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Appeasement Diplomacy in inter war years (1918-1939)

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In International relations, policy of appeasement is a tactic of diplomacy and it means when a state accepts some demands of the other aggressive state that are not to be accepted otherwise, provide them with concessions to pacify and to avoid the conflict through negotiations. Appeasement diplomacy surely has pros but after the failure of Munich Agreement in 1938, the cons of appeasement diplomacy have been increased than its pros. Appeasement diplomacy has strength to prevent any war but history shows us that appeasement diplomacy rarely does. It can be used to pacify the aggression of the other state but on the other hand it can give confidence and courage to other state to increase that aggression. As there is an old saying: “Give them an inch and they’ll take a mile.” Moreover, states can use this as a tactic to buy time as it would allow a state to prepare itself for war that is likely to be conducted in near future. At present, appeasement is considered as a sign of weakness of a state and other states termed it as cowardice act. When an aggressive state doesn’t face any hurdle and restriction in its way, it continues to go in the same way and to maximize itself because it knows that there is no one out there who can challenge my actions. So, appeasement has both pros and cons and it depends on the angle we are observing an event with. For Example: Showing appeasement towards Germany and let it become so powerful was a big mistake by victorious power, according to some strategists. While on the other hand, some believes that it was a good tactic as it provided Britain a good amount of time to prepare itself completely for the war against Germany. Historically, appeasement is referred to the policy of Britain and France in 1930s when they allow Hitler to expand Germany’s power and territory and they didn’t keep check on Germany. Same thing they did to Japan and Italy.  At that time, this policy was popular and looked like a practical one but now it is seen as a weakness in policy. Now, why it was so popular back then; there are several reasons for that. British People and PM Neville Chamberlain wanted to void another destructive and vicious war.

Historical Background:

Following the World War 1, Treaty of Versailles was signed in 1919 in Paris. According to Treaty of Versailles, Germany was the responsible for initiating the World War 1. Some very harsh treatment was given to Germany in the form of loss of territory, demilitarization, and paying the cost of World War 1. Germans resented against this Treaty of Versailles and this resentment and economic sufferings give rise to the ultra-nationalistic sentiments which led towards the dawn of Adolf Hitler and ultimately World War 2. It is important to discuss the terms of Treaty of Versailles in order to understand the appeasement diplomacy in inter war periods. Peace Negotiations were held in Paris and big four leaders from the winning western nations were present in the talks. These leaders include Woodrow Wilson, USA; David George, Great Britain; Georges Clemenceau, France; and Vittorio Orland, Italy. The defeated powers, i.e. Germany, Turkey, Bulgaria, and Austria-Hungary, were not representing themselves in the negotiations in Paris. Big Four had their objectives in the talks: Georges Clemenceau wanted to avoid France from going into another with Germany and also to protect it from any kind of attack from Germany. To refrain Germany from attacking again, he decided to minimize the strength of Germany and for this he demanded heavy repartitions from Germany as it would put Germany in economic crisis and Germany would only fight with the domestic problems. David George wished to see Germany as a trade partner of Britain. Vittorio Orland, on the other hand, wanted to increase the influence of Italy and to transform it into a big power. Woodrow Wilson of USA was against the territorial demands of Italy and he believed to make a new world order that would be in line with his Fourteen Points. But he seemed to be a very idealistic by other leaders as his points were not easy to convert them into policy. At last, under the Treaty of Versailles, Germany was forced by European powers to leave 10% of the territory. Germany was allowed to keep limited nave and army only. German now could not keep an air force. More importantly, Germany, under Article 231 of Treaty of Versailles also known as war guilt clause, was forced to accept the responsibility for initiating World War 1. On Germany side, Hitler had aims to make Germany great again and he wanted to make it a great power. He decided to attain this by destroying the Versailles settlements. He dreamed to build a strong army. He also wanted to regain the territories Germany lost in World War 1 which includes Polish Corridor, the Saar, Alsace-Lorraine that was given to France, and Schleswig. Other than that, he also had aims to gain territories from Poland and Czechoslovakia and wanted to annex Austria.

Phases of appeasement diplomacy:

This appeasement diplomacy can be divided into two phases. Firstly, from 1920s-1937, Britain and France wanted to avoid war at any cost. For this reason, they were accepting the breaches of Treaty of Versailles and they had sealed their lips against the aggressive acts of aggressive power. Examples are reoccupation of the Rhineland and rearmament of Manchuria, Germany and Abyssinia. Secondly, in 1937, when Chamberlain came in power, he actually gave much room to Hitler and he used the track negotiations instead of going towards war or using force.

In 1920s it all started and Britain tried to appease Hitler through Dawes and Young Plans. Locarno treaties were also signed to avoid conflicts; Locarno treaties were signed in 1925 and were actually seven agreements that were negotiated among Britain, Italy, Germany, France and Belgium. Then at Munich, appeasement was at its climax when France and Britain, to stay away from war, gave Germany a gift of Sudetenland and they also remained silent in Czechoslovakia case. Despite doing lot of efforts and giving concessions, this policy of appeasement appeared to be a failure.

Reasons for policy of appeasement:

Firstly, Britain and France had to face a lot of destruction during World War 1 and the next war was believed to be much destructive than before. Britain and France were facing economic crisis and they were not in a position to once again go into war and build their army. This opinion was basically build by the public opinion because people had not forgot the horror memories of World War 1 yet. So, Britain and France thought about accepting the demands of Hitler in order to avoid the Second World War. Secondly, Treaty of Versailles; it was a harsh treatment to Germany as Germany was declared as the reason of war and it had to bear the cost of world war and humiliations. For Britain, this treaty was some kind of injustice and ill treatment towards Germany. Britain showed sympathy towards Germany and Italy and that’s why it gave room to Germany and accepted Hitler’s demands so that it would improve their relations. Thirdly, failure of League of Nations; after WW1, League of Nations was established to maintain peace and stability in the world and to avoid another world war though League of Nations failed to do its job. So, Britain and France believed that we cannot solve disputed by use of force and negotiations are required there. They also wanted to enlighten Mussolini and Hitler so that they would respect and follow international law. For that they do direct negotiations with the leaders and let the Germans do what they wanted to do. Fourthly, fear of communism, communism ideology was started spreading in the world after WW1while western democratic countries were following the capitalism. At that time communism threat was much more dangerous than Hitler, according to some British Conservatives. Britain and France, being a capitalist country, wanted to use Germany and Italy to counter communism in the world. Germany and Italy could go in the camp of communism and to avoid that victorious powers tried their best to not to be strict towards Germany as it could become a buffer in front of communist expansion. Lastly, Britain wanted to let the economy of Germany grow so that it could use its huge market in future and that’s also one of the reasons Britain was ready to accept the demands of Hitler. They thought that growth of Germany’s economy would also decrease the internal violence of Germany.  Other than that, Britain didn’t want too harsh treatment with Germany as it France would be left alone on the continent. To put in another way, Britain was hesitant to see France dominating the European continent alone. So, Britain wanted to keep Germany capable and strong enough so that they could give challenge to France. Apart from that reasons, there was a feeling in the Britain military and politician’s camp that Britain cannot go into a full-scale war and we don’t have enough strength at that time to fight against 2 countries. Britain’s navy that was considered as the strongest threw down their morale that defending Britain Empire against the simultaneous attacks of Japan, Germany and Italy would become far more difficult. France was weak at that time and didn’t want to go in war and US was following the policy of Isolation. Britain PM Chamberlain believed that the longer the appeasement would last, the better it would be for Britain to stand up again.

The Dawes and Young Plan:

After World War I, the relations of Germany and Allies deteriorated due to issues of the reparations and refunding of debts. The victorious countries of the WWI demanded that Germany and its allies should repay the cost of the catastrophes of the conflict. In the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 the European countries and German failed to reach to a conclusion of the amount of payments due to which a Reparation Commission formed to bring a plan acceptable to all. The commission finalized a bill of $31.5 billion but later in 1923 German defaulted and their currency collapsed which standoff the repayments. The U.S was not interested in collecting money from the Germans but more interested in repayment of the $10 billion which U.S had paid during the war time to the Allied powers during war. However, the U.S rejected the call to cancel the debt of the Allies afterward in 1922 London made a statement that the U.K would seek wartime debt repayment from all the European countries equivalent to its U.S debts. In the same year the U.S made a commission to negotiate the debts repayments provided to 17 countries during the wartime.

In 1923 European countries formed a committee headed by Charles G. Dawes to review the situation of German reparations. The Dawes Plan proposed that initially the reparation payment would be reduced and with economic stability the amount would be increased to collect the full amount. The foreign banks will provide a $200 loan to German government while France and Belgium would reorganize the economic policies and evacuate Ruhr to stabilize the economic situation of the country. The U.S banks would provide ample amounts of money to Germans to pay the debts of France and U.K but in return these countries would use money to repay the debts of the U.S.

In 1929 another committee formed to settle the German reparation headed by Owen D. Young which proposed a reduction in the amount to $29 billion and will be paid within 58 years. The loans would float which ultimately led to the end of foreign troop’s supervision in Germany however, the plan is also designed to smooth the way for the reparation payments. But after the great depression the loans to Germans dried up and their economy troubled. In 1931 all the countries paused the collection of debts due to economic depression. After the elections of the Roosevelt, U.K and France drew a link between the war debts and reparations and tried to cancel their debts of the U.S but the U.S did not accept and in 1933 European except Finland defaulted on loans of the U.S.  An important effort was made by the U.S in the shape of Dawes and Young Plan, moreover, after rejection of the Treaty of Versailles and League of Nations by U.S, the Dawes and Young Plan played a pivotal role in reestablishing affairs with European countries.

Munich Agreement:

On September 30, 1938, the annexation of Sudetenland in western Czechoslovakia by Germany was permitted by Great Britain, France, and Italy. This settlement was known by the Munich Agreement. However, the events that led to the agreement are worth mentioning.

Soon after taking of Austria by Germany in 1938, Hitler was eager of taking over Sudetenland, where more than 50 percent of population was of German origin. Hitler discussed with his army head command Wilhelm Keitel about the political and military aspects of “Case Green,” the code name for the predictable takeover of Sudetenland. As agreed, an out of the blue attack would have strong retaliation, hence the decision of diplomatic pressure along with the German political agitation going on in Czechoslovakia since 1933, will create ideal conditions for a military action.

Czechoslovakia was relying on French military assistance, with whom they had alliance along with Soviet Union. Soviet Union also offered their military assistance if the Great Britain and France come to Czechoslovakia’s defense, however, their offer was largely ignored. Meanwhile war mongering speeches were at peak in Germany by Hitler, making war seem inevitable. Both UK and France were reluctant towards defending Czechoslovakia, however, they were anxious to avoid any military confrontation. French announced they were not obliged to go to war for Czechoslovakia under the Franco-Czechoslovak Treaty of alliance of 1924. Equally Britain announced they could not go to war in Czechoslovakia’s defense if the population of Sudetenland were themselves in favor of Hitler.

Seeing no other option, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain insisted to Prague of territorial concessions to Germany of the Sudeten German areas from Czechoslovakia in hopes of avoiding war. Chamberlain insisted Hitler not to go to war and that he will try convincing his cabinet and the French to handover Sudeten German areas of Czechoslovakia to Germany, something which Hitler agreed upon. Though rejected by Prague in the beginning, however, they were forced to accept the condition. However, by September 22, Hitler’s demand became harsher which was rejected by both French and the British, and war came closer than ever.

In hopes of avoiding war at the last hour, Chamberlain proposed a four-power conference, which was agreed by Hitler. Hitler, Chamberlain, Daladier, and Italian dictator Benito Mussolini met in Munich, where it was decided that the Germans would occupied the Sudetenland by October 10, and international commission would be set up to decide about what would happen to other disputed areas. Meanwhile, Czechoslovakia was informed either to submit to the proposal or resist it all alone, having no option, Czechoslovakia submitted to the proposal.

Chamberlain and Hitler also signed a mutual desire to resolve differences through consultation to assure peace before leaving Munich. Chamberlain was given a warm welcome by crowds for securing peace, however, Churchill was not happy about it, saying Chamberlain chose dishonor over war. The Munich Treaty became void after a year when Hitler annexed the remaining of Czechoslovakia and invaded Poland, which initiated the Second World War Even though the Munich Agreement gave some time for the Allies to increase their military preparedness; it did become a motto for its uselessness of appeasing expansionist totalitarian states.

Signs of Appeasement during Interwar periods:

Firstly, Britain did not take any action to have eyes on the German rearmament. Secondly, proper measures and action were not taken when Italy invaded Abyssinia. Apart from that, a naval agreement was also signed between Germany and Britain which was sign of acceptance for German naval rearmament. They signed this agreement and didn’t include Italy and France in consultation. Thirdly, France remained reluctant to mobilize its troops even when Germany reoccupied the Rhineland in March 1936. Hitler played very cleverly and he had offered peace of 25 years to Britain which then became the reason that Britain didn’t back France in most of the situations. Britain was hesitant to see France dominating the European continent alone. So, Britain wanted to keep Germany capable and strong enough so that it could give a challenge to France in the region. Moreover, in Spanish Civil War, Britain and France decided to stay away while Italy and Germany were helping Francisco Franco. Britain officially recognized the Italy’s control of Abyssinia and in return they demanded Italy to bring back its troops that were assisting Francisco Franco in Spanish Civil War. Britain kept and fulfilled its promise while Mussolini failed to complete his side of work. Other than that, observing no strict action against Germany, Hitler went on to demand for Czechoslovakia. It was actually ineffective handling the events from Britain which gave Hitler a confidence to make such wishes. It was a greatest victory of Hitler when Chamberlain followed the appeasement on that issue. If we talk about Czechoslovakia then it was clear that Hitler was going to destroy Czechoslovakia because strategically it was an important location. By controlling the area of Czechoslovakia, Germany would dominate in the central Europe militarily and economically. Secondly, Czechoslovakia was made under the Treaty of Versailles and Hitler had many reservations to it which was also the reason for Hitler going towards Czechoslovakia. Nazi conducted huge protests in the Sudetenland giving the excuse of discrimination towards Sudeten Germans. Clashed started emerging between Germans and Czechs and French and Britain were afraid that it could lead us towards World War 2. To avoid this any length, they persuade Czech and put huge pressure on them to give concessions to Germany and Hitler. At last, it was agreed that Germany can take over Sudeten Germans. After this, Chamberlain had a talk with Hitler to give this offer and Hitler at first accepted it but then in the next meeting which was held at Godesberg he made more demands of taking more territories of Czechoslovakia and instant entrance of troops of Germany into the Sudetenland. Edvard Benes, the then president of Czechoslovakia, didn’t agree to this demand and ordered for the mobilization of his army. Czechs were quite hopeful that they would defend the boundaries of Czechoslovakia with the help of USSR and France against the attacks of Germany and Austria and Hungary. Despite of all the negotiations and agreements, World War 2 broke out in 1939.

Did Appeasement diplomacy become the cause of World War 2?

The answer to this question varies for different historians. Some believed that it was appeasement diplomacy which deteriorated the situation and led us into World War 2. Appeasement policy also became one of the main reasons for the collapse of League of Nations because western democracies couldn’t provide a solid and firm leadership to League of Nations. It also brought Germany, Japan and Italy close to each other and they form Berlin-Rome-Tokyo axis. The concept of balance of power in Europe got disturbed with the emergence of this new alliance. Britain intentions were also not very clear which gave Hitler a trust to attack Poland and with this attack, World War 2 began. To many historians, France and Britain should have stood like a wall in front of Hitler so that Germany could not become so strong. Appeasement diplomacy was encouraging Hitler to do more and go beyond the limits and it was actually appeasement which rose Hitler’s prestige in the eyes of public. When Hitler saw no challenge and no restriction in front of him then he reached out to take huge risks. It could be possible that Hitler was not thinking of waging World War 2, it was the victory at Munich which pushed him to stake on war with Poland. Britain and France, at Munich, had given Hitler a clear idea that they would not go in war with Germany despite Germany is going for more and more. Many historians criticized Chamberlain for not supporting the Czechs at Munich because Poland was even much weaker than Czechoslovakia and Britain and France were not in a position to defend Poland. On the other hand, many defend Chamberlain by saying that what he did at Munich was just to buy time so that Britain would rearm itself for a fight against Hitler. If we see wisely, that actually happened and Britain got a year to rebuild its army for eventual fighting with Germany. John Charmley, a British Historian, wrote in his book about Chamberlain that realistically Chamberlain got stuck and he had no other option but to fulfill the demands of Hitler because there were no alternatives available at that time. Many even think that Chamberlain should be given credit for trying his best to prevent war.

Conclusion:

To conclude the whole discussion, it can be said that Britain adopted this appeasement diplomacy to prevent another full scale war against Germany but it proved to be a disaster for Britain. Hitler found a vacuum and he used it as an advantage and he continued to expand Germany more. We can say that Britain used this tactic to gain more time but had Britain stopped Germany at first place, there would have not been another disastrous and destructive war. Appeasement diplomacy, in the present times, is seemed to be a weaker point of any country and it should be used wisely after doing considerable amount of homework on it repercussions and consequences.

Imaz Tanveer Virk, Student of BS International Relations at National Defence University, Islamabad. He demonstrates keen interest in global politics and Pakistan affairs. He is also a blogger and freelance writer for various online portals.

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Diplomacy

Corona Vaccine: A Diplomatic Tool

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Photo: Xinhua

Covid-19 has exposed the vulnerabilities of prevailing governance set ups but it also brought the bright face of so called failure systems. Covid-19 has hit across the world and damaged political, social and economic life of entire globe but very few of them used their leadership and technical skills to overcome the catastrophe and succeeded. The most victim of covid-19 was china but few western and Asian states also faced the traumatic situation. New Zealand was the first state which declared it corona free zone under the leadership of NZ Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern and later on at somehow china controlled the epidemic spread while Pakistan under the leadership of Imran Khan also used effective Smart lock down policies to save the valuable lives and reduced economic shocks. On contrary to this, the largest democracy India and U.S completely failed to cope up with the situation. During the 2020, major powers like china and Russia provided its medical and technical support to the far distant poor states particularly African and Asian nations and win hearts of the people. Now, 2021 is a year for vaccines and hope of a return to normalcy.

China, the first and foremost state hit by the coronavirus a year ago, just approved its first homegrown vaccine for general use and have endeavors to inoculating 50 million high priority people before early February. According to the centers for disease control and prevention, more than 4.8 million people in the United States have received vaccine dose. In the same way, states like china, Russia and U.S are going to use it a diplomatic tool. Vaccine makers are boosting their productions to produce it on large scale to fulfill the other state’s requirements. Due to outbreak of Covid-19, china had to face the bad music in international affairs but Chinese efforts reflect a desire to revamp its international image.

In May 2020, during a speech Chinese president Xi Jinping positioned Chinese vaccine development and deployment plans as a’’ Public Good ‘’health and further he added that it will be china’s contribution to ensuring vaccine accessibility and affordability in developing countries. In the result of this, Chinese vaccine trials have been conducted in different African, Middle East and Asian states.  The covid-19 pandemic has clearly offered a golden opportunity to china to advance itself as a reliable and inevitable actor of global governance. The Chinese government eventually is going to use vaccine doses as a strategic tool to strengthen their international relationships. A senior researcher for global health at the Washington-based council, Yanzhong huang expressed his views that

‘’The vaccine could be used by an instrument for foreign policy to promote soft power and project international influence’’

The African governments are expressing interests in Chinese vaccine, BBIBP-CorV, developed by the china national pharmaceutical group and china could use vaccine access to bolster economic and political influence in Africa and other regions which are securing enough vaccines. Thus, the vaccine diplomacy would help china to frame itself as the solution to the outbreak rather the cause of it. China’s vaccine diplomacy in Africa serves to be a high reward venture. It sinopharm’s vaccine bore fruits and restores the normalcy of life across the region, china will be praised.  Recently, Sinovac biotech,drug Maker Company based in Beijing, has signed deals with Brazil and Turkey to provide respectively 46 million and 50 million doses. Sinopharm a state owned company is also active to provide the vaccine but deals are less open. China’s global vaccine campaign is in stark contrast to the ‘’America First ‘’ approach which just focuses on vaccinating its own citizens. So, china is in better position to use the vaccine to serve its foreign policy interests. The role of leaders in projecting vaccine as diplomatic tool is vital and Chinese leaders have repeatedly stressed that china’s vaccines are for sharing particularly with the poor nations. It is very evidently that how much china is interesting to build its trust among those states that are part of the development projects like BRI. Most of the countries including Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, Malaysia, Afghanistan and Pakistan are in the priority list. In addition to this, Beijing also offered $ 1 billion dollar loan to Latin America and the Caribbean for access to its corona virus vaccine. Indonesia is another state which received 1.2 million vaccine doses from Chinese pharmaceutical firm Sinovac. Chinese state owned media played very significant role in projecting vaccine a diplomatic tool and showed china as a responsible player leading global efforts to fight the pandemic.

The ambitions of china in projection of soft image are very evident as it wants to realize the world that how much china has capabilities to perform its duties to govern the world affairs. Undoubtedly, the role of Chinese leadership, state owned media and drug maker companies in the pandemic is very influential to shape the pro-Chinese narrative.

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American soft power as an instrument of global hegemony

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Christian Harbulot, director and founder of the Paris School of Economic Warfare, has devoted much of his work to the study of economic warfare and the role it has played in the conflict dynamic of this century. But alongside the economic war, an instrument of similar importance that has allowed the achievement of American hegemony in the so-called multipolar world is certainly soft power.

Posing as the flagship country of free competition, the United States has achieved the best influence operation of the twentieth century. They were able to disguise their economic aggression by calling attention to the denunciation of European colonial empires. This rhetorical trick worked well. The stigmatization of the major ruling powers allowed them to disguise their own conquest initiatives as happened with the colonization of Hawaii. It is in the same spirit that they were able to trivialize their multiple external military interventions for operations to protect their citizens during the crucial period between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

America’s economic soft power was built around this misconception. The United States supported the emancipation of people from colonial oppression and, at the same time, supported the “open door” and free trade. One of their main criticisms of European colonial empires was the privileged exchanges between those empires and their metropolises. The Commonwealth was particularly targeted during the GATT negotiations (1947) and Washington refused to sign the Charter of Havana (1948) which it had desired but which maintained the principle of “imperial preferences” between European countries and their colonies.

By presenting itself as the guarantor of the discourse on free competition and open markets, the United States has built an image of itself as a “justice of the peace” in international trade. This cognitive advantage allowed them to mask their conquest initiatives. The US grip on oil fields in the Middle East and Iran has been the most visible illustration of the US economic war machine. The State Department, intelligence agencies and oil companies have worked together to impose their will on interested countries and potential competitors. The means of action used were often based on the use of force (indirect and then direct participation in armed conflicts in the Middle East, coups d’etat such as the overthrow of Mossadegh in Iran in 1953, destabilization of regimes that supported Arab nationalism.).

The economic soft power of the United States took shape in the aftermath of World War II. Armed with its decisive military superiority, the United States seeks to establish a process of domination in some vital markets. The Marshall Plan planners encouraged European agriculture to buy American soybeans for animal feed. This desire to establish a relationship of dependence on the United States will later spread to other key sectors such as the computer industry and then information technology. Data storage (Big Data) is one of the areas in which the American system is most determined to maintain its primacy and dominance. To “mask” these logic of domination and dependence, the American elites have resorted to two types of action.

1) The formatting of knowledge. Major American universities have gradually imposed their views on how world trade works, taking great care not to talk about geo-economic power struggles. This omission was fraught with consequences as it deprived European elites of a critical view of the nature of American corporate aggression in foreign markets. Academic disciplines such as management sciences or economics have banned any analysis of the phenomenon of economic warfare from their field of vision, which the United States nonetheless practiced with discretion.

2) The capture of knowledge. To avoid being overwhelmed by competing innovation dynamics, the United States has over time developed a very sophisticated monitoring system to identify the sources of innovation in the world in order to contact foreign researchers and engineers as soon as possible and offer them expatriation or financing solutions. through private funds. If this type of knowledge acquisition fails, the use of espionage is not excluded.

3)  Misinformation  and manipulation

The rise to power of the European and Asian economies since the 1970s has forced defenders of American economic interests to adapt their economic warfare techniques to the post-Cold War context. The allies of the main opponents faced before the decisive phase of the emergence of the Chinese economy.

In the 1990s, the United States opened several fronts. The most visible was the economic security policy implemented by Bill Clinton under the pretext that overseas companies were victims of “unfair competition”. Europeans were the first targets. Exposing corruption has become a favorite weapon of US economic diplomacy. But behind this principle there were much more offensive operations. In 1998 the Alcatel group suffered a series of information attacks carried out on the Internet, through media rumors regarding the lack of financial transparency of the general management. This campaign led to the historic fall of a share on the Paris Stock Exchange. To address this question, American industrialists financially supported the creation of NGOs such as Transparency International. These advocates of business moralization stigmatized countries that did not abide by global rules. On the other hand, no subject of this movement was interested in the opacity of the payment methods of the main players of the large auditing firms heavily involved in the signing of large international contracts. The exploitation of a moralizing discourse is now experiencing its operational peak with the extra-territoriality of law.

But the main transformation of American soft power in the last twenty years is the total exploitation of the information society. Everyone remembers the importance of the Echelon system or Snowden’s statements about the size of American espionage through the Internet and social media. By contrast, information warfare techniques applied in economics are still unfamiliar to the general public. The United States is now at war over how to use civil society actors to destabilize or weaken their adversaries.

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Diplomacy

The Modernity of Climate Diplomacy

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Proposition of Modernity

International climate diplomacy may appear to the observer as a newly forged and unknown process compared to other well-established diplomatic affairs. Still as with other diplomatic pursuits of the sovereign state, at its core it must address the need to reach global goals through logical, fair and international legal argument. Given the tremendous scope and complexity of the enterprise this would only be possible through incremental negotiation and compromise among key actors and stakeholders. Incremental progress can only be achieved within a set of global goals, which are designed to codify the relations among states with respect of management and remediation of a new and growing peril – the continuously increasing variability and presence of extreme patterns in global climate.  Although the manifestations of this global peril are predictable their exact occurrences and their magnitudes in our physical reality are chaotic in nature.  This very attribute of the extreme climatic peril makes the propagation of impacts in our economic, financial and social networks highly uncertain and viable to assume the nature of systemic shocks.  The modernity of climate diplomacy is expressed in two proposed aspects of its character.  Firstly, it is presented as a philosophically virtuous policy, fully motivated by the general public good.  Secondly it is presented as the balance of two opposing forces – one of inaction and objection to engagement, and a second of constructive drive to outcomes clearly defined in the best societal interest in its most international scope.  These two forces and the outcomes of their interaction are subject to contagion by the fundamental threat of extreme climate variability.  Their interaction creates uncertainty and volatility of outcomes.  Such attributes are well suited to be reviewed in the mathematical theory of chaotic process.

A Newly Forged Framework

A traditional, well-studied and fundamental diplomatic framework such as the Westphalian system is based on three central propositions. Firstly, international diplomacy has a currency of its own – and this is the power of states.  Secondly, the diplomatic system has a measurable equilibrium among actors, which is achieved with the help of this currency, and this is the balance of power.  The system is highly procedural and not substantive.  Instead of engaging in a clash of ethical and cultural principles, competing actors concern themselves purely in both competing and collaborating in transactions of power, without interference of ideologies.  They will outperform and challenge each other at times and thus create instability and systemic change.  Then through settlement and negotiation the system will return to its equilibrium – the balance of power among sovereign actors.

The propositions of the Westphalian system most closely describe the current diplomatic framework of international security and its arrangements.  It is immediately evident that the Westphalian system of balance of power, and hence of international security, would differ with an effective framework of climate diplomacy in significant and principled manner.  While within the framework of international security, sovereign state power is indeed the currency of balance and stability, the same would not be true within the premises of climate diplomacy.  State power and influence will still allow actors to pursue and accomplish their goals in this field, however it cannot guarantee by itself equilibrium in the task of managing the emerging risk of climate change.  This equilibrium is not found in transactions among states, it is not achieved in gains and losses across the diplomatic table, but it is to be pursued in managing a global, physical threat, which originates not from the actions of a single state, but from the cumulative activity of all human civilization, where certainly not all participants contribute equally.  Fundamentally, unlike in traditional balance of power diplomacy, by projecting state power in international affairs, an actor cannot gain advantage over others. The nature of the threat is such that it depends entirely on geography, locality and physical processes, whose impacts are extremely hard to forecast.  The losses of one state, emanating from the damage of extreme climate, are not the gains of another.  The balance, if at all and if ever achieved is not between states or alliances, but between the whole community of states and a growing global threat. This balance will be evidently expressed in a stable physical and global environment, which allows for the secure and prosperous development of all states and societies. The framework of balance of power diplomacy, even within a multilateral setting, is clearly not appropriately conditioned, or more accurately, it is not adequately equipped to shape and bring about a manageable and survivable balance of the climate threat.

The Philosophy of Public Good

Multilateral diplomacy preserves the same principles as Westphalian system, while the technical setting of the exchange is a forum, transparent to multiple actors, rather than the more traditional one-to-one diplomatic endeavors of sovereign states.  The substance of the process – the currency of the exchange among actors yet remains the power of states.  To create a more effective thought paradigmnew intellectual forces will need to be mobilized to motivate a sense of immediacy and inevitability of desirably positive diplomatic action.  Once this process is awake, however, such forces or streams of thought do not necessarily always need to be in supportive manner of constructive proposition.  They may very well be in opposition to effective action and productive outcomes. In many other areas of social and political life, the original state of public thought and hence of international diplomacy has been that of conservative inaction.  Then in reality and by principles of origin there must be two intellectual and philosophical forces or traditions behind the execution of international climate diplomacy, representing two actual political forces and types of action, those of disruption and balance.

We can trace the philosophical roots of these two forces to ancient Greek philosophical thought. One tradition is of inaction and disengagement; and a second of positive, public good-motivated action.  The philosophical tradition of Epicureanism justifies an absolute materialist view of personal and social life, without a higher and universal set of shared values, without the tenets of common humanism. The pursuit of pleasure, of satisfaction of all material appetites and needs of the individual becomes a primary objective, a primary reason of existence.  Epicureanism is not only an individualistic philosophy, it has a political and social stance.  It sees society as built out of necessity, with individuals striving for success and their existence commandeered by proto Darwinian forces. Furthermore, a political life for the citizenis not needed or desirable.  Privacy, private friendships, and private relationships and contracts rather than social contracts are the desirable mode of social engagement.

In the opposing direction, the Stoic tradition of Greek philosophy can be traced as the force of equilibrium, as the stream of thought which justifies positive, engaged and decisive action.  Stoicism sees order, reason and balance in the world and the cosmos, and these states are definable in precise mathematical terms.  It sees order and reason in a chaotic universe.  Thus, in Stoic thought exists the concept of natural justice.  In a system of balance and order, there must be a force of justice, and this force must be working on the premises of universal humanistic principles.  The supposition is that values of common and cosmopolitan humanity do exist, and they are universal and shared.

A civic and international regime of positive action, of duty and commitment with meaning and purpose of serving the community virtuously is fundamentally existent in Stoic philosophy. A utilitarian streak could add some strength to this stream of thought by defining active climate diplomacy making to be in the best interest of the public good, and hence being perceived as a virtuous act.  Such public perceptions should give public service of this kind additional degree of veracity. The utilitarian aspect comes in the perception of a virtuous policy as always seen to be a just policy.  On an international stage among many actors and under the observant eye of many and various societies of experts just and honest diplomacy acts are always the best policy.  Hence it is always rational and prudent to be honest and just in dealings of international affairs and diplomacy. 

This argument itself exhibits an underlying streak of the Machiavellian tradition, which is not necessarily a disadvantage in this case.  This tradition has been interpreted more often to promote a degree of calculated cynicism.  A closer examination however, may lead to redefine this attitude as practical and working realism, which is effectively conditioned to produce results for the common good of society. The Machiavellian reinforcement of the argument of the benefits of a just and fair climate diplomacy is justified on the premise that these actions are in fact taking place on a stage, and thus political actors are always on display, always being studied and judged by local and foreign societies and groups.  If he were a contemporary of ours, Machiavelli would very likely maintain that on such a stage of the grandest and broadest making, the legitimacy of climate diplomacy can only be derived from its established essence of being a political action designed in the best interest of the whole of the people.  Thus, the process must be perceived as a true instrument for social justice with a highest order of purpose to produce the common good.

These two opposing forces – one of inaction and disengagement, and a second searching for equilibrium in the promise of the public good, which shape the process of climate diplomacy making require a more technical and systemic analysis.  Such analysis is needed to better evaluate the shaping of balance between these forces, to define the constructive and deconstructive tendencies of their interaction. If such exploration contributes to clarity of understanding, to more granular visualization of detail and process, then it would be well worth the investment. The various modern theories of the mathematical sciences are well suited to provide tools and insights to set some foundation for such type of analytical review.

Forces of Mathematical Chaos

Independent and parallel risk factors of economic, security and social nature coexist in physical reality.  At times of smooth and undisturbed operations of the international financial, security and political networks the interdependence between such risk factors does not seem evident.  At such times this interdependence is generally not observed by actors of international diplomacy, simply because it is not a source of systemic tension.  Such interdependence however is revealed at times of extreme and catastrophic events of natural and man-made origin.  At such times of systemic stress networks’ interconnectedness serves as a source for risk contagion and becomes a point of political and public debate and oftentimes contention.

Global crisis such as the current pandemic serve to increase the comprehension of interconnectivity among global actors and nodes.  The speed and magnitude of propagation of political and economic risk across seemingly otherwise independent networks is affected by inherent properties, which facilitate branching and cascading of climate risk into other socio-economic and security forms of risk. Hence to properly design effective diplomatic practice to address such global and agile threat a mechanism and function of solid theoretical nature needs to be developed and formalized. Systemic properties of interconnectedness are key to facilitating the propagation of climate risk across security and socio-economic networks – a process defined as chaotic contagion. Then the task for international diplomacy practitioners and researchers is to understand the properties of interconnectedness of economic, financial, insurance, social networks, such that diplomatic practices, tools and continuous processes are developed and validated.

From first principles of the mathematical theory of chaotic processes one expects that there is order within every seemingly chaotic system. This sense of order is maintained by comprehensive and measurable patterns and rules of behavior of processes and explainable trends in outcomes. The very physical nature of the underlying global peril, and the corresponding diplomatic tasks and actions for states, which arise from this peril, dictate and define the nature of climate diplomacy.  Thus, there are rarely repetitive and regular activities in this sphere of international relations. An international diplomatic system of this nature, a system which can be described as driven by chaotic processes, which govern the interaction among its actors, would be characterized as a complex and dynamic system, with inherent capacities to adapt. Such a framework of diplomacy would be naturally conditioned to perpetuate turbulent and significant changes, much more so, and much more often than a traditional security diplomatic framework.  At the same time such a system is capable to bring order in an irregular environment, all be it, a sense of chaotic order.

Chaotic systems in theoretical sciences are the subject to two contradicting and counter-positioned forces. One force and its characteristic expressions work towards increasing unpredictability, complexity and constant disruption.  The main attribute of these forces of unpredictability is non-linearity of direction.  This is coupled with excessive contagion and propagation of risk and peril, enabled by interconnectedness of nodes, which further brings about systemic uncertainty in general. A second trend and set of systemic attributes balances the chaotic framework by exercising continuous transformation towards self-organization, self-control and innovation towards equilibrium. This vigilance of state of actors and of nodes, combined with diversity of state of the entire system has a positive balancing effect on the most extreme trends of excess shock and of uncertainty of the chaotic framework.

Volatile Outcomes

Compared to traditional security challenges, climate change is a more complex threat – it involves more actors and more nuanced trade-offs.  Still the existing general diplomatic order prevents undesirable collapse of climate diplomacy networks at times of excessive stress and tension.  At its core international diplomacy is as much about statecraft and leadership as it is about institutions and protocols.  The chaotic and uncertain nature of policy moves and of the policy positions of sovereign states provide a clear opportunity for execution of precisely such statecraft by actors with the needed invested interest, resources and capabilities.  A sense of urgency and a sense of pending crisis, which always accompany climate change discussions, would further support actors seeking constructive outcomes.  Once more the need for timeliness – itself the pressing requirements of action in the immediate present, provides another chance to display leadership in diplomatic action. 

At time of severe crisis, as the current experience of the pandemic shows, the first reaction of states was to protect their own borders and to ensure equipment for their own citizens.  This is a rational reaction of self-defense and self-preservation.  However, it is against the norms, treaties and agreements of multi-lateral collaboration, and particularly so within communities and organizations such as the European Union, where such inter-state relations are the ethos and mode of operation.  Furthermore, if the institutional and statist instinct of self-preservation is combined with an identifiable and already existing lack of confidence and suspicion ofmulti-lateral frameworks of collaboration and of treaty making, the effect would be only further disruption and unpredictability.

The same conclusions and experiences are transferable and applicable to the climate risk crisis, which is unfolding at a much slower pace and thus its physical impacts are measurable over longer periods of time.  On the other hand, because of the network and contagion properties between climate risk and socio-economic networks, a propagation of climate risk to these networks is expected to have a much more dramatic and sudden impact.  A most evident case in point is the impact of rising temperatures and draught intensities in the Maghreb and Sahel regions of Africa on armed conflict and thus on population migrations.  Here a gradual and slow unfolding risk factor through propagation and projection into socio-economic realities causes a measurable event of new and completely different nature. 

Such a socio-economic shock is expected to have dual impact on both the philosophical and onthe mathematical theory of chaos planes.  In one of its expressions, the shock will have disruptive and divisive effect on diplomatic networks, triggering state actions of self-insurance and of defending of one’s own interests and assets, which overshadows and takes precedence over existing practices and networks of multi-lateral collaboration.  In the theory of chaos this will be the arrival of a disruptive, unpredictable and turbulent event, which has the potential to change the regime of operation of clearly otherwise independent socio-economic networks.  The duality of expected expression may come in the second phase of self-organizing and remediating action towards achieving equilibrium and balancing out the effects of the initial shock.

This action of self-balance, with a degree of innovation, toward systemic equilibrium may become effective only if it is driven by actors of international diplomacy and presented asa contribution to the common good. On a global scale it is very hard to define the concept of the common good even in areas of international relations, where states have much longer experiences of engagement, of defining norms and treaties, such as security, crisis management and peace keeping. Such a task is further complicated by the general and evident abandonment of the moral vocabulary of the interest of the people and of the common good.International diplomacy such as climate diplomacy would manifests itself in most confident and unequivocal manner when it is executed in the name of the public good.

The predominant methodology of traditional international diplomacy is that of the balance of power,of zero-sum games.  The vision and practice of climate diplomacy must be that of non-zero-sum game, of the alternative – of a positive sum game. At the same time this vision needs to be directed by informed and innovative pragmatism, which evaluates and directs streams of unilateral and collaborative behavior by states on the merits of their outcomes. Such diplomatic action needs to emphasize that false belief leads to failure of reasoning and this in turn may lead to counter-productive unilateral action.Such enlightened pragmatism will need to establish the link between diplomatic action and scientific and statistical facts.  Reality outside and underneath many common perceptions needs to be uncovered.  Policy and diplomacy engagement would become more than a mere accumulation of facts and actions.  At the same time, it is logical to see opposition to climate diplomacy.  In a time of crisis, people retract to basic values and known quantities and entrench to defend them. 

The objective of all diplomatic activity, and that of climate change included, is to achieve its end goals.  This is much more important than the preservation of its virtuous nature, at all time, in all engagements, and among all actors.  It is acceptable that most of the time, on the big scenes of international relations, it is perceived to be virtuous. This is only possible if there is a single or few sovereign authorities behind these endeavors, which will gain from success, and will gain from the public perception of being seen to act in the common good, being directed by virtuous principles of common humanitarian nature.  At times the classical thesis of political morality may prove to be naïve. Then the use of social, economic and environmental justice must be seen to be effective, instrumental and inevitable to balance the unveiling of this naiveté. In the rhetorical tradition we see that it is possible to excuse vices by presenting them as neighboring virtues.  Naivete is one of these a borderline attributes of international climate diplomacy, liable to be interpreted either way, depending on the skill of the actors and the circumstances of the engagement. Despite the perception of naivete, on the technical level, the diplomatic actors will need to feel skillfully the temper of the big stakeholders – the major sovereign powers of the day, almost at once as the diplomatic engagement of the day takes shape.  Then the task of the proponent, of the power behind the constructive engagement is to drive this sentiment, refining the movement of the argument, refining the pace of collaborative and multilateral events.  For the diplomatic engagement to be effective, it needs to constantly evolve and improve.The message of climate diplomacy needs to cover from the deepest and technically most sophisticated argument to the most accessible level of common and simple moral grounds.  Thus, the engagement of climate diplomacy will seamlessly fit into the needed pattern for any relevant audience.  A truly strategic diplomatic engagement would be able to score well and make big gains from small premises.

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