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Biden and the US policy towards the South Caucasus

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Joe Biden’s administration will face multiple foreign policy issues which diminished America’s global position in the last four years. Among them will be a radically changed geopolitical landscape in the South Caucasus as a result of Russia’s growing military presence. Georgia, as the only pro-Western state, will be a focus for US policy, but it will also require reinvigoration of bilateral ties.

Considering Joe Biden’s political background and his recent statements, the US’ foreign policy will likely be based on pursuit of global leadership, defense and promotion of the liberal international order and promotion of democracy.

On a geopolitical level, prevention of balance of power across the Eurasian landmass will be key. The 2017 national security strategy (NSS) document and the 2018 national defense strategy (NDS) document will remain a cornerstone of Washington’s foreign policy. This would involve a greater focus on the great power competition with China, Iran and Russia.

It would also mean that unlike the Trump administration, under Biden the support for American military alliances and partnerships across the globe will increase, which includes support for NATO. Indeed, in contrast to Trump, who called NATO “obsolete”, Biden will try to amend the situation by emphasizing the role of the alliance in global affairs.

The support for NATO will also mean there will be more tools for deterring Russia in Eastern Europe (potentially including the South Caucasus). This would fit into Biden’s intention to build a tougher stance on Russia. He has been calling Russia an “opponent” and a “threat”. In early 2020, Biden wrote in the journal Foreign Affairs that “to counter Russian aggression, we must keep the alliance’s military capabilities sharp, while also expanding its capacity to take on nontraditional threats, such as weaponized corruption, disinformation, and cybertheft.” Related to the support for NATO Biden will also differ from the Trump government in his determination to improve faltering transatlantic ties damaged under Trump.

On South Caucasus

Though the role of the South Caucasus has never been high on agenda of the US administrations, a radically changed geopolitical landscape, namely, Russia’s new military presence in Azerbaijan as a result of the second Karabakh War, could warrant a bigger American trade and security involvement in the region.

The US’ general foreign policy approach will see little change as continuity in America’s approach toward the South Caucasus has been manifested since the 1990s. The question will be about whether the US could increase its projection of power through reconsideration of aspects of its policy established over the past several years.

The overall geopolitical context might not be entirely congenial for the South Caucasus as the US is decreasing its military presence in the Middle East and Afghanistan and has been inward-looking in the past several years. It could take some time for the US to rewind its active involvement in Georgia and the South Caucasus at large. Moreover, China’s economic and military growth will continue to attract much of Washington’s attention. Greater competition between China and the US will follow, which will require attention from US policy-makers and national resources to be dedicated to the Indo-Pacific region.

Though Georgia fears that in the long term, the recalibration of US foreign policy could spell difficulties, since Tbilisi’s aspirations for NATO membership and therefore national security, have traditionally hinged on close relations with Washington, for the next four years, some basic US interests in Georgia will persist. 

One of the imperatives of the US policy since 1990s was to empower successive Georgian governments to use the country’s geographic position as a nodal point in the nascent South Caucasus energy and transport corridor. The effectiveness of the Georgian corridor also underpins a bigger vision, i.e., the Trans-Caspian Corridor, which, under improved circumstances, could turn into a geopolitical reality with Turkmen gas reaching the European market.

In the next four years, we could also see Georgia having to choose between two techno-economic blocks which are being created across Eurasia: one associated with the US, another increasingly with China. Georgian politicians will have to walk a diplomatic tightrope, keen not to draw ire from China, while preserving ties to the West. But as America’s stance on China hardens, it will be more difficult to maintain this balance. Thus, for the Biden administration and its foreign policy, another crucial issue will be to navigate Georgia so as to ensure it avoids entanglements with China and sticking to Western standards and trade practices.

Recommendations

Beyond these basic US foreign policy approaches towards the region and Georgia in particular, a number of improvements could be made. It is in America’s national interest to establish trade and investment initiatives as the forefront of US policy toward Georgia and perhaps even the wider Black Sea region. This could involve Washington enhancing trade ties, encouraging foreign direct investment, and fostering domestic reforms in Georgia. As an example, several days ago, the US embassy in Tbilisi announced that “To help Georgia’s private sector recover from the COVID-19 pandemic, the U.S. Government will fund foreign investment advisory firm OCO Global to identify and promote high-value investment opportunities in the Georgian economy and raise awareness about the country’s economic potential among major international investors.” In a longer run this could lead towards a prosperous regional network of market-based economies that can serve as an antidote to the practices often associated with non-democratic states.

To be successful the policy needs to reflect a deeper change in the US trade approach as Washington’s protectionist trade policies in the recent years have hurt the Black Sea and South Caucasus regional economic ties.

But perhaps the biggest change the Biden administration could unveil is a free trade agreement (FTA) with Georgia. As a country with vital ports, roads and railway infrastructure, FTA with Georgia would give American businesses greater access to the otherwise geographically closed region. And this does not only involve the three South Caucasus states, but Central Asia too as trans-Caspian shipping increases and deeper contacts between the two regions is being established.

Thus, there is a set of policies which will remain unchanged under the new US president, but there is also a wide range of issues where Washington could work on to improve its position, which has been rather static over the past several years. Bigger issues such as growing Russian military presence and Chinese economic activity could serve as a necessary motivator, but there also needs to be a reassessment of some aspects of US approach to Georgia and the region overall.

Author’s note: first published in caucasuswatch

Emil Avdaliani specializes on former Soviet space and wider Eurasia with particular focus on Russia's internal and foreign policy, relations with Iran, China, the EU and the US. He teaches history and international relations at Tbilisi State University and Ilia State University (Georgia).

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Eastern Europe

Belarus Under Sanctions, What Next?

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Russia has unreservedly expressed its solidarity and unflinching support for Belarus after the United States and European Union slapped the fourth package of sanctions against its political leadership, members of the government and on a number of businesses.

On June 23, in an official statement posted to the website of the Russian Foreign Ministry, for instance, described the European Union decision as “illegitimate and illegal EU sanctions against Belarus” and the EU devalues ​​its own claims to the role of guardian of international law.

According to the statement, “the Russian Federation is committed to allied relations with fraternal Belarus. We will continue to coordinate our efforts in the interests of strengthening state sovereignty and ensuring the national security of our countries on the basis of existing international legal agreements, and strengthening our collective stability in the face of external pressure and a policy of containment.”

In the meanwhile, Belarus and the world is waiting for the results of the international investigation into the emergency landing of the Ryanair airline in Minsk.

The European Union, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States presented a joint statement on imposition of sanctions against Belarus, published on the EU website on June 21.

“Today, we have taken coordinated sanctions action in response to the 23 May forced landing of a commercial Ryanair flight between two EU member states and the politically motivated arrest of journalist Raman Pratasevich and his companion Sofia Sapega,” the statement reads.

The sides urged Belarus to cooperate fully with international investigations into the events of May 23, and “enter into a comprehensive and genuine political dialogue between the authorities and representatives of the democratic opposition and civil society, facilitated by the OSCE.”

The EU expanded its sanctions against Belarus, adding 78 persons and 8 companies to the list. The US sanctioned 16 persons and six companies, while the UK sanctioned 11 people and two organizations. Canada imposed sanctions against 17 persons and fiver Belarusian companies.

The European Council notes on its website that the EU sanctions now apply to 166 persons and 15 entities in total. “Those designated are subject to an asset freeze and EU citizens and companies are forbidden from making funds available to those listed. Natural persons are additionally subject to a travel ban, which impedes them from entering or transiting through EU territories.”

The package of sanctions imposed have sparked debates and discussions among Russian politicians and experts as well as foreign academicians. It has attracted unprecedented reports both in the local and foreign media.

Nezavisimaya Gazeta, widely known Russian media, reported that the EU Foreign Affairs Council held a session in Luxembourg, and was attended by Belarusian opposition figurehead Svetlana Tikhanovskaya. After her speech, ministers of 15 EU countries interactively asked her questions about sanctions, the domestic situation in Belarus, and the fact that the Belarusian crisis could be resolved peacefully through joint means of putting pressure on the government.

Besides that and as has been the situation, the Belarusian government has shown no desire to alleviate the tensions in its relations with the EU. United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet said that Belarus terminated the activity of the UN human rights adviser in Minsk. The relations between Belarus and the EU have reached their highest escalation point in modern history.

Experts are still figuring out the possible impact on the economy of Belarus and its relation to Russia. First, all the individuals on the sanction list banned from entering the European Union and any of their potential assets be frozen in the EU.

On the economic sectors, the restrictions will affect the potassium, oil and financial spheres of Belarus. According to various news reports, the sanctions may affect up to 4% of Belarusian exports, which last year amounted to US$29 billion.

For instance, Belaruskali, one of the largest producers of fertilizers in the world, might be one of the companies targeted by the sanctions. It transports its products through the Port of Klaipeda in Lithuania, the newspaper reports. “Before the pandemic, the revenue of Belaruskali reached about US$2 billion. About 90% of its products go through Klaipeda.

It will be practically impossible to replace this route with the aid of Russian ports and railways,” Belarusian political analyst Dmitry Bolkunets explained as reported by Nezavisimaya Gazeta, adding that it is necessary to wait for the final decision on the sanctions regime.

So far, about 20-30% of Belarus exports are under the threat of sanctions, the expert suggested. Before the pandemic, Belarus’ exports reached US$32 billion, so as a result of EU sanctions the Lukashenko government risks losing up to US$10 billion.

Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis noted that Russia would be significantly affected by EU sanctions against Lukashenko’s government. Only Russia can refinance the losses of Belarus, so by introducing sanctions against Minsk, the EU puts part of the pressure on Russia, which has the ability to influence Belarus, the minister explained.

The new Western sanctions against Belarus will not produce the desired effect, while reciprocal measures will negatively affect the interests of the Western citizens and companies, Belarusian Foreign Ministry said Tuesday.

“The sanctions and restriction will not produce the effect, desired by those who ordered them. The reciprocal measures that the EU forces us to take may equally negatively affect the spheres of our cooperation and, eventually, the interests of Western citizens and companies who took unfriendly steps towards our country,” the Foreign Ministry said in its commentary on the sanctions, imposed earlier by the US, the EU, the UK and Canada.

The Foreign Ministry noted that “such approach leaves neither time nor space for a search for windows of opportunity, in order to find an exit from the situation that exists in the relations between Belarus and the EU, the US, the UK and Canada.”

Russia and Belarus parliaments have together against external forces. During its 60th joint parliamentary session held in June, the First Deputy Chairman of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Union of Belarus and Russia, Chairman of the House of Representatives of the National Assembly of the Republic of Belarus, Vladimir Andreichenko, in remarks appreciated the support provided by Russia against the background of attempts by Western states and the European Union to destabilize the situation in Belarus.

According to the 2019 census, Belarus has 9.5 million population. Belarus is a landlocked country in Eastern Europe, and is a former Soviet republic. The leadership has often been described as “Europe’s last dictatorship” by some media outlets, politicians and authors due to its authoritarian government. Alexander Lukashenko has ruled the country since the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

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Georgia in the Post-Liberal World Order

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The purpose of this article is to help start the discussion on Georgia’s foreign policy amid the changing world order.

We live in a post-liberal world order. Post-liberalism does not mean abandoning liberal values, although the energy and ambitions that have characterized this global project under US leadership since the 1990s are nowadays dwindling significantly. Post-liberalism will lead to great geopolitical shifts. America can no longer be as active in spreading democracy and liberal values as it used to do. This ushers in the age of more constrained US involvement in various parts of Eurasia.

There are many reasons for this. The first is probably that the unipolar world order is finally coming to an end, which means the gradual emergence of several geopolitical and geo-economic poles in the world. China, Russia, India, and relatively small and ambitious states such as Iran and Turkey – these aim at re-organizing their immediate neighborhoods. The re-emergence of spheres of influence also involves the rejection of liberal values, and the introduction of a multipolar world order. Multipolarity also means the end of the liberal world order because it is impossible to be a supporter of liberal internationalism, limit your ambitions to certain regions, and avoid spreading liberalism all over the world. Liberalism, a kind of revolutionary movement that cannot be stopped, is either everywhere or nowhere.

To this changing geopolitical landscape must also be added America’s growing rivalry with China. In the coming years, much of the US’ economic or military resources will be focused on opposing China. All of this, in the long run, reduces Washington’s willingness to pursue as active a foreign policy in Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, or the Middle East as it did in the 2000s. From now on, all American attention will be shifted to the Indo-Pacific region. As a concrete example, the Biden-Putin summit held in Geneva avoided issues such as Ukraine and Georgia, as NATO enlargement will cause troubles with Russia.

Where is Georgia?
A multipolar world order affects all countries. Some will be more fortunate because they have a friendly and close political-economic relationship with a major power of this or that region. Others have a better geographical position since they are located in Europe and easily remain a part of Western institutions.

The case of Georgia is much more difficult. The country has been trying since the 1990s to move closer to the West at the institutional level. A lot of success was achieved on this path during Eduard Shevardnadze’s presidency and subsequent Georgian governments. The balance of geopolitical forces in the world in the 2000s gave Tbilisi a legitimate expectation that the Western geopolitical power in the South Caucasus would inevitably succeed. Indeed, America was building a liberal world order, and the spread of democracy throughout Eurasia, as it was then believed, should have been a matter of time.
Georgia had decades to become an institutional part of the West. This failed to materialize, and today, when illiberal forces have grown stronger and are in fact forming a strong anti-liberal movement, Georgia’s chances of joining Western economic, political, and military institutions are much lower.

In search of a new foreign policy vision
What then can Georgia do to achieve its foreign policy goals and strengthen its security amid the changing global order and the less active America? Formulating a multi-vector foreign policy could be one solution. This does not mean that Georgia reneges on joining the Western institutions – NATO and the EU will remain the focus of Georgia’s external policy. However, doing so in parallel with a multi-vector foreign policy may prove more effective. Multi-vectoralism will be based on political realism, very similar to what the neighboring states have been pursuing of late. Official Tbilisi could consider establishing more intensive political ties with major players in the region, as well as Eurasia. Though Georgia has tried to pursue a similar policy before, the need for it in the post-liberal world order will greatly increase.

The multi-vector foreign policy may also be driven by another important trend. Eurasia is slowly splitting into spheres of influence. Russia, China, India, in part, and a few powers smaller than them, are slowly creating exclusive spaces where their political and economic influence will play a leading role. Georgia, to avoid falling under the influence of an undesirable power, could regard the active pursuit of a multipolar foreign policy as a solution. This means engaging all neighbors in a rather intense political-economic dialogue. It also means developing closer ties with China and India, and strengthening military contacts with Turkey and Azerbaijan, etc.

Georgia’s Obstructive Geography
Georgia’s foreign policy dilemma revolves around its fixation on the West. Though profitable in many ways, is also serves as an impediment. But multipolar foreign policy too will face significant obstacles. For example, strengthening relations with Iran and China could damage Georgia’s ties with the West. Furthermore, the illegal control of Georgian lands by Russia limits the possibility of a dialogue with Moscow.

In a way, geography makes Georgia destined to be fixed on the West even if it ends up damaging it. But Georgia’s troubles are also compounded by the fact that a conditional border between the West and the anti-liberal powers will be transiting through the Black Sea and the South Caucasus. Much will depend on the West: was its support for Georgia merely an expression of the spread of liberal values, or a result of concrete geopolitical calculations? If the West is driven by geopolitical interests in Georgia, it can be assumed that the country will be in the camp of liberal democracies. Otherwise, the historic opportunity that Georgia had to join the Euro-Atlantic institutions during the heyday of the liberal world order could be lost for a long time to come.

Author’s note: forst published in georgiatoday.ge

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Is Ukraine at War? Navigating Ukraine’s Geopolitical Conundrum

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In April this year, amidst rising tensions with Russia, a Ukrainian diplomat warned that Kyiv may be forced to acquire nuclear weapons to safeguard the country’s security if NATO does not accede to its membership demand. On the same lines, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky challenged his Russian counterpart President Vladimir Putin, to meet him in eastern Ukraine’s Donbass region to talk on ending ongoing conflict in the region. He further urged the west to give “clear signals” of whether they were willing to support the country in its standoff with Russia.

But why has this situation emerged? Why is NATO and west so reluctant to proceed with forming partnership with Ukraine? Is Russia aggressive towards Ukraine? And as no geopolitical conflict in today’s complex world is possible in isolation or between just two parties, who are the other actors involved in this conflict? This paper investigates these questions to analyse the case of post-soviet Ukraine and how Ukraine remains important to the geopolitical dynamics of not just the post-soviet space, but also the broader Eurasian region as well as the world.

Background

Ukraine has been often deemed as the cornerstone of the Soviet Union. It was not only the second-most populous republic, after Russia, but was also home to much of the Soviet Union’s agricultural production, defence industries and military. However, Ukraine’s history is intertwined deeply with the birth of Russian kingdom itself, as the beginning of Ukraine was the establishment of Kievan Rus which united the Eastern Slavs and laid the foundation for Russian identity. After centuries of direct existence under Russian rule however, Ukraine post-1991, decided to embark on its separate journey, hoping to de-intertwine its fate with that of Russia’s. However, this has not become a success to the extent Ukrainian leaders might have expected. The nation’s proximity to Russia has meant that any government in Moscow will do anything in its capacity to maintain some control over Kiev’s foreign as well as defence policy, in order to keep at bay any adventurist objectives by the western bloc of EU and US. Today, Russian policy’s primary aim is to keep Ukraine out of foreign alliances and geopolitical blocs like that of EU and NATO, and for this, periodic show of strength has become an explicit policy in the last decade for Russia. Further, post the Russia-Ukraine conflict of 2014, where Russia allegedly invaded Ukraine and annexed Crimea according to Russian critics, NATO has been forced to increase its presence in the Black Sea region where Crimean Peninsula exists geographically and has stepped up maritime cooperation with Ukraine (as well as Georgia, who too have similar concerns with Russia). However, although the relations between NATO and Ukraine were updated in June 2020 and Ukraine is now one of the six countries having tag of ‘Enhanced Opportunity Partner’ and makes significant contributions to NATO operations and other alliance objectives, NATO’s scepticism and reluctance on giving full member status to Ukraine is seen in Ukrainian political circles as west’s non-serious attitude towards the nation. Similarly, while EU remains the most important trading partner for Ukraine, its path to becoming an EU member has been harder than the leaders would have imagined.  In the later parts of this article, the 2013 trade war between Ukraine and Russia over the possibility of Ukraine joining EU, and the subsequent toppling of the presidential regime in Ukraine in the next few months is highlighted.

However, even though Russia, EU and NATO have been primary geopolitical actors in Ukraine, recently, new actors have joined the ongoing geopolitical conundrum. The entry of the likes of China and Turkey has not only made the situation more complex but has also raised the stakes for the primary actors. Ukraine has in recent years, encouraged the presence of Chinese businesses in its market and welcomed further expansion of bilateral trade and economic cooperation, to the extent that in 2019, China replaced Russia as Ukraine’s main bilateral partner. In case of Turkey, president Tayyip Erdogan has time and again reaffirmed its support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity as well as Ukraine’s bid to join NATO. Further, Turkey-Ukraine cooperation in the military sector has dramatically increased in the recent years, replacing the traditional Russian base. Interestingly though, Ankara has maintained and has even grown in its partnership with Moscow which somehow softens the stance towards conflict between Ukraine and Russia as gets limited to following the EU-US stance more often than not, unlike in the case of Azerbaijan-Armenia’s Nagorno-Karabakh conflict where Turkey had explicitly supported Azerbaijan when Russia has tried to balance between Armenia and Azerbaijan.    

The Perennial Question: What does Russia want?

Prior to 2014 Ukraine-Russia conflict, Russia had hoped to have Ukraine into its single market project- Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and benefit from the enormous Ukrainian market and population which could have boosted Russian industrial base. However, post the conflict, any hopes for integrating Russia-Ukraine markets have collapsed. Whereas Russia supplied most of Ukraine’s gas until 2014, the supply stopped entirely by 2016. Today, Russia is looking to complete infrastructure projects in terms of energy commodities, which would bypass Ukraine to starve Ukraine from the billions of dollars of transit fee that Russia has paid since long to Ukraine to reach Central and Eastern European markets. Further, since 2014, EU became the main trading partner and has been in talks with Ukraine since very long for Ukraine’s accession to EU. However, Russia for long has seen EU membership as an immediately preceding step to NATO accession, and hence sees the aspect of avoiding EU membership for Ukraine as not only an element of Russian economic policy, but also that of its security policy. Further, Russia now sees EU as not just an economic bloc, but ‘a potential great-power centre in the making’, whose further expansion in post-soviet region is bound to negatively affect Russian credentials of a hegemon as well as the arbiter in the regional conflicts. Russia’s recent mobilisation of troops at the Ukrainian borders which was more of show of strength rather than a potential act of aggression, had raised concerns in the new US presidential regime. In one interview, Russian defence minister Sergei Shoigu explicitly linked Russia’s mass-mobilization drills to NATO’s ‘Defender Exercise’, which has been the biggest military exercise taken in the Black Sea region since the cold war era, saying that ‘The scale of US led military activity required response’. In a way, Ukraine has become a battleground for both Russia and US to showcase their influence and Ukrainian leadership is finding itself in a dilemma, being unsure and insecure of the extent of intentions from both the warring blocs.

The Western Dilemma: Why Ukraine still not in EU and NATO?

There have been several factors at work which has made Ukraine’s path to membership to EU and NATO difficult. Firstly, in the recent years, there has been a concern in the EU political circles that there is no political will in Ukraine to fight vested interests and go beyond the promises of showing credible commitment to genuine domestic reforms. However, on the flip side, the argument is often made that beyond financial and technical assistance that EU can provide to Ukraine and its market, Brussels does not have any new offer to motivate Kyiv in implementing reforms. Further, since the coming of new presidency in 2019 (of Zelensky), the primary focus of the government has shifted to resolving the Donbass conflict where Ukraine is struggling against separatists in Donetsk and Lugansk, who are allegedly supported by the Russian side.

Moreover, it is also an open secret that many member nations in EU itself would prefer to have a different relationship with Russia, who since 2014 has been facing several sanctions in realm of trade, be it in energy sector, consumer goods, or defence and space technology. This is clear when we take in consideration the case of Germany and how the government has for long insisted on getting the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project completed amidst mounting pressure from other members of EU and the US. The project is expected to resolve the energy demand issue for majority of German households for the near future once in function.

In Russia, EU is deemed as the ‘Trojan horse’ for NATO expansion as already mentioned before. However, for NATO, a different set of concerns exist altogether. NATO has been wary of Russia’s continued destabilization of eastern Ukraine and the continuing unrest in the Donbass region. If, however, Ukraine becomes a NATO member, any such conflict would mandate NATO to get involved in the region and aid Ukraine, which then might escalate in a bigger conflict. And this is another important reason for NATO’s restrained stance.

China- The ‘Well-settled’ player in Ukrainian Market

In recent times, China’s economic might has enabled it to leverage the benefits in a variety of ways. Not only does China influence the decisions indirectly at times, but any economy which is intertwined and dependent on Chinese economy, can today expect to feel direct effects of this economic inter-dependency when it comes to foreign policy. An increasingly observable phenomenon is that China in gaining foothold much quicker in those nations of the post-soviet space, where Russia is deemed as a hostile neighbour or state. This was visible in a 2020 public opinion survey by SOCIS which highlighted that almost 60 percent of Ukrainians see Chin as a ‘neutral’ state even if only 13 percent see China as ‘friendly’, but over 63 percent see Russia has a ‘hostile’ state, with only 5 percent deeming Russia as ‘friendly’. Today, China is complementing Ukraine for its deficits, for instance in the field of technology and defence where it is replacing Russia and competing with Turkey, and in realm of exports, China is proving to be a worthy destination for Ukraine’s agricultural products by having a large population and increasingly developed market system. This is quite clear by the statistics which show that Ukrainian exports to China surged 98% in 2020 driven by iron ore, grains, and palm oil.  Ukraine’s president on his part recently praised China for respecting Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and highlighted China’s assistance in combating COVID-19, however, it remains to be seen how these developments would be perceived by both US and Russia.

Turkey- An Emerging Vector

Turkey-Ukraine cooperation in military technology has increased dramatically post the 2014 Russia-Ukraine conflict and today, Ankara supports Kyiv’s bid for membership to NATO as well as peaceful solution to the conflict in Donbass (Donetsk and Luhansk region). Further, in April this year, the two sides pledged in a 20-point statement, ‘to coordinate steps aimed at restoring the territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders, in particular the de-occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea… as well as the territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions’.

However, there is a renewed enthusiasm in the recent Ankara-Moscow dynamics, where the two have come closer since President Erdogan’s policies have become more nationalistic and non-secular in nature, driving Turkey away from the ambit of west and US, and raising concerns about the increasingly populistic approach being undertaken by Turkish government. Further, US’ plans to build new naval bases in the Black Sea region and enhancing military cooperation with Ukraine and Georgia also concerns Turkey, as it directly would result in reduced role of Turkey and a blow to Turkish president’s ambitions of renewing Turkey’s status as a regional powerhouse.

Conclusion

The seven-year war between Ukraine and Russia, which is still ongoing, has changed the relationship between the two countries completely and permanently. Since Ukrainian market is now open to EU and China, a competition to dominate this market is soon to become more and more visible. While Russia would want to avoid Ukraine’s EU accession till as long as possible, Moscow will go to even greater lengths to prevent Ukraine’s NATO membership. On its part, not only will NATO be wary of Russian insecurities, but it will also consider the fact that increasing tensions with Moscow might push it towards Beijing, and a possible military alliance between the two military powers might be the greatest challenge for NATO in the coming future. Since Russia has lacked the economic might post the Soviet union’s dissolution, an alliance with China might balance out almost every limitation that Russia and China have in terms of their superpower capabilities. EU on the other hand keeps a close eye on developments in Kyiv too. Although Kyiv is yet to come up with overhauling reforms which would strengthen EUs believe in Ukrainian system, EU member states themselves will need to overcome a sort of internal division, where several member states hope of having a more normal relationship with Moscow. US on its part is expected to align with Turkey and US in bringing Ukraine in close cooperation with EU and NATO and to do everything possible to detach Kyiv from a possible rapprochement with Moscow. It remains to be seen, how other post-Soviet states like Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan react to these developments taking place in Ukraine and assimilate this in their own discourse of balancing the west and Russia.  

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