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Building Europe’s Future

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On November 18, 2020, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Russian Federation Géza Andreas von Geyr was giving an open lecture at HSE University.

What is the place and role of the European Union in the modern world? How is the European integration project developing, and what role does Germany play in it? How are relations between the EU and Russia today?

The event was organized jointly by HSE University and the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in Moscow as part of the Germany’s Presidency of the Council of the European Union and of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, as well as in the framework of the Year of Germany in Russia.

Text of the Lecture

Building Europe’s Future

Prof Kuzminov, Prof Prostakov, Dear Students,

Thanks a lot for the invitation to speak to you today.

I regret that, due to the pandemic, I can´t talk to you face to face—but I enjoy that I can reach out to so many of you online.

I´m especially grateful for the invitation as your university is one of the best and most prestigious in Russia. And it is an excellent venue for a discussion dedicated to Europe.

I

From the beginning, the HSE has established a strong cooperation with European Universities—and with European Institutions.

The ties in education and science between Russia and Europe go far back in history, they were mutually enriching—and they still are.

That’s why we can say that the DNA of so many universities in Russia is very much European. And we Europeans learned a lot from Russians in the field of science and education as well.

If I take just my country, Germany:

Cooperation and exchange in education and science is one of the most stable and reliable links between our countries—and for me it is one of the most precious:

Because I take it as a strong investment in our common future.

Yes, I´m proud, that today Germany is the top destination for students from the Russian Federation going abroad.

More than 14,000 students and scientists came to Germany in 2019, each of them contributing to building bridges between our countries.

And the other way round Russia is attractive for German students, as its Universities offer great conditions and high standards.

Our scientific cooperation continues to produce excellent results. To mention just two fascinating projects:

Russian and German research centers work together on the European XFEL, the largest X-ray laser in the world, and Russian and German researchers jointly took part in the largest Arctic research expedition ever—“MOSAiC”—which was successfully completed a few weeks ago.

And this bond continues to grow:

We have just concluded a bilateral year of Higher Education Cooperation and Science, and in September, we have started our year of Germany in Russia, which includes a multitude of education and research related events and projects.

II

(Is the discussion on European-Russian relations adequate?)

What I just mentioned shines a light on only some of the many layers of relations Russian universities and scientific institutions enjoy with European countries.

I´m convinced, if we added them all up, the Euro-Russian dimension would turn out as one of the strongest partnerships in education and science worldwide.

This stands as an example for one part of the European–Russian reality: Things go well—in some areas.

The other one is: we all read and experience that EU-Russian relations are, to put it in diplomatic words: not in the best shape.

Or, to be more precise: On very fundamental, tangible political issues we very much disagree.

I could leave it at that, go on and talk about the need to paint a layered and nuanced picture and that a lot of work will have to be done to solve those problematic issues and to rebuild trust.

But my feeling is that the problem goes deeper.

Something went awry in the way we perceive each other.

Are we still both convinced that good European Russian relations are in our long-term interest?

So, do we give this relationship, be it currently good or bad, the strategic depth it should have?

And even more basic:

Do we still understand each other well enough? Do we explain our views well enough?

Are we attentive enough when listening to each other? And: how do we talk about each other?

I´m convinced that the time has come to reflect well on all of this; if we do not take our time to do that, the very core of our relationship could be seriously harmed.

This is what I have in mind talking to you about Europe today.

To explain and to be ready to understand, in both directions. This is, if you so wish, the essence of diplomacy.

So, what in fact I already started with, is to explain my views, offer some remarks on Europe—and I will do this in the form of answers to questions I often hear.

My remarks will be personal ones, not official positions of my government, nor of the German EU Presidency or Council of Europe Chairmanship.

It´s more a European talking with fellow Europeans. And the other way round, of course, I´m ready to hear your remarks and to learn from you.

And speaking about Europe, I mean of course a wider scope of countries than the 27 member states of the EU.

At the same time the EU as such is not only part of this Europe, it has the essential, decisive role.

It has reached a degree of integration the European continent in modern times has never seen before.

So, the first question is or rather was:

Is the current discussion on European-Russian relations adequate? You have just heard my answer—it is not.

My further remarks will be on the following questions:

Is there a core ratio of European integration? What is the motor keeping Europe alive?

Is the supertanker Europe able to adapt? Is the European model outdated?

Is Europe ready for the globalized future? Which future for European-Russian relations?

III

Is there a core ratio for European integration?

Sometimes when I follow discussions here in Russia—and not only here—I think that Europe must be a lost cause.

Statements are made creating an image of a continent all but united.

The EU is portrayed as having lost its moral compass, in foreign policy a poodle of the Americans, as if with Brexit European integration had run out of steam and as if migration would put an end to European identities.

So what does European Integration stand for?

This year we celebrated the 75th anniversary of the end of the Second World War all over the world, all over Europe, especially here in Russia.

I was deeply moved listening in September to Johannes Brahms´ requiem played and sung in Moscow´s Lutheran cathedral by Russian musicians, conducted by an Israeli maestro, in honor of the many millions who lost their lives in the most terrible of all wars and in the Holocaust, both caused by my country, Germany.

What did not succeed after World War I, was successful after 1945: Countries in the western part of this continent, who through centuries fought wars against each other, decided to integrate step-by-step, so that wars amongst them would no more be possible or indeed thinkable.

The dimension of this is unique: Proud nation states, hundreds of years old, started to merge parts of their sovereignty and handed them over to shared institutions.

A community of European nations was build, of nations committed to democracy, freedom and the rule of law.

Out of this very spirit and rationale evolved what is now the European Union.

And after the fall of the Iron curtain it attracted the countries who finally regained their freedom, including their freedom to choose partners—and this Europe seems to be very attractive, or let´s say convincing to many who wish to partner with or even join it, until today.

Yes, this community succeeded in creating a region of enormous economic prosperity – but first and foremost it is and remains a unique peace project.

It was the peaceful togetherness of democracies and the rule of law that gave the people an unprecedented degree of freedom to seize their economic opportunities—not the other way round.

And the encouraging effects of this reach out far beyond the boundaries of the EU.

This remains relevant today, when we talk about the “who we are” of the European institutions.

The answer to the “why” of European integration is to be found on the countless military cemeteries all over Europe, including here in Russia.

IV

What is the real motor keeping Europe alive?

Last week the Ermitage Museum and a Berlin Museum jointly opened a wonderful exhibition in Saint Petersburg on the Iron Age—with the wisely chosen subtitle: “A Europe without borders”.

Yes, it´s worth recalling, that in former times Europe did not define itself by borders, people were trading their talents and goods across the continent, influencing each other´s development from the Italian Peninsula to the German regions and the Caucasus.

This is part of our common heritage, our common history.

And in a special way this reflection of the past also gives us a hint to how our future could look like: A Europe with boundaries, as we are used to it, is not a given or a must.

Since the 1990s big steps were taken into this direction: Within Europe almost 30 countries introduced the so-called Schengen system, de facto abolishing the boundaries amongst them. From Portugal to Estonia, from Sweden to Greece, people can travel without being controlled. Young people can study, work and live in any place they want.

The Erasmus program has enabled, over the last seven years alone, 2 million students to study and train abroad and thus gain a personal experience of Europe growing together. And by the way: This program explicitly includes Russia.

These are some of the most exciting successes of European integration.

Others are the Euro, a common currency well appreciated in the world, in which most EU members participate.

Or think about the economic powerhouses Germany, France or Italy: despite their national strength, trade agreements with Tokyo or Washington are not negotiated by Berlin, Paris or Rome, but by Brussels alone, in the name of all 27, protecting our joint interests with far more leverage than any of us individually could do.

Think about the Council of Europe with its unique mechanism of protecting human rights and defining human rights standards, accessible for every citizen—next year we´ll celebrate 25 years of Russia´s membership. 2019 alone some thousand Russians turned to the court.

Or recall the mechanisms established in the OSCE on transparency, confidence building and verification where again Russia is member.

Its mechanisms were essential for the overall peaceful end of the Cold War in Europe. Today its instruments serve to at least calming down the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, the OSCE is asked to continue giving a framework for negotiations on the future of Nagorno Karabakh and could well help solve the crisis in Belarus.

And, by the way, the OSCE was invited to observe the presidential elections in the USA, as it is in many European countries.

Or more recently, take PESCO, an initiative 25 EU members took for closer cooperation on defense matters: more efficient coordination and joint procurement, thus strengthening European defense.

And I could mention many more areas.

Has Europe established a perfect system? No, there is daily work being done to intensify, to improve, to readjust.

But is European Integration a lost cause? Definitely not, and this is the point I want to make:

What generated European Integration in the first place and pushes it further is its unique way of interacting: it is the culture of compromising.

In fact, European Integration, especially the EU as such, is probably the most efficient compromise machine the world has ever seen.

Every day EU member states meet on different levels on a multitude of issues to discuss, propose, regulate, improve, correct, decide together.

Yes, we all know that there are issues the Union sometimes can´t find a common view on—but compared to the amount of successful coordination and joint decisions those are just very few.

And yes, decision-making might be complicated, sometimes slow, requiring a lot of patience. But let me ask: is there any group of 27 countries constantly defining common policy on almost all areas of politics more quickly and effectively? I don´t think so.

It is the readiness to compromise which is the motor of European Integration.

And compromising becomes possible because all member states are convinced that peace and prosperity are best preserved in togetherness, and because they all are bound to democratic values and the rule of law.

And they can all carry the compromises because they know that in the decision-making process all points of view matter.

V

Is the supertanker Europe able to adapt?

The culture of compromising is demanding.

We experience this daily, even we EU Ambassadors do when meeting here in Moscow. Searching for common positions is not easy, but fair compromises make the solutions found sustainable.

Again, a deeper look into the EU—why not on the most difficult current crises situations:

Let´s take Corona: when the pandemic emerged, no country on the globe was really prepared, everywhere the search began for an acceptable balance between medical and economic health, and of course first reactions were national and inward-looking.

It took a while until the EU found a common approach, first comments from the outside were full of Schadenfreude/malicious joy—and not willing to recognize the fact that the EU succeeded to maintain the trans-border flow of goods: to the profit of countries inside and outside the Union.

Mocking the EU stopped when the 27 rather soon came up with the decision to support those who suffer bad economic consequences of the pandemic with an unprecedented volume of 750 billion €. All this in addition to the EU budget and national investments for recovery.

Or take the Brexit.

I do well remember EU council meetings I attended right after Great Britain took its decision to leave.

There were many in- and outside the Union who seemed to enjoy that the Union was shaken up by London, and who may have hoped that even more member states would follow.

But: it didn’t take long until member states reconvinced each other that in this globalized world no European country could be more successful on its own than together as a Union. And since then my impression has been that the 27 regained even closer unity than before.

It might be surprising to some how quickly the EU adapted to this fundamentally new situation and how strong the common line for the negotiations with London proves to be.

Think about climate policy and the consensus found on the extremely ambitious, progressive “Green Deal”, proposed last December by the European Commission, which might become a decisive, catalyzing element for the world to stop or at least slow down global warming.

Or take EU Foreign Policy in the last weeks:

The fact that the 27 rather quickly agreed on sanctioning those in Belarus responsible for election fraud and violence against their own people will have been a surprise for some, who

might have hoped that the Union be split—the EU is not and kept a clear position, faithful to standards we agreed upon in the frame of the OSCE.

Do these examples mean that everything is perfect?

No, we constantly have to work on our relations amongst each other, on very practical issues as well as sometimes on the mutual respect we have to pay to each other´s specific national experiences and identities.

But the ability of the supertanker EU to adapt should not be questioned.

VI

Is the European model outdated?

Is Europe, especially the EU a modern place, open to the future? My answer is two-fold:

First:

Europe has the industrial base, the scientific base, the human capital and the necessary open society which allows it to keep up with the other top players in the technological vanguard and in the competition for the top brains.

But we may not rest on our laurels, we have to ensure that we remain at the cutting edge of tomorrow’s technologies, in areas such as digitalization, nanotechnology or biotechnology.

That’s why the EU is intensely working on a Single European Digital Market and on a roadmap called the “Digital Compass”. We are also discussing the issue of Europe’s so-called Digital Sovereignty that to our understanding should pave the way for a rules-based framework for the digital sphere.

Our efforts in climate change I mentioned before, on health the European Commission and the German Presidency last week announced, drawing lessons from the pandemic, to be working on a “Common space of Health”, part of a future European Health Union,

and Foreign policy is definitely a field, where we will have to find a way to better speak with one voice.

Now here comes the second part of my answer:

If we look at all the key challenges, we are faced by globalization—be it climate change, reducing poverty, a fair access of all to the more and more limited natural resources of the planet, establishing rules in the information and cyber space—we see that solutions will only be found in togetherness: across nations, countries and continents.

And I speak about challenges not only as problems.

It´s all the wonderful possibilities a globalized togetherness could offer, providing food and water to all humans, as well as education, medicine, and I would absolutely add: freedom and security.

To assure this, a willingness to open up to the world is needed—at the same time there needs to be a willingness to refrain from the wish or even the political goal to dominate others.

This is another lesson, we Europeans learned from the painful history during the last century on our continent.

A very wise European once said: If any European thinks he could be more than Nr 2—then Europe is in trouble.

So we Europeans know from our tragic past that any policy claiming: “my country first” will not work for us.

This is why we, in the EU, manage to be a community of equals—even if some of us might be economically or militarily stronger or politically more powerful than others.

This is sometimes hard to sell to others, because it does not match traditional lines of international power policy—but this is what defines the strength of our togetherness.

And more than that:

Just think about it the other way round: Because the EU members as Nation States regard and treat each other as equals, we together, since decades, are trained to cherish and to promote both: unity and diversity. Or, in other words: a high degree of tolerance.

A croissant in France, a cappuccino in Italy and a slivovic in Zagreb or Prague—on this small continent we enjoy diversity and our cultures will never melt into one—and that is good.

Diversity is at the core of our history, culture, arts, languages.

At the same time there is something that strongly unites us. And this goes beyond the joint code of legislation:

It´s our understanding of freedom and of the dignity of every single human being.

And here I´m not talking just about the EU.

Think about the Council of Europe with its 47 Members having established a highly sophisticated and intense human rights protection system.

Or think about those many issues covered by the Human Dimension of the OSCE, setting and observing standards to the freedom of press, for free and fair elections and so on.

The best expression for what I mean I found in the title of a book written by a British author some years ago: “dignity of difference”. (Jonathan Sacks)

Without space for difference and diversity no Europe.

Does this mean that just everything is possible? Not at all: the protection of the dignity of each human and of their freedom is defining the limits of freedom.

Is this undisputed? No, it is not, we all witness intense discussions on the balance between freedom and security and these discussions are important as they show the vitality of our democracies.

An example: Chancellor Merkel, during the pandemic underlined – with a view to the necessity to limit rights and freedoms of the citizens – that the virus was a tough challenge to a democratic society (“das Virus ist eine demokratische Zumutung”).

And in many European countries during the different crises of the last decade political forces gained momentum, who argue for exclusion and a very national way. My country, too, is not immune against this.

Currently an extraordinary exhibition of contemporary art is being put together, to be shown next year in Berlin, Paris and Moscow.

It brings together more than 80 of the most prestigious artists from 35 European countries, including Russians, expressing themselves on Europe under the slogan “Diversity United”. I´m very much looking forward to this big European event that will be part of the Year of Germany in Russia and which fits so well with respecting and promoting cultural diversity being one of the core tasks of the Council of Europe.

So, this was my second answer to the question about Europe being modern:

Our globalized future will ask for a high degree of tolerance across continents and cultures—of tolerance, which has for a long time already been a prerequisite for our European Integration.

VII

Is Europe ready for the globalized future?

Europe as such does not claim to be a world power.

But we do have interest in peace, stability and prosperity in the world.

And the world means: a more and more globalized world, where problems and opportunities can quickly bridge any distance and cross any border.

During the last years we all learned a lot about this. Just a few examples concerning Germany:

When a few years ago Europe had to deal with an enormous influx of migrants a German politician, now President of the Federal Parliament, Wolfgang Schäuble, called this a “rendezvous with globalization”.

Or: Just a decade ago nobody in Germany would have thought that our soldiers would be sent to Western Africa, Mali, training Sahel forces to fight Transnational Terror and trying to stabilize that fragile part of the world.

We have understood that, in the globalized reality, what seemed to be far away has become part of our own national and European security interests.

Currently especially climate change and the pandemic demonstrate that global problems need global solutions.

Europe´s answer can and will not be building a fortress that must be shielded from a dangerous outside-world. We know that our own well-being and security depend on the well- being and security of our neighbors.

Of course, we need a Europe that efficiently protects its external borders, and we are making progress on this. But at the same time we will have to intensify opening up to neighbours and beyond, and look for partnerships with like-mindeds.

And we will do this more and more together as EU, as our national interests become more and more identical with our joint European interests.

The rationale for this is rather clear:

The big geostrategic trends and dynamics shift towards Asia and away from Europe.

And the demographic trends describe shrinking societies in Europe, while those in Asia and Africa are growing.

As a consequence we Europeans have the choice between acting more nationally, each one of us becoming more and more irrelevant or to intensify our unity and thus stay relevant together.

This means for our partners, that relations with us will stay bilateral, but at the same time they will—like it or not—become more European.

VIII

Which future for European-Russian relations?

Having said all this—where does Russia come in? The simple answer is: on almost all of it.

No country can escape two things: its history and its geography.

In this sense we do already live in what was called “one common European house”. Of course, we all make friends outside, seek best possible relations with neighbors. But moving out—that is not a realistic option for any one of us.

So, back to the questions from the very beginning: How do we think it is best to relate to each other? Do we still follow the rules we agreed upon?

How do we solve problems amongst us?

Do we both still wish to build our future together? And: How do we talk about each other?

Each side has to make up its mind.

I see, as a German and European, the following three perspectives:

First:

Concerning those current very political problems, on which we fundamentally disagree, we have to work very seriously on solutions.

Be it the annexation of the Crimea, the Skripal case, the poisoning of Alexej Navalny, the massive hacking attacks on the German Parliament and the OPCW, and so on:

on all of those issues we have very clear EU positions, and with the so-called “Tiergarten- murder” in Berlin some more might follow.

They all concern issues which are essential to the core of our European self: when international law is harshly violated and Human Rights are harshly violated, when rules we all are bound by are violated, we cannot stay indifferent, we speak out.

An EU or Europe being silent or simply tolerating this, would give up its identity.

And this is not an interference into internal affairs:

The Council of Europe and in particular its Convention on Human Rights guarantee access to a European Court to the citizens of all Member States.

On the OSCE side in the Charter of Paris of 1990 all members are bound to commitments like abiding by common standards of human rights, democracy and the rule of law, refraining from the use of force against each other, respecting territorial integrity and adhering to a concept of joint and indivisible security.

Because of these commitments, violations of basic democratic standards or human rights are no longer a purely internal affair of a member country.

These are standards that all European countries signed up to.

Second:

At the same time we have to care about the strategic view on our relations and about areas where we share the interest that cooperation is needed.

Two weeks ago, the EU Delegation and my Embassy organized an expert meeting with the Russian International Affairs Council about this.

Only one single Russian voice pronounced repeatedly a very skeptical position on the future of EU-Russian relations.

All others present, Russians and Europeans, tried to identify areas where and how cooperation could make sense and improve.

Especially on climate change and transnational health we seem to have a common interest in working on common solutions—not to speak about the crises in Libya, Syria, in Ukraine or in the Caucasus, which need pragmatic cooperation and concertation in order to develop solutions.

And about a strategic view on the relations:

From the EU side, there is a strategy and there are intense discussions about it, just a few weeks ago on the level of our Foreign Ministers.

The five principles of this strategy do have a forward-looking approach,

mentioning the possibility of selective engagement on areas of common interest and stating the way out for the toughest of the problems that stand between us, that is Eastern Ukraine and the implementation of the Minsk agreements.

Speaking about the Council of Europe, of which Germany is taking over the chairmanship today, my government worked hard in support of readmitting Russia to the parliamentary Assembly one and a half years ago.

And concerning the OSCE, we very much hope for more Russian engagement.

Currently Russia is in favour of using the OSCE Minsk Group instruments for working on the status of Nagorno Karabakh—but is not willing to advocate OSCE mediation in Belarus—why?

And I would ask about strategies the other way round:

Where is Russia, given all that happened since 2014, with a forward looking strategy on European Affairs?

I think we should continue the discussions on these questions. Our relations do need strategic depth and we should both find consensus on that.

What I would propose is reflecting on kind of a destination map.

To me, there seem to be many good reasons for that—and only very few against.

By the way, given comments I sometimes hear here in Russia about the EU: I´m convinced that a strong and powerful EU is in the long run the best partner Russia can find to cope with the challenges coming up by globalization.

Third:

The people are close to each other.

In my country there is great affection to Russian culture—and the same is the case all over Europe.

We should do our best to intensify contacts.

Let´s see how the people in Russia think about all this:

The last Levada poll dealing with the EU in Russian public opinion in May 2020 asked Russian citizens whether they consider Russia to be a European country. It brought a split result: 45 % answered yes, 44 % no, the others found it difficult to answer.

One other thing emerged from the Levada poll: The EU is seen positively and considered as an attractive place to study, work and live.

When Levada asked where Russians would like to go if they had to move abroad permanently, three EU countries were among the top-5.

The most appreciated qualities of the EU were a high standard of living, stability, democracy and the rule of law.

82 % said that closer relations with the EU would be in Russia’s interest.

I wonder how a poll would look like if the question is asked how far people in Russia feel European and how far “western”—but this could be a good topic for a future lecture.

IX

These were my remarks on “Building Europe´s future”. I gave you my view on different aspects of Europe,

I expressed my hope for Europe being taken here in Russia for what it is, not perfect, but, as many European politicians put it: The best Europe we have ever had.

And I was trying to show how far Russia is part of all this and could or should be in the future. But this is of course for Russians to decide.

So where are we?

Let me end with the title of a book written on a historical topic a few years ago: “un seul lit pour deux reves”—only one bed for two dreams.

We might have different dreams, but waking up we realize each day that we live together and that we better ought to look for harmony in the daily life of our relationship.

From our partner RIAC

Ph.D, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Russian Federation

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EU-Australia Relations: Strategic Security Cooperation

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Over the last decade, security cooperation between Australia and the EU has grown. Increasing security and defence cooperation with governments outside the EU is something that the EU has looked into. Third-country participation in the “Common Security and Defence Policy” CSDP civilian and military crisis management missions and operations, as well as the exchange of sensitive information, are all examples of this.

Australia participates in CSDP missions and exchanges classified information with the EU. This emphasis on ties with other countries is a key aspect of EU Global Strategy, which asks its allies to assist promote the rule-based global order. “External partnerships” must be restructured and the EU must “engage with key partners, likeminded countries, and regional groupings” in order to share this responsibility.

Australia stated that it would work with “like-minded” friends like the European Union to address global concerns. The EU’s security mandate relies heavily on crisis management. For the EU to be seen and effective in managing crises, it must be able to draw in non-EU countries and establish links with them. Third-country participation in CSDP missions and the signing of Framework Participation Agreements on crisis management show how actors outside the EU regard the EU as a crisis management actor and validate the EU’s crisis management function.

The EU’s external measures to safeguard freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, and human rights must have this external validation if they are to gain “credibility and normative significance.” To “strengthen its own ability to bear responsibility and share the cost with security and defence partners,” the EU needs the support of third countries. European Union “strategic autonomy” refers to the EU’s ability to act and collaborate with international and regional partners but also working independently when necessary, according to the EU’s Security and Defence Implementation Plan, published in November 2016. EU credibility is bolstered as a result.

Ad hoc agreements, which took a long time to draft, are now the preferred method of enabling participation, instead of the time-consuming ad hoc agreements that were previously used. Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop announced the beginning of FPA negotiations with EU counterparts, Catherine Ashton, saying that “North Africa & Middle East have highlighted the value in Australia & EU cooperating closely to react to international crises” at the time of the announcement.

The EU and Australia, according to the FPA, share a common understanding of the threats they face and the objectives they should focus on. Australian participation in two CSDP missions has been made possible by this convergence. Some argue whether or not the European Union and Australia see each other as strategic or priority partners in the fight against global and interconnected security threats, as well as whether or not their geographical domains of interests and aims align.

In two CSDP missions, Australia’s involvement has been capped (and duration as with EUCAP Nestor). CSDP military operations are not permitted. EU crisis management will take a new step forward with participation by Australia in a CSDP military mission. The EU CSDP’s military efforts have primarily focused on developing military capabilities or deploying naval forces. As long as EU member states are unwilling to engage in large-scale military operations, this pattern will continue.

A naval operation in the Strait of Hormuz has been proposed recently by the EU as a means of protecting freedom of navigation and calming tensions between Iran and the United States. We could see Australia participating in an EU military operation as this occurs. As seen by its August 2019 decision to join the US-led mission in the Strait of Hormuz, Australia has a strategic interest in maintaining marine flow.

The EU-Australia security partnership is strengthened because to FPA. European Union and Australian cooperation will have a solid foundation thanks to the FPA, which recognizes common interests in international peace and security. Both EUCAP Nestor and EUAM Iraq have involved Australia in crisis management, but more effort is required. Both parties must agree that Australia will be invited to more than just these two missions. The EU’s CSDP missions are strengthened by its partners, who help the EU to be a responsible global actor. However, it also makes it necessary for Australia and the EU to work together more closely to identify common interests on a variety of issues.

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Finnish Plans for an Arctic Railway  –  Geopolitics Are Intervening

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Authors: Juho Kähkönen and Soili Nystén-Haarala*

NATO Applicant Finland is an Arctic Country with No Access to the Arctic Ocean.

Finland, with a land border with Norway, Sweden, and Russia, is sometimes described as an island because it is located on the northern coast of the Gulf of Finland and the eastern coast of the Gulf of Bothnia of the Baltic Sea. The 832-mile border with Russia has gained plenty of attention in the present geopolitical situation. The lifeline from the Baltic Sea to the North Sea goes through the narrow Danish Straits. Finnish cargo is mainly transported to and from the ports of the Baltic Sea. Before the war on Ukraine, Finnish trains ran to the east up to China through Russia.

Access to the Arctic Ocean is limited to the narrow roads through Norway, which are not qualified for the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T), the major European transport corridors. The closest European TEN-T corridor turns west to Sweden at the bottom of the Gulf of Bothnia. Knowing this, it is no wonder that dreams of access to the Arctic Ocean emerge every now and then.

Map of existing infrastructure

Most recently, the idea was embraced  when the government of Juha Sipilä, with Anne Berner as the Minister of Transportation and Communications, was in power (May 2015 – June 2019). Anne Berner negotiated the future of transportation infrastructure and the Arctic Ocean railway with her Nordic colleagues in Norway and Sweden. In the early phases, the regional politicians in Finnish Lapland mostly either supported or adopted a positively curious attitude towards the proposed railway.

Nevertheless, the plan was later buried with both Norwegian and Finnish reports for their respective ministries in 2018. The reports found the plan lacked feasibility because of excessive costs. However, the Regional Council of Lapland still wanted to maintain the option for a railway in their regional plan. This attempt finally failed in 2021, and the plan was officially buried also in Lapland. The discussion on the plan was strongly polarized between the supporters and the opponents.

Vision of Arctic Railway

The way the prospects of the plan were presented reflected the ideas of economic connectivity and interdependence between Europe, Russia, and China – dreams, which after the Russian brutal attack on Ukraine turned out to be built on false perceptions of an economically dependent Russian Bear and an everlasting peace in Europe. Even after the Russian occupation of Crimea in 2014, the future was full of expectations for economic prosperity; the opening of the Northeast Passage shortening the distance between Rotterdam and Shanghai by 26 percent and between Rotterdam and Yokohama by 37 percent. In addition to the railway, there is a plan to build a tunnel from Helsinki to Tallinn under the seabed. The Arctic railway, together with the tunnel, would connect the Asian and European markets through Finland and the melting Northeast Passage.

Chinese funding was sought for both of these mega infrastructure investments in railroad transportation. Chinese investments in Finland, however, have almost all failed, either because of financial difficulties of the Chinese investors or reservations of the Finnish Military and the Ministry of Defense. For some reason, both Chinese and Russian investments in land property often happened to target areas of strategic military importance. Additionally, one of the five options for the Arctic Ocean railway presented in the reports from 2018 was building a connection across the border to the Murman railway connecting Murmansk and St. Petersburg. The connection was not considered dangerous because rails are easy to dismantle, and cyberwar is a more likely prospect than traditional land warfare. However, Russia’s attack on Ukraine has shown that land warfare in Europe has not disappeared, and Russian military forces might arrogantly try to invade the country across the whole 832-mile-long border.

However, the actual opening of the Northeast Passage is, under any circumstances, still far in the future. It is not yet possible to navigate those dangerous waters without the expensive aid of Russian ice-breakers. Furthermore, European politicians turned a blind eye to the growing geopolitical tensions,  for instance, the increasing threat of nuclear weapons in the Kola Peninsula next to Finnish and Norwegian borders. Nevertheless, it is common knowledge that the Arctic and its raw materials are of highly strategic military and economic importance for Russia. Even after the occupation of Crimea in 2014, Arctic cooperation was in the Arctic Council maintained as “the separate island of cooperation” while political tensions between superpowers increased. The Russian attack on Ukraine underlines the political risks associated with the transportation routes through the Russian economic zone. It is no wonder Finland is now applying for NATO membership, and developing the eastern transportation connection is forgotten.

National Interests Suppress Indigenous Rights

The Arctic Railway plan met strong resistance from the Sámi people, the only Indigenous people in Europe. As the supreme political body of the Sámi in Finland, the Sámi Parliament saw the railway as a threat to their culture and the reindeer herding in the heart of their culture. Oddly enough, the resistance and support from such allies as the Greenpeace seemed to come as a surprise to the supporters of the railway in Helsinki.

The region itself has a long history of ignoring the Sámi and seeing them as troublemakers resisting plans to develop the region. The Sámi are a small nation (77 00 – 103 00 depending on calculations) living in the northern areas of Norway, Sweden, Finland, and the Kola Peninsula in Russia. In Finland there are slightly more than 10 000 registered Sámi who vote in the elections of the Sámi Parliament.

Reindeer herding is a livelihood that requires much space as pastureland; reindeer can move freely in forests, which mainly belong to the State in the Finnish Lapland. Reindeers migrate and live with lichen, plants, and mushrooms. These half-tame animals are the property of reindeer herders, which as a profession is not ethnicity-based in Finland. Reindeer herding increasingly competes with other industries and infrastructure building. Reindeer herding is not just a traditional livelihood but also an industry in the market economy. Although the Sámi lives in a modern way in mixed communities, they still have strong kinship ties and an awareness of their own culture, which is distinct from the mainstream culture. The railway building option (Rovaniemi – Kirkenes) the Finnish Government preferred would have crossed the area of several Sámi reindeer herding cooperatives and disconnected the reindeer migration routes. It would have weakened the profitability of reindeer herding, a livelihood that has kept the remote areas of Lapland inhabited.

Throughout history, the Sámi have experienced racism and contempt from the main population. Their languages were not taught at schools before the 1970s. Just like Indigenous children in North America, they were sent to boarding schools, far away from home, to study in Finnish. Their voices were not heard, and their rights were not respected, for example, when the rivers in Lapland were harnessed for waterpower and forests were cut because of national interest after the World War II. Bad treatment has left scars and a considerable mistrust of the state power. The Sámi have fought for their rights in Norway, Sweden, and Finland, however, and have managed to make the state power recognize their rights.

In the new Finnish Constitution of 1994, the Sámi were granted cultural autonomy. A special Homeland Area was established in Upper Lapland. Within this area, the Sámi have the right to education in their own languages and the right to deal with authorities and in courts in their languages. They also have a Sámi Parliament, the representative self-government body, which plans and implements the cultural self-government guaranteed to the Sámi as an Indigenous people. The Sámi Parliament must be consulted when any project in the Homeland might affect their culture.

Reindeer herding and, for example, fishing are recognized as a part of Sámi culture. The duty to negotiation was drafted based on the Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) principle of the ILO Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169). However, the Sámi Parliament and the Finnish government interpret the duty to consult differently way. The Sámi interpret the FPIC as a duty to ask for permission from the Indigenous population. The authorities, who should consult the Sámi, see it as a duty to consult and strive for a jointly agreed decision. If a joint agreement cannot be reached, the authorities can continue with the project. An even bigger problem is that authorities do not always remember to consult the Sámi. The existence of this duty is still relatively unknown, and if we add the earlier ways of conduct to ignorance, it is no wonder that the Sámi are suspicious of the Finnish state.

The Arctic railway plan is a typical example of conflicted relations between the Sámi and Finnish authorities. The sudden appearance of the plan astonished the Sámi and caused anxiety among reindeer herders about the future of their business and livelihood. The state authorities were also surprised by the strong Sámi reactions and emphasized that there was no project yet, only a discussion. The Sámi brought their position to international awareness through various media channels, while the supporters of the railway in Lapland boosted the idea to the EU and in Asia. The plan highlighted a conflict in the four municipalities of the Sámi Homeland Area, where the Sámi, with one exception, form only a minority of the population. The burial of the plan at the governmental level was mainly due to economic reasons, but abolishing the railway from the long-term regional plan can be seen as the victory of the Sámi and reindeer herding.

Is the Plan Actually Buried?

Following the Russian war on Ukraine, the multiple times buried attempt to build a railway from Finland to Norway has gained interest again. Member of Parliament from Lapland Mikko Kärnä brought the Arctic Railway back to the discussion by stressing that Finland would face significant challenges if transportation on the Baltic Sea were disturbed. This viewpoint reflects the understanding of Finland as an “island.” In practice, 80 percent of Finnish foreign trade goes through the Baltic Sea and as the transportation connection in northern Finland is poor, a railway to Norway would strengthen Finnish security of supply.

Soon after this comment, the Parliamentarian Committee on Transportation and Communication organized a visit to northernmost Finland, where the Arctic railway had been planned. The committee chair, MP Suna Kymäläinen explained the reason for the visit telling that Finland had to prepare for the scenario that traffic on the Baltic Sea would decline and analyzed how the export and import would be organized in such a situation. Currently, the roads connecting Finland to Norway are narrow and in poor condition.

The ongoing war reveals how the planned Arctic Railway is not tied only to the melting Arctic Ocean and shipping through the Northeast Passage. Instead, northern connections show how Finland is not an island but how the infrastructure development has focused on southern Finland around the capital for decades. The situation should not surprise anyone in Helsinki, as the authorities and politicians from the north have underlined for decades how weak the infrastructure in the north is and criticized how resources have been mainly used to develop southern infrastructure.

There is only one short rail track on the Finnish side still to be electrified, but the Arctic Ore Railway as well as the port of Narvik already operate at the limit of their capacity. The fact that the Swedish state mining company LKAB is already talking about strengthening the railway might indicate that the state is on board. Renovating the overloaded railway is, however, going to be a long and expensive project. Sweden has gradually built and electrified the railway from Southern Sweden to the Finnish border. The main driver of this project was the needs of the highly developed industry in northern Sweden – at least up till the port of Luleå.

The connection from Luleå to the Finnish border, however, could also have connected Sweden to the Russian market across Finland. Whereas for Finland, this track through Sweden to Narvik harbor, suddenly turned out to be a strategic corridor to the west in case the Baltic Sea corridor would close. As Sweden applied for NATO membership together with Finland, northern connections have a robust defense interest. In case of war, the Norwegian port of Narvik would be a priority to supply resources to the European Arctic. In Norway, a long-time NATO member country, the transport connections to Finland have re-emerged in the defense debate. The new geopolitical reality reveals how the northern connections would be essential for the national security of supply. However, we should not forget the rights of the Sámi people.

Geopolitics Amplify the Clash between National Interest and Sámi Rights

The discussion about the Arctic Railway reflects the polarized relationship between the Sámi and the Finnish authorities. The Sámi feel that they are never safe and that this time, their rights might be sacrificed at the shrine of national safety. Despite the new concerns about the security of supply, the state authorities now seem to take smaller, more realistic steps to improve transportation connections. A connection through the Swedish Ore Railway to Narvik in Norway is now a realistic option.

Perhaps a quicker way to improve access to the Arctic Ocean is to renovate national road 21 (E8) from Tornio to Tromsø harbor in Norway along the Swedish border. The demands to invest in the road, which is in a dangerously poor condition, had not been noticed in Helsinki before the Russian attack on Ukraine. Strengthening the existing infrastructure to the Arctic Ocean is supported in northern Finland. Improving existing roads and railways does not considerably increase the damage to reindeer herding either. The increased needs for security of supply, however, indicate that the rights of the Sámi are not the first priority in national transportation development. The Arctic Railway across the Sámi Homeland is on the agenda again. Strengthening democracy and taking the minorities’ differing worldviews seriously would be a more civilized way of coexisting in the western world and something the Nordic countries could be expected to do better.

*Soili Nystén-Haarala, Professor of Commercial Law, Dean, Faculty of Law, University of Lapland.

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Europe

The War America Is Waging Against Europe

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Europe is more dependent upon Russia for the fuels that heat it in winter, cool it in summer, heat its water year-round, and energize its factories, than is any other part of the world, but heavy pressures from Washington have driven its leaders — most of them (other than Ursula von der Leyen, Robert Habeck, and Annalena Baerbock) very reluctantly — to slash imports of Russian fuels, and to cut them drastically in October, and then eliminate them almost totally soon after that, in December, when the coldest weather will set in. Cutting those fuel-supplies will cause fuel-prices in Europe to soar. This will be nothing less than the planned immiseration of the peoples of Europe, and it has been planned in Washington, and is being carried out by its vassal-heads-of-state in Europe.

All of this is being done in order to punish Russia. Washington is obsessed with its hatred of Russia, and has been ever since 25 July 1945.

Washington’s obsession for regime-change in Russia (i.e., for Washington to control Russia like it does the rest of Europe) will produce an economic crash in Europe, before this year is out.

The inevitability now of that economic crash is the clear message which Jorge Vilches documents in great detail at the Saker Blog, on June 18th, under the headline “No fuels for Europe”, citing as his sources, and linking through to, the Wall Street Journal, Trading Economics, the Washington Post, Lathan & Watkins law firm, Bloomberg News, Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air, the Guardian, CNBC, Fast Company, OilPrice dot com, S&P, and other well known sources, which might not be telling the truth about some other things, but are reporting truthfully about this. The Vilches article leaves little room for doubt that Europe’s leaders have sealed death-warrants for their nations’ economies by complying with Washington’s demands to do what Washington requires them to do in order to defeat Russia. Whether Washington will defeat Russia or not, this is going to destroy Europe. Here is how and why:

It wasn’t mere bravado when Russia’s RT News headlined on June 19th “EU warned of years of high gas prices ahead”, and opened: “Gas prices in the EU will remain high for several more years, Russia’s vice-premier and former energy minister, Aleksander Novak said on Friday, warning of serious problems across Europe when the autumn-winter period starts.” 

This is clearly to be a suffering by the peoples of Europe that’s brought on by the U.S.-stooge leaders of Europe, who follow orders from Washington, far more than they serve the basic needs of their own peopleeven of the people who had voted for them.

Europe has been, not only since the Soviet Union broke up in 1991, but ever since 1945 in its western parts, U.S. vassal-nations. The only significant differences among the main political parties in Europe are the extents to which they adhere to their instructions from Washington.

Europeans will now be experiencing intensifying impoverishment in order for their imperial masters in Washington to be able to turn the screws even tighter against Russia, which they hate so much for not buckling to the empire (as the rest of Europe has done).

This action against Russia is allegedly being carried out because ‘Putin started the war in Ukraine on 24 February 2022.’ But that’s a rabid lie. Obama started the war in Ukraine, in February 2014, to replace Ukraine’s democratically elected and neutralist President, by a rabidly anti-Russian regime that would then quickly proceed to eliminate the people in the parts of Ukraine that had voted overwhelmingly for the Ukrainian leader whom Obama had overthrown (Obama wanted the new, anti-Russian, regime, to be permanent, ‘democratically’ permanent). The coup worked. (The subsequent ethnic cleansing was only partially successful.)

The neoconservative (U.S.-imperialist) American regime did that — transformed Ukraine into Russia’s enemy, on Russia’s very borders. For example: During 2003-2009, only around 20% of Ukrainians had wanted NATO membership, while around 55% opposed it. In 2010, Gallup found that whereas 17% of Ukrainians considered NATO to mean “protection of your country,” 40% said it’s “a threat to your country.” Ukrainians predominantly saw NATO as an enemy, not a friend. But after Obama’s February 2014 Ukrainian coup, “Ukraine’s NATO membership would get 53.4% of the votes, one third of Ukrainians (33.6%) would oppose it.” However, afterward, the support averaged around 45% — still over twice as high as had been the case prior to the coup.

Putin, prior to 24 February 2022, had done all he could, short of invading Obama’s Ukraine, in order to reverse what Obama had done. This was a matter of Russia’s essential national security, in order to prevent U.S. missiles from ultimately becoming placed on Russia’s border, within only a five-minute flying-distance away from hitting Moscow.

The war in Ukraine certainly didn’t start in February 2022. Overtly, it started in February 2014. But, actually, it had started by no later than June 2011, as being in the planning stages by the Obama regime. That’s when what might be WW III started to be planned. We wouldn’t even know about this if Julian Assange had not told us about it.

Cutting-off Russia’s essential fuel-supplies to Europe is merely a continuation of that war, which was already being planned by Obama in Washington, by no later than June 2011. Obama even said in 2014 that Europe is “dispensable.” That’s the attitude of an imperialist, toward a colony (or group of colonies). It’s the attitude of America’s rulers, toward their stooge-regimes. The peoples of Europe are now paying the prices for that, and those prices will be sky-high, as the weather turns cold. Of course, those leaders will be blaming Putin (for what they themselves actually did).

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