom regarding the Russian media system’s political news. Admittedly, the state has strong influences on “television channels with national distribution“, which has been regarded as “the main source of information about Russia and the world“. By comparison, the pressure of the state has become weak and even non-existent in some less disseminated areas such as the television channel “REN-TV“, the radio station “Ekho Moskvy“, and the newspapers “Novaya Gazeta“, “Nezavisimaya Gazeta” and “Kommersant“, as well as almost the whole of the internet.
Therefore, it is possible to say that the duality of authoritarian attitudes to mass media and journalism—a statist media policy deeply rooted in the framework of state influence on media combined with the growing market-driven economy—has become the most crucial characteristic of the Russian media system“. To this extent, the Russian media system can be described as a statist commercialized model.
The Chinese media system as a state-dominated model
If there is still a likelihood to compare the Russian media system with the Mediterranean Model due to a certain extent of similarities, “bringing the Chinese media system into a worldwide comparative project is to bring one of the most dissimilar systems into the non-Western empirical reality“. Furthermore, if the role above of the state in the Russian media system can be portrayed as “strong influence”, the Chinese state’s position or the sole ruling party CPC in its media apparatus should be regarded as dominant. As mentioned, regarding the political news, Russians still enjoy some freedom in less influential media. In contrast, there is no autonomy in the Chinese press, with the omnipresent regulative measures such as media censorship and the internet Great Firewall in China. Thus, considering the state’s special role, the Chinese media system is far beyond the intervention framework in the West.
In fact, despite Deng Xiaoping’s reform, the Chinese media system of the post-Mao period has still applied the “different versions of Marxism and socialism” to “build socialism with Chinese characteristics” by “providing moral guidance to the population and engineering economic development and social change“. One of the most important reasons that may clarify this “guidance”, namely, strong and resilient media control, is the media ownership in China. It is undeniable that the post-Mao economic reforms have expanded the private capital to some areas that had been commanded by the Chinese government or state-owned enterprises for decades. However, Zhao argues that “in the media sector, although the Chinese state has not only drastically curtailed its role in subsidizing media operations but has also targeted the media and cultural sector as new sites of profit-making and capitalistic development, the state continues to restrict private capital, let alone the privatizing of existing media outlets”.
In fact, the Chinese state has opened the door to private and even foreign capital participation in “the media’s entertainment function” such as the film industry with the intention of profit-making. However, this profit-making entertainment also needs to be filtered by the ideological orientation of the state. More importantly, “the production and distribution of news and informational content” and the “ownership of news media outlets” have remained “monopolized by the state“. Furthermore, this monopoly also results in the fact that the state has appointed major media agencies’ leadership.
Despite the state’s overwhelming control, the Chinese media market has boomed for years since the economic reform of Deng Xiaoping, attributable to the power of marketization. For instance, in 2004, there were 6,580 daily newspapers published worldwide, and the number of daily newspapers published in China ranked first in the world, accounting for 14.5% of the global daily newspapers. However, the commercialization of the Chinese media industry has not surmounted the ideological control of the state. The media market has constituted “two distinct and yet institutionally intertwined press sectors or subsystems“. The first press sector is market-based as the film above industry, while the second is “the party organ sector“, which combines the duality of the political instrument and profit-making. This is because “most state media outlets no longer receive large government subsidies and have largely to depend on commercial advertising“. Nevertheless, rather than causing tensions, the dual roles the party organ sector plays have adopted and contained the marketization within the current political control by the statist implementation of “licensing system and the sponsor unit system“. Consequently, these two systems have guaranteed the predominance of the state over the commercialization and marketization.
As for the political parallelism, the state-dominated Chinese media system has top-level political instrumentalization, indicating “all the features of a quintessential party-press parallelism“. Almost all the media content should and, in practice, have revolved around the official ideology and slogan of the state. This is pertinent to another aspect of four dimensions, based on the theory and standard of Hallin and Mancini: the utterly low professionalization in Chinese journalism, where journalists have to successfully balance the “market forces and the party-press system” to obtain financial benefits and political security. Furthermore, Pan and Lu argue that Chinese journalists “do not fit their practices into the universal model of professionalism”, but “utilize and appropriate diverse and often conflicting ideas of journalism through their improvised and situated practices”, leading to the “truncated and fragmented in Chinese journalism”. Also, unlike the Western conception of relative objectivity in journalism, Hackett and Zhao create a term “regime of objectivity” to describe how Chinese journalists portray information on the precondition of conforming to the state ideology.
Therefore, due to its restricted commercialization and dominated state, Chan summarizes the Chinese media industry’s development as commercialization without independence. Drawing on the above, the Chinese media system can be described as a state-dominated model.
- Chan, Joseph Man. “Commercialization without Independence: Trends and Tensions of Media Development in China”. In China Review 1993, edited by Joseph Cheng Yu-shek and Maurice Brosseau, 25.1 – 25.21. Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, 1993.
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- Dunn, John A. “Lottizzazione Russian Style: Russia’s Two-Tier Media System”. Europe-Asia Studies 66, no. 9 (2014): 1425-51. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2014.956441.
- Hackett, Robert A., and Yuezhi Zhao. Sustaining Democracy? Journalism and the Politics of Objectivity. Edited by Yuezhi Zhao. Toronto: University of Toronto Press Higher Education, 2000.
- Hallin, Daniel C., and Paolo Mancini. Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics. Communic
- ation, Society and Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- ———. “Ten Years after Comparing Media Systems: What Have We Learned?”. Political Communication 34, no. 2 (2017): 155-71. https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2016.1233158.
- Hu, Zhengrong, Peixi Xu, and Deqiang Ji. “China: Media and Power in Four Historical Stages”. In Mapping Brics Media, edited by Kaarle Nordenstreng and Daya Kishan Thussu, 166-80. London ;: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2015.
- Ivanitsky, Valerij. “Mass Media Market in Post-Soviet Russia [Рынок Сми В Постсоветской России]”. Bulletin of Moscow University, no. 6. (2009): 114–31. Retrieved from http://www.ffl.msu.ru/en/research/bulletin-of-moscow-university/.
- Jones, Paul K., and Michael Pusey. “Political Communication and ‘Media System’: The Australian Canary”. Media, Culture & Society 32, no. 3 (2010): 451-71. https://doi.org/10.1177/0163443709361172.
- Keane, John. The Media and Democracy. Cambridge, MA: Polity in association with Basil Blackwell, 1991.
- Oates, Sarah. Television, Democracy, and Elections in Russia. Basees/Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies. Abingdon, Oxon, England: Routledge, 2006.
- Pan, Zhongdang, and Ye Lu. “Localizing Professionalism: Discursive Practices in China’s Media Reforms”. In Chinese Media, Global Context, edited by
- Chin-Chuan Lee, 210-31: RoutledgeCurzon Taylor & Francis Group, 2003.
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- Sosnovskaya, Anna. Social Portrait and Identity of Today’s Journalist: St. Petersburg-a Case Study. (Södertörn Academic Studies: 2000). https://bibl.sh.se/skriftserier/hogskolans_skriftserier/Russian_reports/diva2_16051.aspx.
- Tiffen, Rodney. How Australia Compares. Edited by Ross Gittins. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
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- Wang, Guoqing. “China Newspaper Annual Development Report [中国报业年度发展报告]”. People’s Daily, August 5 2005. http://www.people.com.cn/.
- Zhao, Yuezhi. “Understanding China’s Media System in a World Historical Context”. In Comparing Media Systems Beyond the Western World, edited by Daniel C. Hallin and Paolo Mancini, 143-74. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
- Zhou, Shuhua. “China: Media System”. In, edited by W. Donsbach2015.
From our partner RIAC
Al-Qaeda, ISIS, Taliban and the Modus Operandi of Jihadi Terrorism in Africa
According to sources, the violence in the Southern African country of Mozambique is on the rise and there is a possibility that the war could spread from Mozambique to (South Africa) as well as Zimbabwe and Botswana.
In addition, Islamic militants in Mozambique want to establish ties with other foreign Islamic militants, Mozambique’s al-Shabab militant group has traveled to Somalia to establish ties with the al-Shabab Islamist group.
To strengthen the group, smugglers from Tanzania also smuggle weapons into the area, and villages in Mozambique near the border between Tanzania and Mozambique have been burned to the ground to spread terror. And young people from South Africa are also flocking to Mozambique to join al-Shabab and ISIS.
In addition, ISIS fighters from the Democratic Republic of Congo have been sent to Mozambique. According to sources, the global heroin market has heated up with the advent of the Taliban government in Afghanistan, and heroin is smuggled from Afghanistan to Mozambique and from Mozambique to South Africa, where it is used to smuggle drugs and gems into Europe and the United States.
According to source, the visit of the Taliban representative showed that the Taliban wanted to strengthen ties with Al Shabaab in Somalia, But Hazrat Musa was originally meeting with insurgents who smuggled drugs from Afghanistan to North Mozambique and then from northern Mozambique to South Africa, where most of the heroin was smuggled, then smuggled to Europe and America.
According to an accurate report, the Taliban from Afghanistan, through members of Haji Bashar’s family, established links with al-Shabab in Mozambique, Because Haji Bashar’s cousins and Haji Bashar’s own family members are involved with all the international smugglers and terrorist groups. Russian weapons and Afghan heroin reach North Mozambique via Iran to North Mozambique and then on to South Africa and some of the Heroin are given to Islamic militants in the Democratic Republic of Congo for Gold and diamonds, to use them on young children to destroy their minds.
ISIS leader in Congo Sika Musa Bluko and ISIS leader and activist Abu Yasser in Mozambique have partnered with Haji Bashar, a former Taliban financier in Afghanistan, to smuggle heroin and human organs, The two are still linked to key Taliban leaders. Abdul Rahman Shah Agha from the Taliban, a resident of Kandahar province and with members of Haji Bashar’s family smuggled heroin from Maiwand district to Iran, And Ahmad Reza, a notorious smuggler, smuggled heroin and weapons from Iran to northern Mozambique, From there, Musa and Abu Yathir are responsible for all the heroin and weapons.
Fighting has intensified in Mozambique since the Ukrainian invasion, and Iran has stepped up arms smuggling from Afghanistan, in addition to drug trafficking, in exchange for gems, gold and cash. To this end, the process of distributing weapons to young people in South Africa has been intensified so that they can fight in Mozambique and South Africa on the pretext of religion and ethnicity.
According to sources, the ISIS group fighting in Syria is also in contact with Ansar al-Sunnah and Madinat al-Tawhid wal-Mujahideen in Africa. Large quantities of weapons from Syria also reach these areas to intensify the war, and private traders take advantage of this situation to smuggle precious stones from Africa and then sell them legally, Not only the businessmen but also the army chiefs in the area are involved in making a lot of money. Mozambique’s military is in a crisis, and innocent South African children are being killed in religious and ethnic wars.
Disclaimer: The views expressed within Modern Diplomacy are solely those of the authors in their private capacity and do not in any way represent or reflect the views of the Modern Diplomacy, its Advisory and Editorial Boards, Sponsors, Partners, or Affiliates.
The penetration tactics of the CIA and the Israeli Mossad and the Chinese experience
What occupied me the most during the last period after the control of the American Central Intelligence Agency and the Israeli Mossad on a number of those around me, including: professors, colleagues and relatives, was to spread the story of my madness everywhere, despite my severe isolation from everyone, due to my strict academic and analytical intelligence nature, which completely compels me to move away about all aspects of luxury or racing to get to know others for purely security reasons, related to my personal safety, for being targeted by the Israeli Mossad and the American Central Intelligence for many years, which made me very sorry, for the decline of morals of some, and their selling of their conscience and morals at any price for a few pounds will end It is implemented quickly, but it has caused harm to a person who was looking for restoring the dignity and prestige of the Arabs and helping them dismantle all the American and Israeli spy networks in the Middle East and the region, as well as preparing new generations capable of challenging and imposing and dictating their conditions on everyone with strictness and firmness. But, in the midst of this struggle, I was shocked by the morals of many around me, who sold and betrayed at a cheap price.
Therefore, the previous period was one of the most important periods of my entire life, for my intellectual work and my intelligence analytical efforts as a proactive intelligence analyst, and a future theorist that draws the shape of the foreseeable future and maps of the modern world, and reshapes the alliances of the new world, after the disintegration of the features of American and Israeli hegemony, with the rise of other great, regional and international powers, such as: China and others, to help all Arabs and developing peoples to fully challenge American hegemony, and their constant attempt to impose their conditions on us, and even formal plans to encourage Arabs and the sons of Arab and developing peoples to penetrate the American depth itself, by ending that American hegemony over them, by dismantling all of the American espionage networks in Egypt, the region and even the world, with entering the depth of the American Central Intelligence Agency and wandering in the building of the Israeli Mossad, to obtain all the information we want to know, enabling us to challenge America as a superpower and force it to submit to our conditions and dictate our conditions to it and to the Israelis themselves, after dismantling the Israeli Mossad device itself from the inside after its penetration.
Through my diligent observations, and my psychological and psychological studies of the mentalities and personalities of a number of American and Israeli diplomats, and my search for any previous recorded conversations of American and Israeli intelligence men, I noticed very carefully the extent of the state of confusion and disrespect for the policies of their countries, and their severe prejudice against them, which caught me in the eye of an intelligence expert examining the entire situation. I came to a genius conclusion, according to which the easiest personalities to recruit at any price are American and Israeli diplomats and their military and general intelligence men, given the nature of the pressures and the enormous suffering they face, as well as their complete dissatisfaction with the policies of their countries and their intelligence services with their current formations. This is perhaps what I played during the last period, by following up on all the activities of the American and Israeli diplomats that I reached, and my strict follow-up to everything that falls under my eyes in terms of conversations by their intelligence men to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of their personalities, and to write and record that on an ongoing basis, to identify the most prominent commonalities between them, tracking and knowing those individual differences, which enabled their intelligence and diplomatic services to seek help from them during previous periods. It reached a maximum result, which is the possibility of completely subjugating all American and Israeli diplomats and their intelligence men in favor of other intelligence services, who are hostile, proud and admirable at the same time, as they view China and Russia, their archenemy. Hence, I set out to draw the features of the approach and decipher the symbols and codes of the relationship between them and their current intelligence services, from intermittent communication or complete separation, followed by a defining stage of indifference or ignoring the question. Because through that particular detail and detail, I can penetrate into their depths intelligence, security and psychologically, and then ensure control over them, just as they do with me and those around me, to ensure control over me, considering that I am one of the most prominent proactive intelligence analytical mindsets in the world, as well as my frightening personality for them To my closeness to the countries of China and Russia and their friends alike.
By analogy with the previous point about the possibility of recruiting their intelligence men and diplomats and subjecting them to our conditions – which I tried to draw the attention of the countries of China and Russia to – China has succeeded in achieving an unprecedented penetration of the files of all American and Israeli diplomats and intelligence men alike. The Chinese helped in this, and their absolute and unparalleled success in penetrating the depth of files belonging to the Israeli Mossad and all its employees or dealers, which led to the disclosure of the data of tens of thousands of Mossad employees, the Shin Bet security service, the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission, and the Israeli Institute For biological research, the Israeli military forces, which include: the names of the most prominent pilots, intelligence personnel, members of the special forces, and nuclear scientists in Israel. Israel fears that many parties will benefit from this information, such as: Iranian intelligence, Hezbollah in Lebanon, as well as many other intelligence agencies, which do not maintain friendly relations with Israel.
The Chinese and Russian intelligence are constantly trying to obtain all the information, documents, documents and speeches delivered at all Israeli conferences, or in which Israel was an original party or a participant. Where the most serious issue for the Israelis is related to the readiness of the Arab armies and defense ministries at the present time, to form a “joint military defense alliance between Israel and the Arabs to fight Iran”, which I tried to draw the attention of the Chinese to, and resulted in China forming a multilateral action platform to bring about a kind of dialogue and rapprochement between the Arab Gulf and Iran, away from the policies of Israeli and American provocation, and their tireless attempt to ignite and inflame the situation in the region against Iran as an ally of China and Russia, in favor of Israeli rapprochement with the Gulf states and all.
The Mossad, and other Israeli intelligence and security services, rely on these data, which are owned by the (Israeli Ministry of Interior), in order to recruit new members, whether inside or outside Israel itself. The Israeli intelligence, especially the Mossad, is also working on using false or pseudonymous identities to carry out all its security operations, whether it is to carry out surveillance and gather information, to infiltrate certain places, or to purchase sensitive equipment.
The leaking of such information to China or others is disastrous for the Israeli intelligence and the Mossad, because this leads to the possibility of linking it to activities that take place abroad under false Israeli or foreign identities. It is also possible that the leakage of that sensitive information that China has penetrated may lead to thwarting many Israeli security operations abroad or lead to the arrest of Mossad agents through foreign intelligence agencies. Above all, by verifying these leaked Israeli intelligence data, it is possible to ascertain the living persons and the deceased personalities whose identities are used by the Israeli Mossad in secret missions to conceal the true identity of the Israeli agent entrusted with carrying out a mission.
What is most important to me is China’s follow-up and targeting of all activities and operations of the Israeli Mossad and its close follow-up of all Arab students studying in the defense and military industries abroad, and its follow-up by the Israeli Mossad elements since their first university studies, until the start of their graduation and the end of their studies and then their travel to their homelands. This is what China has learned well through many of its collaborators from countries and individuals, to obtain a lot of sensitive information that the Israeli Mossad elements are trying to access and identify, then turn it into several intelligence reports in files, and track Mossad agents responsible for following up on defense industry students and researchers. And the discussion of their relationship with Mossad officials in several countries other than the Israeli territory itself abroad, and China’s tireless attempt to dismantle all the Israeli encryption programs on the Internet, which Israel uses to communicate with clients, which is shocking to the Israeli Mossad, which is considered an “intelligence earthquake” for Israel.
The point of intelligence worth mentioning to China and the region remains, which is confirmed by all the intelligence documents recently obtained by China, that there is a clear fluctuation in the positions of the leaders of the Arab armies and defense ministries during their speeches at the joint security and military conferences between them, and within the headquarters of the League of Arab States, on the Those Arab armies are still far from being ready and ready to fight any war or joint conflict with Israel against Iran. These analyzes or summaries of closed secret discussions of the leaders of the Arab armies and defense ministries regarding their position on the joint military and defense alliances to confront Tehran’s moves in cooperation with the military leaders in Tel Aviv, are considered the biggest strategic treasure for China, Russia and Iran alike, which is probably what the Mossad leaders realized The Israelis, who are known to report directly to the Office of the Prime Minister’s Office in person, have provided the high political level in Israel with valuable information about the lack of readiness of the Arab and Gulf armies for a military confrontation with Israel against Iran.
On the other hand, after the success of Chinese intelligence in completely dismantling all American spy networks on Chinese territory, doubt arose about China’s success in recruiting diplomats from the American embassy in Beijing to work for it, and the suspicion of American intelligence appeared in everyone, including the American ambassador at the American embassy in Beijing same. Which prompted all American intelligence agencies, to form (special working groups of the elite and elite of American intelligence, the most experienced and the highest ranked, whether within the FBI or the CIA)
FBI & CIA
They assigned this group a very secret headquarters that they chose meticulously in northern Virginia, and assigned it to analyze every operation, and to (study the file of all diplomats working in the American embassy in Beijing very carefully, regardless of their diplomatic ranks, including the American ambassador himself, for fear of recruiting them for China).
This is what Chinese intelligence has succeeded in completely, given the targeting of US and Israeli Foreign Ministry officials by the Chinese, and the most dangerous targeting of China to recruit senior American and Israeli security, military and intelligence ranks and leaders on behalf of the Chinese Ministry of State Security, which is the main intelligence agency for China. They are assisted by all the vast Chinese spy networks spread around the world, in view of the directives issued by the Chinese President, Comrade Xi Jinping in 2018, and his strict directives to Chinese companies to amend their internal regulations to put the concepts of (loyalty and belonging to the Chinese state above achieving economic profit itself). The largest and most dangerous role remains, represented by the (Chinese Ministry of State Security) in Beijing, through its recruitment of the former officer in the US Central Intelligence Agency “CIA”, named “Jerry Chun Shing”, and through him the Chinese intelligence was able to know and track all the lists of the agents he knows are CIA agents, and the most dangerous is the help of former CIA officer “Jerry Chun Shing” of Chinese intelligence in deciphering the encrypted communications system known as “Quafcom” to set up the entire American spy network in China.
The most dangerous Chinese intelligence service is the (Chinese Ministry of State Security), and the Chinese Ministry of State Security begins to monitor and recruit its officers from the first university level, as most of them come from students of the (Beijing University of International Relations), and this is the main difference in the Chinese approach to recruiting intelligence officers. In their first university stages, in order to select the best qualified in a precise and strict manner, and to have better opportunities in examining their backgrounds and their contacts with foreign bodies, and do they have a history of traveling or residing abroad or not? The Chinese Ministry of State Security also places great emphasis on the proficiency of its employees in foreign languages, and runs an “intensive school for teaching foreign languages for officers”, in addition to placing them for a long time under the supervision of a special department of internal security known as (the Ninth Office), whose main function is (monitoring and following up all Workers and conscripts within the Chinese Ministry of State Security).
It comes at the top of the government agencies that practice intelligence activity informally in China, namely: (The National Defense Administration of Science, Technology and Industry), known in China and internationally as the “Sustained Administration”, and it is very similar to the work of the (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency), known as “DARPA” in the United States of America, and we find the role of the Chinese news agency “Xinhua”, which Washington and the West always accuse of working as a cover for Chinese intelligence officers and agents, and which prepares secret summaries for decision-makers in Beijing, and there is also (the Office of Overseas Chinese Affairs), which maintains relations with overseas Chinese communities and Chinese expatriates, as well as the role of the (Chinese Ministry of Education), which monitors and communicates with all overseas Chinese students, all of these Chinese bodies, ministries and agencies employ their followers to collect information for the benefit of the Chinese government.
The main office responsible for recruiting and screening the handpicked in China for espionage activities is (the Liaison Office of the Ministry of State Security in Fuzhou, China). Whereas its elements are spreading all over the world in a decentralized network run by the principal officers.
In general and statistically close to accuracy, the number of Chinese elements loyal to the Chinese state security apparatus within the United States of America alone can be estimated at hundreds of thousands of individuals or assets, some of whom work permanently and others temporarily, and there are statistics confirming that there are more than 17 million Americans of assets. Asian, including four million of Chinese origin, in addition to a huge network of shell companies and front companies, numbering nearly three thousand… All of them are directly affiliated and are under the supervision of the Chinese Ministry of State Security.
Chinese intelligence methods vary in recruiting these elements, but in the case of precious assets, that is, those that provide intelligence information of high importance to China, many additional temptations and advantages are often added to them, and some of them are called “ocean bottom fish”, a Chinese equivalent term For the concept of “sleeper cells” in Western intelligence culture, these fish often receive training up to several months or years inside China, and are mainly used in the process of gathering information and filling gaps in communication networks, and sometimes to spread rumors in their host country. The Chinese intelligence has retained its special and distinctive character of the huge number and widespread espionage operations whose effects are felt all over the world.
Here, we are noticing the extent of the sophistication and advanced of the Chinese intelligence services, which consists of a wide range of intelligence agencies, military departments, corporate offices, party organs, and even research institutions, universities and the media, all of whom are subject to two parallel structures of control, whether by the central government in Beijing, or by Before the intelligence services of the ruling Communist Party in China, whose institutions hold the actual power in the country at the expense of the government itself, and carry out various operational and administrative tasks.
And the most dangerous office of the CIA targeted by Chinese intelligence is the (Office of Foreign Broadcasting Information Service), which includes a complete list of sensitive information from the heart of the CIA, which is passed on to Beijing, and perhaps the most important is information related to the plans of the CIA. The White House and its management of rapprochement or conflict with China, plans whose leakage gave Beijing a higher position in any subsequent negotiations with the American side.
The surprising thing for me, personally, is the prohibition of visiting China for all its recruited agents who are implanted within the American Central Intelligence Agency in particular, since the beginning of their work in the American Central Intelligence Agency, provided that the meetings of Chinese recruits within the American intelligence services take place with the Chinese agents operating them to give them The orders are in other countries apart from China and Washington, knowing that the duration of those meetings takes only a few minutes at most, due to the difficulty of monitoring and tracking them during those few minutes and seconds, and most importantly, the Chinese intelligence agents follow up with the American agencies their assignments that reach them from China with one Chinese intelligence official that does not change, in the manner that he may remain with his agents for a full 30 years, in order to maintain secure, narrow, and unobservable channels of communication by the Americans except with great difficulty.
In general, the Ministry of State Security of China, which is the main Chinese intelligence service, was established in 1983, by merging the (Central Investigation Department with the espionage units of the Ministry of Public Security), to eventually turn the ministry into China’s main civil intelligence service, under it, they are organizing all the official and unofficial intelligence structures in the country, with the exception of the army, which maintained its own military intelligence apparatus, which is under the supervision of the Communist Party of China, and not under the direct control of the government.
The Chinese President, Comrade “Xi Jinping”, directed his intelligence services to stop using embassy employees for espionage purposes, and to rely instead on journalists and businessmen, as part of a grand strategy known as “hide the brightness and feed the mystery”, where “Xi Jinping” wanted to expand the capabilities of his country, however, wanted to keep pace with the West, without engaging in many rhetorical wars and as covertly as possible.
Here, we find the distinctive nature of the Chinese intelligence work, which depends not only on recruiting influential agents to obtain direct and sensitive information, as much as it depends on flooding the enemy intelligence and counterintelligence services and the enemy with thousands of small-scale and scope espionage operations, many of which seem to be of no value. The final total results of those Chinese slow and complex processes is often reflect the traditional human traits of the Chinese who are known for their patience, perseverance and hard work.
We can understand this Chinese way of tiny and small group work to obtain information, in Chinese social norms, and specifically in the well-known Chinese “Guansky” tradition, which means exploiting slow and strong interpersonal networks to influence events, a norm that has been developed and transmitted to Chinese business and economy, and later to the field of intelligence at the structural and technical level, at a time when the intelligence industry and the war of minds and information gathering were at a rapid pace for China, given the density of the intelligence working groups of the Chinese.
The culture of intelligence and information gathering has gained tremendous importance for the Chinese, and their special approach to obtaining information, which has always been far from the general logic and bearing its own mark, was often done through a combination of (three main ways), which are:
- The first way: is what is known as human waves, where they exploit Beijing has its huge human assets to recruit thousands of Chinese to collect huge amounts of information.
- The second way: is to recruit and rely on the services of millions of Chinese people in all countries of the world and extract information from them periodically to reach deeper levels of network analysis of the huge data acquired.
- The third way: It is slowly and patiently cultivating foreign agents in order to conduct active espionage operations in the long term.
Through my intelligence analysis referred to, we can understand that Chinese espionage operations on the American side have made a great resonance in the American intelligence community, and shed light not only on the continuous rounds of the secret intelligence conflict between China and the United States of America, whose chapters still extend to this day, but also on the unfamiliar traditions and tactics of the Chinese intelligence services, one of the most efficient and complex intelligence services in the world, and perhaps the least known, notorious, knowledgeable and unfamiliar with their complex working methods.
Chinese penetration and its destruction of all American spy networks on the Chinese territory
China’s National Counterintelligence and Surveillance Networks and the China Foreign Counterespionage Bureau have succeeded in dismantling all US spy networks on all Chinese territory. The amazing thing is that the Chinese surrounded all American CIA officers and informants, who were going to Chinese restaurants to meet their clients, and the network of American spies in China, which turned out to be all under the control of the Chinese secret services. Every restaurant in China, according to what was announced by the secret reports of the American intelligence, and frustrating is the work of these workers in Chinese restaurants, and their possession of different military and security ranks in the (Chinese National Counterintelligence Service).
Which prompted the Central Intelligence Agency to withdraw and smuggle many agents, informants and spies for America from China since 2010 until now due to its losses there and the vigilance of the Chinese. Which caused the CIA to suffer terrible losses as a result of this great failure it suffered in penetrating deep into the Chinese territory itself. Perhaps this is what brings me back to the memory of what happened completely similar to it, given what the CIA also incurred in the Soviet Union, after the detection of many American agents inside Soviet lands. The terrible shock was that the real reason for the detection of American agents on Soviet soil was betrayal from within the CIA itself, as American spies were handed over to their Soviet hunters by the American FBI agent (Robert Hansen), the head of the same counter-intelligence unit in the CIA, whose name is (Aldrich Ames), who were recruited by the Russian Intelligence Agency “KGB”.
The fearsome Soviet in the seventies and eighties and throughout the Cold War period between the American and Soviet parties.
Here, the reason for the Chinese intelligence dismantling all American spy networks on Chinese soil is due to the (Chinese anti-espionage service) being able to uncover a modern surveillance system, organized by the (US National Security Agency) “NSA” from Taiwan. At first, CIA agents went to the American student in Shanghai, China, “Glenn Shriver”, who collected American information of a defensive nature for Chinese intelligence in order to earn money to inspire American students studying abroad and motivate their patriotism, the (US Federal Bureau of Investigation) “FBI” issued (A video exposes the betrayal of the American student “Glenn Shriver”).
And cases of real Chinese hacking of American intelligence were discovered, including what happened in March 2017, when the employee of the US State Department, “Candice Clinburn”, was arrested after discovering that she had secret contacts with Chinese officials, and her bank account revealed the scandal of the flow of money to her from China, in addition to Chinese officials showered her with precious gifts and drenched her with money, including: an iPhone, a laptop computer, a fully furnished apartment, and many other benefits. But “Clinburn” did not admit her mistake, and no one could prove that she had revealed information about American agents to the Chinese.
In another discovered case of Chinese spying on Washington, in January 2018, “Jerry Chun Xin Li” 53-year-old, was arrested at New York airport. We find here that “Jerry Chun Xin Li” is an American citizen of Chinese descent who served in the US armed forces in the 1980s, and since 1994 has worked for the Central Intelligence Agency, where he had access to highly classified documents. In 2007, he retired and went with his family to “Hong Kong”, and there he worked in an auction house, belonging to a high-ranking official in the Communist Party of China, and he was identified and recruited for China in the face of the CIA.
In addition, the US secret communications system, used in China, known as:
What was used by a network of American agents in China, was very primitive, and the most dangerous was that it was connected via the Internet, and it was very similar to the American intelligence communication system in the Middle East, where the network environment is less dangerous. It is clear that the American intelligence geniuses did not fully appreciate the capabilities of the Chinese hackers and hackers. And when the American investigation team conducted tests to track the Chinese intrusion, it found that the American system of communications with the network of agents and spies in China contains a fatal error, as once it is entered, it is easily possible to access a much wider secret communication system, as the CIA was using it and interacting through it with its agents and agents network all over the world.
More seriously, the CIA was particularly concerned, fearing that Chinese intelligence might have shared this information with its Russian counterpart and informed them of ways to gain access to the “Covcom” system of communications for the US intelligence contacts with its agents on Chinese lands.
What increased the fears of the Americans, is the disappearance of a number of American informants and spies, who were already active in Russia, and they stopped communicating with their operators from the American side at the same time that the American intelligence network collapsed in China, which confirms the Chinese handing over the secret communications code of the Americans spies on the Russian lands as well.
Because of the abject failure of the American intelligence in the face of Chinese superiority over it, so it tried to respond to the (Chinese National Counterintelligence Service) in November 2021, by convicting the American jury of spying for the Chinese intelligence officer (Yangun Shu), who was deputy director of the department in the (Sixth Office of the Ministry of State Security) The Chinese officer in Jiangsu Province), which serves as the main intelligence agency of the Communist Party of China, and accused him of working to spy on US and Western military interests in favor of China, to obtain US military secrets and so on, and here the Chinese officer (Yangun Shu) was arrested in Belgium in the year 2018. Then the final verdict was issued against the Chinese officer (Yangun Shu) on November 5, 2021, convicting the Chinese intelligence officer by a US federal jury of committing the charge of “conspiracy and attempting to commit economic and military espionage and stealing trade and military secrets for China”.
Here, “Yang Shuo” is considered the first Chinese intelligence officer to be extradited to the United States of America. His case shows how China sought to obtain military-industrial secrets to help it militarily modernize its armed forces, which eventually enabled the People’s Liberation Army to build its vast network of Chinese advanced weaponry very quickly.
The important thing should be noticed here is that under the (China National Security Law), every Chinese citizen and company is required to cooperate with the CPC and its leaders in matters of national security. This means, in practice, that those Chinese companies that deal with any foreign companies are still required to share any technology or information they obtain with the Chinese military or intelligence services in the Chinese state. Likewise, all Chinese researchers and graduate students working on science, technology, engineering or mathematics projects are expected to share their research with Beijing, for the welfare and development of their country.
Accordingly, it is clear the extent of the widespread spread of the Chinese in America, Europe and the world, in order to preserve their security and the security of their homeland first, and then to obtain all the advanced technologies that allow them to develop and modernize the industrial and military infrastructure of their country, and this was revealed by “William Ivanina”, the head of the Counterintelligence and National Security Center The United States, that the Chinese are adept in this field, by following a variety of means, through (the Chinese Ministry of State Security, United Front Action Department, People’s Liberation Army).
The Chinese are also using a variety of ingenious tactics in this framework, including the latest electronic espionage devices and systems, to access sensitive information remotely, and what is known as “signal intelligence technology” to quickly capture information, as well as electronic intelligence, which enabled it to decipher all The blades of American spying and wiretapping devices on its soil and abroad. Thus, the vision becomes completely clear to us, about the reasons for the dismantling of all US spy networks by Chinese intelligence on its lands.
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