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Lithuanian-Russian relations: An ambassador’s view

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This year we are marking two centennial anniversaries: the signing of the Peace Treaty between Lithuania and Soviet Russia, and the establishment of the Lithuanian diplomatic mission in Moscow in 1920. The occasion is a good opportunity for us to look into the past and think together about the future of our relationship, so that the “dark pages” of the past are never repeated again. This was the first thing that came to my mind after I was offered the job of Lithuania’s new ambassador to Russia.

I will make no secret about the fact that I accepted the proposal of the President of the Republic Gitanas Nauseda and the Government of Lithuania responsibly, but at the same time, with a grain of concern. Even though Lithuanian-Russian relations are not particularly good now, working in Moscow is a challenging, albeit interesting, posting and, of course, one of the most prestigious in our diplomatic service. In basketball parlance, this is the “major league,” on par with a diplomatic post in Washington, Brussels, London, Berlin or Paris. People here often joke that there are three million basketball specialists in Lithuania and as many experts in relations with Russia.

Therefore, I was absolutely clear about where I was going and how important and responsible this posting really was. I realized the seriousness of the challenges that awaited me there already during the very first months of my work in Moscow. Relations between our two countries have been going through a difficult time for many years now. Immediately after arriving in Moscow, I heard some high-ranking Russian officials describing our relations as “Arctic chill” and “dead end,” so I realized that it was not going to be easy.

True, the top-level talks that were held in Vilnius before my departure for Moscow inspired extremely cautious optimism, because even in these conditions, our countries should focus on mutually beneficial areas and look for areas where we can move forward. I will mention only the main such areas: development of trade relations, establishment of a border regime,  solution of transport problems and issues of diplomatic real estate, Kaliningrad transit and the development of cultural ties.

At the same time, I certainly realize that finding solutions to some of the most difficult issues will hardly be possible any time soon. And still, despite our obviously different views on certain things, we need to have a better idea of each other’s positions and look for the root causes of our problems.

So, we are all set to move forward on the issues we disagree on, and I see no alternatives here. As the saying goes, “when the window is closed, there is no wind or air movement,” which means that when the windows are closed, you can suffocate! This is what I write about in my essay.

Lithuania and Russia at the crossroads of history

Why do I start with history? Naturally, in the 21st century, our assessment of the past has changed. Contrary to the prophecy of Francis Fukuyama, the “end of history” didn’t come with the end of the Cold War [1], but it is now back, primarily on the socio-political aspect. The past often impacts interstate relations, becoming an integral part of the current information wars. On the one hand, historical issues, if viewed not as something that happened in the past, often lead to serious contradictions. On the other hand, the past is also a valid part of our identity. Therefore, historical memory often determines our worldview and our attitude towards many events.

In international or interstate relations, I would single out three strategies for dealing with the past: the past is used to exacerbate or initiate a conflict; the past is used as a tool for building positive relationships and the past is accepted as a given, and its positive and negative aspects are fully recognized. Which one to choose? It depends on the goals we set ourselves. Of these three strategies, I would choose the latter.

The centuries-old historical relationship between Lithuania and Russia is extremely complex and intertwined. There were moments of tension, and there were moments of good-neighborly coexistence. Perhaps this was inevitable because during the Middle Ages, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Grand Duchy of Moscow were both engaged in expanding their territories. The pendulum of military success was swinging all the time. Midway through the 15th century, the army of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, led by the Grand Duke Algirdas, twice besieged the Moscow Kremlin, but never managed to take it. In 1610, Rzeczpospolita – the Commonwealth of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania – encircled Moscow and occupied it, only to see the Russian army occupy Vilna and a number of other Lithuanian cities in 1655.

Both sides pursued their own political goals, and not always by means of military force alone. For example, the Grand Duke of Lithuania Vytautas gave his daughter Sophia in marriage to the then ruler of Moscow, Vasily I, temporarily gaining strong leverage over the policy of the Moscow state.  There were also examples of our two countries fighting together against a common enemy: on July 15, 1410, Polish and Lithuanian forces, along with  several Smolensk regiments, as part of the troops of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, fought in the Battle of Grunwald against the Teutonic Order. There were other examples of interaction. The noble Russian families – the Golitsyns, Trubetskoys, Kurakins and others, whose descendants still come to the Lithuanian Embassy in Moscow on holidays, all trace their ancestry to the representatives of the Gediminas dynasty, who then ruled the Russian cities.

Following the third partition of the Commonwealth of Lithuania and Poland at the end of the 18th century, most of historical Lithuania was annexed to the Russian Empire and remained there until 1918. That period witnessed a series of bloody conflicts. At the beginning of the 19th century, the Russian government did not interfere much in the economic, judicial and cultural life of Lithuania. It was then that Vilnius University enjoyed much-deserved acclaim contributing heavily to Polish culture, and becoming famous for its graduates such as Adam Mickiewicz and others. However, after the uprisings of 1830-1831 and 1863-1864, the situation changed. The Russian authorities even came up with a historical concept of two Russian states – Kievan and Lithuanian Rus, which, due to various historical circumstances, existed separately until the end of the 18th century when Empress Catherine II brought them together into one state. Thus, the region’s ethnic composition and historical concept made it possible to perceive the onetime territory of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania not only as part of the Russian Empire, but also as ethnically Russian.

Upon closer examination, one could ask what this has to do with the Lithuanians who are not Russians, but there were also theories about the Lithuanians being Slavs. In this context, the policy of Russification pursued by the tsarist government, including  the closure of Vilnius University, a ban on the use of the Lithuanian language in public places, the introduction of the Cyrillic alphabet, the desire to consign the very name of Lithuania to oblivion by renaming the region into the Northwest Territory – looks by no means accidental.

However, the second half of the 19th century saw the emergence of a national revival movement in Lithuania, which laid the foundations of the modern Lithuanian culture. Launched by a handful of intellectuals, this  movement ended in 1918 in the revival of Lithuania as an independent state.

The restoration of the national state made it possible to quickly achieve our country’s international recognition. By the way, Soviet Russia was the second country in the world to officially recognize the born-again Lithuanian state. According to the 1920 treaty, [3] Soviet Russia, proceeding from the principle of the right of nations to self-determination, “unconditionally recognizes the independence and sovereignty of the Lithuanian state with all the legal consequences of such recognition and in good faith renounces all sovereign rights of Russia over the Lithuanian people and its territory.” The treaty fixed the Soviet-Lithuanian border, making the city of Vilna (Vilnius) and the Vilnius region part of the Lithuanian state. It also provided for the settlement of property, financial and economic issues between the two countries, free economic assistance to Lithuania by Soviet Russia, recognition of Lithuania’s neutral status and the return (with reservations) of cultural assets previously taken out of the country.

During the period between the two world wars, Lithuanian and Soviet diplomats signed a raft of bilateral agreements, called upon to ensure the stable development of bilateral ties. However, in the summer of 1939, after the Soviet Union and Germany signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and its secret protocols, it became clear that all these accords no longer provided any guarantees and were simply ignored. [4]

Lithuanian and Russian historians are still discussing the tragic events that followed, which, according to the Russian interpretation, ultimately led to Lithuania’s incorporation into the USSR. Lithuania, for its part, regards these events as nothing more than occupation and subsequent annexation. [5] The two sides are unlikely to agree on this issue any time soon, but the work started by Lithuanian and Russian historians must certainly be continued. [6] I still believe that of the abovementioned three strategies for dealing with the past, both of us will eventually choose the third.

I will wrap up this historical journey by saying that despite the tragic years of World War II and the post-war period, the Lithuanians have managed to preserve their national identity and restore their statehood.

In keeping with the Treaty on the Foundations of Interstate Relations between the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic and the Republic of Lithuania [7], signed on July 29, 1991, Lithuania and Russia recognized each other as sovereign states in accordance with their state status, enshrined in the basic acts adopted by the Republic of Lithuania on March 11, 1990 and by the Russian Federation on June 12, 1990. By the way, the agreement makes a clear mention of the term “annexation.”

Shortly after, other agreements followed, setting the timetable for the withdrawal of the Russian (Soviet) troops from Lithuania, delineating the border, on economic and business cooperation, which inspired hope that after many centuries, relations between the two countries would finally return to normal. Lithuanian Presidents Algirdas Brazauskas and Valdas Adamkus visited Moscow, and members of an intergovernmental commission, ministers and lawmakers were meeting regularly. Then everything ground to a halt.

Relations after 1990

Considering the current state of relations between our countries and looking for an answer to the question “Where are we?” I have always avoided a “black and white” approach.

The bad blood of past relations, memories and mutual grievances will not go anywhere, but we still believe that cooperation in the field of culture and sports continues successfully. Eimuntas Nyakrosius, Rimas Tuminas, Ingeborga Dapkunaite, Marius Ivashkevicius, Oskaras Korshunovas are well known in Russia, and Lithuanian artists regularly perform here. The basketball club “Khimki” in Moscow region is coached by Rimas Kurtinaitis, etc.

Despite existing constraints, economic relations between the two countries are developing quite successfully, above all in transport. Russia remains one of Lithuania’s main trade partners with the volume of mutual trade now in the ballpark of 9 billion euros. Business, both Lithuanian and Russian, is looking for the most comfortable conditions to work in. That being said, the potential for trade cooperation is far from exhausted. This year, the COVID-19 pandemic has made adjustments here, but although there seems no end to it in sight yet, we already think about reviving traditionally popular areas of economic cooperation, such as tourism.

Whatever political issues may arise between our countries, Lithuania remains a go-to place for Russian tourists. In Vilnius, Palanga and Druskininkai, you can always see a lot of Russian-speaking travelers, attracted by the European quality of life, closeness to Russia, inexpensive services, security and being able to speak Russian. We hope that in 2021, tourist flows between Russia and Lithuania will return to their pre-epidemic level. In turn, Lithuanian tourists are equally interested in visiting Russia’s Kaliningrad region, as confirmed by the popularity of e-visas.

With the border demarcation process now over, consultations on a border regime agreement are already underway. We hope that the new, modern, and technologically well-appointed Rambinas – Dubki border checkpoint between Lithuania and the Kaliningrad region will open shortly.

Overall, relations between Lithuania and the Kaliningrad region are both positive and pragmatic. After Lithuania joined the EU and became part of its legal system in 2004, our two countries introduced a visa regime. Therefore, to ensure the Russian citizens’ unobstructed passage to and from the Kaliningrad region, a special simplified transit scheme was created on the initiative of the EU and Lithuania, whereby Russian travelers are not required to obtain Schengen visas to move across Lithuania. Together with Kaliningrad, Lithuania is implementing an EU-funded Cross-Border Cooperation Program that municipalities from both sides of the border participate in. One of the Program’s projects envisages the reconstruction of the infrastructure of Tolminkemis, or Chistye Prudy, as this place is now called, where our famous poet and pastor Kristionas Donelaitis once lived, and make it a tourist cite.

Some people tell me that Lithuanians are “Russophobes.” To this I say that in Lithuania all children, from kindergarten to high school graduates, are free to receive a complete education in Russian. Even universities have Russian-language programs, and this is by no means a handout to an ethnic minority. Russians, like Poles, Jews and Belarusians, have been living in Lithuania for a long time, and all of them without exception enjoy the rights of Lithuanian citizens.

Russia is one of the countries where cultural attachés are on the staff of the Lithuanian embassies, and this is another graphic example of the successful development of cultural cooperation between our two countries. The legendary Juozas Budraitis, who is almost a household name in Russia, served as our cultural attaché in Moscow until 2010. We all remember the “Window on Lithuania” program of Lithuanian cultural and business presentations across Russia that was initiated by Budraitis.

Much has been done here in recent years, with exhibitions of contemporary Lithuanian art, screenings of Lithuanian films, presentations at book fairs, Lithuanian issues of Foreign Literature magazine published, along with translations of books by Lithuanian authors, and much more. When speaking about Lithuanian culture in Russia, it is impossible not to mention the music and paintings of our genius Mikalojus Konstantinas Čiurlionis. There are more and more young representatives of contemporary art in Lithuania and Russia now meeting each other and exchanging professional ideas. When it comes to cultural diplomacy, I am an optimist and believe that we can really do a lot in this area by building bridges and bringing our societies closer together.

We do have something to be happy about here, but we also have painful topics that have soured and continue to complicate our relations today. This applies to the past and, unfortunately, to the present as well.

After spending a month in my now position in Moscow, I gave my first interview to Echo of Moscow radio about relations between our countries [9] and could not think of anything better than to talk about an ordinary Lithuanian family, who were banished from their own country and subjected to political persecution and other injustices. [10] You can hardly find a family in Lithuania that did not suffer from Stalin’s deportations to Siberia, political persecution, imprisonment in camps and prisons, executions, and those who had to emigrate to the West to avoid all this.  Sometimes, when we hear people say that “Lithuania, like the other Baltic countries, voluntarily became a part of the Soviet Union,” it makes us feel bad. If you want to understand how it all happened, I recommend reading the memoirs of Lithuania’s pre-war Foreign Minister Juozas Urbshis, who was handed an ultimatum from his Soviet counterpart Vyacheslav Molotov, and other recollections. [11]

We, Lithuanians, are often accused of ignoring the fact that the Russian people, the entire Soviet Union, lost so many of their own and fell victim to Nazi atrocities. However, we, like the rest of the world, are well aware that, compared to other countries, the USSR suffered the most during World War II and that its role in the defeat of Nazism is undeniable.

Sympathetic as we are towards the relatives of the military and civilians of all nationalities who perished during the Second World War, we also hope for understanding of and compassion for the pain suffered by our people, hundreds of thousands of them. The 75th anniversary of the end of World War II reminded us of the great and irrevocable human losses, and we share the pain of Russians (as well as of Ukrainians, Belarusians, Kazakhs and other peoples). But does Russia understand Lithuania’s pain? After all, we had many of our people also killed, deported and losing their property in the post-war period.

When we assess the events of the 20th century we inevitably come across difficult issues that can be resolved only if we listen to and understand each other through our personal pain. There are many issues that we still differ on, and until the wounds have healed, talking about this period will not be easy.

I fully agree with Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, who said: “Let historians study history.” [12] By the way, he also noted that Russia welcomes the work done by a commission of Russian and Lithuanian historians. I am glad that our positions on this issue coincide, because this could become a bridge for us to better understand each other.

A conference on our traumatic past that was recently held in Vilnius showed that it is not just historians, who want to talk about collective “traumas.”[13]

Politicians and diplomats should have a chance to critically reflect on these issues and allow specialists in the field of social stress, prominent public figures and cultural representatives to join this process and complement the work being done by historians. People need to know the truth, because this holds the key to reconciliation.

In his article “75 years of the Great Victory: shared responsibility before history and the future” published in June, President Vladimir Putin wrote: “We urge all states to step up the process of making their archives public and publishing previously unknown documents of the war and pre-war periods … we are ready for broad cooperation and joint research projects engaging historians.” [14]

We wholeheartedly welcome this idea. The archives should also be available to the commission of Russian and Lithuanian historians that I mentioned, because this is the only way we can achieve a common historical assessment and understanding.

There is another problem pertaining to history and historical memory. In the course of the past few decades, we have seen the emergence of great civic initiatives that unite us. Unfortunately, in recent years they have increasingly become hostages to politics and facing artificial hurdles created to undermine their work. For example, Russia has been banning the public Lithuanian youth initiative “Mission Siberia” for several years now *

*Ed. Note

The memorial project “Mission Siberia” was launched in 2006. As part of this initiative, groups of young Lithuanians visited Russia to restore the graves of their compatriots – victims of the purges of the 1930s and 1940s. The project is supervised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania and personally by the President of Lithuania.

In June 2018, the Russian side was forced to suspend “Mission Siberia” due to the unfriendly actions of the Lithuanian authorities, who actually blocked Russia’s military memorial activities in Lithuania thus leaving the graves of Russian citizens without proper care.

not allowing its members to go to Russia and repair at their own expense the graves of their deported compatriots, which had for various reasons been abandoned. Russia describes this as a “mirror” response to Lithuania allegedly creating obstacles to the maintenance of monuments to Soviet soldiers. However, in Lithuania the graves of and monuments to Soviet (and not only Soviet) soldiers are maintained and managed by municipalities with Lithuanian funds. Moreover, since the Lithuanians are buried in Siberia, where they have neither relatives nor friends living there, their graves are neglected. This is how the Mission Siberia youth initiative came about, essentially to look after these abandoned graves so that they simply do not disappear. I still believe that common sense will prevail and we will eventually be able to receive the Mission Siberia delegation in Moscow and accompany them on their way to this or any other Russian region. 

Another sticking point in our relations are security issues, including conventional weapons, energy pressure, as well as asymmetric, unconventional and cyber threats.

Lithuania, as time and events have shown, made the right decision to join NATO in 2004, even though, according to various estimates, is faced no direct military threat from Russia (by the way, the 1991 agreement on the foundations of interstate relations says that “The parties recognize each other’s right to independently exercise their sovereignty in the field of defense and security in forms acceptable to them, contributing to the disarmament process and reducing tensions in Europe, including through collective security systems.”)

It needs to be borne in mind that NATO*

Ed. note*

The 1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia looks rather strange from the standpoint of the Alliance’s defensive doctrine. Those “defensive” actions claimed nearly 2,000 lives, and left about 10,000 more injured. For 21 years now, the destroyed buildings in downtown Belgrade leave no doubt about who the aggressor really was.

Nowadays, NATO’s constant activity near the Russian border raises a lot of questions as to the basis on which the members of the North Atlantic alliance intend to build trusting and transparent relations with Russia. And what about NATO’s major Defender Europe 2020 military exercise, that was to be held in Germany, Poland and the Baltic countries for almost six months, but was largely postponed, but not canceled altogether, due to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic? It was to be the biggest test of NATO members’ ability to support large-scale movement of US forces across the Atlantic to Eastern Europe.  The drill was supposed to involve about 40,000 troops from 19 countries, including about 20,000 Americans. For more details see: in accordance with the security strategy of the alliance, is not directed against Russia.

Unfortunately, today’s objective reality and historical experience, are forcing us to keep an eye on Russia’s military actions in the vicinity of Lithuania’s borders: the military build-up in the Kaliningrad region, the military exercises “West” and what we see as irresponsible behavior.

Small wonder, that geopolitical assessments and threat perception studies still point to Russia as the most unfriendly country towards Lithuania. [15]

For over two decades, NATO and Russia were trying to develop a strategic partnership by fostering dialogue and practical cooperation in areas of common interest. Russia and the Western countries were also attempting to establish an atmosphere of trust, which, much to our regret, was broken, first in Georgia in 2008, and then in Ukraine in 2014. As a result, our cooperation ground to a halt, even though political and military channels of communication remain open.

Through dedicated internal efforts, we have largely managed to solve the problem of our energy security. For example, the price of the gas that Gazprom was selling to Lithuania in 2009 was about 20 percent higher than what the Germans were paying. This price is hard to explain from the standpoint of geography. Therefore, to stimulate competition, we have invested in the construction of an LNG terminal in Klaipeda. Time has shown that this was the right thing to do because Lithuanian companies now decide for themselves where it is cheaper for them to buy gas – via a pipeline or through a terminal. We also buy LNG from Russia through the terminal, whenever the price is right. [16]

What next? Conclusions

Just like any other EU member, Lithuania fully adheres to the guidelines for limiting contacts with Russia, as well as the five key principles of 2016, including full implementation of the Minsk agreements, strengthening EU stability, etc., which also includes selective engagement with Russia. However, a lot still can be done on this track.

Lithuania has always been and remains a supporter of honest and mutually respectful dialogue and mutually beneficial cooperation with the Russian Federation. This is exactly what the 1991 agreement on the foundations of interstate relations provides for. We proceed from the fact that the provisions of this agreement are equally important for Russia as well.

After Lithuania and Russia regained their independence in 1991, we hoped that, after learning the painful lessons of the past and drawing appropriate conclusions, our countries would focus on building good-neighborly relations in Europe.

Lithuania prioritizes respect for fundamental human rights and freedoms, democratic values ​​and international law. We believe that such understanding of and respect for these principles should be conducive to uniting the peoples of Lithuania and Russia.

We sincerely hope that the modern methods of civilized cooperation developed since the end of the Cold War, will help bring back the rule of international law, inviolability of state borders, respect for human rights and rid the world of such concepts as “spheres of influence” in international relations, and that the states’ right to choose the own path of development will be recognized.

While nowadays we clearly differ on various things, we, as diplomats, should strive to maintain a respectful dialogue and seek a common ground for pragmatic solutions to issues of mutual importance. Therefore, we should hear and understand each other, because mutual respect is the only way for us to avoid situations that lead to negative reactions. We can’t quickly and simultaneously solve all the problems that have piled up between us, but if we engage in civilized dialogue, we will be able to communicate and cooperate at any level. For example, we need to establish even more practical ties between our professionals – cargo haulers, customs officers, border guards, scientists, etc.

After all, we can’t just sit back and read media headlines telling us over and over again about a “cooling” of relations. As they righty say, “it takes two to tango.”

In addition to dealing with trade, economic and practical issues, I, as the ambassador of the Republic of Lithuania to the Russian Federation, will also be trying to find more points of contact that bring our peoples closer together. Culture is one such area. I have already written about this, but I will mention several important points here.

As I already mentioned, 2020 marks 100 years since our two countries signed a peace agreement and Lithuania opened a diplomatic mission in Russia. At the Lithuanian Embassy in Moscow, we held a round table “The Peace Treaty of 1920 between Soviet Russia and Lithuania” [17], dedicated to this event, as well as an online exhibition organized by historians from Lithuania, Russia and Poland. Before this year is out, we plan to publish a collection of documents from 1920, jointly prepared by Lithuanian and Russian scientists. The Commission of Lithuanian and Russian Historians is all set to continue its work. A similar joint event by our two countries’ historians is scheduled to be held also in Vilnius.

Also in 2020, Lithuania celebrated the 300th birth anniversary of the Gaon of Vilna, the great rabbi of Lithuania and the most famous representative of the Litvak culture. The Lithuanian Embassy in Russia organized a series of round tables to discuss the historical Jewish heritage in Lithuania and Russia. [18] Similar practical initiatives involving our scientists and historians will follow.

However, there are many other issues related to ecology, pandemics, global problems, regional relations, trade and tourism that I will be focusing on.

Direct exchanges between cities and municipalities will also be a priority. During my work in St. Petersburg in 2005-2008, there were a series of cooperation agreements signed between Vilnius and St. Petersburg, Kaunas and St. Petersburg, Alytus and Petrozavodsk. By the way, in 2022, Kaunas will become the European Capital of Culture, which is an excellent opportunity for further contacts. When it comes to regional cooperation, I would prioritize cooperation between Lithuania and the Kaliningrad region, especially in protecting the environment of the Baltic Sea and the Curonian Lagoon.

Joint regional and municipal projects should be instrumental in helping Lithuanians and Russians to better know each other, their culture, art, and life, stimulate tourism as well as cultural and academic exchanges.

These days, there are fewer and fewer Lithuanians who know what is happening in the neighboring country. When I talk to young Russians, I also see that they know little about Lithuania. We need to maintain a dialogue between our youth and public organizations because otherwise we will not be able to understand each other better.

I will be making every effort to make sure that the names of extraordinary people who bring us closer together are not forgotten. Jurgis Baltrushaitis was a great ambassador and a wonderful poet, who built a sort of a cultural bridge between our two countries. Small wonder, that the Lithuanian secondary school in Moscow bears his name. And there were also people like actors Juozas Budraitis and Donatas Banionis, poet Tomas Venclova and blessed Teofilius Matulionis. Lithuanian President Antanas Smetona and Prime Minister Augustinas Voldemaras studied in St. Petersburg, and Jonas Basanavičius and Vincas Petaris are Moscow University graduates. The famous Russian sculptor Mark Antokolsky and the great painter Isaac Levitan were both natives of Lithuania.

As far as military security goes, I hardly expect any changes here in the short term as tensions in the Baltic region have been growing for quite some time now. First of all, we should start with confidence-building measures and ensure transparency. As far as I know, this is exactly what the European Union and NATO are striving for.

In the present-day situation, any changes won’t come easy, especially when you believe that it is your partner alone who needs to change his behavior, not you. But we are connected by one region, history and people and, therefore, we should have a shared interest in a dialogue to end this impasse so that we can restore an atmosphere of trust and develop across-the-board cooperation. However, this requires dialogue, practical cooperation and compliance with international law.

And finally, politics aside, practical cooperation between Lithuania and Russia continues with border demarcation now completed, negotiations on diplomatic property underway, main contacts maintained, day-to-day problems being addressed, economic and trade relations developing, tourist flows (temporarily suspended due to the pandemic) resuming, along with cultural and academic exchanges, informal meetings of Lithuanian and Russian historians being held (as part of a bilateral commission of historians), a program of cross-border cooperation being implemented, human contacts being established, cooperation with representatives of the Russian liberal opposition, civil society and the academic community continuing, and the Kaliningrad transit being implemented virtually unhindered.

And this is only part of the picture.

From our partner International Affairs

Eastern Europe

Relations between Azerbaijan and the European Union

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The crises, revolutions, and wars of the first half of the 20th century led to serious geopolitical upheavals, economic crises, and serious violations of social justice. Formally formed after the end of World War II in 1945, liberal economic organizations such as the United Nations, GATT and the European Union focused on the formation of liberal internationalism in international relations and the transition to a global system of government (Dower & Williams, 2002). The failure of the liberal steps taken by the League of Nations in 1920 led to major economic crises in the second half of the 20th century. As a result of these economic crises, the end of socialism in international relations with the USSR in the 1990s, the emergence of independent states and liberal internationalism’s efforts to reach a global level reshaped both geopolitical positions in international relations and global economic forces and the system of international relations (Christopher S. Browning, 2013). After the degradation of the left ideology with the USSR, the emergence of independent states moving towards liberal values made the role of international organizations formed in the post-World War II period even more important. This article also provides information on the liberal relations between the Republic of Azerbaijan, which gained independence in the 1990s and the European Union.

General introduction to relations between Azerbaijan and European Union

The wave of democratization that began in 1974 began to radically change international relations. This democratization mainly covered the former USSR states; namely, the former communist states, geographically. After leaving the USSR, these states entered a very difficult process of democratization. Because for many years they lived in a totalitarian political system, as well as in a communist-planned economy. This directly prevented their transition to liberal multi-party democracy as well as to the “laissez faire” capitalist economy. Because, initially, the reforms were carried out with instructions from abroad. (namely, with instructions from global organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, etc.). Second, these countries did not have a strong economic base that would suddenly transition to market capitalism. Third, a culture of respect for individual freedoms was not ingrained in the policies of these states (Heywood, 2013). Therefore, after the collapse of the USSR, the newly independent states began to work closely with the European Union to accelerate the transition to globalization and democratization. Azerbaijan, one of these states, also became an active participant in international relations and international politics in 1991, building its relations with the West and the European Union on the principles of mutually beneficial cooperation, good neighborliness and peaceful coexistence.

The prospects of Azerbaijan’s relations with the European Union were mainly based on internal and external factors. Unlike other countries in the South Caucasus, Azerbaijan’s relations with the European Union are mainly in support of economic and political reforms, the establishment of the East-West transport and communication corridor, infrastructure development, etc. (SAM, Main directions of Foreign Policy of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 2017). Azerbaijan’s strategic transit position in the South Caucasus region, its location at the crossroads of land and air routes between Europe and Asia, and its role as a major distribution hub in Eurasia are of great importance to the European Union (Azerbaijan’s gas policy: challenges and dilemmas, 2009). One of the main tools for the European Union to interact with the countries of the South Caucasus was the European Neighborhood Policy. The inclusion of the Republic of Azerbaijan in the ENP program in 2004 enabled Azerbaijan to implement many of its economic, political, legal and administrative reforms within the ENP, and for this purpose Azerbaijan received financial and technical support from the European Union (SAM, Main directions of Foreign Policy of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 2017). It should be noted that in addition to the European Neighborhood Policy program in its relations with the European Union, the Azerbaijani state joined the Eastern Partnership project at the 2009 summit in Prague. As the Eastern Partnership is an initiative of Poland and Sweden to improve relations with the CIS countries within the framework of the European Union’s neighborhood policy, it initially played a very important role in Azerbaijan’s foreign policy (EEAS – European External Action Service, 2018).

However, neither the European Neighborhood Policy nor the Eastern Partnership promised security guarantees for Azerbaijan’s foreign policy in the next stages of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy, so Azerbaijan did not sign the Association Agreement and began negotiations with the EU for a new comprehensive agreement such as the Strategic Partnership Agreement (Shahin Abbasov, Jan18, 2011). Because in the foreign policy of Azerbaijan, there were economic and political reasons for not signing the Association Agreement of the European Union. Initially, the Association Agreement was not successful on the example of Azerbaijan. Because both sides had different requirements and needs. Secondly, this agreement was of no economic or political benefit to official Baku. However, Azerbaijan has been pursuing numerous projects with the European Union since the 1990s in many areas (energy, transport, education, culture, agriculture, regional development, economic, political and institutional reforms). As oil and gas from the Caspian Basin play an important role in ensuring the EU’s energy security, the European Union itself understands the geopolitical realities of Azerbaijan and acts accordingly (Elkhan Suleymanov. EU-Azerbaijan relations, 2011). Azerbaijan has existed with the European Union not only in the energy and economic spheres, but also in the social and political spheres. However, the relations within this framework have gradually weakened and lost their value. Although the European Union has taken an open position on Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, IDPs, Armenia’s occupation policy and existing UN resolutions, and has even adopted declarations, these principles have subsequently weakened. The first reason is that since both Azerbaijan and Armenia are parties to the Eastern Partnership, the European Union’s inaction in the conflict has affected the activities of the Eastern Partnership. In addition, although Azerbaijan itself is a modern and secular country, it often faced double standards of the European Union.

Historical and legal basis of Azerbaijan-EU relations

After gaining independence in 1991, Azerbaijan began to take an active part in building relations with Western countries and in international politics on the basis of the protection of statehood and national interests, as well as the principles of mutually beneficial cooperation, good neighborliness and peaceful coexistence. The fundamental requirements of state-building after the collapse of the USSR created a good basis for building relations between Azerbaijan and the European Union member states at both bilateral and multilateral levels. Due to its geographical proximity, important geostrategic location, availability of significant energy resources, Azerbaijanis a country of traditional interest to European countries (Sadigov R. The South Caucasus factor in the Eastern policy of the European Union. Politicale.ü.fddissertation, Baku, 2011, p.52). In general, in the first years of independence, the prospects of Azerbaijan’s relations with the European Union were based on internal and external factors. Internal factors included the continuation of reforms in the political, economic and social life of Azerbaijan to achieve the standards of the European Union, the full liberalization of the domestic market, production and services, and the completion of the country’s democratic transformation. External factors included the settlement of the conflicts in the South Caucasus, including the settlement of the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, joint cooperation between the countries of the region, security cooperation, the formation of a unified legislative, executive and judicial authorities in all three countries (Mammadov N, p.285). In general, the Republic of Azerbaijan declared in 1993 that Azerbaijan was interested in establishing relations with the EU. By signing the “Partnership and Cooperation Agreement” with the European Union, Azerbaijan began official relations with the EU. The European Union sent its first representative to Azerbaijan in 1998, and in 2000 the Permanent Mission of Azerbaijan to the EU was opened in Brussels. The Representation of the EU Commission in the Republic of Azerbaijan has been operating in Baku since February 4, 2008. This body was later renamed the Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Azerbaijan. The appointment of the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus on 7 July 2003 was a step towards increasing the organization’s activity in the region (Ahmadov E, p. 227).

The European Union has developed a “Technical Assistance to the CIS” program to provide financial assistance to countries belonging to the new group of democracies, such as Azerbaijan, to implement democratic reforms, create a market economy, develop interstate trade and transport relations and improve the customs system. In 1992-2006, more than 414 million euros in humanitarian, technical and food assistance was provided to Azerbaijan within the framework of the EU’s TACIS and other assistance programs (E. Ahmadov, 241). In addition, serious steps have been taken between Azerbaijan and the European Union in the field of human rights and politics. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Azerbaijan was signed in Luxembourg on 22 April 1993, providing for cooperation in trade, investment, economy, legislation, culture, immigration and the prevention of illicit trade and laying the legal basis for bilateral relations. This agreement can be considered as one of the most successful pages in foreign policy, as it is the legal basis for expanding relations between Azerbaijan and EU institutions. The EU-Azerbaijan Partnership and Cooperation Agreement entered into force in 1999 after ratification by the Azerbaijani Parliament.

European Neighborhood Policy

One of the main tools for the European Union to interact with the countries of the South Caucasus was the European Neighborhood Policy. In 2004, the Republic of Azerbaijan was included in the ENP program. The central element of the ENP is the Action Plan agreed between the EU and each partner country, which sets out a number of short- and medium-term priorities for the country. The “Azerbaijan-EU Action Plan” was adopted at the meeting of the Azerbaijan-EU Cooperation Council held on November 14, 2006 in Brussels (E. Ahmadov, p. 240). The action plan identifies a number of priority areas of cooperation between the European Union and Azerbaijan. These are: mainly the peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict; strengthening democracy; strengthening the protection of the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms; improving the business and investment climate; improving the work of the customs service; support for balanced and sustainable economic development; improvement of economic legislation and administrative practice; Deepening energy and transport cooperation between the European Union and Azerbaijan; strengthening cooperation in the fields of justice, freedom and security, including border issues; strengthening regional cooperation (Mammadov N. Foreign policy: realities and vision for the future. Baku: QANUN, 2013, p.212).The cooperation carried out within the ENP allows Azerbaijan to establish economic relations with EU countries, establish preferential trade and credit regimes, labor, market relations and migration, fight against drug trafficking and organized crime, promote investment, attract new financial sources, etc. opened up opportunities such as (N. Mammadov, p. 287).

Eastern Partnership

The Eastern Partnership initiative was launched by Poland and Sweden at a meeting of EU foreign ministers in Brussels on 26 May 2008. The initiative covers Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus. A joint declaration was adopted at the EaP Summit in Prague on May 7, 2009, and the EaP officially began operations. The EaP intends to raise relations between the European Union and the member countries of the program to a higher level, to continue and expand existing cooperation in bilateral and multilateral formats. Azerbaijan also joined the Eastern Partnership program at the 2009 summit in Prague. The EaP program was a different framework from the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. Thus, in order to establish closer ties with each partner country within the EU, the signing of new association agreements instead of existing partnership and cooperation agreements within the bilateral format, the establishment of a Deep and Detailed Free Trade Zone with a partner country in the WTO, as well as gradual visa requirements. liberalization, deeper cooperation to strengthen the energy security of partner countries and the EU, etc. planned. In other words, the EaP program did not promise the prospect of EU membership, but only a free trade agreement and associative political cooperation with this body, which provided for deep economic integration. However, neither the ENP nor the EaP did not sign the Association Agreement and began negotiations with the EU for a new comprehensive agreement, such as the Strategic Partnership Agreement, as Azerbaijan did not promise EU membership or any security guarantees. Because both the ENP and the EaP were programs that reflected the interests of the EU and the political and economic interests of the partner countries. On the other hand, the signing of the Association Agreement was not economically attractive for Azerbaijan. Because Azerbaijanis not a member of the World Trade Organization, which is one of the main requirements for signing the “Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement”. On the other hand, the Association Agreement would not give a significant vote to Azerbaijan within the EU Customs Union. In addition, membership in the association would not reduce the share of oil and gas exports, which account for more than 90% of Azerbaijan’s exports, in the short and medium term. In general, Azerbaijan views the entry into any customs zone from three perspectives: political independence, economic efficiency and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

In addition, the European Union must accept that both sides have different requirements and needs. Therefore, before the EA Summit in Riga in 2015, Azerbaijan submitted a proposed document on the Strategic Partnership Agreement to the EU. Azerbaijan, like Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, did not sign the Association Agreement, so it preferred to sign an agreement that has a separate legal force and reflects the national interests of the country. On 14 November 2016, the EU Council of Ministers mandated the European Commission and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to begin negotiations on behalf of the EU member states on the signing of an agreement between the EU and Azerbaijan. It should be noted that the new agreement will replace the 1999 TES and will be a new large-scale agreement with a legal obligation. Unlike other framework documents, the STS will address the common problems and goals facing Azerbaijan and the EU and will create a new basis for mutually beneficial cooperation and political dialogue between the two sides. The STS is a practical example of the “difference” approach outlined in the context of pursuing Azerbaijan’s interests in relations with the EU and in the updated version of the ENP (SAM, Main Directions of Foreign Policy of the Republic of Azerbaijan, pp. 324-326, 2017).

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Eastern Europe

Fundamental Reform Can Secure Armenia’s Long-Term Future

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In the past year, the world has changed an unfathomable amount; every country has faced new challenges in the face of the Covid-19 pandemic and the subsequent economic recession. The new global situation presents not only challenges but also the opportunity to think about new ideas, to work out how our energy and focus can be used to create a better future for individuals across the world.

Armenia is one country that has faced existential crisis in the past year; the pandemic, the economic crisis and of course the war in Artsakh. The war has exacerbated socio-economic issues, aggravated social division and resulted in ongoing political instability –all factors that have raised questions about Armenia’s future as a nation and on the global stage. Despite the pain of the last year, it has also given us the opportunity to reflect and rethink our model for fundamental reform in Armenia.

I have long argued that for Armenia to be truly successful, we need to unite and focus on the country’s future. We have a historic responsibility to our ancestors, those who faced persecution, to heal from the past and build a successful country for our children. By building on our unique identity and historic experiences, we can use them to guide our future. However, first we must face up to serious questions on how we would like Armenia to look in twenty to thirty years’ time.

Currently, lack of opportunity is causing Armenians to vote with their feet and leave the country, with an estimated 200,000 intending to leave Armenia this year. To stop this, we must together provide a future of opportunity and belief in success stemming from a change in mindset.

I do not believe that all of the problems we face can be solved by the Armenian state. Instead, both the Armenian authorities and the diaspora should leave political disputes aside in order to consolidate and, alongside international specialists and humanitarian organisations, assist in the building of new institutions, good governance and the development of the country. Engaging with international partners is critical to raising standards and finding effective solutions.

So far, attempts at developing Armenia have been blighted by a failure to unite and mobilise both the nation and diaspora. It is not an easy task, currently there are roughly 10 million Armenians living in over 100 nations. However, we must transform the relationship to one of interdependence and trust.

Until now, members of the diaspora have largely been viewed as a source of charitable aid – this causes disconnect and indifference. Instead of charity, which I believe is detrimental to Armenia’s future as it prevents organic, conducive reforms, the diaspora should invest in long-term projects with meaningful impacts. I believe a shared vision and hope for Armenia can be created through collaboration and the implementation of impact investment. However, a strong Armenian diaspora must become more aware of their responsibility in helping the Armenian nation develop, and by updating and strengthening their institutions, enhance and ensure the preservation of Armenian worldwide heritage.

Commitment and shared responsibility will encourage desire for success and provide a crux for wider development. A blend of commercial, social and philanthropic projects will help build a better more sustainable future for Armenia. Multi-purpose anchor projects – breakthrough projects used to serve the interests of the nation and its people – will help societal evolution.  Anchor projects in the education, technological, scientific and tourism sectors will serve as a way to unite a fragmented nation, by drawing people together through communication and exchange of ideas. Long-term investment and visionare necessary, as social impact investments slowly manifest themselves over 20-25 years. Therefore, close working relationships are essential, investors need to want to be part of the conversation and want to see the projects evolve to impact the wider community.

Re-establishing Armenia as a hub of excellence in education would not only aid development and attract investment, it would attract others to the country. Investment into educational projects is investing in Armenia’s future, and promotes talent, trust, collaboration and multiculturalism –in doing so educational projects have wide-ranging personal, local and global impact. Armenia has already shown it has the potential for success in the educational sphere; with the Tumo Centre, American University in Armenia, Russian-Armenian University, French University and United World Colleges movement all having centres in Armenia. We must utilise the opportunities we have for the implementation of further educational projects.

Additionally, investment into the science and technological space would have wide reaching effect. The development of science and technology is both tangible and lucrative.It will also drive explosive growth in the health, environment and knowledge economies. The FAST Foundation is leading the way in innovation in Armenia, numerous projects support budding scientists, technologists and innovators in Armenia and the global stage. It will amplify and empower scientific advancement in the country, aiming to position Armenia as the technical and scientific hub of the region.

By fostering a competitive economy in Armenia, we can attract further foreign direct investment and also immigration. Additionally, we need to encourage good governance by developing effective and accountable governmental and societal institutions, which commit to excellence and professionalism. Impact investment and the championing of good governance will create an attractive Armenia, where not only Armenians want to live, but also the diaspora, international students and businessmen and women. This would bolster demographic security by dampening the desire for emigration and creating the social and economic atmosphere needed to raise the birth rate in the country. A growing population would mean a larger workforce, which would allow Armenia to become a self-sufficient global player, one that can build regional and global alliances.

Whilst our geographical location at the crossroads of civilisations brings many benefits, we also face regional security threats, which was painfully evident during last year’s 44-day war. In order to bolster Armenia’s position regionally, we must first acknowledge our security situation and construct a more effective and forward-looking defence system. This will take a shift in thinking and a significant increase in spending, but more modern military thinking is needed to protect our borders and people. A reinforced and innovative security system will allow us to look forward and act to guarantee Artsakh’s physical freedom and security.

Armenia faces many challenges, but it also has a number of strengths and competitive advantages – which we must use; not only do the diaspora provide resources and experience of other systems, we are bilingual nation and a nation located at the cross-roads of four civilisations. Armenia’s geography between the Middle East, Europe and the Caucasus means we can take advantage ofa working relationship with the European Union through the Eastern Partnership whilst being a member of the Eurasian Economic Union and Commonwealth of Independent States. Russia in particular is interested in Armenia being competitive, and at the same time is the right ally to ensure regional security.

If we build on these advantages and focus on inter-dependency and responsibility, Armenians and the Armenian diaspora, in collaboration with international partners and humanitarian institutions, can build a successful country. By developing on a local level, we can look to eradicate inequality and push for a fairer more open society, one that is beneficial for all Armenians.

A strong Armenia with modern institutions and a well-educated society will improve the country’s position regionally and on a global scale; allowing Armenia to become a bridge between cultures and organisations.

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Eastern Europe

Shocking results of survey in Lithuania

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Lithuanian authorities in recent future could face harsh criticism from society and disagreement with current foreign and domestic policies.

The recent opinion poll has become the clear indicator of people’ dissatisfaction with government’s policy which resulted in loss of sovereignty of the country.

Lithuanian analysts were very confused with the results of the latest survey. On November 7-30, 2020, a representative survey was conducted by the company Baltijos tyrimai: 1004 residents of the country participated in it, the error of the results does not exceed 3.4%. The results of this survey shocked the researchers.

The study called “Lithuanian society’s susceptibility to disinformation. Narrative analysis.” (“Lietuvos visuomenės paveikumas dezinformacijai Naratyvų analizė”) made by Vilnius Institute for Policy Analysis was presented by one of its author – Gintaras Šumskas.

In an interview with Delfi, he admitted that this time the respondents were not given prepared statements with which they had to agree or not, they were not asked questions so that they could be interpreted ambiguously.

The analysis revealed the following narratives: COVID-19 destroyed the health care system in Lithuania, COVID-19 is used to manipulate and rule the society, Lithuania does not have an independent foreign policy, the Lithuanian educational system lays down the wrong values, the collapse of the USSR did not bring anything good, NATO takes away from members states money that would be better spent on the social sphere.

According to the results, it could be said that Lithuanians not only observe the situation but they analyse and make conclusions.

In time when COVID-19 pandemic almost seriously interfered with the normal daily life, the government wastes money conducting military exercises, deploying foreign troops and even increase military expenditures. The more so, in time when people have no money to burn their relatives who died from coronavirus, Lithuanian authorities declare that military threat is stronger than COVID-19.

The most surprising are the general answers. For example, 66% of the survey participants agree with the statement that “Lithuania is in vain to quarrel with Belarus and Russia, since bad relations will bring economic damage”, and more than half (54%) are convinced that “Lithuania does not have an independent foreign policy – everything is dictated by Brussels (EU) “, and 32% believe that Washington is in charge of Lithuania’s foreign policy.

There is nothing to add. Everything is said by ordinary people during survey.

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