Authors: Dr. Zlatko Hadžidedić, Adnan Idrizbegović
By the end of 2020, a strange information appeared in Bosnian and German media: having made unilateral concessions to the long campaign of Russia to put an end to the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Germany now wants to overthrow the current High Representative, Valentin Inzko, and bring the OHR under control of its own man, Christian Schmidt. Does this bilateral initiative have any legal basis? And, is this petty manoeuvre in the Balkans going to open Pandora’s box on the global level, again?
The Office of the High Representative was established in 1995 by the Dayton Peace Accords, to exercise the remaining10% of the Bosnian state sovereignty, which has in 90% been ceded to the two ethnically defined sub-state units, the so-called entities. As such, High Representative has the authority to overpower blockades and vetoes introduced by the entities. High Representative is an inseparable part of Bosnia’s Dayton Constitution, no less than the entities and their veto power. In that sense, the Russian campaign to eliminate the Office of the High Representative while preserving the entities and their veto power is legally absurd: one cannot take one part of a contract out, while insisting on implementation of the rest; for, taking one part out nullifies a contract altogether. However, implementation of the Russian requests under the given conditions of the Dayton Constitution would destroy the last remnants of the Bosnian sovereignty and integrity, granting full sovereignty to the entities and resulting in Bosnia’s dissolution. Russia, acting for years as a self-proclaimed supporter of Serbia and its interests to dissolve Bosnia, does not introduce any novelty in its foreign policy in the Balkans. Yet, what is going on with Germany, a NATO member, an EU leader, and a self-promoted supporter of Bosnia’s sovereignty and integrity?
It should be noted that a High Representative can be replaced only by decision of the UN Security Council, under recommendation of the Peace Implementation Council, a body for implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords consisting of diplomatic representatives of the US, Russia, France, Germany, Italy, Great Britain, Canada, Japan, and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference represented by Turkey. The UN Security Council decisions can be reached only by consensus of the permanent members with veto power. Decisions of the Peace Implementation Council can also be reached only by consensus of its original members (US, UK, France, Russia, Germany, Italy). It is, therefore, legally absurd, again, to replace a High Representative by a bilateral agreement between Russia and Germany, without any such consensus. It would mean a violation, if not elimination, of all legal procedures, not only those referring to the institution of High Representative, but also those related to the Security Council and the UN as a whole. Indeed, what happened to the German foreign policy, hitherto absolutely devoted to international legal procedures and international law?
An explanation for the German change of course, presented in both Bosnian and German media, was German increasing dependence on Russian gas supply, bearing in mind that Germany has given up all alternatives to the Nord Stream pipeline, which delivers Russian gas to Germany. Once upon a time, the former German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, strongly advocated an alternative pipeline, called Nabucco, which would bring Iranian gas to Germany and the rest of Europe. On the other side, Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, who eventually became Chairman of the Board of both Nord Stream AG and Rosneft, a Russian oil corporation, advocated the Nord Stream pipeline as the preferential one. Eventually, Schroeder had enough luck to have a comprehensive anti-Iranian coalition (ranging from Russia to the US) on his side, so that the Nabucco project was eventually abandoned and the Nord Stream remained the only option. At the time, Schroeder was criticised by German media for linking his private interests with strategic interests of Russia: for, the company Nord Stream AG, of which he was the Chairman, was in 51% owned by the Russian corporation Gazprom. In this way, Schroeder made Germany dependent not only on Russian gas supply, but also on Russian geostrategic interests, articulated by the Kremlin and Gazprom. Schroeder’s personal friendship with Russian President, Vladimir Putin, did not pass unnoticed, either. In this way, Germany not only gave up its own energetic sovereignty, but also abandoned the official EU energetic security strategy, which stipulates diversification of energy supply sources. Schroeder thus intentionally buried the traditional German Ostpolitik; but what was the reason for the next German government, led by Angela Merkel and controlled by the CDU/CSU coalition, to adopt the same course? What has happened to the German geostrategic orientation? Has Germany lost its NATO compass?
After the disastrous consequences of the 1973 oil crisis, German government invested heavily in construction of gigantic oil and gas storages, with a strategic goal to control negative effects of permanent oil price fluctuations on the German economy and population. Yet, these storages have eventually ended up in ownership of the Russian oil and gas giant, Gazprom. Such a development has given Gazprom effective control of the German energy market. Consequently, it has given Gazprom and Russia strategic influence on the entire economy of the European Union. One can only wonder, why has Germany decided to deliver not only its own destiny, but also that of Europe, to Russia? And then, no wonder that Great Britain has opted for Brexit to simply run away – this time, not from the Brussels bureaucracy, but from the Kremlin’s oilgarchy and Russian energocracy.
This U-turn in geopolitical orientation, unilaterally performed by Germany but tacitly agreed upon by the rest of the EU countries, certainly generates shockwaves throughout the Euro-Atlantic structures, inevitably separating Europe from the Atlanticist part of its identity. In this context, the most loyal American allies among the NATO members, Turkey and Germany, have turned their backs on the US and started looking at Russia as a new strategic partner. Both of them utilised the crisis of leadership in the US, caused by President Trump, to reclaim their sovereignty and decide which side to turn to. Since Trump has managed to disable the entire global security architecture as constructed after the World War II, attacking all multilateral organisations and treaties and thus opening the gates of the West for the Russians and Chinese to enter, German and Turkish re-orientation can be justified as rational. Yet, a bitter taste of betrayal – by Germany, by Turkey, but no less by Trump – lingers on. Does it mean that America, under Donald Trump, has eventually lost the Cold War, as Russia had once lost it under Boris Yeltsin? Will American influence be reduced to the English-speaking world? Is Germany, together with Russia, establishing a new, Eurasian Union? Is China going to be a part of it, given its hasty trade deal with the EU? Has the worst Anglo-American nightmare, that of a united Eurasian “World Island”, finally come true? Or the current German-Russian pact is going to end up like the previous one, smashed under the weight of the Anglo-American axis?
Global Pandora’s box has obviously been opened and the world geopolitical order, as we knew it, has fallen apart. A new order, or perhaps a disorder, is approaching. Such a development can be detected at all levels, looking at the top or at the bottom, and is signalled even by the clumsy German attempt to court the Russians by abandoning fundamental legal principles and its own foreign policy postulates in a seemingly insignificant place like Bosnia. Strangely, both Germany and Russia have accepted to play the roles assigned to them in the 1990s by the then British propaganda, which labelled them as patrons of Croatia and Serbia in their efforts to carve up Bosnia along the lines of its multiple religious identities. Whereas Russia openly adopted its role as the protector of the Orthodox Serbs many years ago, Germany’s adoption of the parallel role, that of the protector of the Catholic Croats, is a relative novelty. While in the 1990s both Germany and Russia were reluctant to play the roles casted by others, now they have become eager to demonstrate their rising power through such a game. The attempted appointment of Christian Schmidt leaves no place for doubt that Germany has fallen into this trap with a surplus of enthusiasm. For, the former German Minister of Agriculture, and a member of the Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU),was publicly decorated by Croatia with a medal of “Order of Ante Starčević” for his promotion of Croatian national interests. He proudly shares this medal with prominent Croatian ultra-nationalists and war criminals, such as Gojko Šušak, Mate Boban, Dario Kordić, Jadranko Prlić, and many others, who were inspired by the Croatian Ustash a regime from the World War II, as much as the Ustashas themselves had been inspired by the then German Nazi regime. In this context, it should be noted that Schmidt’s inclinations are not derived from some religious, pan-Catholic sentiments, but rather from his ideological, ultra-nationalist affinities, for which he was rewarded by his ideological brethren. If appointed a High Representative, Schmidt will probably follow the same path, so he will promote interests of Croatian ultra-nationalists, whose goal is to cede a part of the Bosnian territory and make it a part of Croatia, rather than interests of Catholics in Bosnia. Does it imply that he is going to work together with ultra-nationalists of all sorts – and there are enough of them in Bosnia – on the country’s final dissolution? Is that outcome in Germany’s best interest, and what kind of image does Germany project if it sends Schmidts as its representatives? Finally, what message does Germany leave to the world, if it takes the advantage of the uncertain power transition in America to prepare dissolution of a US-sponsored international treaty, the Dayton Peace Accords, thereby introducing, with a help of Russia, a new era of lawlessness?
There are so many questions to which German authorities should offer valid answers, before they pull the trigger to assassinate both Dayton and Bosnia, and destroy some of the last remnants of the international order. Do they think that they owe these answers to the rest of us?
EU: The stalemate in negotiations brings Serbia ever closer to Russia and China
Serbia has been waiting since 2012 for the European Union to respond to its application to become a full member of the EU.
In spite of exhausting negotiations, this response is slow in coming and the main cause of the stalemate has a clear name: Kosovo. Before accepting Serbia’s application for membership, the EU requires a definitive solution to the relations between Serbia and that region that broke away from it after the 1999 conflict – when NATO came to the aid of the Kosovo Albanians – and proclaimed its independence in February 2008.
Serbia has never recognised the birth of the Kosovo Republic, just as many other important countries have not: out of 193 UN members, only 110 have formally accepted the birth of the new republic, while the rest, including Russia, China, Spain, Greece and Romania – to name just the most important ones – refuse to recognise the independence of the Albanians of what was once a region of Serbia.
The European Union cannot accept that one of its members is in fact unable to guarantee control over its borders, as would be the case for Serbia if its membership were accepted.
In fact, since the end of the war between Kosovo and Serbia, there is no clear and controlled border between the two countries. In order to avoid continuous clashes, Kosovo and Serbia have actually left the border open, turning a blind eye to the ‘smuggling economy’ that thrives on both sides of the border.
In this situation, if Serbia were to become a full member of the European Union, it would create a gap in the borders of the entire Schengen area, as anyone passing through Kosovo could then move into all EU countries.This is not the only obstacle to Serbia’s accession to the European
Union: many European chancelleries are wary of Serbian foreign policy which, since the dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation, has maintained a privileged relationship with Russia, refusing to adhere to the sanctions decided by Europe against Russia after the annexation of Crimea to the detriment of Ukraine.
During the Covid-19 pandemic, Serbia even agreed to produce the Russian vaccine ‘Sputnik V’ directly in its own laboratories, blatantly snubbing EU’s vaccine offer.
For the United States and some important European countries, Serbia’s formal accession to the European Union could shift the centre of gravity of Europe’s geopolitics towards the East, opening a preferential channel for dialogue between Russia and the European Union through Serbia.
This possibility, however, is not viewed unfavourably by Germany which, in the intentions of the CDU President, Armin Laschet, the next candidate to succeed Angela Merkel as Chancellor, has recently declared he is in favour of a foreign policy that “develops in multiple directions”, warning his Western partners of the danger resulting from “the interruption of the dialogue with Russia and China”. In this regard, Laschet has publicly stated that ‘foreign policy must always focus on finding ways to interact, including cooperation with countries that have different social models from ours, such as Russia, China and the nations of the Arab world’.
Today we do not know whether in autumn Laschet will take over the leadership of the most powerful country in the European Union, but what is certain is that Serbia’s possible formal membership of the European Union could force Europe to revise some of its foreign policy stances, under the pressure of a new Serbian-German axis.
Currently, however, Serbia’s membership of the European Union still seems a long way off, precisely because of the stalemate in the Serbia-Kosovo negotiations.
In 2013 Kosovo and Serbia signed the so-called ‘Brussels Pact’, an agreement optimistically considered by European diplomats to be capable of rapidly normalising relations between Serbia and Kosovo, in view of mutual political and diplomatic recognition.
An integral part of the agreement was, on the one hand, the commitment of Kosovo’s authorities to recognise a high degree of administrative autonomy to the Kosovo municipalities inhabited by a Serb majority and, on the other hand, the collaboration of the Serbs in the search for the remains of the thousands of Kosovar Albanians presumably eliminated by Milosevic’s troops during the repression that preceded the 1999 war.
Neither of the two commitments has so far been fulfilled and, during the meeting held in Brussels on July 21 between Serbian President Alexander Vucic and Kosovo’s Prime Minister Albin Kurti, harsh words and reciprocal accusations were reportedly exchanged concerning the failure to implement the ‘Pact’, to the extent that the Head of European foreign policy, Josep Borrel, publicly asked the two parties to ‘close the chapter of a painful past through a legally binding agreement on the normalisation of mutual relations, with a view to building a European future for its citizens’. This future seems nebulous, to say the least, if we consider that Serbia, in fact, refuses to recognise the legal value of degrees and diplomas awarded by the Kosovo academic authorities also to members of the Kosovo Serb minority.
Currently, however, both contenders are securing support and alliances in Europe and overseas.
Serbia is viewed favourably by the current President of the European Union, Slovenian Janez Jansa, who is a supporter of its membership because “this would definitively mark the dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation”. The vast majority of European right-wing parties, ranging from the French ‘Rassemblement National’ to the Hungarian ‘Fydesz’, also approve of Serbia’s membership application and openly court the Serbian minorities living in their respective countries while, after the years of US disengagement from the Balkans under Presidents Bush, Obama and Trump, the Biden administration has decided to put the region back on the list of priority foreign policy commitments, entrusting the ‘Serbia dossier’ to the undersecretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, Matthew Palmer, an authoritative and experienced diplomat.
With a view to supporting its application for European membership, Serbia has also deployed official lobbyists.
Last June, Natasha Dragojilovic Ciric’s lobbying firm ND Consulting officially registered in the so-called EU ‘transparency register’ to promote support for Serbia’s membership. ND is financed by a group of international donors and is advised by Igor Bandovic, former researcher at the American Gallup and Head of the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, by lawyer Katarina Golubovic of the ‘Committee of Human Rights Lawyers’ and Jovana Spremo, former OSCE consultant.
These are the legal experts deployed by Serbia in Brussels to support its application for formal European integration, but in the meantime Serbia is not neglecting its “eastern” alliances.
Earlier this month, the Head of the SVR, the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, Sergey Naryshkin, paid an official visit to Belgrade, a few weeks after the conclusion of a joint military exercise between Russian special forces (the “Spetznaz”) and Serbian special forces.
In the Serbian capital, Naryshkin not only met his Serbian counterpart Bratislav Gasic, Head of the ‘Bezbednosno Informativna Agencija’, the small but powerful Serbian secret service, but was also received by the President of the Republic Alexander Vucic with the aim of publicising the closeness between Serbia and Russia.
The timing of the visit coincides with the resumption of talks in Brussels on Serbia’s accession to the European Union and can clearly be considered as instrumental in exerting subtle diplomatic pressure aimed at convincing the European Union of the possibility that, in the event of a refusal, Serbia may decide to definitely turn its back on the West and ally with an East that is evidently more willing to treat the Serbs with the dignity and attention that a proud and tenacious people believes it deserves.
A piece of news confirming that Serbia is ready to turn its back on the West, should Europe continue to postpone the decision on its accession to the European Union is the fact that China has recently signed a partnership agreement with Serbia in the field of pharmaceutical research, an agreement that makes Serbia one of China’s current largest commercial partners on the European continent.
NATO’s Cypriot Trick
When the Soviet Union collapsed and the Warsaw Pact died, there was much speculation that NATO would consider itself redundant and either disappear or at least transmogrify into a less aggressive body.
Failing that, Moscow at least felt assured that NATO would not include Germany, let alone expand eastwards. Even the NATO Review, NATO’s PR organ, wrote self-apologetically twenty-five years after the fall of the Berlin wall: “Thus, the debate about the enlargement of NATO evolved solely in the context of German reunification. In these negotiations Bonn and Washington managed to allay Soviet reservations about a reunited Germany remaining in NATO. This was achieved by generous financial aid, and by the ‘2+4 Treaty’ ruling out the stationing of foreign NATO forces on the territory of the former East Germany. However, it was also achieved through countless personal conversations in which Gorbachev and other Soviet leaders were assured that the West would not take advantage of the Soviet Union’s weakness and willingness to withdraw militarily from Central and Eastern Europe.”
Whatever the polemics about Russia’s claim that NATO broke its promises, the facts of what happened following the fall of the Berlin wall and the negotiations about German re-unification strongly demonstrate that Moscow felt cheated and that the NATO business and military machine, driven by a jingoistic Cold War Britain, a selfish U.S. military-industrial-congressional complex and an atavistic Russia-hating Poland, saw an opportunity to become a world policeman.
This helps to explain why, in contrast to Berlin, NATO decided to keep Nicosia as the world’s last divided city. For Cyprus is in fact NATO’s southernmost point, de facto. And to have resolved Cyprus’ problem by heeding UN resolutions and getting rid of all foreign forces and re-unifying the country would have meant that NATO would have ‘lost’ Cyprus: hardly helpful to the idea of making NATO the world policeman. Let us look a little more closely at the history behind this.
Following the Suez debacle in 1956, Britain had already moved its Middle East Headquarters from Aden to Cyprus, while the U.S. was taking over from the UK and France in the Middle East. Although, to some extent under U.S. pressure, Britain was forced to bring Makarios out of exile and begin negotiating with Greece and Turkey to give up its colony, the U.S. opted for a NATO solution. It would not do to have a truly sovereign Cyprus, but only one which accepted the existence of the Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) as part and parcel of any settlement; and so it has remained, whatever the sophistic semantics about a bizonal settlement and a double-headed government. The set of twisted and oft-contradictory treaties that have bedevilled the island since 1960 are still afflicting the part-occupied island which has been a de facto NATO base since 1949. Let us look at some more history.
When Cyprus obtained its qualified independence in 1960, Greece and Turkey had already signed, on 11 February 1959, a so called ‘Gentlemen’s Agreement’, agreeing that they would support Cyprus’ entry into NATO.1 This was, however, mere posture diplomacy, since Britain—and the U.S. for that matter—did not trust Cyprus, given the strength of the Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL) and the latter’s links to Moscow. The Ministry of Defence (MOD) wrote: ‘Membership of NATO might make it easier for the Republic of Cyprus and possibly for the Greeks and Turks to cause political embarrassment should the United Kingdom wish to use the bases […] for national ends outside Cyprus […] The access of the Cypriot Government to NATO plans and documents would present a serious security risk, particularly in view of the strength of the Cypriot Communist Party. […] The Chiefs of Staff, therefore, feel most strongly that, from the military point of view, it would be a grave disadvantage to admit Cyprus to NATO.’2 In short, Cyprus was considered unreliable.
As is well known, the unworkable constitution (described as such by the Foreign Office and even by David Hannay, the Annan reunification plan’s PR man), resulted in chaos and civil strife: in January 1964, during the chaos caused by the Foreign Office’s help and encouragement to President Makarios to introduce a ‘thirteen point plan’ to solve Cyprus’ problems, British Prime Minister Douglas-Home told the Cabinet: ‘If the Turks invade or if we are seriously prevented from fulfilling our political role, we have made it quite clear that we will retire into base.’3 Put more simply, Britain had never had any intention of upholding the Treaty of Guarantee.
In July of the same year, the Foreign Office wrote: ‘The Americans have made it quite clear that there would be no question of using the 6th Fleet to prevent any possible Turkish invasion […] We have all along made it clear to the United Nations that we could not agree to UNFICYP’s being used for the purpose of repelling external intervention, and the standing orders to our troops outside UNFYCYP are to withdraw to the sovereign base areas immediately any such intervention takes place.’4
It was mainly thanks to Moscow and President Makarios that in 1964 a Turkish invasion and/or the island being divided between Greece and Turkey was prevented. Such a solution would have strengthened NATO, since Cyprus would no longer exist other than as a part of NATO members Greece and Turkey. Moscow had issued the following statement: ‘The Soviet Government hereby states that if there is an armed foreign invasion of Cypriot territory, the Soviet Union will help the Republic of Cyprus to defend its freedom and independence against foreign intervention.’5
Privately, Britain, realising the unworkability of the 1960 treaties, was embarrassed, and wished to relieve itself of the whole problem. The following gives us the backstage truth: ‘The bases and retained sites, and their usefulness to us, depend in large measure on Greek Cypriot co-operation and at least acquiescence. A ‘Guantanamo’6 position is out of the question. Their future therefore must depend on the extent to which we can retain Greek and/or Cypriot goodwill and counter USSR and UAR pressures. There seems little doubt, however, that in the long term, our sovereign rights in the SBA’s will be considered increasingly irksome by the Greek Cypriots and will be regarded as increasingly anachronistic by world public opinion.7
Following the Turkish invasion ten years later, Britain tried to give up its bases: ‘British strategic interests in Cyprus are now minimal. Cyprus has never figured in NATO strategy and our bases there have no direct NATO role. The strategic value of Cyprus to us has declined sharply since our virtual withdrawal from east of Suez. This will remain the case when the Suez Canal has reopened.8
A Cabinet paper concluded: ‘Our policy should continue to be one of complete withdrawal of our military presence on Cyprus as soon as feasible. […] In the circumstances I think that we should make the Americans aware of our growing difficulty in continuing to provide a military presence in Cyprus while sustaining our main contribution to NATO. […]9
Britain kept trying to give up the bases, but the enabler of the Turkish invasion, Henry Kissinger, did not allow Britain to give up its bases and listening posts, since that would have weakened NATO, and since Kissinger needed the bases because of the Arab-Israel dispute.10
Thus, by the end of 1980, in a private about-turn, Britain had completely succumbed to American pressure: ‘The benefits which we derive from the SBAs are of major significance and virtually irreplaceable. They are an essential contribution to the Anglo-American relationship. The Department have regularly considered with those concerned which circumstances in Cyprus are most conducive to our retaining unfettered use of our SBA facilities. On balance, the conclusion is that an early ‘solution’ might not help (since pressures against the SBAs might then build up), just as breakdown and return to strife would not, and that our interests are best served by continuing movement towards a solution – without the early prospect of arrival [author’s italics]11.
And so it is today: Cyprus is a de facto NATO territory. A truly independent, sovereign and united Cyprus is an anathema to the U.S. and Britain, since such a scenario would afford Russia the hypothetical opportunity to increase its influence in the Eastern Mediterranean.
From our partner RIAC
 Ministry of Defence paper JP (59) 163, I January 1960, BNA DEFE 13/99/MO/5/1/5, in Mallinson, William, Cyprus, a Modern History, I.B. Tauris (now Bloomsbury), London and New York, 2005, 2009, 2012, p.49.
 Memorandum by Prime Minister, 2 January 1964, BNA CAB/129/116, in ibid, Mallinson, William, p.37.
 British Embassy, Washington, to Foreign Office, 7 July 1964, telegram 8541, BNA FO 371/174766, file C1205/2/G, in ibid.’, Mallinson, William, p. 37.
 Joseph, Joseph S., Cyprus, Ethnic Conflict and International Politics, St Martin’s Press, London and New York, 1997, p. 66.
 In 1964, Cuba cut off supplies to the American base at Guantanamo Bay, since the US refused to return it to Cuba, as a result of which the US took measures to make it self-sufficient.
 Briefing paper, 18 June 1964, BNA-DO/220/170, file MED 193/105/2, part A. Mallinson,William, Kissinger and the Invasion of Cyprus, p. 127.
 ‘British Interests in the Eastern Mediterranean’, draft paper, 11 April 1975, BNA-FCO 46/1248, file DPI/515/1.
 Cabinet paper, 29 September 1976, in op. cit. Mallinson, William, Kissinger and the Invasion of Cyprus, p.134.
 Mallinson, William, Britain and Cyprus: Key Themes and Documents, I.B. Tauris, London and New York, 2011, and Bloomsbury, London and New York, 2020, pp. 87-121.
 Fergusson to Foreign Minister’s Private Secretary, minute, 8 December 1980, BNA-FCO 9/2949, file WSC/023/1, part C.
Belarus divorces from the Eastern Partnership: A new challenge for the EU Neighborhood Policy
The Eastern Partnership (EaP) is the Eastern dimension of the EU Neighborhood Policy adopted back in 2009 aimed at deepening relations between Brussels and six Eastern European partners – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. The EaP has been regarded as a strategic initiative based on mutual interests and common values with a goal of strengthening political and economic relations with those countries, helping them enhance their institutional capacity through sustainable reforms. While increasing stability and paving the way for the sustainable development of those societies, the EU’s overall goal has been to secure its Eastern borders.
Since the very beginning the EaP has been suspiciously viewed by Russia as an attempt of expansion of the sphere of influence and as a first step of EU membership of these countries. Russians point to the EU and NATO ambitious expansion eastward as the main reason for complicated relations and in this context the EaP has been regarded with traditional fears and paranoic perceptions. The Russian hard power approach causes serious problems for the EaP which fails to mitigate security concerns of partner countries and to come up with serious initiatives for conflict settlement. Being a laggard in terms of soft power, the Russian ruling elite has continuously used all hard power foreign policy instruments at its disposal trying to undermine the coherence of the initiative. And the very recent démarche of Belarus to withdraw from the EaP should be seen in this context of confrontation.
On 28th of June, the ministry of foreign affairs of Belarus announced a decision to halt its membership in the EaP as a response to the EU sanctions imposed on Minsk accompanied by the recalling ambassadors from both sides. Actually, this isn’t the first case of the EaP walkout blackmailed by Lukashenko. The first escape was attempted in September-October 2011, but the difficulties were soon resolved and Lukashenko revised his decision. This time situation seems very complicated and these far-reaching tensions may have tough consequences for Lukashenko’s regime. This new group of sectoral sanctions which target banking, oil, telecommunication spheres and also ban the export of potash, is a harsh response from the EU against Lukashneko’s scandalous hijacking activity in May to detain a Belarusian opposition journalist and blogger Roman Protasevich.
Lukashenko’s administration not only challenges the EU Neighborhood Policy and shows no retreat, but also goes forward escalating the situation. Minsk takes high risks freezing the Readmission Agreement signed by the EU. This document is a legal basis for bilateral cooperation aimed at struggling against irregular migration flows. It’s not a secret that the territory of Belarus has been used for illegal migration for the groups from the Middle East to penetrate into neighboring EU member states such as Poland, Lithuania and Latvia. Moreover, Belarus territory has served as a transit route for smuggling circles going from East to West and vice versa. And now closing eyes on all these channels, Minsk hopes to increase the bargaining power vis-à-vis Brussels. However, given the Western reactions, it seems that this time the EU is resolute.
Despite the fact that Charles Michel, the President of the EU Council, described this withdrawal as “another step backwards” and even threatened that “this will escalate tensions having clear negative impacts”, the EU wants to continue working with the Belarusian society as Josep Borrel stated. The EU’s determination to keep the bridges alive with the Belarusian people, in spite of Lukashneko’s radical stance, is aimed at preventing further isolationism of Minsk which would benefit only Russia.
In contrast to the increasing level of tensions with the EU, the Russian authorities continue to support Lukasheno’s administration, thus trying to deepen the gap and to bring Belarus under their total influence. Russia uses Belarus in its chessboard with the EU and the USA in Eastern Europe. Last year’s fraud elections and brutal crackdown by Lukashenko left him alone with the only source of power stemming from the Kremlin. Thus the withdrawal from the EaP should be understood not only as a convulsion of the Belarusian authorities in response to the sanctions, but also Russia’s employment of the Belarus card to respond to the recent joint statement of the EU-US summit in Brussels, when both parties declared their intention to stand with the people of Belarus, supporting their demands for human rights and democracy simultaneously criticising Lukashenko’s regime and his reckless political behavior and also criticising Russian’s unacceptable behavior.
So, Lukashenko’s step to quit the EaP can be seen as a well-calculated adulatory sign towards Moscow sacrificing the last remnants of sovereignty in order to receive financial and political lifebuoy amid the increasing crisis in the result of sanctions. And the recent visit of N. Patrushev, the Secretary of the Security Council of Russia, to Minsk right after the withdrawal decision shows Russian inclination to strike while the iron is hot and to abuse the vulnerable situation of Belarus. Patrushev stated that the ultimate goal of foreign powers is to change the power in Belarus and he suggested instead of focusing on internal issues, to bring their forces together against external threats as their influence affects internal developments. For this reason, deeper integration of security and military services of both countries are on the table.
The reaction of opposition leader S. Tikhanovskaya was very rough, stating that this suspension will cut the opportunities of ordinary citizens who benefit from the political and economic outcomes of the EaP. Moreover, she claims that Lukashenko doesn’t have a right to represent Belarus since August 2020 and his decisions don’t have legal consequences for Belarus. This kind of approach is shared by the leadership of Lithuania too, whose president and minister of foreign affairs not only refuse to recognize Lukashenko as a legitimate president, but also highlight the role of the Kremlin in supporting the dictatorial power of Lukashenko in exchange for decreasing sovereignty.
The blackmail of Lukashenko to challenge the EU Eastern Neighborhood Policy in order to have the sanctions lifted may bring about such kind of precedents with other partnering countries as well. First of all, this concerns Azerbaijan which continues to face serious problems related with human rights, freedom of expression, the problem of Prisoners of War and other traits of authoritarian power. It’s well-known that human rights issues have been the underwater stones in the EU and Azerbaijan relations and they continue to pose new challenges for Aliyev’s non-democratice regime. Another weak ring of the EaP chain is Armenia. Even though reelected N. Pashinyan is eager to pursue a balanced foreign policy, post-war Armenia still faces serious limitations given its vulnerable dependence on Russia. Besides, Pashinyan’s main rival and the former President R. Kocharyan, whose alliance will be the second largest faction in the newly elected Parliament has recently stated that this new parliament can last up to one and half years and nobody can exclude the possibility of new snap elections. His pro-Russian attitude and anti-Western stance are well-known and in case he becomes a prime-minister, there is no guarantee that he will follow the path of Lukashenko.
Therefore the statement of the Austrian MFA, that ”we cannot leave South Caucasus to others” during the recent official visit of the Austrian, Romanian and Latvian MFA under the mandate of the EU High Representative to the South Caucasus, reminds about the EU presence in the region and also the fact that the ‘normative power’ can be a source of balance and a status quo changer.
Truth and the third wave of the pandemic: To be vaccinated or not to be vaccinated
I have endured the worst possible case scenario. Being locked up in a mental institution for six months while in...
GCC Countries Back on Path to Economic Growth after Contraction Due to the Pandemic
Following a year of economic distress, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) economies are expected to return to an aggregate growth of...
To the Beat of its Own Drum: On Internal Logic of Events in Tunisia
Once every five years or so, Tunisia finds itself in the headlines around the world. Last time, in 2015, it...
What Does NATO Withdrawal from Afghanistan Mean for Regional Actors?
By September 11, 2021, NATO’s 20-year operation in Afghanistan will come to a close. That date marks the 20th anniversary...
Afghanistan may be a bellwether for Saudi-Iranian rivalry
Boasting an almost 1,000-kilometer border with Iran and a history of troubled relations between the Iranians and Sunni Muslim militants,...
The various ways you can buy gold
Gold is usually valued as a commodity, currency, and investment for many years. This is why it’s still popular nowadays...
Passing the Test of the Covid Pandemic
For love of domination we must substitute equality; for love of victory we must substitute justice; for brutality we must...
South Asia3 days ago
Why Strategies of Stakeholders in Afghanistan Failing Against Taliban?
East Asia3 days ago
Belt & Road ABCs: Analysis of “One Belt – One Road” initiative
Economy3 days ago
The Politico-Economic Crisis of Lebanon
East Asia3 days ago
Behind the Rise of China is the Centenary Aspiration of the CPC for a Great China
Reports3 days ago
New Skills Development Key to Further Improving Students’ Learning Outcomes
Development2 days ago
Tanzania’s Economic Growth by Transforming Its Tourism Sector
Human Rights2 days ago
Conflict, COVID, climate crisis, likely to fuel acute food insecurity in 23 ‘hunger hotspots’
International Law3 days ago
Upholding Dharma by Mob lynching?