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Eastern Europe

Russia’s Foreign Policy Towards and Influence on the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

Image source: Azerbaijan Ministry of Defence

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On the 27th of September 2020, the international community witnessed the outbreak of hostilities in the South Caucasian non-recognized republic of Nagorno-Karabakh. It was not the first such occurrence since the Bishkek Protocol of 1994 put an end to the most violent phase of the conflict, which started during the last years of the Soviet Union and further escalated after its dissolution. The Russian Federation was from the very beginning concerned by the developments in and around Nagorno-Karabakh, as the Russian scholars Andrei Sushentsov and Nikita Neklyudov contend that, “Russia sees both the North and South Caucasus as a unified sphere of interest, source of vulnerability, and field of responsibility.” Thus, in 1992, Russia became a co-chair of the newly-created OSCE Minsk Group tasked with finding a sustainable peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The input of an experienced Russian diplomat and expert – Vladimir Kazimirov, the then head of the Russian mediation mission, official representative of the President of the Russian Federation on Nagorno-Karabakh, and co-chairman of the OSCE Minsk Group, was crucial in negotiating the 1994 Bishkek Protocol.

Twenty-six years later, on the 9th and 10th of October 2020, it was Sergei Lavrov, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, whose mediation role was critical in the more-than-ten-hour negotiation marathon with his Armenian and Azerbaijani counterparts, which eventually led to the ceasefire agreement. Nevertheless, it took notably longer than before to bring the sides to the negotiation table and all attempts at upholding the ceasefire (the second agreed upon with the input of Sergei Lavrov, the third brokered by the US, and the last mediated by the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group) fell short of halting the armed clashes and returning the sides to the peace talks. These developments signal a diminishing Russian influence on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and therefore, this article aims at analysing the evolution of Russia’s foreign policy toward and influence on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, shedding light on the differences of the current situation.

Unlike in all other de facto (or unrecognized) states in post-Soviet space, Russia does not fulfil the role of Nagorno-Karabakh’s patron, which is in this case Armenia, with Azerbaijan being Nagorno-Karabakh’s parent state. For Russia, it has always been important to have a balanced relationship with both Armenia and Azerbaijan due to: first, Russia having strong Armenian and Azerbaijani diasporas; second, Russia wanting to retain military presence in Armenia, while having good relations with Azerbaijan that shares a border (demarcated in 2010 after 14 years of talks) with the Russian region of Dagestan, which is of high security concern to Russia. Neither does Russia want a deterioration of relations with any of the two in the context of already seriously strained relations with the third South Caucasian state – Georgia. Russia’s preferred approach is thus for Armenia and Azerbaijan to settle their disputes themselves, with Russia willing to serve as a mediator and broker rather than supporter of one of the sides.

Both Armenia and Azerbaijan cultivate relations simultaneously with Russia and the West, which has also been reflected in the fact that the approach(es) to Nagorno-Karabakh conflict have not been influenced by the deterioration of Russian-Western relations. Therefore, regarding Nagorno-Karabakh, there is still a convergence of Russia’s and the West’s approaches, representing a unique case in the contemporary state of relations. This has been reflected in Russia’s foreign policy approach in this particular case, which has been rather consistent since the fall of the USSR, although it took some time until it became more consolidated, as in the early 1990s, the Russian military took some foreign policy steps independently from official Moscow. The peculiarity of the Russian position has since the inception been the country’s simultaneous role as a mediator and a as a supplier of military equipment to both conflicting parties. Although Russia has invested considerable effort into conflict resolution and has tried to achieve an outcome that would be favourable to its interests (e.g. one that would include a Russia peacekeeping mission), it has been neither willing nor able to impose a settlement on the conflicting sides.

After the dissolution of the USSR, Russia undertook steps to balance the Azerbaijani military advantage by authorizing supplies to Armenia. At the same time, Russia assigned a particularly high value to mediation and conflict resolution efforts, which was perceived by Boris Yeltsin, then President of Russia, and Andrei Kozyrev, then Russian Foreign Minister, as crucial for Russia’s international status and its ambitions to integrate into the international system. As a result, Russia became involved in the work of the OSCE Minsk Group together with the West, although at that time, the two could not find a common position and thus, Russia was also engaged in mediation efforts on its own. Nevertheless, it is important to underline that while Russia has presented certain initiatives beyond the OSCE Minsk Group, those never ran against the activities of the Group and Principles agreed upon within its framework.

Although the Russian initial mediation and conflict resolution attempts fell short of committing the sides to a ceasefire, it was abovementioned input of Vladimir Kazimirov that finally secured a ceasefire on the 12th of May 1994. Nevertheless, in spite of Russia’s unwearying efforts, a political agreement on conflict settlement could not be reached and Russia has over the years repeatedly, yet unsuccessfully, attempted to send a peacekeeping mission to Nagorno-Karabakh, which would have increased its presence and influence in the region, satisficing Russia’s national interests and quest for ontological security to a larger extent than the status quo.

Under Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov, Russia’s foreign policy toward the post-Soviet space became more consolidated and systematic, aiming at increasing influence, integration, and conflict settlement efforts in the post-Soviet space. In 1997, two important events happened: first, Azerbaijan became a founding member of the GUAM group seen by Russia as aimed at containing it; second, Russia expanded its military ties with Armenia, though assuring that it was by no means directed against Azerbaijan. From the Russian side, it was a reactive strategic move serving its objectives of securing influence and military presence in the post-Soviet space, which has to be interpreted in the context of gradually deteriorating relations with the third South Caucasian state – Georgia.

In the 2000s, Russia maintained its active role in conflict settlement. With the other co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, it worked out the Madrid Principles that were adopted in 2007 and have, in their updated 2009 version, ever since been the cornerstone of the conflict settlement efforts, abided by all the mediators. Nevertheless, the beyond-the-Minsk-Group initiative of the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, which culminated in the 2011 Kazan summit attended by the Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan and his Azerbaijani counterpart Ilham Aliev, did not result in the sides signing a document committing them to follow these Principles. In the aftermath, Moscow scaled down its pro-active conflict resolution efforts.

In late July 2014, when the deadliest violence since the 1994 ceasefire agreement erupted at the Nagorno-Karabakh line of contact, Russian mediation once again stepped in to de-escalate the situation The following initiative of President Vladimir Putin, undertaken due to Russia’s “special and particularly close relations” with both Armenia and Azerbaijan, did not materialize and progress in the peace process could not be achieved. In 2015, Russia put forward the so-called Lavrov Plan (it was not officially published) and when the four-day war broke out in April 2016, as the Azerbaijani and Armenian forces started fighting at the line of contact, it was Russia that helped to de-escalate the situation by brokering a ceasefire. The Lavrov Plan was again on the table and while Azerbaijan was willing to consider it, removing opposition to Russian peacekeeping, Armenia rejected it due to the vagueness of provisions on the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh. Over the years, the openness of Azerbaijan and Armenia to a solely Russian peacekeeping mission has faded and progress in conflict settlement has not been achieved.

For a long time, Russia has maintained close contact with both Armenian and Azerbaijani leaderships. Moscow has not considered adopting a revisionist approach in favour of supporting a change of borders and/or recognizing Nagorno-Karabakh, and anytime the conflict escalated, Russia refrained from making categorical statements and value judgements on who is to blame. Therefore, both sides have valued the contribution of Russian mediation, which has also been demonstrated in the current situation. Nevertheless, the September 2020 flare-up has indeed been different from the previous instances of escalation, due to two important changes in the region, which have diminished Russian influence on the conflict and thus led to the prolonged period of armed clashes.

First, both Armenia and Azerbaijan have assertively cemented their contradictory positions, which was to be seen in the October 2020 interviews of Nikol Pashinyan, the Armenian Prime Minister, and Ilham Aliev, the President of Azerbaijan, with Dmitry Kiselev, Director General of Russiya Segodnya International Information Agency. This development has palpably reduced the possibility of a negotiated compromise, which in turn poses limitations on the Russian influence on the sides. Second, the regional influence of Turkey, which has a closed border and no diplomatic relations with Armenia, has been on the rise, as its ties with Azerbaijan have grown stronger, conspicuously demonstrated by the Summer 2020 two-week joint military drills that followed the Armenian-Azerbaijani border clashes of July 2020. Indeed, after the fighting broke out in late September 2020, the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan called on Armenia to end the occupation of Azerbaijani territories and Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu claimed that Turkey was ready to support Azerbaijan at the negotiation table as well as on the ground. While the Russian-Turkish communication channels are in place and well-tested (Syria serves as an example), and the Russian and Turkish foreign ministers have recently been in contact to discuss the crisis, the positions and strategic interests of the two countries notably differ in this case, which makes the situation in the region more complex and entangled.

These two factors have thus hindered Russia’s mediation efforts as well as its ability to prevent the escalation, which would be in line with Russia’s national interests of maintaining stability in the region and preventing a potential spill-over to Russian Northern Caucasus. On the other hand, while having limited and diminished capability to influence the process and the outcome, Russia’s role as a mediator remains indispensable, which is recognized by the conflicting parties as well as by the international community. In this context, it is to be expected that Russia will refrain from openly supporting one side at the expense of the other, unless the conflict spreads to the Armenian territory. It is nearly certain that Russia will carry on with its mediation efforts aimed at bringing the violent phase of the conflict to a halt and addressing the situation in accordance with the Madrid Principles, be it within the OSCE Minsk Group or beyond.

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Second-year student of Multilateral Diplomacy Master's Programme jointly organized by MGIMO University and UNITAR

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Eastern Europe

Is Ukraine at War? Navigating Ukraine’s Geopolitical Conundrum

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In April this year, amidst rising tensions with Russia, a Ukrainian diplomat warned that Kyiv may be forced to acquire nuclear weapons to safeguard the country’s security if NATO does not accede to its membership demand. On the same lines, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky challenged his Russian counterpart President Vladimir Putin, to meet him in eastern Ukraine’s Donbass region to talk on ending ongoing conflict in the region. He further urged the west to give “clear signals” of whether they were willing to support the country in its standoff with Russia.

But why has this situation emerged? Why is NATO and west so reluctant to proceed with forming partnership with Ukraine? Is Russia aggressive towards Ukraine? And as no geopolitical conflict in today’s complex world is possible in isolation or between just two parties, who are the other actors involved in this conflict? This paper investigates these questions to analyse the case of post-soviet Ukraine and how Ukraine remains important to the geopolitical dynamics of not just the post-soviet space, but also the broader Eurasian region as well as the world.

Background

Ukraine has been often deemed as the cornerstone of the Soviet Union. It was not only the second-most populous republic, after Russia, but was also home to much of the Soviet Union’s agricultural production, defence industries and military. However, Ukraine’s history is intertwined deeply with the birth of Russian kingdom itself, as the beginning of Ukraine was the establishment of Kievan Rus which united the Eastern Slavs and laid the foundation for Russian identity. After centuries of direct existence under Russian rule however, Ukraine post-1991, decided to embark on its separate journey, hoping to de-intertwine its fate with that of Russia’s. However, this has not become a success to the extent Ukrainian leaders might have expected. The nation’s proximity to Russia has meant that any government in Moscow will do anything in its capacity to maintain some control over Kiev’s foreign as well as defence policy, in order to keep at bay any adventurist objectives by the western bloc of EU and US. Today, Russian policy’s primary aim is to keep Ukraine out of foreign alliances and geopolitical blocs like that of EU and NATO, and for this, periodic show of strength has become an explicit policy in the last decade for Russia. Further, post the Russia-Ukraine conflict of 2014, where Russia allegedly invaded Ukraine and annexed Crimea according to Russian critics, NATO has been forced to increase its presence in the Black Sea region where Crimean Peninsula exists geographically and has stepped up maritime cooperation with Ukraine (as well as Georgia, who too have similar concerns with Russia). However, although the relations between NATO and Ukraine were updated in June 2020 and Ukraine is now one of the six countries having tag of ‘Enhanced Opportunity Partner’ and makes significant contributions to NATO operations and other alliance objectives, NATO’s scepticism and reluctance on giving full member status to Ukraine is seen in Ukrainian political circles as west’s non-serious attitude towards the nation. Similarly, while EU remains the most important trading partner for Ukraine, its path to becoming an EU member has been harder than the leaders would have imagined.  In the later parts of this article, the 2013 trade war between Ukraine and Russia over the possibility of Ukraine joining EU, and the subsequent toppling of the presidential regime in Ukraine in the next few months is highlighted.

However, even though Russia, EU and NATO have been primary geopolitical actors in Ukraine, recently, new actors have joined the ongoing geopolitical conundrum. The entry of the likes of China and Turkey has not only made the situation more complex but has also raised the stakes for the primary actors. Ukraine has in recent years, encouraged the presence of Chinese businesses in its market and welcomed further expansion of bilateral trade and economic cooperation, to the extent that in 2019, China replaced Russia as Ukraine’s main bilateral partner. In case of Turkey, president Tayyip Erdogan has time and again reaffirmed its support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity as well as Ukraine’s bid to join NATO. Further, Turkey-Ukraine cooperation in the military sector has dramatically increased in the recent years, replacing the traditional Russian base. Interestingly though, Ankara has maintained and has even grown in its partnership with Moscow which somehow softens the stance towards conflict between Ukraine and Russia as gets limited to following the EU-US stance more often than not, unlike in the case of Azerbaijan-Armenia’s Nagorno-Karabakh conflict where Turkey had explicitly supported Azerbaijan when Russia has tried to balance between Armenia and Azerbaijan.    

The Perennial Question: What does Russia want?

Prior to 2014 Ukraine-Russia conflict, Russia had hoped to have Ukraine into its single market project- Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and benefit from the enormous Ukrainian market and population which could have boosted Russian industrial base. However, post the conflict, any hopes for integrating Russia-Ukraine markets have collapsed. Whereas Russia supplied most of Ukraine’s gas until 2014, the supply stopped entirely by 2016. Today, Russia is looking to complete infrastructure projects in terms of energy commodities, which would bypass Ukraine to starve Ukraine from the billions of dollars of transit fee that Russia has paid since long to Ukraine to reach Central and Eastern European markets. Further, since 2014, EU became the main trading partner and has been in talks with Ukraine since very long for Ukraine’s accession to EU. However, Russia for long has seen EU membership as an immediately preceding step to NATO accession, and hence sees the aspect of avoiding EU membership for Ukraine as not only an element of Russian economic policy, but also that of its security policy. Further, Russia now sees EU as not just an economic bloc, but ‘a potential great-power centre in the making’, whose further expansion in post-soviet region is bound to negatively affect Russian credentials of a hegemon as well as the arbiter in the regional conflicts. Russia’s recent mobilisation of troops at the Ukrainian borders which was more of show of strength rather than a potential act of aggression, had raised concerns in the new US presidential regime. In one interview, Russian defence minister Sergei Shoigu explicitly linked Russia’s mass-mobilization drills to NATO’s ‘Defender Exercise’, which has been the biggest military exercise taken in the Black Sea region since the cold war era, saying that ‘The scale of US led military activity required response’. In a way, Ukraine has become a battleground for both Russia and US to showcase their influence and Ukrainian leadership is finding itself in a dilemma, being unsure and insecure of the extent of intentions from both the warring blocs.

The Western Dilemma: Why Ukraine still not in EU and NATO?

There have been several factors at work which has made Ukraine’s path to membership to EU and NATO difficult. Firstly, in the recent years, there has been a concern in the EU political circles that there is no political will in Ukraine to fight vested interests and go beyond the promises of showing credible commitment to genuine domestic reforms. However, on the flip side, the argument is often made that beyond financial and technical assistance that EU can provide to Ukraine and its market, Brussels does not have any new offer to motivate Kyiv in implementing reforms. Further, since the coming of new presidency in 2019 (of Zelensky), the primary focus of the government has shifted to resolving the Donbass conflict where Ukraine is struggling against separatists in Donetsk and Lugansk, who are allegedly supported by the Russian side.

Moreover, it is also an open secret that many member nations in EU itself would prefer to have a different relationship with Russia, who since 2014 has been facing several sanctions in realm of trade, be it in energy sector, consumer goods, or defence and space technology. This is clear when we take in consideration the case of Germany and how the government has for long insisted on getting the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project completed amidst mounting pressure from other members of EU and the US. The project is expected to resolve the energy demand issue for majority of German households for the near future once in function.

In Russia, EU is deemed as the ‘Trojan horse’ for NATO expansion as already mentioned before. However, for NATO, a different set of concerns exist altogether. NATO has been wary of Russia’s continued destabilization of eastern Ukraine and the continuing unrest in the Donbass region. If, however, Ukraine becomes a NATO member, any such conflict would mandate NATO to get involved in the region and aid Ukraine, which then might escalate in a bigger conflict. And this is another important reason for NATO’s restrained stance.

China- The ‘Well-settled’ player in Ukrainian Market

In recent times, China’s economic might has enabled it to leverage the benefits in a variety of ways. Not only does China influence the decisions indirectly at times, but any economy which is intertwined and dependent on Chinese economy, can today expect to feel direct effects of this economic inter-dependency when it comes to foreign policy. An increasingly observable phenomenon is that China in gaining foothold much quicker in those nations of the post-soviet space, where Russia is deemed as a hostile neighbour or state. This was visible in a 2020 public opinion survey by SOCIS which highlighted that almost 60 percent of Ukrainians see Chin as a ‘neutral’ state even if only 13 percent see China as ‘friendly’, but over 63 percent see Russia has a ‘hostile’ state, with only 5 percent deeming Russia as ‘friendly’. Today, China is complementing Ukraine for its deficits, for instance in the field of technology and defence where it is replacing Russia and competing with Turkey, and in realm of exports, China is proving to be a worthy destination for Ukraine’s agricultural products by having a large population and increasingly developed market system. This is quite clear by the statistics which show that Ukrainian exports to China surged 98% in 2020 driven by iron ore, grains, and palm oil.  Ukraine’s president on his part recently praised China for respecting Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and highlighted China’s assistance in combating COVID-19, however, it remains to be seen how these developments would be perceived by both US and Russia.

Turkey- An Emerging Vector

Turkey-Ukraine cooperation in military technology has increased dramatically post the 2014 Russia-Ukraine conflict and today, Ankara supports Kyiv’s bid for membership to NATO as well as peaceful solution to the conflict in Donbass (Donetsk and Luhansk region). Further, in April this year, the two sides pledged in a 20-point statement, ‘to coordinate steps aimed at restoring the territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders, in particular the de-occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea… as well as the territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions’.

However, there is a renewed enthusiasm in the recent Ankara-Moscow dynamics, where the two have come closer since President Erdogan’s policies have become more nationalistic and non-secular in nature, driving Turkey away from the ambit of west and US, and raising concerns about the increasingly populistic approach being undertaken by Turkish government. Further, US’ plans to build new naval bases in the Black Sea region and enhancing military cooperation with Ukraine and Georgia also concerns Turkey, as it directly would result in reduced role of Turkey and a blow to Turkish president’s ambitions of renewing Turkey’s status as a regional powerhouse.

Conclusion

The seven-year war between Ukraine and Russia, which is still ongoing, has changed the relationship between the two countries completely and permanently. Since Ukrainian market is now open to EU and China, a competition to dominate this market is soon to become more and more visible. While Russia would want to avoid Ukraine’s EU accession till as long as possible, Moscow will go to even greater lengths to prevent Ukraine’s NATO membership. On its part, not only will NATO be wary of Russian insecurities, but it will also consider the fact that increasing tensions with Moscow might push it towards Beijing, and a possible military alliance between the two military powers might be the greatest challenge for NATO in the coming future. Since Russia has lacked the economic might post the Soviet union’s dissolution, an alliance with China might balance out almost every limitation that Russia and China have in terms of their superpower capabilities. EU on the other hand keeps a close eye on developments in Kyiv too. Although Kyiv is yet to come up with overhauling reforms which would strengthen EUs believe in Ukrainian system, EU member states themselves will need to overcome a sort of internal division, where several member states hope of having a more normal relationship with Moscow. US on its part is expected to align with Turkey and US in bringing Ukraine in close cooperation with EU and NATO and to do everything possible to detach Kyiv from a possible rapprochement with Moscow. It remains to be seen, how other post-Soviet states like Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan react to these developments taking place in Ukraine and assimilate this in their own discourse of balancing the west and Russia.  

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‘Strategic Frivolity’ of the West and the Belarus Issue

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The Western countries’ reaction to the detention of an opposition leader in Minsk has revealed the high degree of readiness of the United States and its allies to create risky situations for the sake of momentary political benefits. No matter how the actions of the Belarusian authorities were consistent with international aviation law and customs, the behaviour of Washington and most of European capitals showed that they are difficult, if not hopeless partners for the rest of the world community. Now we have no reason to fear that developments will turn into an uncontrolled escalation — the attacks of the West against Lukashenko do not directly impact Russian interests. However, what has happened in the media and in diplomatic circles in recent days provides ample opportunity to consider the need for new containment measures in relation to the habit of the US and Europe to take European and international security so lightly.

So far, Russia’s reaction to these emotional outbursts has been restrained, because the actions of the Western countries did not directly harm its interests. But if such hysteria repeats, it will confirm the lack of intentions in the West to establish any kind of stable dialogue with those powers that are not willing to subordinate their respective domestic and foreign policies to its demands. Is this some kind of a “strategic frivolity”, whose appearance in international affairs and the behaviour of the EU and the US has become more and more regular as the balance of power in world politics shifts? Russia, for its part, can show any amount of restraint, but the line beyond which this will become impossible, may be passed unnoticed.

As a matter of fact, such a reaction of the West to the stoppage of an international flight by the Belarusian authorities and the detention of one of the passengers did not come as a surprise. In recent years, Russia, China and others have become accustomed to the fact that the United States and Europe have been quick to sacrifice international stability when it has suited their concurrent goals.

The EU countries have been grasping at any straw in their attempts to confirm their greater relevance in terms of international law on the world political stage. It hasn’t been working out very well so far.

At the summit on May 25, the leaders of the European Union countries approved a resolution calling for a package of measures against Belarus — personal sanctions and broader measures against the Belarusian economy. But it is clear how ineffective these measures will be, even to the European observers. After the failure of the EU to work out a common position on the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, the failure of another attempt to “punish” the government of Alexander Lukashenko will serve as another blow to the international reputation of the EU.

Britain, which left the EU, but remains the closest satellite of the United States, is in principle trying to behave as the main opponent against any country whose position does not coincide with Washington’s wishes. Now London’s position is aligned with that of the Baltic states, which are most irresponsible in their statements and actions. It is unlikely that this will strengthen London’s position on the world stage. The United States, for its part, is acting in its usual way — while lacking any direct interests, it easily creates risks for others. Surprisingly, in this respect, the behaviour of the US resembles the behaviour of Minsk, which is also not always ready to take into account Russia’s diplomatic wishes.

For Russia, the recent diplomatic “plane crash” involving Belarus does not pose immediate threats, but it may become another test for Russia’s legendary restraint. Moscow is clearly accustomed to the fact that the Western states are not always predictable in their actions and, in principle, live “in their own world”, where there are certain rules for them, and completely different ones for others. So far, Russia has reacted to all this in a very reserved manner. The measures the West has taken against Minsk do contradict basic Russian interests in the field of European security, but they do not create threats and do not harm Russia. However, it is the ease with which the West enters a conflict with any nation, at the slightest pretext, that causes Russia’s concern.

It will be extremely fortunate if, during the Russia-US summit, scheduled for June 16 in Geneva, the parties can deliver some appeasement to international or regional politics. It is unlikely that the summit will result in any breakthrough of a general nature; there are no preconditions for this. But the very ability of Russia and the United States to discuss common interests will show that both great powers retain the responsibility necessitated by their strategic importance. So far, however, we cannot be sure even of such a minimal positive outcome of the expected meeting.

Russia concurs that the actions of the Belarusian authorities are no example of prudence. Nevertheless, one gets the impression that Moscow has adequately estimated the scale of Western pressure on Minsk and understands that in the situation that has arisen, reactions such as that of the Belarusian government are quite predictable, and even justified. In 2020, a number of Belarus’ neighbours in the West openly supported a movement to overthrow President Lukashenko. Russia then supported the legitimate Belarusian government and warned of its readiness to provide it with practical assistance.

Lukashenko himself can pursue his interests as much as he wants, and sometimes even refuse to coordinate actions with Russia — Belarus is a sovereign state. However, the alternative to his regime now is an attempt to bring to power such forces that will confidently follow the Ukrainian scenario.

The internal political crisis in Belarus, even if it enters a hot phase, would be beneficial to the interests of the United States and would have a devastating effect on European security. However, as we can see, now the countries of Western Europe are in a state of political “knockdown” and cannot control events that risk putting an end even to the minimal independence and choice possessed by Europe. Britain and the countries of Eastern Europe are ready to create risky situations, because outside the conflict with Russia, they have no future in international politics. The fact that the future within the framework of this conflict may turn out to be very short for all of them does not bother them at all. Britain and the countries of Eastern Europe are dominated by forces, for which adventurous behaviour has become the basis of politics inside and outside. Germany and France cannot stop them because they are engulfed in colossal internal problems.

We can hardly expect that the next surge of “strategic frivolity” will have really dramatic consequences. In any case, the world history of all-out wars does not know examples when large-scale armed conflicts would have really insignificant incidents as a pretext. In all known episodes, a “tragic accident” has always involved the interests or security of one of the leading powers. Now we don’t see this, and most politicians in the West are therefore behaving irresponsibly, because they do not expect a serious escalation. Moreover, the Lukashenko government is indeed becoming one of the permanent opportunities for the United States and Europe to stage high-profile political campaigns without a real threat to the world. But this is not a guarantee that if there are grounds for a big conflict, the behaviour of the West would be more reasonable than these days.

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Ryanair Incident: Five Sanctions Risks for the Republic of Belarus

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The detention in Belarus of a plane operated by the Irish company Ryanair has caused a sharp reaction in the US and the EU. The issue of expanding sanctions was again on the agenda. They may turn out to be even more serious than the restrictive measures introduced last year in response to the situation around the presidential elections.

The approach of Washington and Brussels is defined by several lines of argument which converge at one point. First, the detention of the plane resulted in the arrest of opposition politician Roman Protasevich. The incident reignited the theme of democracy and human rights violations, which have long served as a basis for sanctions. Second, the Western powers proceed from the fact that the aircraft was detained under the false pretext of a terrorist attack threat on board. The statements of the Hamas movement that they were not involved in the events added their share of farce. Third, the detention was carried out with the use of an Air Force fighter, that is, this aspect of the incident can be interpreted as the use of force. History knows a number of examples of such detentions, including the forced landing of Bolivian President Evo Morales’ plane in Vienna in 2013. From a formal point of view, Minsk acted in the interests of national security within Belarusian territory. However, this formality and the existence of precedents are unlikely to play a serious role. In the USA, the incident is understood as a “shocking act” that endangered the lives of passengers and has served as a new reason to condemn Lukashenko for undermining democracy. Similar assessments were given in Brussels and London. Threats of new sanctions were voiced almost immediately. There are five main sanctions risks for Belarus.

The first risk is that of a ban on the use of the territory of Belarus for aircraft transit, a ban on flights to Belarus, as well as on the reception of aircraft from Belarusian airlines. Threats quickly began to shift to a practical level. The leaders of the EU countries called for a ban on flights of Belarusian aircraft in EU airspace. The UK and France have already introduced such measures. Some airlines have cancelled flights through Belarus. The big questions are: how long will such measures last and how unanimous will states and companies be in implementing them? However, it is clear that all this will complicate supply chains, as well as cause economic damage to the country and its partners abroad.

The second risk is that of diplomatic sanctions. In response to the replacement of the state flag of Belarus with the flag of the Belarusian opposition in Riga (with the participation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Latvia), Minsk decided to expel all employees of the Latvian embassy. Similar decisions were made in Riga with regard to the employees of the Belarusian embassy.

The third risk is the denial of EU investment programmes. The government of Belarus would hardly receive such assistance even without the incident with the plane. The condition of assistance is a democratic transition in the country.

The fourth risk is another wave of sanctions against Belarusian officials. Such sanctions were widely used in response to the events in 2020. They play a rather symbolic role and do not do much economic harm. Usually they entail visa bans and the freezing of assets. At the same time, their psychological function should not be ignored. Such sanctions are usually aimed to sow discontent among the political elite, betting on its dissatisfaction with the political course of the country’s leadership. The EU may assume that even the security forces may not like to play the role of pariahs.

Finally, the fifth risk is that of blocking sanctions against strategic enterprises. Such sanctions have also been used in the past. A number of large Belarusian enterprises are already in the sanctions list (SDN) of the US Treasury. Most of them have a general license. Previously, such licenses were extended for long periods (up to two years). However, in April, the license was renewed for only a month and a half. It expires on June 2, 2021. Will the US, and after them the EU, carpet bomb the Belarusian economy? The lifting of the exemptions and the renewal of sanctions would cause serious economic damage. However, the threat of such actions will remain inevitable.

The resumption of blocking sanctions against big companies has not yet been discussed loudly. Despite the visceral opposition to the Belarusian leader and the country’s political system, the West is hardly eager to strengthen Russia’s position in relations with Belarus. This would deprive the Belarusian leadership of room for manoeuvre in its dialogue with Moscow and make Minsk much more dependent. But this is theory. In practice, such sanctions will provide a headache for Russia itself. They will hit the economic ties of Belarusian and Russian enterprises. The latter may fear secondary US sanctions. In addition, Belarus is likely to need large-scale economic assistance. The threat of sanctions poses important problems for the Union State of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus. Among them is the creation of payment mechanisms that would ensure uninterrupted economic ties in the event of an aggravation of the sanctions pressure.

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