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Victory in Strategic Studies: The Problematic Neglect of a Central Concept

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Within the academic sphere of strategic studies there seems to be no doubt that the concept of victory remains to be understudied.[i] Many scholars argue that the notion of victory is trapped in underdevelopment and thus lacks analytical merit due to the inherent fuzziness and contentiousness of the term.[ii] Nevertheless, considering that the very telos of war is winning and that the notion of victory occupies a central position in strategic thinking, it is all the more surprising that the concept of victory is most often not sufficiently considered.[iii] When taking into account that strategy as such has been described as a “theory of victory”, it seems indispensable to investigate why victory has not received as much attention as its importance in strategic thought suggests.[iv]

One might counter this statement arguing that the concept of victory has been a subject of strategic considerations throughout millennia. This notwithstanding, Martel concludes that “ideas about victory historically emerged haphazardly and erratically rather than as a coherent theory” – despite the plethora of literature on war.[v] Many theorists also tend to focus on the question of how to win war, while neglecting why one wins (the causal links between means and ends) and what it means to be victorious.[vi]

Victory is a highly contested term. This is because victory as a desired end state is often used ambiguously to accommodate strategic flexibility and adjust political objectives to the dynamics of war.[vii] The notion of an end state shall, however, not obscure that victory and defeat are not binary terms. As Bartholomees highlights, victory is predominantly a subjective assessment, not a fact or objective condition.[viii] This assessment, in addition, does not necessarily have to be permanent but can be reevaluated and challenged as e.g. the aftermath of World War I demonstrated.[ix] Victory further unfolds along different levels. Hence, military (tactical, operational) victory must not be equated with political (strategic or grand-strategic) victory, which is particularly hard to measure with quantifiable criteria.

However, that victory is a difficult concept which seems to elude final fixation must not be considered as sufficient explanation for the neglect of the study of victory in strategic studies. For that reason, in the following it shall be investigated whether victory has simply lost its relevance in the face of wars that – allegedly – cannot be won. In addition, the question shall be raised as to what extent liberal democratic values and the predominance of the just war paradigm can be considered as an explanation for the disregard of the concept of victory. For, as Hao puts it, “[a] military is not divorced from the society” – and neither is strategic thought.[x]

Further, this essay builds on the conviction that a more thorough study of victory is not only necessary but the continuing (relative) lack of attention to victory is also deeply problematic. Thus, this essay follows Martel’s assessment that “if policy-makers are unclear about what victory means, they are less likely to achieve it”.[xi] Among other aspects, this essay particularly aims to emphasize the necessity to establish a clear understanding of the meaning of victory for military interventions. This essay concludes that the notion of victory has endured the passing of time and will certainly continue to do so. Therefore, paying attention to the advancement of the concept of victory, especially regarding its adaptation to contemporary characteristics of warfare, and the establishment of a sound theoretical framework of victory will be inevitable.

Out of Sight, out of Mind – Is Victory Still Relevant?

The invention of nuclear weaponry led to a shift from winning wars to avoiding them (at least between nuclear powers).[xii] Consequently, during the Cold War, the perception arose that the concept of victory had become meaningless either due to the notion that nuclear wars could not be won or that hereby “no victory […] would be worth the price”.[xiii]

However, others claim that limited nuclear war could occur (with its corresponding victory and defeat). According to this strand of thinking, the concept of victory should not be rejected as practically unachievable and meaningless. In that sense, Gray outlines that the lack of a theory of victory within the overarching frame of nuclear strategy on NATO’s part was dangerous.[xiv] Firstly, because the focus on nuclear threat in contrast to nuclear execution (that is, the actual resort to nuclear weaponry) reduced the credibility of the fundamental goal of effective deterrence.[xv] Gray further argues that the concept of MAD functioned in terms of self-deterrence, which denied “freedom of strategic nuclear action” and hence hindered the development of a theory of victory here.[xvi] Thus, even if the advent of nuclear weaponry impeded strategic thinking about victory, the study of victory in the nuclear age might continue to be relevant – particularly in times of possible proliferation.

It seems to be commonly accepted that while the nature of war remains unchanged throughout history, the character of war (in terms of methodological, technological and ideological factors) is subject to fundamental change.[xvii] These new ways of waging war have been described as “unwinnable”, which would render it pointless to reflect about victory.[xviii]Firstly, the (not so new) concept of hybrid warfare must be considered, which is, for instance, applied by Russia in the Ukraine conflict using information warfare to obscure its goals.[xix] Thus, winning a hybrid war is difficult: If it is unclear what victory constitutes for the adversary, it is hard to prevent the opposing side from winning and in turn make oneself the winner.

Further, William Lind declared the emergence of “fourth generation warfare” and Mary Kaldor introduced the term “new wars” to capture the inclusion of non-state actors in warfare, the emphasis on identity politics and the return to the Hobbesian use of violence.[xx] Obviously, it is almost impossible to terminate such wars with “decisive victory”. The notion of wars that cannot be won particularly manifests itself in terms such as “perpetual” or “endless war”. These have been predominantly used to describe US involvement, most prominently regarding the so-called “War on Terror”.[xxi] While many argue that the “War on Terror” can simply not be won or reject the term altogether, Gordon emphasizes that “[a]l most entirely missing from this debate is a concept of what ‘victory’ in the war on terror would actually look like”.[xxii] This obscurity is best captured in former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s reply to the question of what victory constitutes within the “War on Terror”.[xxiii] To Rumsfeld, “victory is persuading the American people and the rest of the world that this is not a quick matter that is going to be over in a month or a year or even five years”.[xxiv]

Again, it is self-evident that such a conflict configuration cannot be resolved by decisive, military victory. However, as Howard highlights, wars ending with decisive victories do not constitute the norm but a historical anomaly.[xxv]Therefore, Gordon pleads for an understanding of victory that adapts to this “new and different kind of war” in order to “avert considerable pain, expense and trouble” – thus to put an end to this war’s endlessness.[xxvi]Consequently, the argument that the concept of victory has become irrelevant as wars are now “unwinnable” or “endless” does not hold. The question of victory is closely connected to the debate about the future of wars. Instead of declaring the notion of victory inapplicable in such contexts, the incentive should rather be to make victory finally keep pace with the times – especially regarding realistic outcomes and how to achieve them.

According to Blum, three developments have altered contemporary wars and notions of victory: “in the goals of war, the rules of war, and the targets of war”.[xxvii] In that sense, especially the rules of war have become increasingly restrictive after World War II. Human Rights Law is assumed to apply in war and the notion of human security has ever more permeated the conduct of war.[xxviii] Thus, Blum concludes that especially for those being committed to international law and morality (e.g. liberal democracies) it has become more difficult to aspire to go to war but also more costly to win.[xxix]For that reason, Blum argues that in order to reconcile the values, which especially liberal democracies are trying to uphold, with the necessary “evils of war”, victory is articulated in ever broader, blurrier terms.[xxx]

The difficulty of precisely articulating victory can further be connected to the framework of just war theory, which has become the predominant lens through which war and peace are being perceived in the West.[xxxi] However, victory is not problematized among contemporary just war theorists, which is highly problematic since “just war is just war”.[xxxii]This means that the central concept of victory cannot be euphemized but needs to be studied even if this uncovers dissatisfying aspects, namely that even a just war will produce unfavorable outcomes when victory is reached.[xxxiii]Thus, it seems as if the attempt to uphold particular values, which are enshrined in contemporary just war theory, have formed a mindset that hindered the formulation of a more pronounced concept of victory – in the practitioner’s and scholarly realm alike.

Victory as the Great Unknown – Consequences and Dangers

As has become clear, without a theory of victory that can answer questions such as “what does victory mean?”, “what are the benefits, costs, and risks of victory?” and“are we willing to pay the price of victory?”, wars cannot be won and set goals will not be achieved.[xxxiv] Roberts makes the case for the United States and argues that a continuous lack of a theory of victory regarding potential regional conflicts but also the changing character of war might result in US defeat in the next big war.[xxxv] Regarding the employment of nuclear weaponry, Gray emphasizes that if a theory of political victory is absent to reasoning about nuclear war, “there can be little justification for nuclear planning at all”.[xxxvi]

A theoretical framework of victory is indispensable for policymakers to be able to decide when it is necessary to use force.[xxxvii] This is particularly significant in the context of military interventions. If decisions about military interventions are based on a sound conception of victory, policymakers will be enabled to better achieve their goals, minimize costs, foresee the consequences of their decisions, and boost the prospect of success.[xxxviii]If military interventions are pursued without a concrete understanding of victory, as was arguably the case in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, military strategies are designed under great uncertainty, using inapt tools and might consequently be doomed to fail.[xxxix] This can have catastrophic consequences for both the intervening country and the country being intervened in. Similarly, peace operations operate on increasingly vague mandates. Thus, a coherent theory of victory is often absent – with all the negative consequences this entails.[xl]

Further, a clear definition of victory is crucial to enhance public support as transparency and public scrutiny can be ensured.[xli]More importantly, a theoretical framework of victory will provide the tools to meaningfully debate the (lacking) necessity of the use of military force and will thereby improve legitimacy.[xlii]

Hence, if victory continues to be theoretically and conceptually underdeveloped, the greatest danger will be the repetition of past mistakes – be it regarding miscalculations of necessary resources to achieve victory or the decision if it is worth to go to war.

Conclusion

De Landmeter concludes that “victory as a concept appears to be very problematic and might be devoid of meaning altogether” – especially regarding modern war.[xliii]The opposite is the case. It is true that the term victory has been (mis-) used as a shapeshifting, convenient catch-all term. Yet, as was demonstrated, above all the emergence of new ways of warfare presupposes not an abandonment of victory but a thorough theory of victory to enable policymakers and scholars to assess which aims can be realistically achieved, at what cost and under which risk. In sum, the concept of victory must be further theorized and adjusted to current contexts to unfold its full potential as a guidance for future strategic decisions and to prevent any rhetorical or strategic misuse.

War will not cease to exist, thus the strife for victory won’t either. While especially the Obama administration tried to ban victory from its “strategic lexicon”, President Trump had already returned to the rhetoric of victory.[xliv] Hence, victory is a sticky concept that is not to be defeated easily – even if attempts were made to avoid the term and replace it with the even vaguer notion of success.


[i] See, for instance, Armstrong, Jan and J. J. Widen, Contemporary Military Theory. The Dynamics of War (New York: Routledge, 2015), 44.

[ii] Mandel, Robert, Reassessing Victory in Warfare. Armed Forces & Society 37 no. 4 (2007), 13.

[iii] Angstrom and Widen, Contemporary Military Theory, 43.

[iv] King, Iain, Beyond Ends, Ways, and Means: We Need a Better Strategic Framework to Win in an Era of Great Power Competition. Accessible via: https://mwi.usma.edu/beyond-ends-ways-and-means-we-need-a-better-strategic-framework-to-win-in-an-era-of-great-power-competition/?fbclid=IwAR2M07YxxJ0FafODMGB9A80msbjbH4eOMI1qCbRB1ti0B3r7TPEY6GwOf9w [last access: December 19th 2020].

[v] Martel, William C., Victory in War: Foundations of Modern Strategy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 371.

[vi] Hoffman, Frank G., The Missing Element in Crafting National Strategy. A Theory of Success. JFQ 97 no. 2 (2020), 61 and Bartholomees, J. Boone, Theory of Victory. Parameters 38 (2008), 25.

[vii]Landmeter, Eric A. de, What constitutes victory in modern war? Militaire Spectator 187 no. 3 (2018), 141.

[viii]Bartholomees, Theory of Victory, 26.

[ix] Ibid., 30.

[x] Hao, Chong Shi, A Swift and Decisive Victory: The Strategic Implications of What Victory Means. PRISM 4 no. 4 (2014), 108.

[xi] Martel, William C., Victory in Scholarship on Strategy and War, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 24 no. 3 (2011), 518.

[xii]Ibid., 514.

[xiii]Brodie, Bernard, The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1946), 75.

[xiv]Gray, Colin, Nuclear Strategy: The Case for a Theory of Victory. International Security 4 no. 1 (1979), 62.

[xv]Ibid., 63.

[xvi]Ibid., 70.

[xvii]Landmeter, What constitutes victory in modern war?, 144.

[xviii] O’Driscoll, Cian, No substitute for victory? Why just war theorists can’t win. European Journal of International Relations 26 no. 1 (2020), 198.

[xix]Snegovaya, Maria, Putin’s Information Warfare In Ukraine. Soviet Origins of Russia’s Hybrid Warfare. Russia Report I (2015), 15, accessible via: http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Report%201%20Putin’s%20Information%20Warfare%20in%20Ukraine-%20Soviet%20Origins%20of%20Russias%20Hybrid%20Warfare.pdf [last access: December 19th 2020].

[xx] Lind, William S., Understanding Fourth Generation War. Military Review (2004) and Kaldor, Mary, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999).

[xxi] In the context of the specific role of the US in “endless wars”, Stephen Wertheim argues in an interview on his new book “Tomorrow, the World” (Cambridge et al: Harvard University Press, 2020), that “US military dominance became an end unto itself. Endless dominance produced endless war” (For the interview in full length see https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674248663, last access: January 25th 2021).

[xxii] Gordon, Philip H., Can the War on Terror Be Won? Foreign Affairs 86 no. 6 (2007), 53.

[xxiii] Keen, David, Endless War? Hidden Functions of ‘The War on Terror’ (London: Pluto Press, 2006), 82.

[xxiv] https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/rumsfeld_092001.html [last access: January 25th 2021].

[xxv] Howard, Michael, When are wars decisive? Survival 41 no. 1 (1999), 129.

[xxvi] Gordon, Can the War on Terror Be Won?, 54.

[xxvii] Blum, Gabriella, The Fog of Victory. The European Journal of International Law 24 no. 1 (2013), 392.

[xxviii] Ibid., 393.

[xxix] Ibid.

[xxx] Ibid. 420f.

[xxxi] O’Driscoll, No Substitute for Victory?, 189.

[xxxii] Ibid., 201.

[xxxiii] Ibid.

[xxxiv] Martel, Victory in War, 32.

[xxxv] Roberts, Brad, On the Need for a Blue Theory of Victory. War on the Rocks, September 17th 2020, accessible via: https://warontherocks.com/2020/09/on-the-need-for-a-blue-theory-of-victory/ [last access: December 20th 2020].

[xxxvi] Gray, Nuclear Strategy, 82.

[xxxvii] Martel, Victory in War, 371.

[xxxviii] Ibid., 38.

[xxxix] Blum, The Fog of Victory, 421.

[xl] Cf. Garcia, Antonio, South Africa and United Nations Peacekeeping Offensive Operations: Conceptual Models (Chitungwiza: Mwanaka Media and Publishing, 2018).

[xli] Martel, Victory in War, 382.

[xlii] Ibid., 376.

[xliii]Landmeter, What constitutes victory in modern war?, 146.

[xliv] O’Driscoll, No Substitute for Victory?, 190.

Sandra J. Bandemer graduated in History and Political Science at LMU Munich and is a second year Master student in Peace Research and International Politics at the University of Tübingen. Currently she is based in Paris and studies at Sciences Po. Her main focus lies on international security studies as well as the history and politics of the Middle East.

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Time for an International Cyber Court?

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In the current international environment, the significance of the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) is steadily rising. In this context, international cooperation is gradually moving towards a legal architecture for ICT governance and international information security (IIS) as an integral part of the overall international security framework. One of the key global challenges on this path is cybercrime. In a broader sense, cybercrime can be defined as criminal activity related to the ICT environment. Such are, for instance, crimes that target a PC or a network as well as crimes that rely on a PC or a network as a means for the attack.

According to statistics, global damages from cybercrime in 2022 alone were estimated at around USD 8.4 trillion. However, the cost of cybercrime incidents will expectedly exceed USD 11 trillion this year, while annual global spending on countering cyber offenses could exceed USD 20 trillion by 2026, an increase of almost 150% since 2022.

International cooperation in countering cybercrime is actively developing. Thus, its various forms in criminal prosecution includes mutual legal assistance, cooperation in the field of arrest warrants, law enforcement collaboration, mutual recognition of foreign verdicts, etc. There are four identifiable sources of such cooperation: <

  1. these are multilateral treaties on international cooperation in combating crime;
  2. multilateral treaties on criminal prosecution for certain offences;
  3. similar bilateral treaties;
  4. national legislation whose provisions may regulate international cooperation mechanisms for combating cybercrime.

Nevertheless, it can be pointed out that “the existing possibilities of legal assistance and international cooperation in fighting cybercrime are woefully insufficient in most cases.”

As for international litigation of ICT security violations, there is a need for a specific international mechanism to address the most grievous cyber offences that pose a threat to international security. Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter establishes the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes. One of the peaceful methods is judicial settlement. As for the application of this principle to ICT, the widespread desire to establish a global court with jurisdiction over transnational crimes in ICT has led to a variety of approaches in domestic and foreign international law doctrine [1]. This issue is particularly relevant nowadays, given a steep rise in the number of cyber offences.

In 2010, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 65/230 to address the issue of consolidating the existing judicial mechanisms and/or to propose new national and international judicial or other measures against cybercrime. It instituted the open-ended intergovernmental lexpert group to conduct a comprehensive study of the problem of cybercrime and responses to it at the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. Notably, the creation of an international cybercrime court was not on the agenda of the Group’s first meeting in Vienna of January 2011.

The judicial mechanisms existing within the UN system have proven that effective and transparent international justice is possible. This sets the stage for the successful resolutions to issues pertaining to this area. Particularly, it is noted that the establishment of a judicial mechanism “…would guarantee that offenses are not treated differently in different jurisdictions” and “…would provide an opportunity for prosecution in those cases where states are often reluctant to prosecute such misdeeds.”

There are several concepts prevalent in domestic and foreign doctrines, regarding the implementation of judicial proceedings against the misuse of ICTs.

Expanding the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court and Creating a Cyberspace Branch

First, the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) could be extended. For example, the idea of delegating cases involving cyberspace to the ICC was voiced at the UN Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, organized by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime in Bangkok in 2005: “…it is recommended that the crimes of cyber terrorism and cybercrime be considered with a view to developing an acceptable definition and listing them as crimes within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.”

This option should be pursued by adopting additional provisions to the Rome Statute that would cover ICT and expand the list of crimes under its jurisdiction. In doing so, it is important to reach a global agreement that all nations should ratify the amendments to the Rome Statute. However, this further complicates the process, given that a number of states have not ratified the document yet. One reason is that they view “many of its provisions as contrary to national interests and state sovereignty.” As part of the implementation of this option, it is proposed to create an International Criminal Tribunal for cyberspace, which would be a division of the ICC.

International Criminal Court or Tribunal for Cyberspace

The second option being considered is instituting a special international criminal court or tribunal for cyberspace, which would operate under the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Cyberspace (ICTC).

There is a position that “cyberattacks of the greatest global concern, which intentionally cause significant and comprehensive disruption of critical communications and information infrastructure, should fall under the jurisdiction of the ICTC.” The idea of its creation was proposed by Norwegian judge, international expert in cybercrime, and co-author of the concept of harmonizing computer crime legislation, Stein Schjolberg. In his work, Mr. Schjolberg puts forward the idea of establishing the ICTC. Its mandate would include prosecuting those who commit or order the most serious violations of the international cybercrime laws established under the provisions of the proposed statute, as well as pronouncing sentences on global cyberattack perpetrators. His list includes the following offences:

  • acts committed intentionally against computer systems, information systems, data, information or other property protected under relevant international criminal law;
  • wrongful acts of destroying, damaging or disabling critical communications and information infrastructure that result in damages to national security, civil defense, public administration and services, public health and safety, banking and financial services.

Creating ad-hoc courts or tribunals

Another option on the table is the creation of ad-hoc courts or tribunals as special temporary judicial mechanisms, established in accordance with the UN Security Council’s decision taken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which governs actions against threats to peace, breaches of peace and acts of aggression. The jurisdiction of these tribunals, as proposed, would extend to “the prosecution and punishment of cybercrime and should cover violations of the global treaty or package of treaties on cybercrime, as well as massive and coordinated global cyberattacks on critical information infrastructure.” Regarding the ratio of the jurisdiction of such ad-hoc courts or tribunals to national courts, parallel jurisdiction would be exercised, whereas priority would be given to the ad-hoc court or tribunal.

International Court of Justice on Cyberspace

Finally, there are ideas of establishing an independent International Court of Justice for cyberspace, which would deal with the most serious cybercrimes that pose a threat to the international community in general, and also particular international information security. While the former three options have jurisdiction over personal criminal responsibility for certain acts in the ICT environment, [2] the fourth option makes a state become a subject of international law.

Today, we can also hear statements from some countries about the need to establish a cyber-UN – a structure whose activities would focus on investigating crimes in ICT. However, this initiative has a certain idiosyncrasy: it has been declared that this institution won’t be inclusive, but rather selective and exclusive. Particularly, the Ukrainian side has stated that “Russia should have no place there.” In other words, the proposed organization will be leveraged to promote the interests of specific states and to discriminate against unwanted nations. Meanwhile, it’s not the political interests of individual states, but the formation of an international legal framework of cooperation to prevent conflicts in ICT that should be the key mission of such an institution.

It is crucial for any initiatives aimed at establishing a global judicial authority for regulating ICT to be equitable and open. In this regard, the UN seems to be the most effective forum, given that such a decision could be made binding on all member states by means of a respective action taken by the UNSC.

Regular Institutional Dialogue

However, there still remains another option. As part of the regular institutional dialogue on information security that is being discussed in the UN Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) on information and communication technology (ICT) security, as well as ICT security 2021-2025, a judicial body could be created. Nevertheless, this issue is not on the agenda yet and is unlikely to emerge in the near future. This is due to the fact that the parties already have disagreements on many issues within the mandate of the OEWG, so any attempts to establish a judicial body may further stall the negotiation process.

Maintaining the status quo

As was mentioned earlier, diverse positions on the issue at hand are pushed due to lack of agreement on basic theoretical foundations. The opposite view that there is no need for the emergence of additional forms of jurisdiction over cyberspace, since successful international cooperation is possible within the already existing framework, also makes some sense.

Is It Time to Form an International Cyber Court?

In view of apparent contradictions and no clear system of ICT regulation or information security stipulations in the international law, working out a new framework is perceived as a bit premature right now.

Today, debate is under way in the international law doctrine about the need for a tribunal whose mandate would include adjudicating cases related to ICT. However, the very nature of cyberspace brings with it certain intricacies. For example, the difficulty of attributing cyberattacks as well as collecting evidence from a technical point of view makes it difficult to establish the involvement of a particular state in any particular cyberattack.

Besides, there is a problem which boils down to the fact that there is a lack of consensus on the fundamental issues of international information security (IIS). For example, we see no uniform understanding of key terms. Moreover, states not only interpret them differently, but also use different terms. There are serious ideological differences on various aspects of ICT use and regulation. No tradeoff has been worked out on whether the existing norms of international law are applicable to ICT or whether new norms need to be developed, and whether there is a requirement for legally binding norms of international law that would be applicable to ICT, or if “soft law” would sufficient enough. In the meantime, a common vision or at least a compromise vision of the legal foundations of ICT, as well as harmonization of legislation, not to mention a global convention, is first and foremost necessary for the implementation of judicial proceedings on the global scale. Despite the fact that many states and regional organizations have developed and adopted a legal framework to combat cybercrime in recent years, there is no harmonization of national legal systems and no international convention to regulate activities in ICT in general and to handle cybercrime in particular. Thus, A.A. Danelyan points out that “there is no comprehensive universal international legal framework for cooperation” in ICT. The politization of ICT problems only makes the above-mentioned challenges even more daunting.

All of these factors threaten to result in a yet another politicized or ineffective institution. Due to the lack of comprehensive international legal regulation of international information security, creating such a body at the current stage of international law evolution and amid a serious crisis crippling international relations, would be an untimely move.

[1] The doctrine of international law refers to the system of views and theories held by scholars, the national academic community. Source: www.ilarb.ru/html/news/2013/14062013.html

[2]  Here, it is important to accommodate the divergent positions of states on the implementation of personal criminal responsibility for cybercrime as well as their political priorities.

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Maritime Security & Geopolitics in Indian Ocean Region

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By linking the Middle East, Asia, Europe, and Africa, the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) serves as an important global trade and commercial hub. The Strait of Hormuz, the Bab el-Mandeb, and the Malacca Strait are just a few of the strategic choke points that are located there. The region faces a number of security risks, including piracy, terrorism, territorial disputes, and geopolitical tensions. In particular, off the coast of Somalia, where pirates have seized commercial ships and held crews hostage for ransom, piracy has been a significant problem in the area for a number of years. But in recent years, the number of piracy incidents has significantly decreased as a result of the efforts of international naval forces and increased security measures by shipping companies.

Similarly, another major issue in the area is maritime terrorism, with several terrorist organizations active in the Indian Ocean’s littoral states. Shipping lanes, ports, and other maritime infrastructure are at risk from these groups. The most notorious terrorist organization present in the area is Al-Shabaab, which has ties to Al-Qaeda and is based in Somalia. Al-Shabaab has carried out numerous assaults on commercial ships and port facilities. Whereas, the Doklam plateau and the South China Sea are the subjects of the biggest territorial dispute in the area between China and India. The dispute has led to higher tensions between the two nations, and both sides have increased their military presence in the area.

However, China has been stepping up its presence in the Indian Ocean region, and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has significantly contributed to the infrastructure growth of the area. The Hambantota port in Sri Lanka and the Gwadar port in Pakistan are just two of the port development initiatives included in the BRI. India and the United States are concerned about these ports because they believe China is attempting to increase its influence in the region. Whereas, the United States is another significant player in the IOR, particularly in terms of preserving regional security and stability. Due to the fact that Bahrain is home to the US 5th Fleet, the US has a sizable naval presence in the area. The US has also been actively collaborating with other regional players, like India and Japan, to counter China’s expanding influence.

Simultaneously, the area, which makes up about one-fifth of the world’s oceans, is home to important shipping lanes. Due to these sea lanes, which link the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and Asia, the Indian Ocean region is an important trade route. The Indian Ocean is the conduit for almost 80% of the world’s oil trade and 40% of its merchandise trade. Therefore, ensuring safe and secure navigation through the area is crucial for expanding economic activity and global trade. The Indian Ocean region has a complex and varied geopolitical landscape. There are many states in the region, all of varying economic and military strength.

Along with these major players, the IOR is also home to a large number of other stakeholders, including smaller nations like Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and the Maldives, as well as regional alliances like the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC). These stakeholders have a significant impact on how the region will develop and will probably gain significance as the IOR continues to gain prominence.

Another significant risk to the IOR’s maritime security is the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). There are worries that non-state actors could obtain WMDs due to the presence of several nuclear-armed states in the region, including Pakistan and India. Governments and law enforcement organizations face a serious challenge when it comes to the smuggling of nuclear materials and components through the maritime domain. For regional stability and global security, the potential use of WMDs in the IOR by terrorists or state actors could be disastrous.

Similarly, a less well-known but no less important threat to maritime security in the IOR is marine environmental degradation. In addition to being a significant fishing ground, the area is home to some of the busiest shipping lanes on earth. However, unrestricted fishing methods, shipping pollution, and the disposal of waste at sea have resulted in the deterioration of marine ecosystems and the depletion of fisheries. The state of the marine environment not only jeopardizes fishermen’s means of subsistence but also has wider ramifications for global ocean sustainability and food security.

Last but not least, the creation of innovative techniques and plans for maritime security represents another chance. For example, improvements in satellite and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) technology could aid in enhancing the monitoring and surveillance of the region’s waters, making it simpler to identify and address security threats. Likely contributing to an increase in maritime security in the IOR is the development of new maritime policing techniques like the use of floating police stations and closer collaboration with coastal communities.

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It’s high time to step up the protection of Europe’s critical maritime infrastructure

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After the truth about the Nord Stream pipeline explosion came to light, the whole world knows that the United States was behind the destruction of critical infrastructure. In fact, the destruction of infrastructure is not a new method to achieve America’s purpose. Since the last century U.S. has recognized the important strategic value of critical infrastructure and has accumulated relevant experience in combating it. The Nord Stream pipeline is not the first target of attack by the United States, nor will it be the last. We should be wary of the U.S. using various means to gather information on critical infrastructure, strengthen protection of underwater infrastructure in order to prevent recurrences of similar incidents.

The U.S. has “extensive experience” in destroying critical infrastructure

In Nicaragua, the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) overthrew the dictatorship of the close U.S. ally Anastasio Somoza in 1979. Since then, the United States has tried to destabilize the political situation in Nicaragua by various means. The U.S. intelligence agency formed a special detachment, directed it several times to destroy oil storage facilities and pipelines of Nicaragua and deployed mines in many ports to blow up oil tankers. The two most destructive attacks were on the fuel reserves in Corinto and Benjamin Zeledon ports. Approximately 4 million gallons of gasoline, diesel oil and other fuels were destroyed, equivalent to about a week’s worth of the country’s consumption. The means of sabotage by the United States in Nicaragua was exactly the same as that of the Nord Stream pipeline explosion. In addition, in the 1970s the U.S. directed terrorists to destroy Chile’s infrastructure including power plants and electrical substations, violently overthrew the democratically elected President Salvador Allende’s regime, and plunged Chile into a long-term military dictatorship.

In recent years, the United States has turned its attention to the oil-producing country, Venezuela. In 2020, the United States ordered agents to launch terrorist attacks on Venezuela’s Amuay refinery (one of the world’s largest and is capable of processing up to 630,000 barrels per day of crude oil) and the 146,000-bpd El Palito refinery, in an attempt to cut off economic lifeline and eliminate the anti-American regime.

Past events have shown that the United States is accustomed to eliminating anti-American forces by destroying infrastructure. U.S. sabotage has caused irreparable damage to the target country, regardless of whether the ultimate goal can be achieved. And the United States usually “does not have to” pay for its actions.

The undersea warfare launched by the United States is still going on

Behind the US’s wanton destruction of critical infrastructure is the support of high-level combat capabilities. In fact, the U.S. has a long history of research on undersea warfare, focusing on training professional military personnel, developing sophisticated underwater weapons and continuously upgrading combat systems. In 2016, the Washington Post reported that the U.S. Office of Naval Research (ONR) is seeking to “build the Eisenhower highway network on the seabeds in the seven oceans”. Mathias Winter, head of the office, said the ultimate goal is to “have large-scale deployments of Unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) and build service stations underwater”. The U.S. military is gradually implementing this vision. The UUV mentioned above is the “highlight” of the arms competition between the major powers in recent years. It can perform multiple tasks such as anti-submarine, seabed mapping, and frontier reconnaissance. It should be pointed out that few countries in the world have the ability to develop UUV, while the U.S. started earlier in this field and its technology is relatively mature. In January 2023 the U.S. Navy announced that it will soon begin the underwater testing of the first Orca XLUUV. The Orca is just one of several unmanned underwater vehicle projects underway by the Navy, other projects in development include the large submarine-launched UUV Snakehead, medium submarine-launched UUVs Razorback and Viperfish. The realization of the United States’ vision will boost its penetration into the marine environment of various countries. In January 2023, Namibia announced that it had discovered in its waters a US saildrone used to gather data underwater. At the same time, the U.S. military places a high priority on the training of combat divers. In addition to the famous Navy SEALs, there is a very small Army community, mostly made up of special operators, that goes through the Combat Diver Qualification Course to become combat divers. Business Insider reported in detail on the training process in February 2022.

International oil economist and author John Foster said the pipeline sabotage has opened a Pandora’s box of troubles and has endangered pipelines worldwide. It is clear who benefits. In the face of a complex and volatile international situation, critical infrastructure protection is more vital than ever. Underwater infrastructure is particularly attractive to attackers due to the difficulty of regulation and protection. The seabed internet cable between Henningsvær and Svolvær in Lofoten, Norway was broken on October 4, 2022, and the cause of the damage is still unknown. In this regard, the Spanish “Abésai” published an article saying that the recent sabotage of the Nord Stream gas pipelines seemed a powerful symbolic action that exposed the vulnerabilities of the West, while the 475 undersea cables currently in existence that are carrying more than 95% of the world’s internet traffic are the overlooked Achilles’ heel. Among them, the Euro-Atlantic area is the oldest undersea cable route and carries traffic between Europe and America with dozens of cables. Since a majority of the data is stored in data centers located in the United States, it can be said that the US is the main “owner” of transatlantic communications and has the ability to control submarine cables.

The connecting undersea cables [submarinecablemap.com]

The Nord Stream pipeline explosion was a “wake-up call” for Europe, which led many countries to scramble to improve security of highly vulnerable undersea pipelines and communications cables. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg announced on 15 February 2023 the creation of a Critical Undersea Infrastructure Coordination Cell at NATO Headquarters to protect critical underwater infrastructure, noting that further measures will be finalized at the next scheduled summit in Vilnius on 11-12 July 2023. The purpose of the United States to promote the collection of information on the underwater infrastructure of other countries in the name of infrastructure protection in multilateral frameworks such as NATO is extremely obvious.

Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger famously stated: ”To be an enemy of America can be dangerous, but to be a friend is fatal.” After the war was dragged into endless combat mode by the U.S., no place or asset in the world is safe anymore. Chaos will ensue.

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