Connect with us

Europe

How the EU can help accelerate the implementation of the SDGs internally and worldwide in 2021

Published

on

Authors: Guillaume Lafortune and Guido Schmidt-Traub*

Earlier this month, the Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN) and the Institute for European Environmental Policy (IEEP) released the second edition of their flagship Europe Sustainable Development Report(ESDR2020), which tracks the performance of the European Union (EU), its member states, and other European countries on the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) agreed by all UN member states in 2015. The report shows how the SDGs can be used as a roadmap for a sustainable and inclusive recovery inside the EU, andhighlights how the European Green Deal/SDG Diplomacy can help to achieve sustainable development worldwide and advance EU geopolitical interests.

Finland in the lead, but major SDG challenges remain in all EU countries

Finland tops the 2020 European SDG Index followed by two Nordic countries – Denmark and Sweden. Yet even these countries face major challenges on the SDGs. There are also major gaps in SDG performance across EU countries.

The EU faces its greatest SDG challenges in the areas of sustainable diets and agriculture, climate, and biodiversity – and in strengthening the convergence of living standards across its countries and regions. This year’s report presents pre-COVID-19 data, demonstrating that even before the onset of the pandemic, no EU country was on track to achieve all 17 SDGs by 2030. The EU and partner countries were performing especially poorly on SDG 2 (No Hunger), due to unsustainable diets, high and rising obesity rates, and unsustainable agricultural and farming practices. There are also significant performance gaps for SDG 12 (Responsible Consumption and Production), SDG 13 (Climate Action), SDG 14 (Life Below Water), and SDG 15 (Life on Land).And the 2020 Leave-No-One-Behind Index included in the report underscores the need for further actions to reduce various forms of inequalities within countries. Convergence in living standards across countries must also be strengthened as highlighted by the large spreads in performance across countries on SDG9(Industry, Innovation, and Infrastructure) and limited convergence over the past five years.

The EU needs an integrated and comprehensive approach to implement the SDGs and must clearly communicate about the SDGs. The COVID-19 pandemic, along with unprecedented pressures on multilateralism and a rules-based international order, threatens the visibility and viability of the SDGs as the world’s shared goals for sustainable development. Therefore, as a first priority, the three pillars of EU governance – the European Council, the European Parliament, and the European Commission – should issue a shared political commitment to the 2030 Agenda and to the 17 Goals.

The 2020 SDG Index for European countries

Source: SDSN and IEEP, 2020. The 2020 Europe Sustainable Development Report: Meeting the Sustainable Development Goals in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic. Sustainable Development Solutions Network and Institute for European Environmental Policy: Paris and Brussels

International spillovers generated by the EU undermine other countries ability to achieve the SDGs

The 2020 International Spillover Index, included in the report, also shows that European countries generate large, negative spillovers outside the region – with serious social, environmental, and economic consequences for the rest of the world.

Examples include the social costs of inhumane work conditions in some value chains. For instance, imports of textile products into the EU are related to 375 fatal workplace accidents and 21,000 non-fatal accidents every year. The EU also generates environmental spillovers through deforestation, greenhouse gas emissions, and other pollutants embodied into international trade or the export of waste and toxic substances, as well as financial spillovers through unfair tax competition and security spillovers through the export of arms to conflict zones. Such spillovers undermine other countries’ ability to achieve the SDGs, and they are a stain on the EU’s legitimacy and international reputation.

The EU must urgently address these negative international spillovers. This will require coherent trade and external policies through Green Deal Diplomacy, strengthened tax cooperation and transparency, the application of EU standards to exports, and curbing trade in waste. Moreover, the EU needs to systematically track such spillovers and assess the impact of European policies on other countries and the global commons.

The 2020 International Spillovers Index for European countries

Source: SDSN and IEEP, 2020. The 2020 Europe Sustainable Development Report: Meeting the Sustainable Development Goals in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic. Sustainable Development Solutions Network and Institute for European Environmental Policy: Paris and Brussels

Three priorities to curb negative international spillovers

As part of its SDG strategy, the EU should undertake three broad sets of actions to curb negative spillovers.

Firstly, it must ensure coherent trade and external policies. It is right, for example, for European countries to ask how the MERCOSUR trade agreement will support the objectives of the Paris Agreement, and for the Commission to include binding commitments to implement the Paris Agreement in each trade agreement. The combination of strong EU diplomacy coupled with technical and financial support, where necessary, to protect critical ecosystems and strengthen labour standards and other social outcomes will ensure the EU’s legitimacy and preclude it from being seen as “protectionist.”

Secondly, the EU must strengthen tax cooperation and transparency. One of the most pervasive negative SDG spillovers is the loss of public tax revenues in developed and developing countries due to unfair tax competition, profit shifting, tax secrecy, and the abetting of money laundering. These resources are then no longer available to governments for investment in the SDGs in their own countries. Fortunately, the new EU Commission has begun to address the issues of unfair tax competition among Member States with renewed vigour, and European countries are the forefront of efforts under the OECD to address in 2021 the tax challenges arising from the digitization of economies, tax transparency, and information exchange for tax purposes.

Thirdly, the EU must lead by example by applying EU standards to exports and curbing trade in waste. Data in the ESDR2020 shows, for example, that companies in many EU countries export toxic agrochemicals that are banned inside the EU. The same applies to the export of waste. While such exports may be perfectly legal, they counteract the commitment to achieve the SDGs in every country. Thus, the Green Deal, its subsidiary policy instruments, and future trade agreements should be clarified to ban such exports. Efforts under the Circular Economy Action Plan to make manufacturers responsible for the safe disposal and recycling of their products must also extend to wastes that would otherwise be shipped beyond Europe’s borders.

Using SDG / European Green Deal Diplomacy to advance global SDG action in 2021

At a time when multilateralism is under unprecedented pressure, European partnership, diplomacy, and soft power must play a critical role in advancing the EU’s internal and external priorities, including the SDGs. This should extend to both high-income and low-income countries alike. The European Green Deal has attracted major international attention, and other countries are keen to partner with European initiatives and experiences in mutual learning and transformation processes. The COVID-19 pandemic has only further spotlighted the importance of multilateralism.

The EU is poised to lead on multilateral SDG Diplomacy, but it is no longer alone on the international stage. China has committed to carbon neutrality before 2060 followed by Japan and South Korea’s pledges to carbon neutrality by mid-century. The incoming Biden Administration in the US has also pledged to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050.

EU leadership and diplomacy will be critical to advancing key multilateral processes towards achieving the SDGs, including at the UN General Assembly, the High-Level Political Forum on the SDGs, the G7 Summit (under UK Presidency in 2021 and German Presidency in 2022), the G20 Summit (under Italian Presidency in 2021), and the Annual Meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Of particular importance, will be leadership from the EU – alongside China and the UK – in ensuring successful COPs in 2021 on biodiversity in Kunming and on climate in Glasgow.

One of the most important bilateral relationships for the EU is with China. While there are many areas of profound disagreement between the EU and China, both powers share a commitment towards promoting sustainable development. With China hosting next year’s COP of the Convention on Biological Diversity, and the EU (through Italy) co-hosting the Climate Convention COP, the EU has a huge opportunity to explore common grounds in this geostrategic relationship. In particular, China’s carbon neutrality pledge offers the chance for deeper cooperation under Green Deal Diplomacy, including on the question of border tax adjustment tariffs and other level- playing field requirements. Additionally, the recently launched high-level EU-China dialogue on the environment – bringing together the First Vice-President of the EU Commission, Frans Timmermans, and Vice Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Han Zheng – may become an important channel for Green Deal diplomacy and help set the stage for the EU-China heads of state summit.

As European countries work to recover from the COVID-19 pandemic, strategies to ‘build back better’ must be aligned with the SDGs. The needed steps are bold but ultimately feasible, and current proposals by the Commission point the way. China’s carbon neutrality pledge and the election of Joe Biden in the United States hold the promise for greater multilateral cooperation on climate change and other SDGs. We must count on the EU and European countries to lead these efforts.

*Guillaume Lafortune and Guido Schmidt-Traub, Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN)

Continue Reading
Comments

Europe

Iceland’s Historic(al) Elections

Published

on

The morning of September, 26 was a good one for Lenya Run Karim of the Pirate Party. Once the preliminary results were announced, things were clear: the 21-year-old law student of the University of Iceland, originating from a Kurdish immigrant family, had become the youngest MP in the country’s history.

In historical significance, however, this event was second to another. Iceland, the world champion in terms of gender equality, became the first country in Europe to have more women MPs than men, 33 versus 30. The news immediately made world headlines: only five countries in the world have achieved such impressive results. Remarkably, all are non-European: Rwanda, Nicaragua and Cuba have a majority of women in parliament, while Mexico and the UAE have an equal number of male and female MPs.

Nine hours later, news agencies around the world had to edit their headlines. The recount in the Northwest constituency affected the outcome across the country to delay the ‘triumph for women’ for another four years.

Small numbers, big changes

The Icelandic electoral system is designed so that 54 out of the 63 seats in the Althingi, the national parliament, are primary or constituency seats, while another nine are equalization seats. Only parties passing the 5 per cent threshold are allowed to distribute equalisation seats that go to the candidates who failed to win constituency mandates and received the most votes in their constituency. However, the number of equalisation mandates in each of the 6 constituencies is legislated. In theory, this could lead to a situation in which the leading party candidate in one constituency may simply lack an equalisation mandate, so the leading candidate of the same party—but in another constituency—receives it.

This is what happened this year. Because of a difference of only ten votes between the Reform Party and the Pirate Party, both vying for the only equalisation mandate in the Northwest, the constituency’s electoral commission announced a recount on its own initiative. There were also questions concerning the counting procedure as such: the ballots were not sealed but simply locked in a Borgarnes hotel room. The updated results hardly affected the distribution of seats between the parties, bringing in five new MPs, none of whom were women, with the 21-year-old Lenya Run Karim replaced by her 52-year-old party colleague.

In the afternoon of September, 27, at the request of the Left-Green Movement, supported by the Independence Party, the Pirates and the Reform Party, the commission in the South announced a recount of their own—the difference between the Left-Greens and the Centrists was only seven votes. There was no ‘domino effect’, as in the case of the Northwest, as the five-hour recount showed the same result. Recounts in other districts are unlikely, nor is it likely that Althingi—vested with the power to declare the elections valid—would invalidate the results in the Northwest. Nevertheless, the ‘replaced’ candidates have already announced their intention to appeal against the results, citing violations of ballot storage procedures. Under the Icelandic law, this is quite enough to invalidate the results and call a re-election in the Northwest, as the Supreme Court of Iceland invalidated the Constitutional Council elections due to a breach of procedure 10 years ago. Be that as it may, the current score remains 33:30, in favor of men.

Progressives’ progress and threshold for socialists

On the whole, there were no surprises: the provisional allocation of mandates resembles, if with minor changes, the opinion polls on the eve of the election.

The ruling three-party coalition has rejuvenated its position, winning 37 out of the 63 Althingi seats. The centrist Progressive Party saw a real electoral triumph, improving its 2017 result by five seats. Prime-minister Katrín Jakobsdóttir’s Left-Green Movement, albeit with a slight loss, won eight seats, surpassing all pre-election expectations. Although the centre-right Independence Party outperformed everyone again to win almost a quarter of all votes, 16 seats are one of the worst results of the Icelandic ‘Grand Old Party’ ever.

The results of the Social-Democrats, almost 10% versus 12.1% in 2017, and of the Pirates, 8.6% versus 9.2%, have deteriorated. Support for the Centre Party of Sigmundur Gunnlaugsson, former prime-minister and victim of the Panama Papers, has halved from 10.9% to 5.4%. The centrists have seen a steady decline in recent years, largely due to a sexist scandal involving party MPs. The populist People’s Party and the pro-European Reform Party have seen gains of 8.8% and 8.3%, as compared to 6.9% and 6.7% in the previous elections.

Of the leading Icelandic parties, only the Socialist Party failed to pass the 5 per cent threshold: despite a rating above 7% in August, the Socialists received only 4.1% of the vote.

Coronavirus, climate & economy

Healthcare and the fight against COVID-19 was, expectedly, on top of the agenda of the elections: 72% of voters ranked it as the defining issue, according to a Fréttablaðið poll. Thanks to swift and stringent measures, the Icelandic government brought the coronavirus under control from day one, and the country has enjoyed one of the lowest infection rates in the world for most of the time. At the same time, the pandemic exposed a number of problems in the national healthcare system: staff shortages, low salaries and long waiting lists for emergency surgery.

Climate change, which Icelanders are already experiencing, was an equally important topic. This summer, the temperature has not dropped below 20°C for 59 days, an anomaly for a North-Atlantic island. However, Icelanders’ concerns never converted into increased support for the four left-leaning parties advocating greater reductions in CO2 emission than the country has committed to under the Paris Agreement: their combined result fell by 0.5%.

The economy and employment were also among the main issues in this election. The pandemic has severely damaged the island nation’s economy, which is heavily tourism-reliant—perhaps, unsurprisingly, many Icelanders are in favor of reviving the tourism sector as well as diversifying the economy further.

The EU membership, by far a ‘traditional’ issue in Icelandic politics, is unlikely to be featured on the agenda of the newly-elected parliament as the combined result of the Eurosceptics, despite a loss of 4%, still exceeds half of the overall votes. The new Althingi will probably face the issue of constitutional reform once again, which is only becoming more topical in the light of the pandemic and the equalization mandates story.

New (old) government?

The parties are to negotiate coalition formation. The most likely scenario now is that the ruling coalition of the Independence Party, the Left-Greens and the Progressives continues. It has been the most ideologically diverse and the first three-party coalition in Iceland’s history to last a full term. A successful fight against the pandemic has only strengthened its positions and helped it secure additional votes. Independence Party leader and finance minister Bjarni Benediktsson has earlier said he would be prepared to keep the ruling coalition if it holds the majority. President Guðni Jóhannesson announced immediately after the elections that he would confirm the mandate of the ruling coalition to form a new government if the three parties could strike a deal.

Other developments are possible but unlikely. Should the Left-Greens decide to leave the coalition, they could be replaced by the Reform Party or the People’s Party, while any coalition without the Independence Party can only be a four-party or larger coalition.

Who will become the new prime-minister still remains to be seen—but if the ruling coalition remains in place, the current prime-minister and leader of the Left-Greens, Katrín Jakobsdóttir, stands a good chance of keeping her post: she is still the most popular politician in Iceland with a 40 per cent approval rate.

The 2021 Althingi election, with one of the lowest turnouts in history at 80.1%, has not produced a clear winner. The election results reflect a Europe-wide trend in which traditional “major” parties are losing support. The electorate is fragmenting and their votes are pulled by smaller new parties. The coronavirus pandemic has only reinforced this trend.

The 2021 campaign did not foreshadow a sensation. Although Iceland has not become the first European country with a women’s majority in parliament, these elections will certainly go down in history as a test of Icelanders’ trust to their own democracy.

From our partner RIAC

Continue Reading

Europe

EU-Balkan Summit: No Set Timeframe for Western Balkans Accession

Published

on

From left to right: Janez JANŠA (Prime Minister, Slovenia), Charles MICHEL (President of the European Council), Ursula VON DER LEYEN (President of the European Commission) Copyright: European Union

On October 6, Slovenia hosted a summit between the EU and the Western Balkans states. The EU-27 met with their counterparts (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Kosovo) in the sumptuous Renaissance setting of Brdo Castle, 30 kilometers north of the capital, Ljubljana. Despite calls from a minority of heads of state and government, there were no sign of a breakthrough on the sensitive issue of enlargement. The accession of these countries to the European Union is still not unanimous among the 27 EU member states.

During her final tour of the Balkans three weeks ago, German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated that the peninsula’s integration was of “geostrategic” importance. On the eve of the summit, Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz backed Slovenia’s goal of integrating this zone’s countries into the EU by 2030.

However, the unanimity required to begin the hard negotiations is still a long way off, even for the most advanced countries in the accession process, Albania and North Macedonia. Bulgaria, which is already a member of the EU, is opposing North Macedonia’s admission due to linguistic and cultural differences. Since Yugoslavia’s demise, Sofia has rejected the concept of Macedonian language, insisting that it is a Bulgarian dialect, and has condemned the artificial construction of a distinct national identity.

Other countries’ reluctance to join quickly is of a different nature. France and the Netherlands believe that previous enlargements (Bulgaria and Romania in 2007) have resulted in changes that must first be digested before the next round of enlargement. The EU-27 also demand that all necessary prior guarantees be provided regarding the independence of the judiciary and the fight against corruption in these countries. Despite the fact that press freedom is a requirement for membership, the NGO Reporters Without Borders (RSF) urged the EU to make “support for investigative and professional journalism” a key issue at the summit.”

While the EU-27 have not met since June, the topic of Western Balkans integration is competing with other top priorities in the run-up to France’s presidency of the EU in the first half of 2022. On the eve of the summit, a working dinner will be held, the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, called for “a strategic discussion on the role of the Union on the international scene” in his letter of invitation to the EU-Balkans Summit, citing “recent developments in Afghanistan,” the announcement of the AUKUS pact between the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom, which has enraged Paris.

The Western Balkans remain the focal point of an international game of influence in which the Europeans seek to maintain their dominance. As a result, the importance of reaffirming a “European perspective” at the summit was not an overstatement. Faced with the more frequent incursion of China, Russia, and Turkey in that European region, the EU has pledged a 30 billion euro Economic and Investment Plan for 2021-2027, as well as increased cooperation, particularly to deal with the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic.

Opening the borders, however, is out of the question. In the absence of progress on this issue, Albania, North Macedonia, and Serbia have decided to establish their own zone of free movement (The Balkans are Open”) beginning January 1, 2023. “We are starting today to do in the region what we will do tomorrow in the EU,” said Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama when the agreement was signed last July.

This initiative, launched in 2019 under the name “Mini-Schengen” and based on a 1990s idea, does not have the support of the entire peninsular region, which remains deeply divided over this project. While Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro are not refusing to be a part of it and are open to discussions, the Prime Minister of Kosovo, Albin Kurti, who took office in 2020, for his part accuses Serbia of relying on this project to recreate “a fourth Yugoslavia”

Tensions between Balkan countries continue to be an impediment to European integration. The issue of movement between Kosovo and Serbia has been a source of concern since the end of September. Two weeks of escalation followed Kosovo’s decision to prohibit cars with Serbian license plates from entering its territory, in response to Serbia’s long-standing prohibition on allowing vehicles to pass in the opposite direction.

In response to the mobilization of Kosovar police to block the road, Serbs in Kosovo blocked roads to their towns and villages, and Serbia deployed tanks and the air force near the border. On Sunday, October 3, the conflict seemed to be over, and the roads were reopened. However, the tone had been set three days before the EU-Balkans summit.

Continue Reading

Europe

German Election: Ramifications for the US Foreign Policy

Published

on

Image source: twitter @OlafScholz

In the recent German election, foreign policy was scarcely an issue. But Germany is an important element in the US foreign policy. There is a number of cases where Germany and the US can cooperate, but all of these dynamics are going to change very soon.

The Germans’ strategic culture makes it hard to be aligned perfectly with the US and disagreements can easily damage the relations. After the tension between the two countries over the Iraq war, in 2003, Henry Kissinger said that he could not imagine the relations between Germany and the US could be aggravated so quickly, so easily, which might end up being the “permanent temptation of German politics”. For a long time, the US used to provide security for Germany during the Cold War and beyond, so, several generations are used to take peace for granted. But recently, there is a growing demand on them to carry more burden, not just for their own security, but for international peace and stability. This demand was not well-received in Berlin.

Then, the environment around Germany changed and new threats loomed up in front of them. The great powers’ competition became the main theme in international relations. Still, Germany was not and is not ready for shouldering more responsibility. Politicians know this very well. Ursula von der Leyen, who was German defense minister, asked terms like “nuclear weapons” and “deterrence” be removed from her speeches.

Although on paper, all major parties appreciate the importance of Germany’s relations with the US, the Greens and SPD ask for a reset in the relations. The Greens insist on the European way in transatlantic relations and SPD seeks more multilateralism. Therefore, alignment may be harder to maintain in the future. However, If the tensions between the US and China heat up to melting degrees, then external pressure can overrule the internal pressure and Germany may accede to its transatlantic partners, just like when Helmut Schmid let NATO install medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe after the Soviet Union attacked Afghanistan and the Cold War heated up.

According to the election results, now three coalitions are possible: grand coalition with CDU/CSU and SPD, traffic lights coalition with SPD, FDP, and Greens, Jamaica coalition with CDU/CSU, FDP, and Greens. Jamaica coalition will more likely form the most favorable government for the US because it has both CDU and FDP, and traffic lights will be the least favorite as it has SPD. The grand coalition can maintain the status quo at best, because contrary to the current government, SPD will dominate CDU.

To understand nuances, we need to go over security issues to see how these coalitions will react to them. As far as Russia is concerned, none of them will recognize the annexation of Crimea and they all support related sanctions. However, if tensions heat up, any coalition government with SPD will be less likely assertive. On the other hand, as the Greens stress the importance of European values like democracy and human rights, they tend to be more assertive if the US formulates its foreign policy by these common values and describe US-China rivalry as a clash between democracy and authoritarianism. Moreover, the Greens disapprove of the Nordstream project, of course not for its geopolitics. FDP has also sided against it for a different reason. So, the US must follow closely the negotiations which have already started between anti-Russian smaller parties versus major parties.

For relations with China, pro-business FDP is less assertive. They are seeking for developing EU-China relations and deepening economic ties and civil society relations. While CDU/CSU and Greens see China as a competitor, partner, and systemic rival, SPD and FDP have still hopes that they can bring change through the exchange. Thus, the US might have bigger problems with the traffic lights coalition than the Jamaica coalition in this regard.

As for NATO and its 2 percent of GDP, the division is wider. CDU/CSU and FDP are the only parties who support it. So, in the next government, it might be harder to persuade them to pay more. Finally, for nuclear participation, the situation is the same. CDU/CSU is the only party that argues for it. This makes it an alarming situation because the next government has to decide on replacing Germany’s tornados until 2024, otherwise Germany will drop out of the NATO nuclear participation.

The below table gives a brief review of these three coalitions. 1 indicates the lowest level of favoritism and 3 indicates the highest level of favoritism. As it shows, the most anti-Russia coalition is Jamaica, while the most anti-China coalition is Trafic light. Meanwhile, Grand Coalition is the most pro-NATO coalition. If the US adopts a more normative foreign policy against China and Russia, then the Greens and FDP will be more assertive in their anti-Russian and anti-Chinese policies and Germany will align more firmly with the US if traffic light or Jamaica coalition rise to power.

Issues CoalitionsTrafic LightGrand CoalitionJamaica
Russia213 
China312 
NATO132 

1 indicates the lowest level of favoritism. 3 indicates the highest level of favoritism.

In conclusion, this election should not make Americans any happier. The US has already been frustrated with the current government led by Angela Merkel who gave Germany’s trade with China the first priority, and now that the left-wing will have more say in any imaginable coalition in the future, the Americans should become less pleased. But, still, there are hopes that Germany can be a partner for the US in great power competition if the US could articulate its foreign policy with common values, like democracy and human rights. More normative foreign policy can make a reliable partner out of Germany. Foreign policy rarely became a topic in this election, but observers should expect many ramifications for it.

Continue Reading

Publications

Latest

Americas1 hour ago

Gallup: World’s Approval of U.S. Govt. Restored to Obama’s Record High

On October 19th, Gallup issued their “2021 Rating World Leaders” report and finds that “Six months into the first year...

Science & Technology3 hours ago

China beats the USA in Artificial Intelligence and international awards

The incoming US Secretary of the Air Force said that China was winning the battle of Artificial Intelligence over the...

Development5 hours ago

Iraq: An Urgent Call for Education Reforms to Ensure Learning for All Children

Learning levels in Iraq are among the lowest in the Middle East & North Africa (MENA) region and are likely...

Middle East7 hours ago

Breaking The Line of the Israel-Palestine Conflict

The conflict between Israel-Palestine is a prolonged conflict and has become a major problem, especially in the Middle East region....

Development12 hours ago

More Funding for Business and Trade to Help Lao PDR Recover from Pandemic

The World Bank and the Government of Lao PDR have agreed to scale up a Competitiveness and Trade Project that...

South Asia13 hours ago

Changing complexion of “militancy” in the occupied Kashmir

Two teachers, Supinder Kaur and Deepak Chand, were shot dead in Srinagar on October7, 2021.The Resistance front owned the killing....

Finance15 hours ago

Brands for change: mainstreaming the value of brands for a more sustainable world economy

A brand is a name, term, design, symbol or any other feature that gives a product, service or concept an...

Trending