Southeast Asia
ASEAN and North Korea: A Way Forward

Due to the stalemate on the Korean peninsula, it is time to find alternate policies to deal with North Korea. Past inter-Korean history has indicated that a long term multilateral approach is the way to go compared to a short term based crisis diplomacy. The process of bringing North Korea to the negotiating table requires the support of diverse actors especially when regular channels of communication have been blocked. To this end, ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) as an organization and its member states have the capacity to take a larger role in inter-Korean affairs in providing a structured process for regional confidence building and security cooperation. Past history of ASEAN indicates the organization has the capacity to facilitate engagement of North Korea through its many institutionalised frameworks, especially between South Korea and the United States.
ASEAN, formed in 1967 has embraced dynamic East Asian countries as dialogue partners. Its member states are deeply aware that security incidents triggered by North Korea will significantly affect Southeast Asia’s own development. Basically, any whiff of instability in East Asia will spell trouble for ASEAN’s economic growth which is interlinked greatly with the Japanese, South Korean and Chinese economies. A stable East Asia is crucial as ASEAN is also the main driver of initiatives such as the East Asian Community, East Asian Summit, ASEAN Plus Three and so on and not forgetting the newly minted Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).
Despite’s ASEAN’s regional importance, it is intriguing that the role of ASEAN in inter-Korean peace and security issues has not been explored to its fullest. Though the East Asian region is commonly associated with dynamic economic growth, nonetheless, North Korea is the only country in East Asia that has a reputation for reclusiveness. Despite a number of inter-Korean summits and US-North Korea meetings in Singapore and Hanoi between 2018 and 2019, North Korea has disengaged itself from all forms of diplomacy beginning 2019. Against this backdrop,i n the absence of sustained official dialogue between the U.S. South and North Korea as well as the collapse of the Six Party Talks, ASEAN is capable of engaging North Korea, with the condition, its presence is supported by major players.
For decades, ASEAN has faithfully supported Seoul’s position towards North Korean denuclearisation. This is due to North Korea’s intermediate range ballistic missiles, which are capable of reaching Southeast Asia. In addition, historically, ASEAN believes in the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (SEANWFZ) which disallows its members to acquire or produce nuclear weapons. For these reasons, ASEAN has continued its support for North Korean denuclearisation.
In promoting New Southern Policy to all 10 ASEAN Member States (AMS), President Moon Jae In of South Korea repeatedly urged regional governments to get involved in the Korean Peninsula peace process as well as integrate North Korea into regional affairs. To date, however, besides asking for support, there has not been a concrete South Korean proposal to institutionalize ASEAN as a serious player in inter-Korean affairs. Therefore ASEAN remains secondary to the involvement of bigger powers on the Korean peninsula.
There are multiple channels where ASEAN and its member states can engage North Korea in a more meaningful manner and at the same time integrate Pyongyang into the ASEAN community processes which includes the security, economic and social communities. The ‘ASEAN Way,’ a non-confrontational approach to diplomacy which relies on building trust through regular consultations allows for the organization to be a facilitator or a mediator between the two Koreas and become an additional platform for the United States and other major powers in engaging Pyongyang.
Though North Korea has embraced multilateralism in the past, Pyongyang has been more successful in interacting bilaterally with ASEAN member states. Due to historical and ideological linkages, ASEAN member states have relatively civilised relations with North Korea. Pyongyang has established diplomatic relations with every ASEAN country, and has embassies in every country in the region except for the Philippines and Brunei. In addition, Thailand, as host of the ASEAN meetings in 2000, took the initiative to invite the North to join the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). It has to be noted that Cambodia assisted Thailand greatly when inviting the North Koreans.
Pyongyang’s interactions with ASEAN is varied. Southeast Asian private and non-governmental firms have also been allowed to operate in North Korea. For example, while Singaporean household and luxury goods are common, Thailand’s Loxley Pacific built the internet infrastructure in North Korea. In addition, a Singapore based NGO, Choson Exchange, has continued to train young North Koreans in business and entrepreneurship.
Nonetheless, the murder of Kim Jong Un’s half-brother Kim Jong Nam in a Malaysian airport in February 2017 and the discovery of numerous illegal activities in the region did strain relations. Despite this and increased missile and nuclear tests in 2017, ASEAN member states refused to break off diplomatic ties or expel North Korea from the ARF.
Given the fact that Kim Jong-un readily accepted Singapore and Vietnam as summit locations for US- North Korea talks, it is reasonable to argue that not only does he view ASEAN positively but the economic developments of these states is appealing to him. Presumably, Kim Jong Un was assessing if these two Southeast Asian states could be exemplars for achieving economic modernisation of North Korea.
Currently, North Korea’s engagement with ASEAN is limited to the ARF and Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific(CSCAP) at the Track One and Track Two levels. These platforms have been useful for North Korea to interact with other states. Following the breakdown of the Six-Party process in late 2008, the ARF has served as one of the few remaining channels of institutionalized contact on security issues for North Korea. Since the COVID-19 era has severely affected the North Korean economy, the timing is right for ASEAN to amalgamate Pyongyang into the regional economic expansion. Therefore, North Korea should be invited to be part of other ASEAN-led mechanisms, such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the ASEAN Ministerial Meetings with Dialogue Partners. These platforms will provide a range of opportunities for North Korea to extend deeper regional security and economic engagement.
Despite the fact that North Korea had acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), a prerequisite to become a dialogue partner, ASEAN previously rejected North Korea’s request to become a dialogue partner. It can be assumed the rejection was directly related to frequent North Korean missile tests.
In comparison to other regional organisations, ASEAN is better qualified than most to keep North Korea continually engaged as well as in providing a favourable setting for addressing the state’s legitimate concerns. To the North Koreans, ASEAN is seen as being impartial when dealing with Pyongyang. Against this backdrop, there is a diplomatic opportunity for ASEAN to play the role of a mediator in bring together Pyongyang, Seoul and the US.
Since North Korea’s relations with both Seoul and Washington is at an all-time low, ASEAN should reconsider inviting North Korea as a dialogue partner or at least an observer. This will allow ASEAN to gain support from the international community to bring North Korea into the East Asian community vision. Such a move would certainly provide North Korea a strong rationale to participate and become a stakeholder in regional affairs. To avoid being alienated further, participation in ASEAN would give North Korea a chance to highlight its position, perceived threats and other areas of concern. In the long run, it could very well eliminate North Korean perceptions of insecurity and lack of trust towards the global community and might even give it the security guarantee it wants. A platform for active engagement, mediated by a neutral party, offers a slim chance that North Korea might return to the negotiating table as well be prepared to commit to a more staggered approach towards denuclearisation. For ASEAN to have an informed, sustainable and practical North Korea policy, it would require political will and South Korea’s institutionalised participation, which probably can be conducted within the context of the New Southern Policy. As North Korea’s participation grows in ASEAN, more likely than not, the state will be able to take advantage of newer opportunities that may lead it to concentrate more on economic development rather than building its nuclear capabilities further.
Southeast Asia
Management of Nuclear Mining in Indonesia

Nuclear energy in its development is very rapid and plays a major role in improving the quality, as well as the added value of various products in various activities to improve people’s welfare. In accordance with its nature, nuclear energy has two impacts, namely: the side of benefits to realize welfare; and on the other hand, it has potential hazards that must be managed properly. Based on this, Nuclear Mining Material as one of the strategic natural resources is a vital commodity that controls the lives of many people, must be controlled by the state with optimal management in order to obtain the maximum benefit for prosperity and welfare of the people as mandated in the 1945 Constitution Article 33 paragraph (2) and paragraph (3). Therefore, the use of nuclear technology for human life needs to be monitored and regulated with regulations that consider the value of benefits and potential radiation hazards caused.
In order for the use of nuclear power to be optimized, it is necessary to make regulations that regulate utilization governance and prevent bad things from happening due to radiation hazards as a consequence of nuclear utilization containing radioactive substances and nuclear materials. Law Number 31 of 1964 concerning Basic Provisions of Atomic Energy is one of the first steps to strengthen nuclear power in Indonesia by means of Institutional Strengthening that utilizes (1) nuclear materials such as uranium and other radioactive materials, (2) reactor development and reactor utilization for electricity, and (3) utilization and development of radioisotopes in aspects of health, agriculture, industry, and others. Then, since 1978 has ratified several international agreements including:
- Law Number 8 of 1978 concerning the Ratification of the Treaty on the Prevention of the Spread of Nuclear Weapons;
- Law Number 9 of 1997 concerning the Ratification of the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone ;
- Law Number 1 of 2012 concerning the Ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
- Law Number 10 of 2014 concerning the Ratification of the International Convention for Suppression Acts on Nuclear Terrorism.
Indonesia does have Law Number 10 of 1997 concerning Nuclear Power. However, there are still many provisions that have not been regulated and provisions that do not keep up with the times along with the development of nuclear power in the world of science and technology. In fact, the elements contained in nuclear have not all been used by Indonesia and there are still illegal buying and selling practices to date. Whereas nuclear elements, such as monazite, contains U (0.1-0.3%), Th (± 6%), LTJ (60%), and phosphate. LTJ has enormous benefits and its supply is currently dominated by China. Based on the records of the Ministry of Industry, every production of 1 ton of tin is estimated to produce 22 kg of monazite, which means that 34,000 tons have been produced monazite in the last 17 years (there are 2000 tons of thorium and 170 tons of uranium). If there is a regulation related to this, it will certainly ensure legal certainty and governance, and this can be a huge economic potential for the country.
At this time nuclear energy has contributed about 11% of the world’s energy and there are 452 nuclear reactors actively operating and spread across 31 countries in the world with a total capacity of 399,354 MW. Each year it is estimated that more than 66,883 tons of uranium are needed to run these reactors. Now as many as 54 new reactors are being built in 19 countries, and it is estimated that by 2035 the world’s uranium demand will increase by about 30% to 72,000-122,000 tons. The existence of NZE (Net Zero Emission) targets by many countries, mostly by 2050, and only a few countries by 2060, causes the possibility of projected nuclear power plant construction to increase.
Indonesia is one of the countries that has committed to achieving the Net Zero Emission (NZE) target by 2060 through Presidential Regulation No. 98 of 2021 concerning the Economic Value of Carbon based on the principles of welfare and the principles of sustainable development. The consequence of setting this target is that Indonesia must gradually reduce the use of fossil energy sources and replace them with clean energy sources derived from new and renewable energy, with the aim of national interest and preservation of national functions for the sustainability of future generations.
Based on exploration data that has been carried out by BATAN (National Nuclear Energy Agency which has now merged into the National Research and Innovation Agency, Indonesia has the potential for Uranium and Thorium (elements of nuclear used) in the Kalan and Ketapang (West Kalimantan areas), Kawat (East Kalimantan), Katingan, Mentawa and Darab (Central Kalimantan ), Singkep (Kepulauan Riau), Bangka Belitung, Sibolga (Sumatera Utara) and Mamuju (Sulawesi Barat). If Indonesia can take advantage of the opportunity for these natural resources for national development and community welfare, then Indonesia can contribute as a supplier of nuclear mining materials later. The International Energy Agency (IEA) 2021 projects that by 2040 there will be an increase in the number of nuclear power plants that are likely to exceed the projected supply of uranium in the same period (World Nuclear Association, 2021). This is likely to have an impact on competition among nuclear power plant managers to get a guaranteed uranium supply.
Based on data owned by BAPETEN (Nuclear Energy Supervisory Agency), export and import activities for nuclear materials, in 2017 there were imports of 28.08 kg, in 2018 as much as 28.14 kg, and in 2019 as much as 41.69 kg. In Law No. 7 of 2014 concerning Trade there is no specific regulation on trade related to nuclear power. Whereas in the field of nuclear power also cannot be contained export and import activities, as well as their prohibitions and restrictions. Given that the Indonesian state has limited fulfillment of the needs of nuclear materials and radioactive substances that must be met from domestic production, export, and import activities, as well as the possibility of re-export of used sources are very potentially needed as a gateway to traffic between countries. In Law Number 6 of 2023 concerning the Stipulation of Government Regulations in Lieu of Law Number 2 of 2022 concerning Job Creation into Law, there are regulations related to the mining of nuclear-excavated materials. This arrangement partially deleted several articles of Law Number 10 of 1997 concerning Nuclear Energy, partly added new articles and partially replaced existing articles. However, unfortunately, the two laws have not explained specifically related to regulations regarding the licensing of exports and imports of nuclear-excavated materials directly related to nuclear materials and radioactive substances.
The problem faced by Indonesia today is that there is no positive law that can reach the development of scientific and technological advances related to nuclear power and has not been able to meet the needs of nuclear power safety, security, and facility arrangements. Then, there is no special criminal regulation to ensnare all forms of action faced related to the misuse of nuclear materials, radioactive substances, and ionizing radiation plants that can threaten the life of the nation, state, and society.
If the legal legitimacy of the management of nuclear mining already exists, it is not impossible that the use of nuclear power will increase in various sectors, especially in mining, radioactive mineral processing, nuclear energy, energy storage, and radioactive mineral-based batteries. National competitiveness as a positive impact of nuclear technology can also be stronger. In addition, Indonesia’s radioactive mineral-based natural resources can be utilized optimally, then business actors are potentially increasingly interested in investing in the nuclear industry, and public safety and security from radiation hazards are guaranteed. Absolutely, taking into account the balance of existing living environments, while maintaining the environment despite nuclear mining activities. This is also a demand against nuclear mining companies that must meet the provisions in Law No. 32/2009 on Environmental Protection and Management.
The author hopes that this paper can contribute to the preparation of laws and regulations on the management of nuclear mining materials so that Indonesia immediately has a legal rule for nuclear mining activities, as well as complementing Government Regulation Number 52 of 2022 concerning Safety and Security of Nuclear Mining which was published earlier.
Southeast Asia
Behind the cancellation of Tesla’s investment in Indonesia

Authors: Yeta Purnama and Wulan Fitriana*
In April 2022, the issue of Tesla’s interest in investing in Indonesia attracted the attention of the domestic public, following a meeting held by Elon Musk, the owner of a prominent electric car company, with the Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs and Investment Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan. The meeting discussed nickel raw materials for the electric car supply chain.
This was then followed up directly by President Jokowi during the implementation visit to SpaceX in May 2022. During the visit, they also did not reach an agreement, although in August 2022 Luhut said the value of the nickel purchase contract from Tesla reached US$ 5 billion or the equivalent of IDR 74.5 trillion. However, until mid-2023, an official agreement on Tesla’s investment plans had not yet been announced.
Instead of setting investment in Indonesia, recently Tesla was even rumored to be opening an electric car factory in neighboring Malaysia. Even though Indonesia has been intensively lobbying with a nickel concession offer to Tesla, the offer does not seem convincing enough to involve Indonesia in fulfilling the supply chain for battery raw materials at the company. For Tesla, a sustainable company comes first Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) is the main reason to be considered. However, on the other hand nickel companies in Indonesia are still far away from being sustainable. This can be interpreted that one of the reasons for Tesla canceling its investment is because the company’s concern for ESG is still low.
Battery production ecosystem which is not sustainable
As a company that owns track record Pretty good ESG with shoes total 65/100 according to disclosure Refinitiv, there are at least two reasons why Tesla has not provided further information or even thwarted its intention to make Indonesia an investment destination. The first reason is regarding the poor production ecosystem. Several nickel mines in Indonesia have not even been included in the ESG rating agency which is an important aspect to attract international investors concern to climate change.
Second, half-hearted regulations in an effort to reduce emission reductions. For example, by perpetuating nickel mining companies meet energy needs by using coal-fired power plants to support smelter activities. The emission footprint in fulfilling the electric vehicle supply chain is a false solution for the government to reduce greenhouse gas emission reductions.
This is exacerbated by company non-compliance with regulations, one example is the downstream policy. It is known that illegal export of nickel ore occurred due to the export ban and required the process of refining nickel in the country. This fraud was also influenced by differences in the price of nickel ore at home and abroad. Miners tend to choose exports because the price of nickel ore in the domestic market tends to be lower than the export price.
This activity is known to have caused losses to the state due to loss of royalties and export duties from companies.
Even though the government has issued regulations as stated in the Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources Regulation Number 11 of 2020 concerning the Third Amendment to the Regulation of the Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources Number 07 of 2017 concerning Procedures for Setting Benchmark Prices for Sales of Metal Minerals and Coal. However, this has not been implemented properly in the field.
Based on the results of the 2021 evaluation, it shows that among the 73 companies, there are smelters, miners, and trader, there are as many as 65 companies that have been assessed according to the HPM, the rest are still not in accordance with the stipulated HPM and are even still under international regulations.
What needs to be done in the future
Inviting Tesla to become a net investor in the country is a fairly good effort from the government in diversifying cooperation partners, despite its dependence on investment from China which is quite problematic in the environmental and governance sectors. However, there are several things the government needs to do in the future to attract foreign investment, especially in maximizing the management of nickel resources in the country. First, it is necessary to carry out policy reforms that are truly serious in the energy transition effort.
One of them concerns the application of Risk-Based Licensing mandated by the Job Creation Law. This bill is not supported by the availability of a database on risk mapping, while environmental permits have been abolished, resulting in threats to environmental quality degradation.
Second, the government needs to retire dependence on fossil energy as early as possible, by starting a mix of energy transitions more quickly, including overcoming over supply electricity must pushed with policy. Because, currently the policies made by the government in making a road map for the transition of new energy and renewable energy in the EBET Bill are still half-hearted and there are still many fake solutions in the bill, for example such as geothermal and coal gasification which are actually efforts to extend the life of dirty energy in Indonesia. domestic.
Third, the government needs to carry out strict supervision and proper regulation. Especially regarding environmental and governance issues which are important aspects to create a more sustainable corporate ecosystem. Because of ideals net zero carbon will not be achieved effectively without involving a number of parties and stakeholders.
*Wulan Fitriana, Researcher at CELIOS.
Southeast Asia
ASEAN needs to walk a tightrope

The Quad leaders’ statement clearly reiterated the importance of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the context of the Indo-Pacific. Said the statement:
“Today we reaffirm our consistent and unwavering support for ASEAN centrality and unity. We are committed to ensuring the Quad’s work is aligned with ASEAN’s principles and priorities and continues to support implementation of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP)”
The statement also referred to Indonesia’s chairmanship of ASEAN in 2023.
This statement is important for several reasons. First, there have been differences between ASEAN and the US with several ASEAN leaders expressing concern over the consistent deterioration in ties between China and the US. Countries like Singapore have repeatedly reiterated, that they would not like to make choices between Beijing and Washington, since they share robust economic ties with both countries.
At the Boao Forum, often referred to as China’s Davos, held in March 2023, the Singapore PM again underscored the global ramifications of strained ties between China and the US. The Malaysian PM, Anwar Ibrahim perceived to be pro-US, expressed concern over US’ ‘decoupling’ from China.
Second, ASEAN countries which also share close economic links with the US have recently begun to speak about ‘De-dollarisation’ which refers to reducing dependence upon the US dollar for trade. The Malaysian PM, Anwar Ibrahim also spoke about Asian Monetary Fund (this idea was initially mooted by the Malaysian PM in the late 1990’s when he was Malaysia’s Finance Minister). Like many other regions, ASEAN is wary of US’ increasingly insular economic policies in recent years. While seven Asean countries — Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam – are part of the US led IPEF (Indo Pacific Economic Framework) they have complained about IPEF not having a trade component.
Third, Indonesia has taken a different stance from the west on the Russia-Ukraine war. Like India, which is the current chair of G20, Indonesia too has pointed to the need for addressing disruptions caused to the global supply chains by the Russia-Ukraine war. Yet, it is an important stakeholder in the Indo-Pacific and is also important in the context of the goal of reducing economic dependence upon China and altering global supply chains. Apart from Vietnam and India, Indonesia has been one of the favoured countries for companies seeking to re-locate from China.
In spite of all the above differences, several ASEAN states have begun to show greater interest in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific. ASEAN came up with its first Indo-Pacific vision in 2018, but it has clearly stated that it’s approach vis-à-vis the Indo-Pacific is different from that of the US and not targeted at China. In recent months however, some ASEAN countries have begun to express their discomfort with regard to China’s increasingly aggressive behaviour on the South China Sea issue. Philippines, a US ally, which had in recent years been trying to strike a balance between US-China, has once again strengthened security ties with US. In February 2023, Philippines provided the US military access to four more military bases in the ASEAN nation. The US defence department while commenting on Philippines decision to grant access to four more military bases said that this:
“will make our alliance stronger and more resilient, and will accelerate modernization of our combined military capabilities,”
In conclusion, the ASEAN grouping is very important in the current geopolitical context and while it needs to walk a tightrope between China and the US it is an important player in the context of the Indo-Pacific for several reasons. As mentioned earlier, ASEAN countries are especially important in the changing economic architecture, where many western countries are seeking to reduce their dependence upon China and many US firms are expanding their operations in ASEAN countries – especially Vietnam. Apart from this, several ASEAN nations do not want to adopt a confrontationalist stance with Beijing due to their economic interests as well as geographical proximity but are not comfortable with China’s assertive behaviour and thus need to find common cause with the Quad.
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